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Robert Millay
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THE
WORKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

DISCOURSES, SERMONS, &c.

BY

FRANCIS PLACER DUNN, M.A.

RECTOR OF RICHMOND,

AND VICAR OF ST. MARY'S, LONDON;

WITH NOTES

AND A HISTORY OF THE

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WORKS

THEOLOGICAL AND APOCRYPHAL

OF THE

ANCIENT BIBLE

AND

THE

NEW

TESTAMENT

WITH

A

CRITICAL

AND

EXPLANATORY

COMMENTARY

ON

THE

OLD

AND

NEW

THE
WORKS,
THEOLOGICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Including some pieces not before printed,

OF

FRANCIS BLACKBURNE, M.A.

LATE RECTOR OF RICHMOND,
AND ARCHDEACON OF CLEVELAND;

With some account

OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF THE AUTHOR, BY HIMSELF,

COMPLETED BY HIS SON

FRANCIS BLACKBURNE, L.L.B.

And illustrated by an Appendix of Original Papers.

IN SEVEN VOLUMES.

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AN
HISTORICAL VIEW
OF THE
CONTROVERSY
CONCERNING
AN INTERMEDIATE STATE
AND
THE SEPARATE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL
BETWEEN
DEATH AND THE GENERAL RESURRECTION,
Deduced from the
Beginning of the PROTESTANT REFORMATION to
the PRESENT TIMES.
WITH
Some Thoughts, in a Prefatory Discourse,
ON THE
Use and Importance of Theological Controversy.

The SECOND EDITION, corrected and greatly enlarged.

Much of the SOUL they talk, but all awry.

MILTON.

[THE SECOND EDITION PRINTED, MDCCLXXII.]

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AMST.

[The second edition printed, MDCCLXXII.]

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ADVERTISEMENT.

IT is not necessary to pretend, that this second edition of the *Historical View*, is occasioned by the rapid sale of the first, or called for by the author's friends, to supply the scarcity of the remaining copies. What reception the former edition met with from the public, the author hath not concerned himself to inquire. After an existence of seven years, it is natural to conclude, the book has submitted to the fate of many others that have not risen above the line of mediocrity, and is gone, εἰς τὸν τοῦτον τοῦ ἔθους; which may be better or worse according as the purchaser or the vender might be disposed to inter it with more or less ceremony.

By one or other of these, complaints were made, that full justice had not been done to some writers of note, who were pointed out to the author, as equally worthy of the attention of the public, with those he had distinguished in his collection. To this remonstrance he gave ear, and determined at length to review such of these as seemed to him more especially

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to deserve the pains; and he hath accordingly selected, for the reader's farther contemplation, some sentiments of *William Tyndall*, *Anthony de Dominis*, and *Thomas White*, the last of whom hath travelled a road, in which, as far as appears to the author, none have gone before him, or followed him.

Perhaps the author might have taken in two or three more of the writers of the last century, had he not thought, that an especial respect was due to some great names, and a portion of compassion to some little ones, whose publications have appeared since the first edition of his book, and the room taken up by these, is just as much as he thought it necessary to employ in the present exhibition.

The importance of the subject hath been so very differently estimated by different writers, that there is no saying under what denomination they who take, what the orthodox call, the wrong side of the question, may now be classed. It is believed, they are yet ranked among heretics and enemies of the church; for though they alledge, that the church has thought proper to expunge an article of religion which anathematised their doctrine, they are still urged with some expressions in the liturgy, importing, that the soul exists in joy and felicity, after being delivered from the

burden of the flesh; and to this the soul-sleepers are reminded, they must have subscribed, (if clerks or graduates) as well as to the thirty-nine articles, and, if I mistake not, a zealous brother (a strenuous adversary to religious curiosity) hath lamented, that the revival of this heresy hath been greatly encouraged, if not wholly occasioned, by the dismissal of the article above mentioned: hence, for ought we know, an additional argument may be formed for enforcing subscription to the present set, as well as a complete justification of those who so vigorously opposed a late petition, praying relief from such subscription.

For an answer to these important considerations, the author is contented to refer the objectors to such of their more benevolent brethren, as are inclined to represent subscription to the thirty-nine articles and the liturgy, as a mere mechanical manœuvre, to which the church and the law may affix what internal character they think fit. Perhaps it may not be impossible to point out subscribers, (strenuous opposers too, of the said petition) who have strayed as far upon paper, from the genuine sense of the articles and the liturgy in other doctrines, sufficiently authenticated by them, as the *soul-sleepers*, so called, have done in supporting their particular opinion.

It ought, however, to be esteemed a great blessing to the literary republic, that liberal minded men of genius, with very different ideas of church-discipline and church-security, have, in their several controversies, entered freely into the merits of the cause in agitation, without too scrupulous a regard to established forms and systems, to which many of them, notwithstanding, profess a most devoted attachment.

The late petitioners may possibly be of opinion, that a little sincerity or consistency in these matters would neither have enfeebled nor disgraced the performances of these learned authors, some of which, in other respects are highly valuable. It is, however, an incident of no small advantage to the cause of truth and religious liberty, that so many considerable writers, should, with their own pens in their own hands, recollect that they are PROTESTANTS, a circumstance that may be easily overlooked, when a gentleman, in a hurry, borrows the pen of my lord's chaplain or secretary.

The author of these papers hath been long used to think, that the cause which the ensuing history will be found to favour, has very visible merits, both in illustrating the real effects of our Redeemer's mission, and in estab-

lishing the authority of the written records of it, against the claims, interpretations, and decrees of popery, which he is for attacking at the very root, without the fear of digging up any plant which *our heavenly Father hath planted*, under whatever specious complexion human traditions may pretend to be of the celestial family.

It should be a maxim of the reformed church of ENGLAND, that the farther she removes from the doctrine and discipline of Rome, the stronger her foundations will be as an evangelical church, and the safer her temporalities, under the protection of her lawful prince. It were to be wished, that she had not one circumstance in her constitution, either borrowed or copied from the creeds, rituals, or ordinances of the popish system. The new testament would supply her with whatever she might want of those kinds, for the faith, the worship, or the government of a christian church.

This indeed, as times go, is but a kind of unclerical wish; and, from the strict conformists to the present theological fashions, may perhaps derive upon the man who avows it, the appellation of AN OVER ZEALOUS PROTESTANT, a term however which comes with no great propriety, as a term of reproof, from a

writer who hath demonstrated upon the most unquestionable evidence, that *every papist is bound by his principles to destroy every protestant, and to break the most solemn covenants he may enter into with people of that denomination, wherever and whenever he may do either with impunity.*

A
PREFATORY DISCOURSE,

CONTAINING

Some Thoughts on the USE and IMPORTANCE of THEOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY.

IF it were to be determined by a general ballot, what particular classes of writers should be condemned to everlasting silence, polemic divines would infallibly be honoured with the first majority.

They would, in the first place, be proscribed by the members of their own faculty, among whom the sedate and orderly sons of discretion, are for ever declaring their aversion to all religious disputation, as dangerous to ecclesiastical foundations, blessing their stars that the repose and emoluments of an establishment, have set them above the temptations of seeking their bread or their fame, out of the beaten track of authorised and orthodox confessions.*

* A certain ingenious writer hath indeed insinuated that some pious fathers would probably exert themselves in this province, "if the drudgery of controversy were not too officiously taken out of their hands." *Moral and Political Dialogues*, p. 75. Does this gentleman mean that these officious drudges should stay for the li-

With these would agree statesmen and politicians, whose plans and enterprizes might be grievously embarrassed by theological disquisition, of which history affords multitudes of examples.*

cense of their pious fathers, as was the case in the reigns of the *James's* and the *Charles's* ? One pious father I could name, who, when these dialogues were published, was still living, an honour and an ornament to the bench he sat upon, not only entertained different sentiments, but nobly published them to the world, in a vigorous and affecting plea for the *Liberty of the Press* at a time when a plan of politics was in contemplation, which some persons, as it is said, have since attempted, and are yet attempting to realize. May we not hope, that he hath left behind him some pious fathers, animated with the same generous sentiments ?

* *Politici qui sæpe dogmata vera à falsis, salubria a noxiis non norunt distinguere, omnia nova suspecta habent* Grot. in *Act.* xvii. 6. Les Princes n'aiment point les grands changemens dans le culte, de peur que leur personne n'en souffre, ou que cela ne soit prejudiciable au government. Voyages de Jaques Massé, ed. 1710, p. 154. A recent instance has shewn, that ministers of princes are liable to these panics as well as their masters, and the expedient they have fallen upon to compose their anxieties, has been a little remarkable, viz. an endeavour to stifle religious controversies by cultivating and encouraging the root from which the greater part of them that are now in bloom, have sprung. With all deference to their superior wisdom, the more hopeful way would have been, to have removed the root into an Italian or a Spanish climate ; it has done mischief enough in this already ; and will probably do more for the care they have taken to preserve it. Surely a statesman of this country must be little better for his experience of the genius of Britons, or his knowledge of their history, who is not aware that all the thunder of ecclesiastical censures, seconded by all the terrors of the secular arm, have never been able to check religious controversy upon English ground. Perhaps there never was more of it than at this present time ; and the method lately taken to check it, will most probably increase it very considerably. The politicians of the last generation wisely gave controversy its free scope, upon a well grounded maxim, that theological disputation seldom or never did any harm to the state, till the state went out of its way to check it. Whenever it has been left to its natural operation, it has fallen quietly asleep without the help of *Poppy* or *Mandragora*, and has seldom been awakened but by the hissing of some of the thirty-nine Hydra-heads, which the

Lawyers, physicians, and philosophers of different classes might perhaps foresee little or no inconvenience in debates, with which their studies and occupations are understood to have so little connection.* The suffrage of these however must of course be conformable to the taste of their clients, patients, and patrons.

politics of the present day are so very fearful of displacing. A learned writer treats the attempts of statesmen and others to check reasonable reformatations in the church, with the severity they deserve. "In this maxim," says he, (viz. that the grand points of christianity ought to be taken as infallible revelations) "all bigotted divines and "free-thinking politicians agree; the one for fear of disturbing the "established religion, the other lest the disturbance should prove "injurious to their administration of Government." Note upon a letter of Bolingbroke to Swift in Pope's works, vol. IX. p. 121. ed. 1753. One would imagine the author of this note would have no objection to the examination, and, if need be, the correction of theological forms and systems. Common fame, however, speaks him to be the same person of whom it is said in another note, that, "he is one of those men who wish to see things continue as they are, "and not, as the saints yearn, to see the rubbish of human ordinances "taken out of the way." [*Moral and Political Dialogues*, p. 295.] Would not some people conclude from hence, that he must either be a bigotted divine, or a free-thinking politician? But consistency is not the vice of these moral and political writers. For, would you believe it? This very man who thus sneers the godly work of reformation, falls foul, in his postscript upon Hume the historian, for, "laying out half of his pains in exposing the absurdities of reformed "religion." Now Hume's pains are chiefly laid out in taxing the reformers themselves with enthusiasm and sedition. And is not this the very objection which this Dialogist and his master have to those, whom he, in derision, calls saints? And will they undertake to shew, that the saints he means go upon worse or other principles, than our first reformers?

* We are told, however, that the catholic physicians of France made the greatest opposition of any others to protestants taking degrees in their faculty after the edict of Nantes. *Comme si la doctrine des Medecins*, says the historian, *avoit de grands interets a demeler avec l'heresie*. Hist. de l'Edit. de Nantes, Liv. vi. p. 271.

On another hand, the professors in polite literature, the connoisseurs in the fine, and the adepts in the finer arts, perfectly shudder at the sight of any thing that has a scholastic or a theological air. The spectres of the indelicate Luther, and the horrid Calvin are ever before their eyes, and the sound of the axes and hammers, wherewith their disciples broke down all the carved work of the mother and mistress of music, painting, and sculpture, is still in their ears; and if future debates should bring on a farther degree of what these zealots called reformation, who can answer that a single Madona of any character might survive the storm?*

In one word, this general disaffection to religious controversy, is so prevalent, that if we believe the monthly writers, who cater for readers of all tastes and complexions, there is not one stomach in a thousand that can digest it. Controversial divinity is accordingly repre-

* Crit. Review for Feb. 1762, p. 133. And for June the same year, p. 460. And Mr. Walpole's anecdotes of painting, vol. III. p. 1. 2. "But it is too much to expect, that our virtuoso and divine [bishop Sprat] should have read Tertullian. These are not times wherein men will have will or leisure to look into those antiquated studies. To be wits and agreeable company, to be poets, to see and understand and write plays, to talk of and to pretend to certain toyish experiments, these are cares of such high concernment, that philology is but pedantry, and polemical divinity, controversies with which we are fatiated." *Stubb's animadversions on the Hist. of the Royal Society*, p. 11.—These indeed are the words of an author highly obnoxious to many of his contemporaries, on account of his indecent acrimony, and extravagant sentiments on different subjects. But the man was no fool, and saw the tendency of that rage for polishing which prevailed in these times, and hath had effects, even in our days, which do not much discredit to his sagacity.

sented in their collections, as stale, insipid, meagre, and nauseous, and, in general, fit for nothing but to be returned upon the hands of those who bring it to market.*

* “There is scarce any species of writing so unprofitable to the public, as polemic divinity.” *Monthly Review for September, 1764*, p. 237. Be it known to the reader, that one of the two controversies which drew this remark from these sentimental critics, was that called the *Bangorian*, in the event of which, the death-stroke was given to the principles of civil and ecclesiastical tyranny, so that they have never since been able to hold up their heads, not even in the shape of an alliance, under which a craftsman of no ordinary skill, hath more lately endeavoured to revive and reinstate them. An ingenious writer, in the *St. James's Chronicle*, Oct. 27, 1764, who styles himself *Hoadleianus*, thus animadvert on this obnoxious passage. “But,” say the Reviewers, “there is nothing more unprofitable than polemical divinity. According to some men’s notion of profit, this assertion may be true. *Vertu et profit ne marchent pas souvent ensemble*. A man is likely to get but very little in these days, who trims his midnight lamp for no other end than the investigation of religious truth, and is known only to the world by an impartial concern to represent and enforce it. The mode of profitable writing is, to compose flattering dedications to proud favourites, or lying eulogiums on prouder prelates; to extol the illegal proceedings of a corrupt court, and the blessed wisdom of those who eased old England of that vast weight of glory and opulence, which would have sunk us in pride, luxury, and distress. But after all, the satisfaction of that virtuous mind, which is open only to truth, and employed with integrity and affection to promote it, is a profit as infinitely superior to all that can be acquired by literary prostitution, as heaven is to hell. And it need not be added, where any rational sense of God, and duty is entertained, that nothing contributes more to knowledge and happiness than free inquiry, and the discussion of religious truths. It is to these alone that PROTESTANTISM owes all her glory, and to these alone she appeals for her immutable triumph and defence.” The political zeal of this writer will be thought to have carried him beyond the bounds of discretion, perhaps of decency. His sentiments however, bating the acrimony of his expression, are just and irrefragable; and I am obliged to produce him, in order to shew, that the author of the *Historical View* is not absolutely singular in his opinion of the usefulness of religious controversy to the cause of religion, vir-

There have been times however when it bore a better character, and found a more equitable and even honourable reception; for what particular services may be understood by the following account of the age of *Thomas Becket*, taken from Mr. *David Hume*, a witness in the present case, to whose competency there lies no objection.

“ The spirit of superstition was so prevalent,
 “ that it infallibly caught every careless rea-
 “ soner, much more every one whose interest,
 “ honour, and ambition were engaged to sup-
 “ port it. All the wretched literature of the
 “ times, was inlisted on that side. Some faint
 “ glimmerings of common sense might some-
 “ times pierce through the thick cloud of ig-
 “ norance, or what was worse, the illusions of
 “ perverted science, which had blotted out the
 “ sun, and enveloped the face of nature. But
 “ those who preserved themselves untainted
 “ from the general contagion, proceeded on no
 “ principles which they could pretend to justi-
 “ fy. They were more beholden to their total

true, and liberty. And I have the more satisfaction in this persuasion, in that when it came to the turn of the *Historical View*, to be reviewed, the critic (the same probably who had exhibited to the public, his own idea of Hoadley's and Jackson's writings) took his *amende honorable*, in a few sarcasms on the author, and some others, without one significant word in vindication of his remark on polemical divinity. Far am I from derogating from the merit of so useful and laudable works as our periodical Reviews. The compilers of them, (if we may believe the preface to Junius's letters published in octavo) are and have been some of the most characteristic names in the kingdom, and indeed some of them likely enough to gibbet such ecclesiastical patriots as Hoadley and Jackson, to the best of their skill and abilities. The Reviewers are indeed a fluctuating corps. A Reviewer of 1764, may not now be in existence.

“ want of instruction, than to their knowledge,
 “ if they still retained some share of under-
 “ standing. Folly was possessed of all the
 “ schools, as well as all the churches, and her
 “ votaries assumed the garb of philosophers,
 “ together with the ensigns of spiritual digni-
 “ ties.”*

To disperse these clouds of folly and superstition, was, I apprehend, from the very nature of the case, the proper work of theological controversy, and this work, history informs us, theological controversy performed. *Roger Bacon* was one of the first who felt the incumbrance of superstition, and the influence it had in controuling all his endeavours to propagate learning and science in various branches. He was accordingly obliged to fight his way through many established follies and absurdities, in order to introduce those amazing plans, which are still doing honour to his name and memory.† ’Tis true, he so far failed, that superstition still kept its ground, and prevented, in a great measure, the raising any superstructures of consequence upon Bacon’s foundations, for full two hundred years. At length arose *Martin Luther*, who confining all his powers to theological controversy, laid bare the superstition of the times to the very root and exposed it in all its deformity, to the view of the whole world. From this period true religion and useful learning sprung up together at a thousand openings, were cherished by the kindly heat of patronage and emulation, and plentifully wa-

* *Hume’s Hist.* vol. I. p. 294. 4to.

† See *Bacon’s* (Roger) article in the *Biogr. Britan. Rem.* (c.)

tered by the free course of rational debate, to which the uncontrouled examination of the scriptures gave the first occasion.*

Mr. Hume indeed hath said elsewhere, that
 “ the spirit of popish superstition was no hin-
 “ drance to the introduction of literature, or
 “ even of liberty.”† But reconcile this who
 can, with what he says p. 286, of the volume
 already cited, viz. “ that the prevailing opini-

* Dr. Middleton is no inconsiderable authority, to our purpose. Speaking of Brutus' and Cicero's correspondence he tells us, that,
 “ As the genuine letters subsisted till the purity of the Latin was lost,
 “ so these remains which are now in our hands, were actually in being
 “ long before that purity revived, being cited by Petrarch, two centu-
 “ ries before the reformation.” Which he consequently considers as
 the epoch whence taste and fine writing began to flourish in Europe.
 Dissert. on these Epist. p. XIV. A book was put into the index
 expurgatorius, anno 1677, with an Appendix, *De abominanda,
 barbarie quæ rem literariam ante LUTHERUM fœdaverat.* See
 the Roman Index of Benedict XIV. published in the year 1758.
 p. 182. at the word MITTERNACHT. An early and valuable
 testimony to the superior learning of the Reformed, was given by
 Francis Baudouin, or Baldwin, in a discourse drawn up by him and
 sent to the King of Spain in 1564, with a view to compose the reli-
 gious feuds in the Netherlands, and to prevail, if possible, for a tole-
 ration of the protestants. This discourse is preserved in the eighth book
 of John Francis Petit's General History of the Netherlands, and the
 passage I refer to, is thus translated by Grimston. “ Moreover we
 “ must in despite of ourselves, confesse, that the greatest and best
 “ wits, and the most learned men maintain their partie, [the Pro-
 “ testant party.] I will not disgrace the others. But if we will lay
 “ aside all favour and affection, we shall find that the most excellent
 “ wits have been, and are of their profession: Yea the restauration
 “ of arts and sciencies, (the which were buried in darknesse) is come
 “ from them. The knowledge of the tongues, especially the Greek
 “ and Hebrew, hath been beautified more by them, than by any
 “ others.” Grimston's Translation of Petit's Hist. p. 364.

† See the masterly letters on Mr. Hume's History, printed for
 Sands and Donaldson at Edinburgh, 1758. Letters IV. and V.

“ ons and sentiments of the age [of Becket]
 “ were matter of principle and conscience.” In
 that case surely, they must continue to keep
 the mind in the darkness and slavery above de-
 scribed, till they were refuted and exploded ;
 and that they never were to any purpose till the
 time of Luther’s reformation. If Mr. Hume
 thinks fit to contradict himself, it is nothing to
 me. There are certain seasons when authors lose
 the sensation of their own prejudices, and then it
 is you may follow them with the greatest safety.
 The passage I have cited from Mr. Hume, con-
 cerns a period of time, when the protestant re-
 formation was out of sight, when Mr. Hume
 perhaps thought not of it ; when the force of
 truth extorted from him a representation, which
 his aversion to our first reformers was not at
 hand to controul.

A more recent critic, who is otherwise dis-
 posed to do our first reformers full justice, seems
 to me to have blamed them in the wrong place,
 by not distinguishing sufficiently between the
 effects of ecclesiastical tyranny, and the effects
 of those controversies to which that gave oc-
 casion.

“ The Calvinistical principles of the Genevan
 “ discipline, he tells us, tended to inspire a per-
 “ secuting spirit: polemical writings conduced
 “ to inflame religious dispositions.*

And is not this equally true of the episcopal
 principles of english discipline, and of the in-
 flammatory polemic writings in our own coun-
 try an hundred years after Calvin was in his

* See the Critical Review for July 1764, art. i. p. 8.

grave ? And were there no improvements going forward during that whole century ? The honest truth is, that these very controversies first struck out, and in due time, perfected those noble and generous principles of religious and civil liberty, which, too probably, without these struggles, or something of the same sort, would hardly have been well understood to this very hour. It is to the controversies about the Geneva-discipline, that we owe the efforts of the excellent Castellio to disgrace the infernal doctrine of punishing heretics capitally. And though it may be said of him, *magnis tamen exiit ausis*, yet did not his documents starve with him,* but being bred up and gradually nourished by certain choice spirits, became strong enough, in the next century, to bring the great patron and practiser of the vile doctrine in our own country, to the block.

Our critic goes on. “ The contest ran high
 “ between the Papist and the Lutherans ; and
 “ the rage of controversy took place of calm
 “ reasoning, candid enquiry, and cool disqui-
 “ sition.”

This is writing backwards. But no matter ; let us attend him. It would be very obliging if this gentleman would inform us where all this calm reasoning, candid enquiry, and cool disquisition were to be found, before the contest between the Papists and the Lutherans commenced. If they had not then existed, the rage of

* Castellio, after his dismissal from Geneva, lived and died at Basil in the utmost poverty. See Bayle's Dictionary.

controversy could not then take place of them. If calmness and candor were then common things in men's disquisitions, in what instance, we request to know, were they superseded by the rage of controversy? When Luther first attacked Indulgences, publickly, by posting up his theses, he declared, that calm reasoning and candid enquiry into the truth, was all he aimed at. To this Maimbourg bears witness, as well as Sleidan and Seckendorf.* And the truth of it is confirmed by the calm and even submissive letters he wrote to the Pope, the Archbishop of Mentz, and the Bishop of Brandenburg. The rage of controversy, it is own-

* Non pas, dit il [i. e. Luther] pour les [Theses] assurer et les soutenir comme veritables, mais seulement pour les examiner (dans une dispute reglee) a fin qu'on pût s'eclaircir de la verite. Maimb. Hist. Luth. liv. 1. p. 31. Sleidan, lib. 1. p. 1, 2. Seckendorf, lib. i. p. 24. How the case stood in Germany before Luther's time, we may learn from the following account. Ante tempora Lutheri, et ipsius quoque ætate, risus paschales a Clericis ita inveci fuerint, ut jocosa adagia, in linguam quasi eorum fuerint conversa. Uti etiam constat universam nationem Germanicam in summis, mediis, infimis, in compositione verborum fuisse impolitam, crudem et agrestem; multaque liberius loqui solitam, quæ hodie in pessime moratis haud ferrentur. De Luthero id exploratum est, adagia ipsius, quæ nobis sæpius joci scurriles esse videntur, non ex quâdam vel levitate, vel scurrilitate, vel neglectâ gravitate profecta esse, sed ex vehementia ejus, et studio planè et perspicuè loquendi: quæ animi adfectiones ori et sermoni ejus ea suggesserunt, quæ ipsi visa sunt, in legentium, præsertim Germanorum suorum animos maxime penetratura. *Hernschmidius de vitâ Lutheri*, p. 119. edit. 1742, a *Georgio Knappio*. Nor was the mild Melancthon uninfected with this common humour of the times. *Non vident isti Asini*, says he, in one place, *apud Hieronymum contra Vigilantium, nullam extare syllabam de Invocatione*. Apolog. Conf. Aug. cap. de *Invoc. Sanct.* And yet these *Asses* were no other than the divines who, under the protection of the Emperor Charles V. drew up a confutation of the Ausburgh Confession. This indecency however, was not peculiar to Germany

ed, began on this occasion, by the fury of Ec-
cius and Prierias : and whatever this learned
critic may think, if these men, and their fel-
lows had not been followed and exposed in their
own way, in all human probability, every ad-
vantage which the writer of this essay himself
ascribes to the protestant reformation, had
been disappointed.

“ But though,” continues our critic, “ the vi-
“ rulence of these disputants retarded, for a
“ time, the progress of arts, sciences, and bel-
“ les lettres, yet some extraordinary geniuses
“ adorned the 15th century, whose enlightened
“ understandings surmounted all obstacles.”

In what one instance, can it be pretended,
that the virulence of these disputants retarded
the progress of arts &c. for a single moment?
Luther himself, at least is innocent of the charge,
who was a connoisseur in music ; not only a

The controversy between *Laurentius Valla* and *Poggius* in *Italy*,
abounds with the most scandalous scurrility. [See the Preface to Re-
vius's notes on *Valla, De Collatione Novi Testamenti.*] *Poggius*
files him, *Ostentator insane, perfide fidei decoctor.* *Valla* returns
him, *Homo tartaræ, Satanae frater, ignis æterni sempiternum pa-
bulum, Italiæ dedecus, sæculi terpitudo, civitotis sterquilinium, &c.*
Varillas says *Valla* led up this fashion of writing, and Mr. Bayle
only confronts him with two writers of nearly the same age, *Vergerius*
and *Petrarch*, and neither of them controvertists in Divinity. [See
Valla's article in Bayle's Dictionary.] But what is most extraor-
dinary, we find even the meek spirited *Erasmus*, who could not away
with *Luther's* acrimony, not only apologising for, but defending the
practice in *Valla*. Here follows part of what he says on the subject.
—*Laurentianum nomen apud omnes qui bonas amant literas, pro
invidioso, gratum et venerandum haberetur: quippe qui studio resti-
tuendæ rei literariæ, partes multo odiosissimas sciens ac prudens sibi
sumpserit. Neque enim non videbat vir acutus, tam inveteratum
morbum non posse sanari, nisi tristibus pharmacis, uisuris et secti-
onibus, idque magno cum dolore plurimorum; neque vero nesciebat,*

performer, but a skilful composer.* And one of his domestic concerts, where Luther himself presides, is the subject of a capital picture by Titian now to be seen in Scotland.† He was also an ingenious designer, of which a remarkable instance is preserved by Sleidan.‡ And, as Dr. Jortin expresses it, sacrificed to the graces in some elegant latin verses ;|| and all this in the midst of the rage and virulence of controversy, of which he bore the greatest burden every way. How many thousand artists and philosophers were there in those days, to

adeo delicatas esse mortalium aures, ut vix etiam inter bonos viros invenias qui verum libenter audiat ; foreque, ut non ii tantum exclamarent *quorum ulcera tetigisset*, verum etiam illi, qui ex alieno malo sibi metum fingerent. Tamen pio quodam calore percitus, nullum laborem, nullam recusavit invidium, modo paucis non ingratis (omnes autem gratos esse oportebat) beneficium suum commendaret.—Jam vero quod quosdam in totum damnavit, [*Laurentius*] quid, obsecro, tam erat necessarium, quam indoctis auctoritatem, hoc, est, *ὅ γὰρ τὴν λεοντίνην* detrudere, ne turbæ imperitorum, pessima pro optimis sequeretur? Quibus in rebus, si quando vir ille videtur nimis exscandescere, non hujus vitio, sed depravatoribus istis erat imputandum. Denique nimio consultius fuerat alieno abuti vitio, quam ob unam maculam a tot commoditatibus alienari. Sunt enim prorsum quædam *αναγκαστικὰ καὶ κακά*, quibus tamen vel sua causa sapientes, abuti consueverunt. Itaque unius, *Laurentii* mordacitas (siquidem ita malant appellare) non paulò plus conduxit rei literariæ quam plurimorum *ineptus candor*, omnia omnium sine delectu mirantium, sibi que, invicem plaudentium, ac mutuum, quod aiunt, scabentium. *Erasm. Epist. Lib. iv. Epist. 7. Ed. Lond. 1642.* where there is more to the same purpose. If Luther had given Erasmus a fee to plead for him on this accusation of virulence, this brief, with a little alteration, would have served the turn.

* Seckendorf, lib. i. p. 21.

† In the collection of the Right Hon. the Earl of Kinnoul at Duplin Castle.

‡ Sleidan. Com. lib. xvi. p. 344. fol.

|| Life of Erasmus, vol. I. p. 126. and see Seckendorf, lib. iii. p. 165, where there are specimens.

whose progress these disputes did not, could not give the least interruption ?

But who, after all, were these extraordinary geniuses, who, in spite of polemic divinity, adorned the 15th century ; will the reader believe that the only instance produced is our SHAKESPEARE ? who was not born till half of the 16th century was run out ? With the like want of precision are Bacon, Raphael, and Holbein referred by this writer to one and the same period ; and the pleasantry of it is, that such men as Shakespeare and Holbein should have obstacles thrown in their way by polemic divinity.

Many others of the same cast with our critic have retailed these random censures on the theological controversy, against whom however we can appeal to writers of the first eminence, who have had the candour and the conscience to acknowledge that science and literature are indebted to it for some of their most valuable improvements. “ But then, say our contemporaries, it was but in the way of scaffolding ; “ which, the building being so far advanced, “ may be spared, and the finishings executed “ to better advantage without it.”

All in good time. Are you sure that science and literature, in their present state, may not still be beholden to theological disquisition, even in the inferior province of scaffolding ? There may be some insignificant sorts of literature, the farther improvement of which would not quit the cost : and it would be absurd to say that theology, as a science, hath a necessary or immediate connexion with all other branches of learning of more importance. What I plead

is this. While debate and examination are allowed and countenanced in matters of religion, which is of the highest concern, there would be no danger that the door should be shut against disquisitions of another nature and tendency. But if the popular religion should once be settled into an uncontrollable form, consider the consequence. System, whether composed of popish or protestant materials, is system still; the child of pride and avarice, and the fondling of tyrants, hypocrites and bigots. By these science and literature of all kinds have ever been suspected, as unfavourable to orthodox foundations. Who knows what the sons of genius may strike out in our own, or in future times? Would you put it in the power of those who patronize the system in vogue, to check these efforts by the narrow bounds they are disposed to prescribe? Be provident therefore, if you will not be grateful. Encourage examination and rational debate for your own sakes. Keep open the door for others that it may not be shut against yourselves.*

* “ Learning owes its flourishing state to the press, and as any
 “ branch of learning may chance to be connected with some scheme
 “ of policy, the restraints of a licence or imprimatur, would cramp
 “ and fetter ingenious minds to such a degree, that they would com-
 “ pose themselves to rest, and have learned and curious disquisitions,
 “ for such puerilities in literature as cannot offend.” *Essay on the
 liberty of the press*, p. 40. Nothing can be more judicious than
 Mrs. Macaulay’s reflection on the conduct of Charles 1st’s parlia-
 ment of 1628, in taking cognisance of the religious disputes then on
 foot. Had they, instead of vindicating the narrow system of the
 English confession, supposed by them to be the established doctrine
 of the church, employed their theological talents in the discussion of
 the principles of religious liberty, they would have shewn themselves

“ But modern controversy is dull, trifling,
 “ unimportant, and insipid; and what is still

“ possessed of an essential qualification necessary to form able legis-
 “ lators.” She observes, however, that they entered upon this pro-
 vince, “to serve the best purposes,” namely, to discourage the en-
 croachments of superstition on the civil rights of mankind. “Modes
 “ of faith,” says this valuable historian, “powerfully operate on every
 “ government; and the ecclesiastical constitution of a country has an
 “ irresistible influence on the political. We must consider, there-
 “ fore, these illustrious patriots as combating errors, which, however
 “ trivial they may appear on a slight view, yet carried with them
 “ alarming consequences to liberty.” Hist. of England, vol. ii.
 4to. p. 57. / Sensible of all this, archbishop Laud, by a declaration
 he procured to be prefixed to the thirty-nine articles, attempted to
 silence the theological disputes between the calvinists and arminians,
 so far at least, that the former might draw no aid from their princi-
 ples of religion to contravene his master’s attempts on the civil liber-
 ties of his people. I cannot indeed agree with Mrs. Macaulay,
 that “the essential points of faith in arminianism, had nothing in
 “ them repugnant” [or those of puritanism, nothing in them favour-
 able] “to the freedom of the English constitution.” This, how-
 ever, is not material to the point. I would illustrate by her just re-
 flection on the general conduct of the parliament, and their patriotic
 intention. And to justify these it was sufficient, that the arminians
 “were studiously bent to exalt the power of churchmen, and were
 “ wedded to those forms and ceremonies that degrade the pure spirit
 “ of religion, into an idolatrous worship of the objects of sense, &c.”
 But to combat these evils with success and effect, it was perhaps ne-
 cessary for the patriots, occasionally “to metamorphose themselves
 “ into mere gown-men;” and indeed would have been necessary,
 in whatever way they had undertaken to beat down the usurpati-
 ons of church-power, and the pernicious influence of the superstition
 then encouraged. Would to God we had seen more of these mere
 gown-men, in these latter times, capable and willing to examine, in
 the same department, into the principles on which such laws as the
 last act of uniformity are founded. It is for want of such mere
 gown-men in parliament, from time to time, that Mrs. Macaulay
 has occasion to observe, “that the most obnoxious of those ceremo-
 “ nies which Laud so childishly insisted on, were established at the
 “ restoration, and have been ever since regularly practised in the
 “ church.” Vol. iv. p. 144. Another sort of gown-men indeed
 have arisen more lately, who have declared it criminal to revile [in
 plain English, to find fault with] those institutions, with which the

“ worse, carried on with a rudeness and acrimony highly offensive to politeness and sometimes to common decency; and particularly scandalising in the clerical order, where the greatest number of polemic writers are to be found.”

But who are the greatest sufferers by dull, trifling, insipid performances? Surely either the authors, or the retailers of them; but most commonly the former. And would you envy such men the privilege of gratifying their vanity, at a sort of expence which of all others

honest and illustrious patriots of 1628, made so free; and to clench the matter, have added to this decision, the comfortable doctrine that they are irrevocably bound upon us to the end of time.

* * Since this note was written, we have heard this doctrine exploded in the honourable house of commons, both by the friends and opponents of a late petition for relief in the matter of subscription, &c. But the friends of christian liberty have heard more. They have heard their cause supported in that honourable assembly, with powers of reasoning, and a comprehension of the full merits of it, which would have done honour to the patriots of any period of our history, and with a liberality of sentiment, which sets them far above the character of mere gown-men, whether we consider the narrowness of the systematic trammels, or the precise scholastic mood and figure in which the gown-men of the last generation were trained to their exercises. Nor do I mean to detract from the worth or abilities of those gentlemen by whom the petition had the misfortune to be opposed and rejected. The case was new to them; and it is hardly possible that the clamours, abuse, and misrepresentation of violent and prejudiced men without doors, should leave even very ingenuous minds without some degree of prepossession against a cause and its abettors, which was every where spoken against. The cause however is now before the public, and it is to be supposed, in a different light from that in which it first appeared. Farther discussion will give it still more strength and credit; and the petitioners have every thing to hope in a future trial, from the judgment, candour, and piety of those to whom, under God, they commit their cause, and from the evidence they have given of the simplicity and godly sincerity of their own upright intentions.

brings them the soonest to repentance? Is there any fear that capable and judicious readers should overrate such writers? And have not others as much right to indulge their taste as you or I? In the mean time there are writers in the same province of real merit. Let all of them have a fair trial, and a candid hearing, and proscribe the blockheads as soon as you will.*

The wrath, acrimony, insolence, and dogmatic spirit of some controversial writings are, we own, indefensible. They are not pardonable in those who have the best cause in the world, and are in other respects, the ablest defenders of it. Nevertheless, these are, in some instances, necessary evils; in others they will admit of extenuation. In some men an eager spirit is the fault of constitution. From others, even good men, angry or satirical expressions may be forced by just provocation. “If any
“where (says one of our great grandfathers) I
“have used more sharpness than is pleasing to
“men who would have all polemical writings
“managed without passion, I shall only say,

* The critics, however, would have but an indifferent time of it in attempting this proscription. The blockheads are a powerful party, and in nine instances in ten, have the *junctas phalanges* on their side, especially in theological controversy. Mr. Le Clerc has endeavoured to furnish the critics with a criterion in this difficult province. *Parrhasiana*, Tom. ii. article 1. And tells us in another place, that, “he has there said enough to distinguish controversies
“which are useful from those which are not.” *Bibl. Choisie*, Tom. iii. p. 195. The consequence was, that the blockheads proscribed Mr. Le Clerc in their turn, and by their prolocutor Cave, declared him an enemy to christian divines. *Parrhas*, Tom. i. art. 10. To which an old nonjuror in one of our universities, added his suffrage, that the said Le Clerc deserved no mercy.

“ that the Dr’s (Heylin’s) hard grating, hath
 “ sharpened my style, and made it more keen
 “ and piercing, than I could have allowed
 “ myself to use towards a good-natured adver-
 “ sary. It is almost morally impossible for
 “ him, who contends with a fiery and furious
 “ antagonist, not to be sometimes a little over-
 “ heated.” If the hands of every writer were
 to be tied, who does not keep within the strict
 bounds of christian moderation and lenity, I
 know some individuals of other classes, who
 would be as impatient under the restraint as
 any divine of them all. And why should di-
 vines be obliged to set an example, which wri-
 ters on other subjects are not obliged to follow?

Mr. Bayle, in one of his fits of candour, finds
 fault with Mr. Claude for saying, in excuse of
 Luther’s intemperate style, that, “ perhaps
 “ there was some particular necessity, at the
 “ time of the reformation, to employ the strong-
 “ est expressions to awaken men from that
 “ profound slumber, in which they had lain
 “ so long.” Whereupon Mr. Bayle observes
 that, “ because God is pleased sometimes to
 “ make use of such instruments, it will not fol-
 “ low that violence and passion are commend-
 “ able, upon pretence that the corruption of
 “ the world needs the harshest treatment.” *
 I apprehend Mr. Claude did not think of com-
 mending Luther’s passion and violence; on
 the contrary, he wishes he had been more tem-
 perate in his writings. So do I, if his intem-
 perance, upon any occasion, led him into ca-
 lumny or falsehood; which however in descend-

* Bayle’s Dict. Luther. [T]

ing to particular instances, would bear a dispute.* For the rest, if the times wanted Luther, they wanted him with all his appurtenances; nor could his zeal, or what is called his intemperance, have been spared, without wanting the reformation too. †

* For instance, where he says Jerom Aleander was born a Jew. Others had said so before Luther; and though Aleander, in refuting this imputation, insisted upon being descended from the Marquisses of Istria, yet it was said, that family knew nothing of him; and Mr. Bayle himself is obliged to leave the matter in uncertainty. Dict. Aleander [G].

† Melchior Adam, having insinuated that Luther might have made greater proficiency in his youthful studies than he did, if he had met with proper masters, adds, *et fortassis ad leniendam vehementiam naturæ, mitiora studia veræ philosophiæ, et cura formandæ orationis profuissent*. Vit. Luth. p. 102. Luther studied the scriptures with the utmost attention and assiduity, and wanted no helps to understand them, which the age afforded. If this study could not correct any blameable vehemence in Luther's nature, what true philosophy might that be, which would have done the business more effectually? With respect to the event, it was much better as it was. How fit a more temperate and polite scholar would have been for the work Luther went through, may be conjectured by considering the conduct of Erasmus, who, with all Luther's convictions upon his mind, could never bring himself nearer a reformation than some satirical strokes upon the stupidity and impostures of monkery, severe enough indeed in some instances, but of no great significance from the pen of such a writer, who idolized the pope and the great churchmen of his time, the patrons and upholders of every religious abuse and corruption, with the most abject adulation. He would have had Luther to have followed his example in this. *Admonui, [Lutherum] ut parceret romano pontifici, cujus auctoritatem expedit haberi sacrosanctam, parceret principum celsitudini, qui conviciis attacti, aut intempestivius admoniti, non solum non redduntur meliores, sed exacerbati perniciosas aliquoties excitant tempestates, sit que ut et monitori sua pereat autoritas, interdum et vita, et monito suus fructus. Siquidem ut veritati nunquam fas est adversari, ita celare nonnunquam expedit in loco. Semper autem plurimum refert quam in tempore, quam commode et attemperate eam proferas. Quædam inter se fatentur theologi, quæ vulgo non expediat efferri. Et sæpe sanat admonitio tempestiva, blanda ac*

But every intemperate writer is not a Luther, nor intituled to the same allowances. Let us

civilis, quos perderet sæva et intempestiva objurgatio, Epist. *Laur. Campegio*. an. 1520. Erasmus, no doubt, thought these very wise maxims, and we must suppose he practised accordingly. But unfortunately he had none of those fruits to shew, which should have been brought forth by his civil blandishments of the pope and other potentates of his time. And as Luther had the cool and barren endeavours of Erasmus before him to profit by, he wisely went to work another way, and succeeded. Melancthon, in his funeral oration for Luther, [apud Seckendorf, Lib. iii. p. 649,] mentions, that Erasmus often said, *Deus dedit huic postremæ ætati, propter morborum magnitudinem, acrem medicum*, meaning Luther. The orator did not wrong Erasmus. He had the same sentiment under Erasmus's own hand. *Plane, ne dicam dolo, sic undique corrupti mores christianorum, flagitabant immitem aliquem castigatorem*, Epist. 3. Lib. xix. Edit. Lond. 1642, col. 817. Here we see Erasmus does not qualify his sentiment even with Mr. Claude's *perhaps*. We see likewise, that the corruption of the world, in those days, was more than a pretence, and though passion and violence are not commendable in themselves, yet being used as instruments of reformation in the hand of Providence, with good effect, they deserve at least a more commendable name. Our countryman, John Milton, was full as good a judge of these matters as Mr. Bayle. Here follows his apology for Luther's acrimony. Having mentioned some instances of prophetic severity from the scriptures, he goes on thus:—"But
 " ye will say, these had immediate warrant from God to be thus bitter, and I say, so much the plainlier it is proved, that there may
 " be a sanctified bitterness against the enemies of truth. Yet that
 " ye may not think inspiration only the warrant thereof, but that it
 " is, as any other virtue, of moral and general observation, the example of Luther may stand for all; whom God made choice of
 " before others, to be of highest eminence and power in reforming
 " the church; who, not of revelation, but of judgment, writ so vehemently against the chief defenders of old untruths in the Romish
 " church, that his own friends and favourers were many times offended with the fierceness of his spirit. Yet he being cited before
 " Charles V. to answer for his books, and having divided them into
 " three sorts, whereof one was of those which he had sharply written, refused, though upon deliberation given him, to retract or unsay
 " any word therein, as we may read in Sleidan. Yea, he defends
 " his eagerness, as being of an ardent spirit, and one who could not
 " write in a dull stile; and affirmed, he thought it God's will to have

therefore freely consign all passionate polemics to those officers of justice in the republic of

“ the inventions of men thus laid open, seeing that matters quietly
 “ handled, were quickly forgot. And herewithal, how useful and
 “ available God had made this tart rhetoric in the churches cause, he of-
 “ ten found by his own experience. For when he betook himself to le-
 “ nity, and moderation, as they call it, he reaped nothing but con-
 “ tempt, both from *Cajetan* and *Erasmus*, from *Cochlæus*, from *Eccius*
 “ and others ; infomuch, that blaming his friends who had so coun-
 “ selled him, he resolved never to run into the like error. If at
 “ other times he seem to excuse his own vehemence, as more than
 “ what was meet, I have not examined through his work, to know
 “ how far he gave way to his own fervent mind. It shall suffice
 “ me to look to mine own.” [Vid. Milton’s Prose Works, Folio,
 Edit. 1697. p. 340.] And indeed Milton here only brings the ex-
 ample of Luther to justify the liberty he had taken with the prelatic
 advocates of that time, whom he represents as “ notorious enemies
 “ to truth, and their countries peace,” (in the very same colours in
 which Luther had painted his Romish adversaries) and consequently,
 to be handled with a rougher accent, &c. Without looking for
 minute resemblances, and stating the precise differences between the
 present and preceding men and times, we daily hear complaints, on
 the one hand, of errors, corruptions, and glaring incongruities in our
 ecclesiastical establishment ; and on the other, of the acrimony with
 which these things are exposed, and the bitter reproofs given to those
 men who defend, palliate, and support them. In the mean while,
 the haughty churchmen make reprisals, neither with more decency,
 nor with equal reason. The most rude abuse of a dissenter from the
 established system, is, in a Divinity Professor, official ; in a digni-
 tary fattened with the sops of the church, justice and honour. At
 all this, those good souls, who

“ would all were well, so ’twere not long of them,”
 are grievously scandalized, but take care, however, to balance to-
 wards the surer side ; praising the mild and moderate spirit of church
 governors for—not exercising the powers (which, thanks to the
 civil part of our constitution, they have not) against intrepid and pre-
 cipitant champions for the dissenters ; one of whom, I trow, did not
 conclude with precipitation, that a discourse which came forth with
 the ensigns of authority in its front, was expressive of the genuine
 sense and spirit of our church establishment ; especially unapprised,
 as he seems to have been, that the discourse itself might not be ex-
 pressive either of the sense or spirit of that respectable individual from
 whom the tyrant, formality, wrested those ensigns. When such dis-

letters, who, to give them their due, are not slack in bringing offenders of this kind to condign punishment.

After all, may there not be a little affectation in this general clamour against warm and satirical disputants? Is human nature so totally mortified in all those who pretend to be scandalized at this way of managing controversy, that they immediately throw by every book which has any sprinklings of attic salt, or even of Roman wormwood? I once knew a very great and good man who was ingenuous enough to acknowledge, he had greatly profited by some books in which he should hardly have read three pages, if they had not been enlivened by a sort of spirit by no means allied to christian meekness.

But the most provoking circumstance in this case is, that numbers of writers complain of this offensive acrimony in others, who are

courses as that of Dr. Balguy, which ascribes so much to mere human institutions, at the expence of the instruction afforded us by the scriptures, are published in a country where the protestant religion is openly professed,—when a writer, who is acknowledged to be a resolute maintainer of the grand principle which gave birth to the reformation, and to which our church still professes to adhere, is, upon that very account, most bitterly reproached, as her declared adversary, what would the ingenious *Tyro-Phileleutherus* have a man who is desirous of preserving the protestant religion in its native simplicity, say to the reproachers? He himself may, if he chuses it, pay them the compliment of a mild and moderate spirit, and try to worm himself, and his own pacific pleas for reformation, out of the reach of their petulant censures; but let him not be forward to blame those as too peremptory and acrimonious, who cannot see any thing in those censures, but a Pharisaical obstinacy in precluding all inquiry into the abuses, corruptions, and absurdities of the reigning system, and who, in consequence of so seeing, exhibit the censurers with their proper insignia.

much less faulty than themselves.* These should never be looked upon in any other light, than as seeking apologies for indulging their own licentious genius, at the expence of much better men than themselves, who never gave them the least pretence for retaliations of this kind: of which some very striking examples might be produced.

Perhaps, if one were to inquire strictly into the causes why certain rescripts, of no small intrinsic merit, and on no trifling subjects, have met with so cool a reception in the world, it would be found that the gentle, modest, and pacific manner, in which the authors of them have delivered their sentiments, has contributed more than any thing else to their being so little regarded.† And this I take to have

* “ He (Voltaire) is always talking of reason, humanity, forbearance, and mildness: he is always lamenting the indecent quarrels and animosities that prevail too much among men of learning; and perhaps no man living acts more in opposition to these pompous professions. He has composed an agreeable and witty chapter concerning printed lies; and no author certainly hath printed more than he himself.” Annual Register, 1762, p. 50. Think not reader, I have gone to France for want of examples at home. They were bold britons who gave occasion to the poet to remark,

That, Candour's maxims flow from Rancour's throat.

Nor has any man been louder in his complaints of this sort, than the most abusive writer of our own times and country.

† A pregnant instance of this, is the book called *Free and candid Disquisitions relating to the church of England, &c.* to which the greatest objection with some persons was, the humble and submissive terms in which the authors of that work delivered their sentiments and proposals, called by some people, *cant* and *whining*. Thus it was of old, and thus it is still. There are subjects of the utmost importance to the credit and advancement of true religion, to which, whether they who handle them *pipe* or *mourn*, the men of *this* generation will pay no attention. *Whereunto shall they be likened?*

been the case with that particular question, on which the ensuing papers are employed. The learned bishop of Carlisle's appendix to his *Considerations*, &c. is so drawn up, as not to give the least affront either to those who hold the contrary doctrine upon the credit of the church, or to any particular writer who hath explained his own sense of the matter to the public. Mr. Peckard's first and second observations, as well as his answer to Mr. Fleming, are patterns of politeness and moderation, as well as of solid reasoning and good sense. Yet have both these writers been treated by their opponents with some rudeness, attended with invidious and groundless insinuations. And though their adversaries are, upon this subject at least, the weakest of all weak writers, yet have they, to all outward appearance, carried their point; the generality of popular speakers or writers, who have occasion to touch upon the future condition of the human soul, adhering still to the system of a conscious intermediate state, resting, as they would have it believed, upon the complicated evidence of scripture and philosophy.

I remember a remark somewhere, that the generality of readers, when they meet with a writer of controversy who keeps within the bounds of moderation and civility, and more particularly if he expresses the least diffidence with respect to any part of his argument, presently conclude, that such a man does not interest himself greatly for the truth of his cause, and that consequently the matter in debate is of no especial importance.

Whether for this, or for some other reason,

there is room to believe that this is the judgment that is most commonly formed of the dispute concerning the intermediate state of man between death and the resurrection. It is supposed to be a matter of indifference to christians who believe a resurrection of the dead, and a final judgment, in what condition the man, or the soul, after the death of the body, remains, during the interval.

In order therefore to shew the slender foundation there is for a prejudice of this sort, it will be necessary once more to state the case, and to examine what pretensions this question may have to the attention of the serious, dispassionate, and reasonable part of mankind?

The question is, whether the scriptures afford any just and solid grounds for the popular doctrine of the immortality of the soul of man, and particularly, any evidence of its existence, when disunited from the body, in a state of conscious perception; and whether, in consequence of this notion, there is not a certain intermediate state of happiness and misery for good and wicked men respectively, between death and the general resurrection?

They who hold the negative in these points, alledge, that according to the scriptures, life and immortality were brought to light by the gospel of Christ, in a sense exclusive of all other teachers, and all other revelation, at least from the birth of Moses downwards; exclusive likewise of all information from the light of nature, or the result of philosophical disquisition on the substance or qualities of the human soul. They insist that Christ is *the way, the truth, and the life*, so that no man *cometh to the father* [so

as to be *like him*, and to see him as he is in a future state] but by the mediatorial power of Christ. That the way of *coming to God*, in the sense, and by the means abovementioned, is the resurrection of the dead of which, assurance is given unto all men, by the resurrection of JESUS. They hold moreover, that the sentence pronounced upon our first parents, imported a total deprivation of life, without any reserve or saving to the life of the soul ;* and consequently that eternal life, or a restoration and redemption from the consequences of this sentence, was effected for, revealed, consigned, and insured to man, in and through Christ, and will be accomplished in no other way than that spoken of by Christ and his apostles, who have left no room to conclude that there is a separate or intermediate life for the soul, when disunited from the body.

* The distinction between the life of Adam's soul and the life of his body, seems to have risen from, or at least to have been greatly encouraged by, a blunder of *Philo Judæus*, in a passage quoted, and praised by *Grotius* on Luke iii. 38. The Syriac and Arabic translators of the new testament having had some scruples, as *Grotius* supposed, lest Adam should be understood to be *ex divinâ substantiâ genitus*, did not call him the son of God in the terms they had used to denominate the other descendants of Adam respectively, but had only said of him, *qui ex Deo est*. *Grotius* seems to think this a needless delicacy ; but instead of observing, as he might have done in two words, that no such difference is marked in the original, he proceeds to shew how *Adam* might be called *the Son of God*, by an argument which very probably the evangelist never thought of. And to support his hypothesis, he appeals to a passage of *Philo*, where we find the following account. ὅς [Adam] ἐνεκα' ευγενειας' οὐδενι θνητῷ συγκρίτως, χερσὶ μὲν θεαῖς· εἰς ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τε καὶ τῶν τυπῶν αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ ἀχρόστοις τε καὶ πλάστικῃς. Ψυχῆς δὲ ἀξιώθεις ἀπ' οὐδενος ἐν τῶν εἰς γεννησιν ἢ κολύων, ἐμπνευσταῖος Θεοῦ τῆς θεῆς δυνάμεως ὅσον ἡδυνάτω δεξάται θνητῇ φύσει. Which *Grotius* thus translates. *Qui quod ad nobilitatem attinet, neminem habet qui se-*

On the other side it is insisted, that the human soul is immortal in its own nature, and capable of an active and conscious existence in a state of disunion and separation from the body. That this natural capacity of the soul was not impaired, or at all affected by any thing that happened upon the transgression of our first parents; and that the death to which they were condemned, was only the death of the body. The consequence of all which is, that there is, and would have been a future immortal state of being beyond the present life, and (the moral attributes of God pre-supposed) a just retribution therein, independent of the doctrine of a resurrection of the dead.

Now so far as this is the creed of believers in Christ, it requires some explanation, lest it should seem to make void, or at least render insignificant or unnecessary some of the capital truths of the Gospel. Accordingly, divers methods of accommodating this philosophical theory to the doctrine of the scripture, have been invented, that these privileges of nature may not appear to transcend the riches of Gospel-grace. The principal of which is, placing *redemption, salvation &c.* in and through Jesus Christ, in circumstances which either keep the ideas of life and death out of sight, or reduce them to mere figurative terms; either,

cum comparetur, manibus divinis in simulacrum corporeum formatus summa arte figulari; anima autem donatus non ab ullo qui genitus est, sed Deo inspirante ei tantum divinæ facultatis quantum ferre poterat NATURA MORTALIS. But the misfortune of this doctrine is, that when Adam first received the breath of life, his nature was not mortal. His mortality commenced not but with his transgression, and was the declared penalty of it. When Adam

for example, in modes of purification from the stains of original sin, or in certain secret effects and influences of grace and faith upon the soul, or in communications of the holy spirit, to which man, in his unregenerate state, could have no title.

And then again, lest the end of a resurrection of the dead should seem to be defeated by the hypothesis of a permanent life and consciousness in the soul, and its capability of happiness and misery in a separate state, an intermediate condition is contrived, in which the departed souls of good men are supposed to have an imperfect reward, and the souls of the wicked an imperfect punishment, during the interval between death and the general resurrection, when every one will receive a full and complete recompence for the deeds done in the body.

It is well known how easily these things are taken upon trust, and how little disposed the generality are to examine how far they agree with the scriptures : and there is one argument, much insisted on, which seems to make exa-

came out of the hands of his creator, his nature was immortal ; and upon that, if we believe our christian scriptures, the divine sonship depends. Christ himself is said by St. Paul to have been *declared* [rather *determined*, *op. Dei*] to be the *Son of God* by his *resurrection from the dead*, Rom. i. 4. And accordingly the sonship, heirship of christian believers is uniformly referred to their restoration to immortality,—to their future inheritance in heaven, through Christ the *first fruits*, the *first-born among many brethren*, all through the new testament. That the nature of Adam was at his creation immortal, St. Luke knew ; and Grotius should have known it, at least better than Philo Judæus.

mination upon this head unnecessary. “ If a
 “ future state,” say these reasoners, “ is but
 “ ascertained, it can be no great matter upon
 “ which of these hypotheses it is founded.
 “ Which way soever the point is decided, the
 “ sanctions of the gospel stand sure. They
 “ who deny an intermediate state, acknowledge
 “ the resurrection of the dead, and a future
 “ judgement ; and they who hold a separate
 “ existence of the soul in an intermediate state,
 “ mean not to preclude or supercede a final
 “ retribution, or the resurrection of the dead.
 “ So that the motives to virtue and righteous-
 “ ness, and the discouragements of vice and
 “ iniquity, taken from the certainty of a future
 “ recompense, being secured either way, it is
 “ of little or no consequence which of these
 “ opinions we espouse.”

But might not one reason thus upon many other controverted points, some of which perhaps may be thought to be of much greater importance? It is readily allowed that, where good christians bring forth the fruits of the gospel spirit in their manners and dispositions, it may not always be necessary or expedient to disquiet them with objections to their peculiar tenets, though manifestly wrong and absurd; especially where there is reason to believe, that what you would substitute in the place of such tenets, would have no better effect upon their moral sentiments and practices, than their present opinions. My charity inclines me to hope and believe there may be some bigotted papists, who hold all the errors of their church to the very extremes of idolatry and superstition, who

nevertheless exhibit the true christian character in their general practice. And I am likewise persuaded that some such there may be among the followers of Mahomet.

What then? Because there are here and there instances of individuals, who are not practically corrupted by the influence of the errors they hold, is there no utility or edification in exposing the corruptions of Popery, or the fables of Mahometism? Pitch upon any church or religious society where you will, and how small a proportion do they who stick to the purely preceptive part of their institute, without deviating into the licentiousness for which their respective systems of doctrine and discipline leave room, bear to those, who, provided they are orthodox in their professions of faith, and conformable to ecclesiastical forms, scruple not to follow their own appetites and devices, in sure and certain confidence, of escaping at the last, by the means of those dispensations, atonements, absolutions, &c. with which all religious societies are, in some degree, provided?

If the doctrines and precepts of Christ are in truth the standards of piety and virtue, and the rules and directories to the highest perfection frail man can arrive at in the present life, and to the consummation of his best hopes in another, it must be of the utmost importance, that these doctrines and precepts should be understood in the very sense, as near as may be, in which they were delivered by our blessed Lord, and those commissioned by him to dispense them to the world. To preach and to propagate erroneous interpretations of gospel doctrine,

though by accident no evil impressions may be made by it upon some few well-disposed minds, must infallibly have a worse effect upon a large majority. And there are examples in the new testament, shewing evidently enough, that this was the opinion of the apostles and their assistants.*

It has been the opinion of some eminent men who studied the scriptures with great judgment, application and success, that if our forefathers, who had the management of the protestant reformation, had enjoyed the lights and aids with which succeeding times have been favoured, and could have divested themselves of their scholastic manner of reasoning, the differences on which the several churches where they presided, separated from each other, might have been, in a great measure, prevented. If this is true, or even probable, much edification may still arise from clearing up the genuine sense of scripture, and freeing it from those mistaken interpretations, which unskilful men first adopted, and others, interested in the credit of particular churches, have since thought fit to maintain, in some cases, perhaps, contrary to their own inward conviction. Private christians at least will be led by this information, to distinguish between truth, and the mere apparition of it; between the genuine word of God, and the traditions of men; and may thence be instructed, what few seem to be aware of, how much depends upon their studying the scriptures for themselves, and how liable they are to be imposed upon by those who think of

* See Acts xviii. 24, 25, and compare chap. xix. 1—7.

little in their observations on the sacred writers, but how they may best serve the system of the society to which they belong, or some hypothesis of their own, still more precarious than that.

They who after the most diligent search, cannot find in the scriptures, any foundation for the doctrine of a separate existence of the soul, or any trace of an intermediate state of life and consciousness between death and the resurrection, think themselves sufficiently justified by the foregoing considerations, not only in disowning this doctrine themselves, but in their endeavours to have it disowned by all good christians, as productive of nothing better, than superstition, idolatry, and enthusiasm on the one hand; and infidelity on the other: and they apprehend, that by admitting life and immortality to have been brought to light by the gospel of Christ, in the strict and proper meaning of the words, and exclusive of all other means and sources of immortality, (as St. Paul and his contemporaries appear to have understood the doctrine) a total lapse must ensue of the chief supports of deism and popery, not to mention other idle notions of more recent original.

These, we own, are high sounding pretensions, but they are at the same time pretensions of real importance to the cause of christianity in general, and that of the protestant religion in particular; and, on that account, demand from every one who is well affected to either, a candid and serious attention to those arguments which are brought to make them good. There are, it is true, other arguments against

popery and infidelity, which have been urged against them with success: but it is equally true, that the arguments on the other side have received a great degree of plausibility, and even of real weight, from the concession of a separate existence of the soul in a state of consciousness and activity.

For example, if it be denied, and cannot be proved, that man will inherit eternal life, otherwise than in consequence of his rising from the dead, as that is insured by the promises of the gospel, and the previous resurrection of Jesus, the faith and hope of that species of infidelity called deism, are at an end. But while christian writers are persuaded that they ought to maintain the natural, indefeasible immortality of the soul, and its conscious existence in a separate state, as if this doctrine were some way connected with the principles of the christian religion, they leave the deists in possession of a strong hold, from whence it seems impossible to dislodge them. For thus they reason: “you
 “allow that a future state of reward and pu-
 “nishment may be proved from the nature of
 “the human soul, from the unequal distribu-
 “tion of good and evil in the present life,
 “from the free agency of man, and the docu-
 “ments of reason and nature, importing, that
 “upon the final event of things, the judge of all
 “the earth will certainly do right. What ne-
 “cessity then for a particular revelation, or a
 “particular mediator, to inform us of, or to
 “secure to us certain privileges of which we
 “were in possession without them.”

I am not the only one who hath observed and pitied the embarrassment of the most emi-

ment advocates of christianity, when this objection was urged home upon them. In vain had they proved the truth and authenticity of the christian revelation, by what is called the external evidence, even to demonstration; in vain had they shewn, from the moral doctrines of the gospel, an agreement with the most rational conclusions of wise men in all ages, unless they could shew the peculiar uses and importance of such a dispensation. To what purpose such a profusion of miracles, so eminently powerful a minister, so transcendent a character as that of Jesus at the head of this dispensation, if his errand was no more than to give an additional testimony to the supposed discoveries of natural religion? Which, considering the universal consent of wise men in all ages, so much boasted of on all sides, and by both parties, seems to be an end much below the necessity for the interposition of *the Son of God*, as it might have been accomplished by the ministry of any one of those inferior prophets of the old testament, who surely were sufficiently gifted and instructed to authenticate doctrines and precepts, which were already to be found in the works of so many poets and philosophers, in every body's hands? And yet this, in short, is the whole to which the account given us of the *cui bono* of revelation, by most of our modern advocates for christianity, seems to amount.

Let us now consider another case. The notion of two natures or principles in man, independent of each other, is plainly the foundation upon which our modern pietists of various denominations, build their respective systems.

They conceive the influences of divine grace to operate upon the soul only, while the body remains under all the melancholy distemperature of its *original* corruption; which however is understood to have no ill effect upon the salvation of the believer, while his wounds, inflicted by carnality and concupiscence, are healed by *faith*. Hence, instead of considering the purification of the *whole man*, as the work of a gradual instruction and discipline under the precepts of the gospel, they hold that the redemption, justification, sanctification, &c. of particulars is instantaneous, upon the first act or motion of faith and repentance, and some of their writers seem to speak of these privileges, as if they were even previous to conversion. This they call the *new birth*, which is supposed to cleanse the soul from every stain of sin; the blame of all obliquity and deviation from the precepts of the gospel being thrown upon the *old man*, whose malignity (being controuled by the incessant operations of *faith*) is however happily prevented from doing any harm to the purified spirit of believers.

This scheme of doctrine, with a thousand extravagant consequences drawn from it, could evidently have no place but upon the supposition of two distinct natures in man, propped up by the application of certain passages of scripture torn from their context, and wrested from their true meaning, in order to accommodate them to the Pagan accounts of the nature and properties of the human soul.*

* These misapplications arise chiefly from the mention made in the scriptures of an opposition or contrariety between *flesh* and *spirit*,

To do justice however to all sides, it must be observed that these visionaries alledge, “they
“are but treading in the footsteps of our pre-
“decessors of the establishment, and analy-
“sing the very system to which every ortho-
“dox son of the church of England subscribes

concerning which the learned Pearson hath left us the following admonition. “Quid *σας* quid *πνευμα* apud græcos scriptores denotet,
“nemo nescit; at si omnes in universum sensus, quibus his vocabulis
“græci usi sunt, recenseantur, nullus omnino invenietur qui mentem
“apostolorum attinget. Cum enim *baschar* carnem proprie significet,
“eadem tamen vox ab Hebræis nonnunquam pro *homine ipso*, ali-
“quando pro *humana natura*, sæpe pro ejusdem *imbecillitate*, aut
“etiam *vitiositate*, usurpetur, et in hac sensuum varietate unica voce,
“*σας* a LXX reddatur, hinc evenire necesse est, ut quoties apostoli
“eo sensu usurpent quem græci veteres haud agnoverunt, ex hebræo
“idiomate, et versione LXX explicetur.—Ita cum *ruach* satis pro-
“prie *πνευμα*, qualiter a veteribus græcis usurpatur, denotet, et præte-
“rea etiam apud hebræos multa alia significata contineat, quæ apud
“græcos haud comparent, cum apostoli eo sensu usurpârunt quem
“græci veteres haud agnoverunt, ex hebræo idiomate et versione
“LXX explicandi sunt.” *Præfat Parænet*, before *Field’s* Sep-
tuagint, 1665, p. 13. The good bishop took this remark from the
learned *Gataker’s* Dissertation *de novi instrumenti stylo*, p. 54, 55,
ed. 1648. How little the distinctions marked by these able and
judicious critics have been attended to, is deplorably evident from the
labours of the most of those who have commented upon, or drawn up
systems from the passages in the apostolic writings here referred to.
That they, who in their interpretations of scripture, pretend to the
aid of immediate inspiration, or go by the rules of different kinds of
cabalism, should hold these rational criticisms in contempt, is not
marvellous. But that they who pretend to read and explain the
scriptures by the help of grammatical and philological literature
should overlook these necessary distinctions, is unaccountable. To
some of these therefore, and particularly to Mr. *John Steffe*, the
author of *two letters* on the *Intermediate State*, would I humbly
recommend the deliberate consideration of the remarks of *Gataker*,
Pearson, and some others, upon the style of the sacred writings, be-
fore they conclude from similar, or even the same expressions, that
Moses, *David*, *Solomon*, and *Paul*, had precisely the same ideas of
the human soul, with *Hesiod*, *Homer*, *Pythagoras*, *Cicero*, and other
worthies of the Pagan ages.

“ his *unfeigned assent* to this very day.” And they scruple not to boast, that they have the satisfaction to see, that after all the clamour raised against them, the most dextrous of their reverend, and even right reverend opponents, is obliged, in overturning their creed, to quibble away his own; in which, *I would willingly hope*, they are mistaken.

What interest popery has in the determination of this question, is shewn at large in the following *Historical View*, where it will be seen, that while our reformers were studiously lopping the branches of superstition and imposture, they inadvertently left the stock, with a vigorous root in the ground, which their successors, with a surprizing inattention to the pernicious consequences of their misapprehension, have been cultivating to a fresh growth, to the great hazard not only of the protestant religion, but even of christianity itself, which is at this hour so greatly obscured and well nigh choaked under the thick shade of this venomous exotic.

By this time the intelligent reader will readily comprehend, that a doctrine, which, like that of *the sleep of the soul*, strikes so home at the pride of the philosopher, the enthusiastic visions of the mystic, the lucrative systems of the interested churchman, and the various prejudices and superstitions of their respective disciples, should be loaded with all the obloquy and scandal which bigotted and provoked adversaries can lay upon it. We are indeed obliged to those who content themselves with calling it an unimportant, insignificant doctrine; for though their moderation arises from

too superficial a knowledge of the subject, to give weight to their judgement, yet it is candid at least to confess, that they see no harm in it. The far greater part agree in stigmatizing it as an heresy, derogatory to the nature of man, subversive of his future hopes, and savouring not a little of atheism and impiety.*

In vain have the espousers of this opinion remonstrated against these unjust and cruel censures. In vain have they offered themselves to be tried by the scriptures of the new testament, and the tenor of the christian dispensation therein exhibited. In vain have they asserted their firm belief of a resurrection of the dead through Christ the redeemer, and acknowledged their obligations to him of duty and gratitude for the grace and privileges of his gospel. Not the least regard has been paid to their most solemn professions on this head.

* ERASMUS, who permits free disputation on most theological subjects, yet will not allow a good churchman to moot upon this and some few others. Scio says he, *quædam esse ejus generis ut nefas sit ceu dubia, vocare in disputationem. Quod genus sunt, An Christus sit Deus, et idem homo? An natus absque viri opera? AN ANIMÆ SUPERSINT A MORTE CORPORIS? An hæc corpora sint olim revictura? Hæc enim tamen evidenter, traduntur nobis auctoritate divinæ scripturæ ac totius ecclesiæ consensu, ut impium sit et periculosum de his in diversam partem defferere, nisi forte nobis cum Ethnicis res incideret. Et tamen non arbitror odiosè rejiciendum, qui de hujusmodi quoque rebus animi sui scrupulum, ut est humanæ mentis infirmitas, doctis aperuerit; nihil aliud agens, quam ut quod credit utcunque, credat certius.* In 1 Cor. vii. 39. This gracious and condescending permission, to consult learned men on scruples of this sort, provided you will give security before-hand, to stand to their award, is in the true style of human establishments. The reason indeed of this condition is plain. The scrupulous mortal always labours under an infirmity of mind; the learned orthodox, and established casuist or confessor, has no such feelings.

• Their opponents still go on to charge them with endeavouring to sink mankind to the condition of beasts that perish, without making the least allowance for their holding, what is equally admitted by both parties, a restoration of the defunct to life and immortality, by a resurrection of the dead,

It is in order to shew this unrighteous and unchristian treatment in its proper colours, and to lodge an appeal against it, with those who have candour and temper enough to look farther for the grounds of such accusations, than the echoes of an injudicious multitude, inflamed by the injurious misrepresentations of their interested leaders, that the following detail of facts is drawn up, and submitted to the consideration of the public.

It is remarkable that protestants, who have on most occasions refused to be governed by tradition, seem to have submitted to it in this matter with the most implicit deference; and some of the same men, who in treating upon other theological subjects, are wont to press a thorough examination of popular opinions, and exhort us to receive nothing upon the mere merit of its long possession, and the concurrence of numbers, have affected to represent the natural immortality of the soul, not only as an universal, but an uniform tenet of mankind in all ages and countries, and in all circumstances. And there is no doubt but thousands adhere to the opinion at this very time, who have no other argument to produce for it, but this of an universal and uniform concurrence.

But is this the truth of the case ? Does it, or can it be made to appear, that men were uniform in all ages, either in their notions, concerning the sort of soul intitled to immortality, or the kind of immortality to which it is intitled ? No, the disputes on this head are carefully concealed in all popular discourses ; and the people are left to take a thing for granted, in which were their teachers called upon to explain the terms they use, hardly two of them perhaps would agree in the same definitions.

The late Mr. Grove of Taunton, being hard pressed by Mr. Hallet, junior, upon this subject, began a work concerning *The weight of tradition for a future state*, of which he lived to finish only one chapter. The title is ambiguous, nor is it clear from what remains, upon what Mr. Grove would have rested his argument. The *weight* of tradition may mean, the superior numbers who have given their suffrage for a future state in times past, and the *comparative* weight of these, when put in the opposite scale to those who have argued and concluded against it. Or the *weight of tradition* may signify the *real intrinsic importance* of tradition, in deciding the question concerning a future state.

If Mr. Grove intended to treat his subject upon the latter footing, no doubt but he would take the superiority of numbers for granted ; a point which would not be worth disputing with him. But if in the former sense, he could hardly avoid observing, how greatly the weight of tradition would be diminished, by the various and disagreeing accounts of the thing it-

self, which this tradition hath handed down, not only in different ages, but in the same age, and even in the same country.

The following papers are designed to afford a short, but, as it is hoped, a satisfactory view of the *weight* of tradition for a future state, in the sense of *merit* and *importance*, during a particular period of time, the most interesting to the present generation (with respect to questions of this kind) of any other; as abounding not only with more and better materials for researches into philosophical opinions, through the revival and cultivation of useful literature, but productive likewise of many more eminent men, who with different views, and from various motives, have employed their talents in this disquisition.

Such of these as appear to be most worthy of our regard we shall call upon to speak for themselves, leaving innumerable others unnoticed, not as being, upon the whole, less considerable, but as men who have only repeated what some or other of our witnesses have said before or after them.

And if, upon the result, it shall appear, that there has been no manner of consistency, among those who have dogmatized upon the natural immortality, or separate existence of the soul; if it shall appear that later inquiries have exploded and reprobated former theories, and that men who have seemingly agreed in asserting the general doctrine, have flatly contradicted each other in setting forth the grounds of it, and consequently in the construction of their arguments brought to support it, may we

not humbly hope, that the offence that has been taken at those who have dissented from them all, and have refused to adopt any accounts of futurity except those in the new testament, will now cease, and that our impartial readers will not think it strange or unreasonable, that we who think a state of separate existence of the soul derogatory to the word of God, should not receive it with a blind submission to the *ipse dixit* of men, who however considerable in other respects, could never satisfy each other in their respective accounts of a doctrine, which all of them pretended to believe ?

I have only farther to add, that as the church of England herself hath declined, in the most solemn declaration of her tenets, to interpose her judgment of this controversy for more than two hundred years, and gives countenance to the notion of a conscious intermediate state, no otherwise than by some ambiguous expressions in one of her offices, which of all others, and by the confession of all parties, wants most to be corrected ; it is not only unfair but inhuman for one set of her members to brand another with HERESY, merely for holding the negative side of this question. It is indeed to exceed in bitterness even the gall of popery itself ; the most sensible and reasonable men of that communion, speaking with great contempt and indignation of those who impute *heresy* to their adversaries in points, which are not decided by the CHURCH.*

* Mr. Bayle speaking of the impertinence of the Jesuit, Maimbourg, in sneering at the number of honourable testimonials prefixed to the works of the Jansenist writers of *Port Royal*, makes the fol-

And were they who are *dignified* with the name of *Soul-sleepers*, disposed to seek reprisals upon the *Orthodox*, what depredations might they not make, by comparing some of their avowed opinions with the corresponding articles of the church, which they have solemnly subscribed more than once, and which are still standing in full authority to confront them.

lowing remark. “ Cette raillerie étoit fort déraisonnable ; car
 “ c’étoit lui et ses confreres qui à force d’appeller *Heretiques* les
 “ ecrivans de Port Royal, les avoient contrains de se munir, d’un
 “ grand nombre d’approbations. Au reste, je ne trouve pas étrange,
 “ qu’elles déplussent aux Pere Maimbourg, car elles faisoient, voir la
 “ temerité insupportable, qu’il avoit eüe d’accuser d’*heresie* des gens
 “ qui passaient pour orthodoxes dans l’esprit des plus savans prelates du
 “ royaume, auxquels, et non pas aux Jesuites, il appartient de juger
 “ decisivement de la qualitié d’une opinion.” *Critique Generale*
del’ Histoire Calvinisme, vol. I. p. 89, 90. It is no reasonable
 prejudice against the truth and justice of this remark, that it comes
 from a protestant writer. There was not a jansenist among the ca-
 tholics of France, who did not loudly complain of this calumnious
 imputation of *heresy*, even such of them as dealt it about with the great-
 est freedom to the protestants. There was not a more bigotted ca-
 tholic on the face of the earth than the famous Arnauld, or a more
 virulent writer against the protestants ; at the same time, that no
 man was ever more impatient when the reproach of heresy was
 thrown upon himself or his party. See his *Preface* to the second vo-
 lume of his *Nouvelle Defense de la Traduction du Nouv. Test. im-*
primée à MONS. And the *Advertisement* prefixed to vol. i. of *Les*
Imaginaires, &c. under the name of the Sieur *Damwilliers*.

The End of the Preface.

AN
HISTORICAL VIEW
OF THE
CONTROVERSY, &c.

CHAP. I.

The doctrine generally received in the christian church concerning the state of departed souls, overthrown by a canon of the council of Florence. The Greeks at that council obliged to concur in it. The Florentine doctrine calculated to favour purgatory. Remarks on the canon. Was probably the occasion of the disputes at Rome on the immortality of the soul, in the pontificate of Paul ii.

BEFORE the council of *Florence*, which was held in the year 1439, under pope *Eugenius* IV, the current doctrine, both of the Greek and Latin churches, was, that “the souls of
“ the saints were in *abditis receptaculis*, or as
“ some of them expressed it, *in exterioribus*
“ *atriis*, where they expected the resurrection
“ of their bodies, and the glorification of their
“ souls; and though the fathers believed all
“ of them to be happy, yet they did not think
“ they would enjoy the beatific vision before
“ the resurrection.”*

But the pope above-mentioned having by an infamous stratagem, and in opposition to the council of Basil, inveigled the patriarch

* See bishop Taylor's *Liberty of Prophecy*, p. 152.

of Constantinople and some of his clergy, to attend him in a council indicted at Ferrara, and adjourned to Florence,* had the address to obtain their consent to the following canon.

“ If the truly penitent shall depart this life
 “ in the love of God, before they have made
 “ sufficient satisfaction for their sins of com-
 “ mission and omission, by fruits worthy of
 “ repentance, their souls are purged by the
 “ pains of purgatory; and the suffrages of the
 “ living are profitable for the relieving them
 “ from the pains of purgatory, namely, by sa-
 “ crifices of the mass, prayers, and alms, which
 “ according to the ordinances of the church,
 “ are wont to be performed by the faithful, on
 “ the behalf of the faithful; but the souls of
 “ those, who, after baptism, have incurred no
 “ stain of sin, as also those souls, which hav-
 “ ing contracted the stain of sin, whether in
 “ their bodies or divested of their bodies, have
 “ been purged as above-mentioned, *are re-*
 “ *ceived into heaven immediately, and clearly*
 “ *behold the triune God as he is;* but some of
 “ them more perfectly than others, according
 “ to the difference of their merits.” †

The compilers of this canon saw, no doubt, the absurdity of supposing, that those souls

* Geddes Introductory Discourse, prefixed to Vargas's Letters. And the Greek history of this Council published by Creighton, 1660. The eastern bishops pleaded poverty, and that they could not afford the expence of attending the council in Italy. But Eugenius, determined to have them at any rate, undertook to bear their charges, and even to defray the expences of the Emperor who accompanied them: for which purpose he sold all his plate, and pawned the pontifical tiara to the florentines for forty thousand crowns of gold. See Journal des Scavans. An. 1675. p. 94.

† Caranza Sum. Concil. 454. f. v. 12mo.

which had undergone the purgatorial purification, should still remain *in abditis receptaculis*, perhaps in a state of insensibility, as some of the fathers held, or *in exterioribus atriis*, in a state of mere expectation. But purgatory was to be supported at all events, and the poor greeks, on this occasion, were obliged to desert the most eminent lights of their own church, for which, however, some of them were sufficiently mortified when they got home.*

But that the protestants should be complainant enough to make *this plain recession from antiquity*, as bishop Taylor terms it, upon no better authority than that of this canon, is a little surprizing. This, however, is the fact, as will evidently appear by and by, with this difference, that these protestants sent the souls of the saints directly to heaven, without calling at purgatory.

It is probable that this alteration in the church's doctrine, might give occasion to the philosophical inquiries and disputes we read of

* Joseph the patriarch died at Florence suddenly in the night, having just time to leave a rescript behind him, importing his full agreement with the church of Rome, particularly in the articles of the roman pontiff's supremacy, and the doctrine of purgatory. This was well contrived, and was no doubt instrumental to the procuring the subscription of his associates. Who however were not only disowned by the church of Constantinople when they returned, but, if we may believe Gaspar Peucerus, [*Chronic. sub anno 1439*] excommunicated, and denied christian burial. Platina says, *græcorum natio, haud ita multa post, ad antiquos mores recidit*. Eugen. iv. p. 267. Edit. 1562. But indeed they did not think themselves bound for a single moment by this act of their florentine delegates. There was however some struggle to have the union of the greek and latin churches, as patched up at Florence, received by the synod at Constantinople, but without success. Vid. Sguropol. Hist. Con. Florent. at the end.

no long time after, in the city of Rome itself, concerning the immortality of the soul. These disputes afforded one pretence at least to pope Paul II. to abolish the college of Abbreviators, and to persecute the members of it, of whom Platina was one, and the celebrated Pomponius Lætus another. The pope objected to them that they disputed upon the immortality of the soul, and held Plato's opinion upon that subject, which Platina did not deny, but justifies himself and his fellows by the authority of St. Austin, who thought Plato's doctrine resembled that of the christian religion. Says the pope, "you give occasion by your disputations, to call in question the being of God."—*Platina* answers, *that this might be equally objected to all the divines and philosophers of those times, who for disputations sake, and for the purpose of finding out the truth, called in question the being and nature of souls, of GOD, and of all separate intelligences.**

This happened in the pontificate of Paul II. which began in the year 1464, and ended, 1471, and I cite it only to shew that such disputes were on foot in those days, and that they were supposed to do harm to religion.

* Platina in Paulo 2do.

CHAP. II.

A canon of the Lateran council under Leo. x. confirming one of the Clementine constitutions which asserts the natural immortality of the soul. Luther's opinion of that council. The doctrine of the canon built upon the hypothesis of substantial forms. Some modern divines and philosophers not at all more intelligible, or better founded than the old schoolmen.

THE spirit of philosophizing however, seems 1513. to have gone on without much controul, from this period to the year 1513, when the immortality of the soul being openly called in question,* it became necessary for the pope and the church to give some check to it; which was done in a canon enacted in what may be called the *rump* of the Lateran council, held under Leo X. in the year above-mentioned. †

It will be necessary to put down this canon at length, as it is published by Caranza. ‡

* Sleidan. lib. 2. p. 37.

† Luther says of this council, that it was of so little authority as to be laughed at by the Romanists themselves. Sleidan. u. 5. p. 35.

‡ Cum diebus nostris nonnulli ausi sint dicere de natura animæ rationalis, quod mortalis sit aut unica in cunctis hominibus, et aliqui temere philosophantes, secundum saltem philosophiam, verum esse asseverant, sacro approbante concilio damnamus et reprobamus, omnes asserentes animam intellectivam mortalem esse aut unicam in cunctis hominibus, et hæc in dubium vertentes; cum illa non solum vere et per se essentialiter humani corporis forma existat (sicut in Can. Clementis papæ 5, in generali Viennensi concilio edito continetur) verum immortalis, et pro corporum quibus infunditur multitudine, singulariter multiplicabilis, et multiplicata, et multiplicanda sit. Quod ma-

“ Whereas in these our days, some have
 “ dared to assert concerning the nature of the
 “ reasonable soul, that it is mortal, or one and
 “ the same in all men; and some, rashly phi-
 “ losophizing, declare this to be true, at least
 “ according to philosophy, we, with the ap-
 “ probation of the sacred council, do condemn
 “ and reprobate all those who assert that the
 “ intellectual soul is mortal, or one and the
 “ same in all men, and those who call these
 “ things in question; seeing that the soul is
 “ not only truly, and of itself, and essentially
 “ the form of the human body, as is expressed
 “ in the canon of pope Clement Vth, published
 “ in the general council of Vienne; but like-
 “ wise immortal, and, according to the num-
 “ ber of bodies into which it is infused, is sin-
 “ gularly multipliable, multiplied, and to be
 “ multiplied. Which manifestly appears from
 “ the gospel, seeing that our Lord saith, *they*
 “ *cannot kill the soul*: and elsewhere, *he who*
 “ *hateth his soul in this world, &c.* and also
 “ because he promises eternal pain (*rather*
 “ *rewards*) and eternal torments to those who
 “ are to be judged according to their merit in

nifesse constat ex evangelio, cum dominus ait, *animam autem occidere non possunt*. Et alibi, *qui odit animam suam in hoc mundo, &c.* Et etiam cum æternam pœnam (l. æterna præmia) et æterna supplicia pro merito vitæ judicandis repromittit: alias incarnatio, et alia christi mysteria nobis minime profuissent, nec resurrectio expectanda foret, ac sancti et justī miserabiliores essent, juxta paulum, omnibus hominibus. Cumque *verum vero minime contradicat*, omnem assertionem veritati illuminatæ fidei contrariam, omnino falsam esse definimus, et ut aliter dogmatizare non liceat districtius inhibemus, omnesque hujusmodi erroneis assertionibus inhærentes, tanquam hæreticos vitandos et puniendos fore decernimus. Caranza. Sum. Concilior. Lovan. ii. 1681. pag. 412. b. 413. a.

“ this life. OTHERWISE the incarnation, and
 “ other mysteries of Christ, would not profit
 “ us, nor were a resurrection to be expected;
 “ and the saints and righteous would, accord-
 “ ing to Paul, be most miserable of all men.
 “ And seeing that *truth never contradicts truth*,
 “ we determine every assertion, which is con-
 “ trary to revealed faith, to be false; and we
 “ strictly inhibit all from dogmatizing other-
 “ wise, and we decree that all who adhere to
 “ the like erroneous assertions, shall be shunned
 “ and punished as heretics.”

This venerable council, it appears, were of opinion, that if the human soul was proved or allowed to be naturally mortal, there could be no resurrection of the dead, no rewards or punishments in a future state, no benefits from the incarnation, and other mysteries of Christ, (one of which OTHER mysteries by the way, was a *purgatory*.) * And the axiom, *verum vero non contradicit* ; applied as it is in this canon, imports, that the scholastic argument for the immortality of the soul, and the scripture-revelation of a resurrection of the dead, must either be both true, or both false.

It is true, the substantial forms of the *Thomists* are no longer in repute, and the argument drawn from thence for the immortality of the soul, is, in these more enlightened days, exploded. But that is only to make way for another scholastic argument, equally obscure and precarious, devised by Des Cartes, and adopted

* Aquinas infers the soul's capability of purgatorial pains, from its being the substantial form of the body. Aquin. Summ. qu, LXXV. art. 1. resp. ad 5^{am} 1 partis.

by many good christians and true protestants to this hour, who are just as positive as Leo and his doctors, that the philosophical and evangelical arguments for immortality, stand upon the same foundation. In support of which notion, a doctor of our own of no inconsiderable figure, hath introduced our blessed Saviour, deducing his argument for a resurrection of the dead, against the Sadducees, Matt. xxii. 29. through the medium of the SEPARATE EXISTENCE of the soul.* What a million of pities that such a discovery should escape the sagacity of Leo and his Lateran councilors!

C H A P. III.

Peter Pomponatius's *book De animæ immortalitate. Attacks and exposes the followers of Aristotle. Pomponatius reviled as an infidel by Protestants as well as Papists. His meaning mistaken both by Mr. Bayle and Bishop Warburton.*

1516. BUT to go on with facts. Peter Pomponatius a philosopher of Mantua, not at all intimidated by this Lateran thunder, published a book in the year 1516, on the immortality of the soul, in which he exposed the futility of that argumentation by which the followers of Aristotle had endeavoured to prove the immortality of the soul, on the principles of their master ; by shewing that they either mistook the sense of Aristotle's principles, or drew wrong conclusi-

* Div. Leg. of Moses. Vol. iv. p. 343. ed. 1758.

ons from them. He then examines the hypothesis of Aristotle himself, and shews, that the mortality of the soul may be as easily proved by it, as the contrary. After which he states the moral arguments for the immortality, or rather against the mortality of the soul, under eight heads, and having shewn that they are weak and inconclusive, he infers upon the whole, in his last chapter, that, “ the immortality of the
 “ soul, being a problematical question, we can
 “ have no assurance of the thing, but from re-
 “ velation, and that they who would build im-
 “ mortality upon any other foundation, only
 “ verify the character given to certain self-
 “ sufficient reasoners by the apostle namely,
 “ *professing themselves wise they became fools.* *

It is no wonder that these *mootings* should expose Pomponatius to the rage and abuse of the popish clergy of all denominations. In vain did he pretend to submit his lucubrations

* The R. R. author of the *Divine Legation of Moses*. &c. censures Mr. Bayle for misrepresenting Pomponatius, by placing him in the class of those who have thought religion useless to society, which he calls an impiety. Whereas according to the R. R. author, the impiety of which Pomponatius was guilty, was, the pretence that religion was the creature of the magistrate. D. L. B. 1. I will venture to say, the R. R. author misrepresents Pomponatius as much to the full as Mr. Bayle. In this philosopher's XIV chapter we meet with the following passage, “ Nam quod communiter diciter, si ani-
 “ ma est mortalis, homo deberet se totum tradere voluptatibus corpo-
 “ ralibus, omnia mala committere, ad sui utilitatem, vanumque esset
 “ Deum colere, divina honorare, preces ad Deum fundere, sacrificia
 “ facere, cæteraque hujus generis ; satis responsio patet per ea quæ
 “ dicta sunt ; nam cum naturaliter felicitas appetatur, et miseria fugia-
 “ tur, et per dicta, felicitas consistat in actu virtuoso, cum ex tota
 “ mente Deum colere, divina honorare, fundere at Deum preces, sa-
 “ crificare, sint actus maxime virtuosæ, ideo debemus totis viribus

to the controul of the apostolic see. He had classed Aristotle, and the whole tribe of schoolmen, among the *wise men who became fools* in their own self-sufficiency ; and upon these did the most lucrative doctrines of Rome almost entirely depend. But the strange part of the story would be, that this writer should incur the displeasure of protestants, for opposing the doctrine of a popish canon, if later experience had not convinced us how complaisant

“ *inniti ad acquisitionem istorum, p. 138.*” Now this being the religion of the first class of men he had mentioned before, p. 123. *qui ad virtutem inducuntur EX SOLA VIRTUTIS NOBILITATE*, without any inducement from the magistrate ; with what truth could the R. R. author affirm, that Pomponatius, pretended *religion to be the creature of politics* ? Unless he will say that to worship God with the whole heart, to pray to him &c. are not religion. Ay ! but by religion the R. R. author meant only future rewards and punishments. [Div. Leg. Edit. 4. 1755. p. 89.] So it seems. But if the whole of religion consists in these sanctions, will it not follow upon this author's own principles, that Moses taught the Jews no religion at all ? Well then, we allow that Pomponatius held future rewards and punishments to be the creature of politics. But where is the impiety of this ? For if as Pomponatius asserts, we can have no certainty of immortality but from revelation, or the canonical scriptures, I would desire to know of the R. R. author, whose creatures those future rewards and punishments must be, which were proposed to the Pagans by the ruling powers among them, and which had no connection with revelation ? And it is of such future rewards and punishments only that Pomponatius speaks, and of which he says, in the passage referred to by the R. R. author, that they were the invention of politicians. Henceforward then, Pomponatius is acquitted of all impiety, except it be impiety against human establishments of religion, with which indeed he plainly enough declares neither the religion of the gospel, nor the religion of philosophers can possibly incorporate. How far he is in the right is another question. But without doubt the R. R. author had his reasons for being displeased with the consequences that might be drawn from the doctrine of our Mantuan philosopher, as totally subversive of the *ingenious* principles of his *Alliance, &c.*

we have been to the catholics in these points, since those days. Heretic, Impious, Epicurean, Atheist, were liberally bestowed upon Pomponatius on this occasion, with how little justice has been shewn by Mr. Bayle. And we shall see, as we go along, that several eminent men have adopted Pomponatius's general principle, in contradiction to a certain sort of philosophy, in much higher reputation for the supposed perspicuity of its grounds, than that of Aristotle and Aquinas.

One of Pomponatius's syllogisms is this : “ If
 “ Christ is raised from the dead, we shall like-
 “ wise rise ; and if we rise, the soul is immor-
 “ tal : But Christ is raised : THEREFORE the
 “ soul is immortal.”

Considering what was meant in those days by immortality of the soul, the consequence is weak, and the reasoning pitiful. This however ought to have satisfied the philosopher's adversaries that he was neither atheist nor heretic. But the objection laid here ; this syllogism did not account for the intermediate immortality in a state of separate existence. Nothing is mentioned of the substantial form, on which, as we have observed, the soul's capability of purgatorial pains was made to depend.*

I have often wondered that the modern contenders for the separate existence of the soul, should ever be prevailed with to give up this

* Quantumcunque immateriale in materiale agat, non videtur tamen actionem converti. Quare et etiam apud Theologos dubitatio orta est, quomodo animæ cruciari possint ab igne corporeo. Pompon. cap. 8. p. 42.

commodious substantial form : or that none of the numerous followers of Des Cartes, Clarke, and Baxter, should think of substituting something in the room of it. When they speak of the happiness of separate souls, they make a tolerable case, and flourish on the spiritual joys of a thinking substance, with great edification to those who are in love with mystic rapture and extacy. But when they come to dispose of the souls of the wicked, they are totally at a loss. Some of them are obliged to leave them asleep, [Steffe, &c.] Others talk of punishments by parity of reason, and of their suffering—no body knows what or how, [Goddard, &c.] It is very extraordinary they should not recollect that their catholic predecessors, having substantial forms always at hand, were never under any such embarrassment.

C H A P. IV.

Luther ranks the natural immortality of the soul among the monstrous opinions of Popery. The grounds of his censure doubtful. Were not what Cardinal Perron supposed them to be. The doctrine of the sleep of the soul espoused by Luther on scriptural authority. The Appendix referred to.

1520. *IN* the year 1520, Luther published a defence of his propositions condemned by a bull of Leo X. which were in number 41. The 27th runs thus.

“ It is certain that it is not in the power of
 “ the church or the pope to establish articles of
 “ faith, or laws for morals or good works.”
 And the reason he gives for this is, that these
 articles and laws, are already established in the
 word of God ; which he proves from 1. Cor. iii.
 11.* After which he goes on, “ but I permit
 “ the pope to make articles of faith for himself
 “ and his faithful, such as, *the bread and wine*
 “ *are transubstantiated in the sacrament. The*
 “ *essence of God neither generates nor is gene-*
 “ *rated. The soul is the substantial form of*
 “ *the human body. The pope is the emperor of*
 “ *the world, and the king of heaven, and God*
 “ *upon earth.* THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL, with
 “ all those monstrous opinions to be found in
 “ the Roman dunghill of decretals, that such
 “ as his faith is, such may be his gospel, such
 “ his disciples, and such his church, that the
 “ mouth may have meat suitable for it, and
 “ the dish a cover worthy of it.”

This ironical permission of Luther is evidently
 aimed at those decrees of the popes, which

* Certum est in manu Ecclesiæ aut Papæ non esse statuere articu-
 los fidei, imo nec leges morum, nec bonorum operum.——Permitto
 tamen quod Papa condat articulos fidei sibi et suis fidelibus, quale
 sunt, *Panem et vinum transubstantiari in sacramento, Essentiam*
Dei nec generare, nec generari. Animam esse formam substantialem
humani corporis. Se esse imperatorem mundi et regem cæli, et De-
um terrenum. ANIMAM ESSE IMMORTALEM ; et omnia illa in-
 finita portenta in Romano sterquilinio decretorum, ut qualis est ejus
 fides, tale sit evangelium, tales et fideles, talis et ecclesia, et [l. ut.]
 habeant similem labra lactucam, et dignum patella sit operculum.—
Affertio articulorum innuim Martini Lutheri, per bullam Leonis
X. damnatorum. Oper. Tom. ii. fol. 107. Wittembergæ, 1562.

were founded upon scholastic determinations.* But more particularly at that Lateran canon above-mentioned, which established the immortality of the soul after Aquinas, in consequence of its being the substantial form of the body. Sylvester Prierias, in his dispute with Luther, relied almost wholly on the authority, of St. Thomas, whom Luther in his replication, treated with the utmost contempt.† Hence may arise a doubt whether Luther in this passage, intended only to reprobate the school doctrine of the immortality of the soul, or to deny the thing itself?

Cardinal du Perron, supposes Luther denied the immortality of the soul, for the sake of the effect the contrary doctrine, would have upon the practice of invoking saints.‡ But it is certain that Luther himself had not quite laid aside the practice of invocation, at the time he wrote this defence of his articles.||

Afterwards indeed Luther espoused the doctrine of the sleep of the soul, upon a scripture foundation, and then he made use of it as a confutation of purgatory and saint-worship, and continued in that belief to the last moment of his life.

I know this hath been controverted even by

* The axiom, that *the essence of God neither generates nor is generated*, is a sentence of Lombard, which being controverted by the Abbot Joachim, as heretical and absurd, was patronized and decreed in the Lateran council held under Innocent, III, in the year 1215, where Joachim was formally condemned. Lombard's proposition was afterwards espoused and vindicated by Aquinas.

† Sleidan, lib. 1.

‡ Perroniana, motte LUTHER.

|| Seckendorff, in Indice tertio ad annum 1521.

some of his own followers. The question upon many accounts, is worth debating ; and as the discussion of it would break the thread of our present disquisition, I shall reserve what I have to say upon the subject, for an Appendix ; observing that Luther in his commentary upon Ecclesiastes, which was published in the year 1532, was clearly and indisputably, on the side of those who maintain the sleep of the soul.

C H A P. V.

William Tyndall *defends* Luther *against* Sir Thomas More's *objections to the doctrine of the sleep of the soul. This a proof that the doctrine was held by the first reformers. Deserted afterwards by many Protestants. The probable occasion of Tyndall's Protestation. Copy of the said Protestation. Extract of a Letter from Tyndall to Frith, supposed to refer to the contents of the Protestation.*

IN the year 1530, William Tyndall answered Sir Thomas More's Dialogue. More objected ^{1530.} to Luther, that he held, “ that all soules lye “ and sleep till domes day.” It is to be supposed, that, if this was not Luther's doctrine, Tyndall would have denied it ; or at least have said, that it was not held by the protestants in general. Instead of that he acknowledges it for the doctrine of the protestant, grounded on scripture, as appears by his answer. Viz.

E

“ And ye in putting them [departed souls]
 “ in heauen, hell, and purgatory, destroy the
 “ argumentes wherewith Christ and Paul proue
 “ the resurrection. What God doth with them,
 “ that shall we know when we come to them.
 “ The true faith putteth the resurrection,
 “ which we be warned to looke for euery houre.
 “ The heathen philosophers denying that, did
 “ put, that the soules did euer lyue. And the
 “ pope ioyneth the spirituall doctrine of Christ,
 “ and the fleshly doctrine of philosophers to-
 “ gether, things so contrary that they cannot
 “ agree, no more than the sperite and the
 “ fleshe do in a christen man. And because
 “ the fleshly minded pope consenteth unto hea-
 “ then doctrine, therefore he corrupteth the
 “ scripture to stablish it. Moses saith in Deut.
 “ the secrete thinges pertaine unto the Lord,
 “ and the thynges that be opened pertaine unto
 “ us, that we [may] do all that is written in
 “ the booke. Wherefore, Sir, if we loued the
 “ Lawes of God, and would occupy ourselues
 “ to fulfill them, and woulde, on the other
 “ side be meeke, and let God alone wyth hys
 “ secretes, and suffer him to be wiser than we,
 “ we should make none article of the faith of
 “ this or that.” And again : “ If the soules
 “ be in heaven, tell me why they be not in as
 “ good case as the angels be? And then what
 “ cause is there of the resurrection.*

Again. *More* objects thus. “ What shall
 “ he care, how long he liue in sinne that bele-
 “ ueth Luther, that he shall after this life feele

* Tyndall's Works published by Fox. 1573. p. 324.

“ neyther good nor euill in bodye nor soule,
 “ untill the day of dome.”——Tyndall answers,
 “ Christ and hys apostles taught no other, but
 “ warned to look for Christe’s comming agayne
 “ euery houre : which comming agayne, be-
 “ cause ye beleue will neuer be, therefore haue
 “ ye fayned that other marchaundise. *”

These extracts plainly shew, what was the doctrine espoused by the first reformers upon this subject ; that is to say, they shew what they were charged with by their adversaries, and what they themselves avowed. Tyndall, we may observe, ascribes the contrary doctrine (as Luther had done before him) to the pope ; and in saying, that *the pope joined the spiritual doctrine of Christ, and the fleshly doctrine of the philosophers together*, he plainly alluded to the proofs from scripture alledged in the Lateran canon, to support the dogma of the Peripatetics, that *the soul is the substantial form of the body* ; which the Cartesians afterwards considered as inconsistent with its immateriality, and consequently, destructive of the doctrine of its immortality.

When Tyndall wrote this answer, to Sir Thomas More’s Dialogue, he did not suspect he had any adversaries upon this point except the papists. But it should seem, that in no long time after, the protestants had put him to his purification on this article. The canon of the Lateran council determines, that upon the supposition that the soul is mortal, a resurrection of the dead is not to be expected. How they grounded

* Tyndall, p. 327.

this conclusion on these premises, does not appear, nor is at all comprehensible. The same notion however had got into the heads of some protestants. The contents of the next section will prove the fact, but without enabling us to account for it. It was reserved for a genius of the present age to prove the resurrection of the dead, through the medium of the separate existence of the soul. What we know is, that Tyndall was obliged to publish a solemn protestation asserting his orthodoxy on the article of the resurrection of the dead, and the state of departed souls, which he would hardly have done to exculpate himself to the papists. It was more probably occasioned by the objections of some protestants to so much of his answer to Sir Thomas More, as hath been cited above. Let the reader judge from the terms of the protestation itself. Here it is.

A protestation made by William Tyndall, touching the resurrection of bodyes, and the state of the soules after this life ; adstracted [abstracted] out of a Preface of his that he made to the new testament, which he set forth in the yeare 1534.

“ Concernyng the resurrection, I proteste
 “ before God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, and
 “ before the universall congregation that be-
 “ leeueth in him, that I beleewe according to
 “ the open and manifest scriptures and catho-
 “ licke faith, that Christ is risen agayne in the
 “ flesh which he receaued of his mother the
 “ blessed virgine Mary, and body wherein he
 “ died. And that we shall all, both good and
 “ bad, rise both flesh and body, and appeare to-
 “ gither before the judgement seat of Christ,

“ to receeue euery man according to his
 “ deedes. And that the bodies of all that be-
 “ lieue, and continue in the true faith of Christ,
 “ shal be indewed with like immortalitie and
 “ glory, as is the body of Christ.

“ And I protest before God and our Saviour
 “ Christ and all that beleue in him, that I
 “ hold of the soules that are departed, as much
 “ as may bee proued by manifest and open
 “ scripture, and thinke the soules departed in
 “ the faith of Christ, and loue of the lawe of
 “ God, to be in no worse case than the soule
 “ of Christ was, from the tyme that he deli-
 “ uered his spirite into the handes of his father,
 “ untill the resurrection of his body in glory
 “ and immortalitie. Neuertheless, I confesse
 “ openly, that I am not perswaded, that they
 “ be already in the full glory that Christ is in,
 “ or the elect angels of God are in. Neither
 “ is it any article of my faith: for if so it were,
 “ I see not but then the preaching of the re-
 “ surrection of the flesh, were a thyng in vayne.
 “ Notwithstanding yet I am ready to beleue
 “ it, if it may be prooued with open scrip-
 “ ture.”*

This protestation being not to be found in any preface or prologue to the former editions of Tyndall's new testament, was doubtless calculated to obviate some objections which the friends of the reformation had made in the interval, to Tyndall's doctrine in his controversy with Sir T. More. If John Fox knew any particulars concerning the offence given by Tyn-

* See Tyndall's works published by Fox, 1573, at the beginning of the book.

dall to the protestants on this head, he hath left us in the dark, making no mention of any such offence, either in his acts and monuments, or in the abridgement of Tyndall's Life prefixed to his edition of his works.

There is a letter of Tyndall to Frith, preserved by Fox, * wherein is a caution which seems to allude to this controversy.—“ You will,” says Tyndall, “ crepe alow by the ground, “ and walk in those things that the conscience “ may feel, and not in the imaginations of the “ brain; in fear, and not in boldness; in open “ and necessary things, and not to pronounce “ or define of *hid secrets*, or things that neither “ help or hinder, whether they be so or no; in “ unitie, and not in seditious opinions; inso- “ much, that if you be sure you know, yet in “ things that may abide leisure, you will deferr, “ or say (till other agree with you) *methink* “ *the text requireth this sense or understand-* “ *ing*: yea and that if you be sure that your “ part be good, and another hold the contrary, “ yet if it be a thing that maketh no matter, “ you will laugh and let it pass, and referr the “ thing to other men, *and stick you stiffly and* “ *stubbornly in earnest and necessary things.*”

This admonition was written in the year 1533, and certainly alludes to differences of opinion among the protestants themselves, and particularly to this concerning the state of departed souls, which as we have seen, Tyndall, in his answer to Sir T. More, put among the secrets of God. These were intimations which, in his disputes with the papists, Frith did not

* Acts and Mon. Part ii. p. 987. and Tyndall's works, p. 455.

want; and I have cited them only to shew the probability that Tyndall's protestation had respect chiefly to protestant objectors. For that such there were will be seen in the next chapter.*

* Tyndall indeed gives testimony in this letter to Frith, and also in his protestation, to another original and important maxim of the first reformers, namely, *to stick stiffly and stubbornly to necessary things*, that is, to things that may be *openly and manifestly proved by the scriptures*; and to make no article of faith of this or that, which may not be so proved, and consequently is not necessary. This indeed is not a doctrine likely to be adopted by councils and convocations. Churchmen in high stations presume to hold their authority by a different tenure; but it is nevertheless the true original doctrine of the reformation, and they who chuse *stiffly and stubbornly* to stick to another rule, should find a denomination more properly descriptive of their principles, than that of protestant. What Tyndall thought of the necessity of believing the intermediate happiness of souls departed in the faith of Christ, may be understood by his declaration, that, in his opinion, if this were an article of faith, the preaching of the resurrection of the flesh were a thing in vain. There is great reason to believe that the arguments of the early protestants against purgatory and saint-worship, implied their belief of the sleep of the soul. The eighteenth of the articles exhibited in Scotland in 1546, against George Wishart was in these words. *Thou false heretic hast preached openly, saying, that the soul of man shall sleep to the latter day of judgment, and shall not obtain life immortal until that day.* To which Wishart answered, "God
" full of mercy and goodness forgive them that say such things of
" me. I wot and know surely by the word of God, that he which
" hath begun to have the faith of Jesus Christs, and believeth firmly
" in him, I know surely the soul of that man shall never sleep, but
" ever shall live an immortal life. The life which is renewed from
" day to day in grace and augmented; nor yet shall ever perish or
" have an end, but ever immortal shall live with Christ. To which
" life all that believe in him shall come, and rest in eternal glory." Fox. Acts and Mon. p. 1157. There is an obscurity, and probably an intended ambiguity in this good man's answer. Perhaps a passage in Luther's Table-talk, may give some light into his meaning. He says of the godly who are afflicted on earth, "true it is,
" they have peace in faith, but the same peace is invisible, and sur-
" passeth all human conceit; insomuch that being even in death,
" feeling no life at all, we must nevertheless believe we live." p. 402.

CHAP. VI.

CALVIN's Psychopannychia. *The time and place of its publication remarkable. On what account. An angry, abusive, weak performance. His arguments and proofs adopted, by modern Psychopannychists. Disingenuous with respect to the anabaptists. And the heathen philosophers.*

1534. **A**BOUT this time, 1534, Calvin had begun to figure, and two years after Luther had published the commentary just mentioned, Calvin put out a small tract at Orleans, which he intitled, *Psypchopannychia*, by which word is signified that the soul wakes throughout the whole night of death, with all the consciousness and sensibility necessary to the enjoyment of happiness.

There is something remarkable in the time and place of this publication.

In this very year 1534, and in this very city of Orleans, a ghost was conjured up by the Franciscans, which played a number of pranks, much in the style of the late *Cock-lane* spirit, and with much the same views of spite and re-

Both Luther and Wishart evidently refer to the text. *He that liveth and believeth in me shall never die.* Wishart indeed adds afterwards, *I know surely that my faith is such, that my soul shall sup with Christ ere it be six hours.* Alluding to our Saviour's promise to the penitent thief. Be it however observed, that this life of the soul depends entirely upon FAITH. What became of the souls of unbelievers (to which probably the accusation more immediately related) WISHART sayeth not.

venge.* Sleidan, who tells the story, having related how much the impostures were pitied and relieved, under their correction, by the populace, and particularly by the good women, proceeds to observe what excellent purposes of the ecclesiastical kind, were answered by these same spectres, particularly in supporting the doctrine of purgatory, encouraging private masses, and bringing in large profits to the priests. “But, continues he, after Luther’s doctrine came to be understood, and had gained a little strength, this kind of spectres by degrees vanished away. For Luther teaches from the scriptures, that the souls of the dead are at rest, waiting for the final day of judgment; and that those disturbances, frightful noises and phantoms are raised by satan, who loses no opportunity of confirming men in the practice of impious rites, and the belief of false opinions, that he may render ineffectual the blessings conferred upon us by our Saviour Christ.”†

Now Calvin had composed his book seven years before its publication at Orleans; and why he should chuse this critical season to disclose these sentiments, would be hard to say. Some part of this year he spent at Paris, and most probably he came not to Orleans, till the latter end of it. The juggle of the Franciscans, and the process against them, run out into a great

* Rogatus quid vellet [novicius] et quis esset? significat non sibi licere loqui. Jubetur ergo per signa respondere ad interrogata. Foramen erat factum, per quod admotis auribus, exorcistæ vocem haurire poterat et intelligere. Deinde tabulam habebat ad manum, quam interrogatus, feriebat.

† Sleidan comment, L. IX. p. 239—242.

length of time, and as this incident was considerable enough to find a place in Sleidan's history, it could be no secret to Calvin. But admit that Calvin's book made its appearance before the Franciscan spectre; it is certain that Luther's doctrine, mentioned by Sleidan, was still earlier by some years; and it is equally certain, that in proportion as Luther's principle bore down the trade of apparitions, that of Calvin, would encourage and promote it.

LUTHER, by consigning *all* the dead to a state of rest and sleep, left no pretence for the appearance of human souls after death. But Calvin managed his matters so, that though he was willing to suppose the souls of the elect, were in such a state of felicity, as would not admit of their being interrupted by worldly considerations; yet he left the sons of perdition to their liberty. For he says, "it is nothing to him what becomes of *their* souls; he would only be responsible for the faithful: * which I suppose, has given the hint to all succeeding *Psychopannichists*, to be so exceedingly shy of mentioning the condition of wicked souls in a separate state: fearing, as it should seem, to burn their fingers in purgatory.

In the mean time, as all the spectres of the monks were manufactured out of these wicked souls, it was no contemptible favour to leave them access to this reprobate group; one of

* Quod si quis ipsorum adhuc obstrepat, *quid perditionis filiis futurum sit?* Nihil ad nos. Ego pro fidelibus respondeo.—*Psychopan*, fol. 50. of the *Strasburgh* edition, 1545.

these, has occasionally been worth more to a church or a convent, than a dozen saints.

As to the book itself, it is hot, furious, and abusive. The *Hypnologists*, as he calls them, are *babblers, madmen, dreamers, drunkards*; in one word, *anabaptists* and *catabaptists*, under which name he says, are comprehended all sorts and kinds of wickednesses.* Happily for them, his arguments are as feeble and sophistical as they themselves could wish. Such as they are however, they have furnished all the orators and disputants for the consciousness of the separate soul, from that day to this, with scriptural authorities. For Calvin had so much wit in his anger, as not to meddle with the philosophical arguments for immortality.†

But though he charges the anabaptists with first broaching the doctrine of the sleep of the soul, in these latter days, he is nevertheless obliged to own, that some thousands were in that way of thinking, and some of these good men; that is to say, not anabaptists. Whence it appears, that he very well knew this doctrine was no way connected with the pernicious extravagancies of those enthusiasts; though this

* And yet he has the modesty to say in his second preface, *quam nec contra eos [anabaptistas] nisi modice bilem effudi; ut qui ab omni procacitate et loquendi petulantia perpetuo abstinuerim.*

† “Valeant philosophi, *says he*, quibus, cum in omnibus pene rebus solemne sit, nec finem, nec modum facere dissensionibus; HIC ita inter se rixantur, ut vix duos testes habiturus sis, in quacunque tandem opinione acquiescas.” He acknowledges however that Plato and Aristotle have discoursed excellently on the faculties of the soul, but that you would in vain consult them for any just account of its substance or origin. However, he thinks them upon the whole wiser and more orthodox than the *Hypnologists*, who boast that they are disciples of Christ, fol. 1. v.

he is disingenuous enough to insinuate in divers passages. *

He says likewise in one of his prefaces, “that
“ they who hold the opinion he endeavours to
“ confute, pay no regard to the scriptures;”
even while he is labouring and sweating to set
aside the force of a great number of texts they
bring from thence.

Among other things, he takes notice of an
objection to his system, drawn from the silence
of the scriptures, touching any rewards and
punishments but those of a final judgment.

He acknowledges the fact, but will not allow
of the consequence. “ I answer, says he, that
“ Christ is our head, whose kingdom and glory
“ have not yet appeared. If the members
“ were to go before the head, the order of things
“ would be perverted and preposterous. But
“ we shall then follow our prince, when he
“ shall come in the glory of his Father, and
“ sit upon the throne of his majesty. *In the*
“ *mean time, THAT liveth*, which is in us, of,
“ or from God, namely our spirit, because
“ Christ *liveth* who is our *life*; for it would be
“ absurd that we should *perish*, while our *life*

* Calvin wrote two prefaces to his *Psychopannychia*, the one at Orleans 1534, the other at Basil 1536, accommodated to the two editions of his book. Both these prefaces are in the Straßburgh edition of 1545. It is only in the latter of them that he allows some of those who held the sleep of the soul, to be good men. Possibly he might have heard of Tyndall, and some others of the same sentiments as good as himself, whom he could, with no decency, rank with such wretches as he had made the anabaptists in his first preface. His words however sufficiently shew, that there were more than Luther and Tyndall who differed from him on this article, whom he had no right to suppose, as he does, to be more credulous, or more ignorant of the scriptures, than himself.

“ *liveth.* And because our *life* is in God, it
 “ is therefore *with* God and happy.*

It would be doing too much honour to his contemptible string of quibbles to offer a replication. We therefore bid John Calvin good night, observing only that one might bring his own commentaries, composed in his riper years, to confront the foolish interpretations of many scriptures cited in the *Psychopannychia*.

CHAP. VII.

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul exhibited in the protestant confessions of faith. Little or nothing of it in the earliest of them. Obscure and ambiguous on the article of saint worship. The first Helvetic confession silent as to the doctrine of the soul's immortality. The doctrine asserted in that of Wirtenbergh. In what terms. Inconsistency of the Saxon confession of 1551. Poorly qualified by the Gallic and Belgic harmonizers. The obnoxious clause left out by the editors of the Corpus Confessionum of 1612.

IN no long time, the doctrine of the separate 1530-
 existence of the soul began to creep into the 36.
 public confessions of divers protestant church-
 es, and consequently to be equally sacred
 among the reformed, as the canons of Clement
 and Leo had made it among the papists.

Hitherto indeed no formal confession of the

* *Psychopan*, fol. 35.

protestant faith had publicly appeared, except those presented to the Emperor, Charles V. at the diet of Augsburgh, 1530, one by the Elector of Saxony and the princes his adherents, known by the name of the confession of Augsburgh; and another by the free cities of Strasburgh, Constance, Memmingen, and Lindau.

The latter has nothing concerning the immortality of the soul, nor any thing tending to discover the sentiments of the subscribers, on that subject.

The other which was drawn up by Melancthon, touches upon it very lightly, in the article concerning the invocation of saints, upon the pretence, that the writers among the Lutherans had been very full on the subject. This want of precision begat conferences between the papists and protestants, wherein the latter are said to have allowed, “that saints and angels intercede for us, and were therefore to be honoured but not invoked.”* This and other concessions mentioned during this diet, are put to the account of Melancthon’s timidity. Whether he ever made such a concession is yet a problem,† nor does such allowance seem to be very consistent with the argument in the confession, viz. “that invocation of saints attributes omnipotence to the dead, and implies that the saints know the motions of men’s hearts.”‡ Be that as it might, this doctrine of intercession, under certain limitations, was

* Maimbourg Hist. Luth. apud Seckendorf. l. ii. pag. 178.

† Vid. Seckendorf. l. iii. p. 548.

‡ Corpus Confess. p. 28. partis 2dæ.

afterwards admitted by some of the Lutherans, as we shall presently see.

The first Helvetic confession, exhibited by *Bucer* and *Capito* at the convention of divines at Wittenbergh, in the year 1536, and afterwards by *Bucer* alone at *Smalcald* 1537, makes no mention of the separate soul, or caring for the dead. This confession, and that of the four free cities above-mentioned, were probably both drawn up by *Bucer*.*

* I take these accounts from the harmony of confessions published at Geneva 1581. Perhaps it may be thought strange that so few of the reformed churches as were then in being, should have had any formal confession for so long a time, particularly that there should be an interval of fourteen years, viz. from 1537 to 1551, wherein we have no account of any new formulary of that kind. There were probably particular churches who had their objections to these explicit confessions, on account of the difference of opinion among them, upon particular articles, and for want of a leader of sufficient authority to enforce an assent to them. Calvin, as we are informed by Mr. Bayle, [Dict. Art. Calvin.] made all the people of Geneva solemnly abjure popery, and swear to a prescribed form of faith, in 1537. But his stiffness in some points of discipline, occasioned his dismissal, or rather banishment from Geneva the year following. He was recalled in 1541, and recovered his authority and influence, not only at Geneva, but in the reformed churches at a distance, viz. in France, Germany, England, Poland, &c. [Bayle, u. s.] However the deference paid to his judgment, was not without its limits, particularly in the article of publishing confessions of faith. This appears from two letters of his, the one to Luther, the other to Melancthon, complaining of the backwardness of the French on this head. *Cum Gallos nostros viderem, [says he to Luther,] quotquot a tenebris Papatus ad sanitatem fidei reducti erant, nihil tamen de confessione mutare, ac perinde se polluere sacrilegiis papistarum, ac si nullum veræ doctrinæ gustum haberent, temperare mihi non potui quin tantam hanc socordiam, sicuti meo judicio merebant, acriter reprehenderem. Qualis enim hæc fides, quæ intus in animo sepulta, nullum in fidei confessionem erumpit? Qualis religio quæ sub idololatriæ simulatione demersa jacet?* This Letter is subjoined to Alexander More's oration intitled CALVINUS, published by Gamonet, 1648. He tells Luther

In the year 1551, confessions were prepared to be exhibited to the council of Trent by divers protestant states and churches, among others, by the Duke of Wirtenburgh, and by the churches of Saxony.

“ We acknowledge, say the Wirtenburghers, “ that the saints in heaven pray for us before “ God, *suo quodam modo.*” In the next chapter they say, “ faith requires that we should think “ that the dead are not nothing, but that they “ truly live before God ; the pious happily in “ Christ ; the wicked in an horrible expecta- “ tion of the revelation of divine judgment.”* Wrestling thus what the Apostle Heb. x. 27, says of apostates in this world, to the intermediate state of the impious dead ; as indeed Calvin had done before them.†

afterwards, that he had written two books upon the subject, which had in part awakened some of them to a sense of their duty, and had occasioned a question among them, what they should do ? They objected, it seems, that to publish a confession, would expose them to persecution. But Calvin was obliged to own, that they had other specious reasons, which he could not answer to their satisfaction, and therefore, at their request, applied to Luther, for a final determination. This Letter is dated Feb. 18, 1545. Calvin’s letter to Melancthon is of the same date, and was sent by the same messenger. Luther never answered this letter that I can find. Melancthon sent his judgment to Calvin, which the latter afterwards published. The main dispute seems to have been whether it was lawful for a protestant to be present at popish worship, and to join in their ceremonies or not ? Calvin, who held the negative, thought the publication of their confession would effectually prevent the practice. The French churches however, had no formal confession till the year 1559.

* Harmon. Conf. p. 14 i mæ partis.

† Ubi oculi mentis nostræ, qui nunc sepulti in carne, hebetes sunt, absterferint hanc velut lippitudinem, videbimus quæ expectabamus, et ea requie delectabimur. Neque enim veremur id post apostolum dicere, qui è converso dicit φοβεσθαι την εκδοκην χριστου manere reprobos. Si hæc terribilis, illa sane et læta, et beata merito vocabitur. Psycho-pan, 35. f. v.

The Saxons say, “ In this faith [viz. of the
 “ three creeds] we invoke the true God, who
 “ manifested himself to his church by sending
 “ his son, and adding other illustrious testimo-
 “ nies, *joyning our prayers with all saints in*
 “ *heaven and earth.*” In another place how-
 ever they affirm, “ that the saints are dead, and
 “ cannot hear the prayers of their votaries,”*
 and how in that case they can “ *joyn* with them
 “ in prayer,” is a little incomprehensible.

However, when the harmonizers of the protes-
 tant confessions, under the auspices of the
 Belgic and Gallican churches, undertook in the
 year 1581, to make all things smooth and con-
 sistent, they found themselves under a neces-
 sity of applying a corrective to these doctrines
 of the Saxons and Wirtenberghers, as follows.

“ *Joyning our Prayer.*] We learn in many
 “ places of the holy scripture, that the angels,
 “ according to the nature of the ministry which
 “ they are sent to perform, do further the salva-
 “ tion of the godly, and it is evident from that
 “ saying, *love doth not fall away*, and by Apoc.
 “ vi. 10, that the spirits of the saints taken
 “ up unto Christ, do with *their holy desires*, IN
 “ SOME SORT, help forward the grace and good-
 “ ness of God, touching the full deliverance
 “ of the church. And we judge that as well in
 “ this as other places of the same confession,
 “ and also that place in the 23d chap. of the
 “ confession of Wirtenbergh, which followeth
 “ after the second section, p. 45 [p. 48 of the
 “ latin] are so to be interpreted. And we ac-
 “ knowledge NO OTHER intercession or intreat-

* Corpus Conf. p. 72, & 125. 2dæ partis.

“ing, either of the blessed angels, or of the
 “spirits of holy men, that are now departed
 “from us.”*

Probè fecistis, incertior sum multo quam dudum.

When people say the saints pray for them, intercede for them, and that they are better for such intercession, though I know they are mistaken, I know at least what they mean. But when I am told, “that (not the prayers, but) “the desires of the saints, do, in some sort “help forward the grace and goodness of God, “in the full deliverance of the church,” I am bewildered in a mist of words, to which I can fix no ideas.

The editors of the *Corpus Confessionum*, made shorter work with the Saxons still, by exhibiting their confession without the clause, *conjunctâ precatone nostra*. I was going to say, fairly, till I cast my eye by chance on the first words of the preface to this collection, viz. *Exhibenter in hoc volumine, celeberrimæ confessiones fidei, ex optimis quibusque editionibus, EX OMNI PARTE INTEGRÆ.*

For my part, I cannot help commiserating the distress of these poor men, who having once allowed the saints a conscious existence in heaven, were so hard put to it to keep clear of the consequences.

* See the observations at the end of the *Harmony of Confessions*. Obs. 1. upon the Saxon confession:

C H A P. VIII.

The 40th of K. Edward the 6th's Articles, the first instance of the express condemnation of the doctrine of the sleep of the soul, in a protestant confession. A passage from Bishop Burnet relative to those Articles. A conjecture at whom that article was aimed. The article dismissed upon the review in 1562.

THERE was however as yet, nothing in any 1552. of these confessions, which formally condemned the doctrine of the sleep of the soul, as an heresy. The Lutherans, as appears by the particulars above recited, halted between two opinions. Whatever Luther's private sentiments were, he had nowhere decided dogmatically on the subject; and the difference between his followers, and those of Zuinglius concerning the sacrament, so wholly engrossed the attention of both parties, that other matters were much overlooked.

The honour of first condemning this tenet was reserved for our English reformers, who in the 40th of King Edward's articles composed in the year 1552, and published the year following, expressed themselves thus.

“ They who say that the souls of such as depart hence do sleep, being without all sense, feeling, and perceiving, until the day of judgment, or affirm that the souls die with the bodies, and at the last day shall be raised up with the same, do utterly dissent from the

“right belief declared unto us in the holy
“scripture.”

Bishop Burnet, speaking of these articles, says, “Thus was the doctrine of the church
“cast into a short and plain form, in which
“they took care both to establish the positive
“articles of religion, and to cut off the errors
“formerly introduced in the time of popery,
“or of late broached by the anabaptists and
“enthusiasts of Germany; avoiding the nice-
“ties of schoolmen, and the peremptoriness of
“the writers of controversy.”*

One may be pretty sure that this article was not aimed at any error of popery; and what business had our reformers to condemn the enthusiasts of Germany, in a point of doctrine which had not been censured publicly by the orthodox of their own country? It is probable the doctrine here condemned had been held and propagated by some of our own people at home.

“There were,” says Strype, “a looser sort of
“professors of religion, a sort of anabaptists,
“who, a little before that time, had private
“meetings, wherein they proposed odd questi-
“ons, and vented dangerous doctrines and
“opinions. Of these the council having no-
“tice, they thought it very fit to discounte-
“nance and restrain them.”†

The truth is, whoever in those days entertained any opinion out of the common road, was called an anabaptist, though perhaps he did not know what were the distinguishing doctrines

* Burnet's Hist. Ref. vol. ii. p. 168.

† Life of Cranmer, p. 233.

of that sect. Just as in these latter times they who have been troublesome to the professors of the orthodox system, have been classed with arians, socinians, methodists, &c.

But whatever was the motive with King Ed-1562. ward's reformers to declare against the sleep of the soul in this preremptory manner, when the articles came to be reviewed in 1562, by Parker and his associates, this 40th article was dropped; in consideration, as it should seem, that by allowing separate souls to have sense, feeling, and perception, the doctrines of purgatory, and invocation would very naturally follow. It is for their honour too, to suppose they had looked into the scriptures with a little more care and sagacity than their predecessors, and could not find the right belief mentioned in the article.

C H A P. IX.

The second Helvetic confession totally Calvinistical. Condemns the doctrine of the Sleep of the Soul. Remarks upon the seventh article of it. Adopts the peripatetic doctrine of substantial forms. Anathematizes in the terms of a popish canon. Condemns inadvertently a doctrine of Calvin. Part of the 27th article of it. Espouses the Florentine doctrine of the immediate migration of holy Souls to Heaven.

IN the year 1566, was published the second 1566. Helvetic confession, fabricated entirely upon

the Calvinistical plan. Luther had now been long out of the way, and the reign of Calvin at Geneva had determined by his death, but two years before. Beza succeeded him, and most probably drew up this confession, of which the following is part of the seventh article, intitled, *of the creation of all things, of angels, the devil, and man.*

“ We hold that man consists of two, and
 “ those different substances in one person ; of
 “ an immortal soul, seeing that, being separ-
 “ ated from the body, it neither sleeps nor
 “ dies ; and of a mortal body, which yet, at
 “ the last judgment, shall be raised from the
 “ dead, that the whole man from thencefor-
 “ ward may remain to eternity, either in life
 “ or death. We condemn all who scoff at the
 “ immortality of the soul, or bring it into
 “ doubt by subtle disputations, or who say that
 “ the soul sleeps, or that it is a part of God.”*

Who sees not in this protestant canon, the features of that of the Lateran council?

1. Mr. Bayle, apologizing for Pomponatius, has the following remark. “ In Pomponatius’s
 “ time they knew of no philosophical system
 “ but that of Aristotle, so that to assert that
 “ the immortality of the soul could not be
 “ proved by the principles of that philosopher,
 “ and to assert that it could not be proved by
 “ philosophical reasons, was one and the same
 “ thing.”†

What Bayle says of the time of Pomponatius, is equally true of the time of Calvin and

* Corp. Confess. p. 25. 1mæ partis.

† Bayle, POMPONACE rem. [F.]

Beza. The doctrine of the two substances in man, is founded upon the philosophy of Aristotle, in the Helvetic, as well as in the Roman Bull. Calvin was as deep in substantial forms, as Clement or Leo : and as it might be made appear by his account of election, reprobation, grace, &c. had as much occasion for them.

2. The Helvetic heroes as well as the pontifician, are for prohibiting all disputes upon the question concerning the immortality of the soul, and both under the same anathema. *Damnamus et reprobamus, &c.*

3. The Helvetians say, “we condemn all “who assert that the soul is a part of God.” CALVIN, if I mistake not, asserted something very like it, in a passage cited above out of *Psychopannychia*. He calls the soul, *id quod in nobis ex Deo est*. If by *ex Deo*, he meant only *from God*, the same may be said of every ingredient in our composition. But his expression shews that he meant to distinguish the soul from something else which was not *ex Deo*, in the same sense at least. How this distinction can be explained without considering the soul, as *discerptum quiddam ex Deo*, I see not.

In the twenty-sixth article of the same confession, we meet with the following passage.

“We believe that the faithful migrate directly from their corporeal death to Christ, “and therefore do not want the prayers, liturgies, or liturgic offices of the living for the “dead. Also we believe that the wicked are “directly precipitated into hell, from whence “there is no outlet for impious persons, to be “procured by any offices of the living.”

If this is really the case, not only liturgic offices, but even a resurrection, and a future judgment are needless things. Be it remarked that this is the first time we meet with the Florentine doctrine, of *immediate migration* to Christ (noted as a deviation from the primitive creed by Bp. Taylor, as above) publicly avowed by a protestant church. However, so little careful were these Helvetians of expressing themselves accurately and consistently, that in another place of this very confession, the souls or spirits of the saints get no higher than the stars. *Postquam astra petiisset spiritus.* Art. V.

CHAP. X.

The Scottish confession, art. 17th, declares against the sleep of the soul. Curious particulars relating to this confession. Does not harmonize with the second Helvetic touching the immediate migration of holy souls to Christ, or the direct precipitation of the wicked and unbelievers into hell.

1568. **T**HESE last particulars remind me of our 1580. neighbours the Scots, whom I was in some danger of passing by. In the year 1560, their confession was offered in, and ratified by the parliament at Edinburgh, August 17, * of which here followeth the seventeenth article.

* See Spotswood's Hist. of the church of Scotland, B. iii. p. 150. Ed. 1677. where are some circumstances much to the honour of our reforming neighbours.

“ The elect departed are in peace, and rest
 “ from their labours : not that they slepe and
 “ come to a certain oblivion, as some fantas-
 “ ticks do affirme: but that they are delivered
 “ from all fear and torment, and all temptati-
 “ ons to which we and all God’s elect are sub-
 “ ject in this life, and therefore do bear the
 “ name of the church militant: as contrari-
 “ wise, the reprobate and unfaithful departed
 “ have anguish and paine that cannot be ex-
 “ pressed. So that neither are the one nor the
 “ other in such slepe that they fele not their
 “ torment” [l. joy or torment,] * for which
 they quote, *Luke* xvi. 22, 23. xxiii. 43.
Apoc. vi. 9.

I am afraid this article will by no means
 harmonize with the Helvetic migration of holy
 souls to Christ, nor with direct precipitation
 of the wicked and unbelievers into hell. The
 happiness of the saints here mentioned, is all
 of the negative sort, and though positive tor-
 ments and anguish are, in this Scottish confes-
 sion, made the portion of the wicked, yet we

* I transcribe this from a copy of the Scottish confession, printed
 at London, by Rouland Hall, 1561, said to be set forth and autho-
 rized according to the Quenes Majesties injunctions. [Elizabeth.]
 It is exactly the same which is at the end of the English translation
 of the *Harmony of Confessions*, of which I have two editions, and all
 three agree in saying that, “neither the one nor the other feel their
 “torment.” But the latin in the *Corpus Confessionum*, has it, *ut*
neque hi neque illi, adeo dormiunt, quin sentiunt in qua conditione
versentur. In the history of the reformation in Scotland ascribed to
 John Knox, the words are, “so that neither are the one nor the
 “other in such slepe, that they feel not joy or torment.” The latin
 translation of this confession was made by a Scotch nobleman (then
 probably an exile in Switzerland) who, in a short preface, speaks of
 it as “first published in the year 1568, and being only in the Scot-

find it all ends in this, that neither the one nor the other are so fast asleep, but that they are sensible of their condition. The hypothesis of the Scots seems to admit of an increase of happiness and misery after the resurrection; that of the Helvetians will admit of none.

CHAP. XI.

The confession of the Remonstrants censured by the Calvinists for omitting to mention the immediate migration of good souls to Heaven. Ascribe this omission to Socinianism. Episcopius's sensible answer. Extremely provoking to the Calvinists, as recriminating upon their master. The great confusion of protestant writers of those times on this subject. Accounted for by Lud. Capellus; who does not stand clear of confusion himself. An instance of it.

1612. ACCORDINGLY when, in the year 1612, the confession of the remonstrants appeared, the calvinists censured it, among other things,

“tish dialect, had not been, that he knew of, communicated to other
“churches.” It is unaccountable that this nobleman should not
know, that this very confession was in print several years before.
That it had not been communicated to foreign protestant churches is
probable enough from the following circumstances. “In the year
“1567, the churches of Geneva, Berne, and Basil, with other re-
“formed churches of Germany and France, sent to the whole church
“of Scotland the sum of the confession of their faith, desiring to
“know, if they, the Scots, agreed in uniformity of doctrine, alledg-
“ing, that the church of Scotland was dissonant in some articles from
“them.” To this the church of Scotland with Knox at their head,
answered, “that they agreed in all points with those churches, and
“differed in nothing from them, albeit in the keeping of some festi-

for omitting to mention, the happy immortality of souls in heaven, after this life, which, they say, is expressly delivered in their catechism; and for this omission, the remonstrants are accused of socinianism.*

Episcopus defends himself and his brethren by observing, “that the judgments of the
 “greatest divines had formerly, and still did
 “vary, concerning the state of departed souls;
 “that the fathers seemed to be pretty well
 “agreed, that no souls were admitted into paradise, till our Saviour by his death, opened
 “the door and went in, with the penitent thief
 “in his company: that though all the fathers
 “down to the end of the fourth century, judged
 “that the souls of the faithful were received
 “into paradise after our Lord had opened it,
 “yet they were far from agreeing what or where
 “this paradise was. Some understood that it
 “meant *Heaven*, others *Hades*, not the place
 “of torment but a common receptacle where
 “the souls of the good and bad were reserved
 “till the last judgment, for which he cites

“val days, their church assented not, for only the sabbath was kept
 “in Scotland.” p. 436. The ready way to convince these foreign churches of this agreement, had been, to send them an authentic copy of the Scottish confession, that they might judge for themselves. The confession sent to Scotland on this occasion, was undoubtedly the second helvetic, which, as is observed above, differed from the Scottish one in the article of migration; though possibly the Scots were not aware of it. These festival days, and some ceremonies had been abolished at Geneva, and that model Knox adopted in Scotland. Afterwards, in 1538 the festivals, &c. were restored at Geneva, by an act of a synod held at Lausanne. Calvin and Farel refused to submit to this restoration, and on account of that and some other scruples, were obliged to leave the city. See Bayle’s Dict., CALVIN. Rem. [K.]

* *Apologia pro confessione remonstrantium. cap. xix.*

“ Lactantius, lib. vii. cap. 21.—The greek
 “ fathers, he says, were unanimous in their
 “ opinion, that the souls of the saints did not
 “ enjoy the vision of God, nor were admitted
 “ into the fruition of glory, till the resurrec-
 “ tion; and that Calvin himself seems to have
 “ favoured this notion, both in his *Psychopan-*
 “ *nychia* and in his institutions; * and lastly,
 “ that the socinians themselves acknowledge
 “ as much concerning the reception of souls
 “ into heaven, immediately after their depar-
 “ ture from the body, as is expressed in the
 “ general words of their catechism, &c.”†

The calvinists, I believe, must have been grievously provoked and mortified by this reply of Episcopius, the truth of which they could not deny. To shew that they went against the stream of the most orthodox fathers in their catechism, was bad enough. But that was a small matter in comparison of his putting it out of their power to fix socinianism on the

* *Ludovicus Capellus* published a tract intituled, *de hominum post mortem statu usque ad ultimum judicii diem*, wherein he attempts to prove, against the received opinion, “that the separate soul doth
 “ not go immediately to heaven or hell upon the death of the body,
 “ but remains in a state of expectation, which is a state of happiness
 “ or misery, according as the soul is conscious of the good or evil of
 “ its by-spent life, during its union with the body.” See a collection of his pieces in folio printed at Amsterdam, 1689. In this tract, Capellus cites these passages of Calvin, mentioned by Episcopius, as agreeing with his opinion, but is obliged to add such comments and explanations to Calvin’s words as plainly shew the sentiments of that reformer to have been by no means clear and precise upon the subject. Calvin indeed was far from being master of the question; and one may discover in his expressions a kind of perplexity, which was plainly suggested by the fear of giving advantages to his adversaries of different denominations.

† *Apol. pro Confes. Remonst.* 41, s,

remonstrants, without stigmatizing their venerable master with the same brand-mark.

The reader will not expect that I, who profess to consult his ease as well as my own, should take notice of a thousandth part of the various scribblings on the immortality of the soul, with which every subdivision of the period we have gone through was pestered, by papists, and protestants, by men of all sects and heresies, and even by Jews and Mahometans. It is but good manners to suppose, that they who presided in christian churches, and to whom the formation of public systems of doctrine was left, would select the quintessence of all the learning that had ever been employed in elucidating any particular subject. It is our misfortune that they seem to have succeeded worse on the question before us than upon any other. I mean this of our protestant ancestors. For to what do all their determinations amount, but to a confused jumble of inconsistent notions concerning an intermediate state, which while one set are labouring to prop by scripture hints and innuendos, in consequence of the old system of natural immortality, another are endeavouring to pull down, in order to keep out purgatory, by proving that the scriptures speak of *two* states *only*, heaven and hell.

It may probably be neither unentertaining nor unedifying to subjoin the account that Capellus gives of the original of this distress.

“Some,” says he, “perhaps may wonder, how it has happened, if our opinion is the more probable, that both protestant and popish divines have agreed in that opinion

“ which we oppose ; (viz. that the souls of good
 “ men go immediately to heaven :) I answer,
 “ that both the one and the other have departed
 “ from the primitive opinion of the ancient
 “ fathers of the christian church, and espoused
 “ this other, but with very different and con-
 “ trary views. The papists, in order to sup-
 “ port their erroneous practice of invoking
 “ the saints, thought it convenient, that the
 “ saints should be stationed, before the resur-
 “ rection, in the third heaven, where the blessed
 “ enjoy the beatific vision of God, and where,
 “ in their fictitious mirrour of the divine es-
 “ sence, they might behold all things which
 “ are transacted upon earth : and that being
 “ by this means nearer, and consequently more
 “ like unto God, they might seem to be pro-
 “ perer objects of our prayers, vows and religi-
 “ ous worship. It was therefore the spirit of
 “ superstition and idolatry, which drove the
 “ papists into this opinion. But the protes-
 “ tants, having another popish error to oppose,
 “ namely purgatory, and the proper satisfaction
 “ for sin there to be made, which would have
 “ authorised the pope’s indulgencies, were
 “ afraid that, if they should grant that there
 “ was a *third* place appointed for the souls of
 “ the pious and holy after this mortal life, they
 “ might likewise be obliged to admit this fic-
 “ titious purgatory. And therefore thought
 “ it safer absolutely to deny any middle state,
 “ than to expose themselves to the tricks and
 “ subtilties of the papists in supporting their
 “ purgatory, by granting such third or middle
 “ state.” *

* From the tract above-mentioned at the end,

What Capellus proposed by this dissertation, was to help his brethren the protestants, out of this difficulty, which he thought might be done by shewing, “that a purgatory would not follow from the concession of a middle state, such as the primitive fathers had represented it.” In this he succeeds well enough. But he had done much better service to the protestant cause, and gained more honour to himself, had he shewn, as he might have done by the help of those very texts he employs, that there were no grounds for the notion of an intermediate consciousness of separate souls, either of the righteous or the wicked, between death and the resurrection. But by incumbering himself with this intermediate consciousness, without determining where or how the separate soul subsists, he has left the dispute just where he found it; and to confess the truth, has made strange work with some of those texts, which, in their plain, obvious meaning, neither favoured him nor his adversaries.

For example. Speaking to that text of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 18. where the apostle says, *If Christ is not risen, then they who are fallen asleep in Christ are perished*, he comments upon it thus, *Pereunt, non quidem, quoad $\tau\omicron$ esse, sed quoad $\tau\omicron$ bene esse ; hoc est, quantum ad felicitatem* [positam in lætâ beatæ resurrectionis futuræ expectatione, as he describes this felicity above] *qua sic prorsus evertitur, sublatâ resurrectione*. What idea can any one form of these half-perished souls? But what will not an eagerness to serve an hypothesis tempt a man to say?

C H A P. XII.

Antony de Dominis *discusses the questions concerning the separate existence of the soul in his book De Rep. Ecclesiastica. His character in short by Fuller. Admits the point may be debated without danger to the faith or scandal to the church. States the question with candor. Urges the O. T. scriptures for the cessation of thought and consciousness after death, with great strength. Has nothing to set against them but apocryphal Esdras. The passage quoted from that writer examined. Proceeds to authorities in the N. T. Makes concessions which ruin his cause, both with respect to the Scriptures and Philosophy. His conclusions in favour of separate existence, futile and childish. Probably against his real sentiments. Was to manage K. James I. a strenuous Dæmonologist.*

1622. **W**E have led the reader a little out of the chronological line, by introducing *Ludovicus Capellus* before his time ; which however was in some sort necessary, to shew, what the motive was, that induced so many protestant writers to desert the scriptural road pointed out to them by Luther and Tyndall ; and likewise the difficulties into which they were drawn by espousing Calvin's refinements, who, whatever he might pretend, was beholden to Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, &c. for the most plausible parts of his system, which abounds even in his comments upon several texts of scripture, with

that very philosophy he would be thought to disclaim, and which is the corner stone of the purgatorial fabrick.

We now return into the former track, and are sorry we cannot introduce the reader to a more respectable fellow traveller than *Marc Antony de Dominis*, sometime Archbishop of *Spalato* or *Spalatro*, who, according to one of our historians, “ had too much wit and learning to be a cordial papist, and too little honesty and religion to be a sincere protestant.”* However as he professes, that the discussion of this point would not interfere with any established article of faith, and consequently, that nothing would be lost by speculating upon it (a consideration, to which he, as well as some wits and scholars of more modern times, was more especially attentive) we may for the present avail ourselves of his *wit* and *learning*, and give him credit for as much *honesty* and *religion*, as he can fairly lay claim to.†

This writer’s particular business with this question seems to have been, to make way for the arguments he afterwards advances against a popish purgatory ; which purpose, the texts

* Fuller, Church History. B. X. p. 100.

† He seems however to have borrowed a little honesty of somebody who had it to spare, in the following just and liberal reflection, which is humbly recommended to the contemplation of some of our modern curators of orthodoxy.—“ Et quia quoad secundam et tertiam opinionem, nullus est fidei articulus plane definitus, liberior relinquitur ingenii theologorum disputandi locus, citra schismatum et divisionum omne periculum. Res enim inter orthodoxos theologos perniciosissima est, si charitate abrupta, divisionis inter ipsos fiant, ubi alii in diversam ab aliis abiunt sententiam. Si enim salvâ charitate, hoc non liceret, theologica scientia esset penitus destruenda.”

of scripture he brings, and the sense he is inclined to put upon them, answer very effectually. But having a royal dæmonologist upon his hands, it became his prudence to manage so, as to have separate souls in readiness for the several errands on which, conjurers, witches, and second-sighted discerners of ghosts and apparitions, chose to employ them.

“ He informs us that there are three opinions
 “ concerning the state of souls after death ;
 “ two, which carry matters to extremity, and
 “ a third, which he calls the middle one. The
 “ first of these extremes is, that souls are in a
 “ profound sleep, from the death of the body
 “ to the resurrection ; and in that state, have
 “ neither joy nor sorrow, enjoyment nor suf-

“ et theologicis contemplationibus esset ultimus finis imponendus, ob-
 “ struendumque es omnibus ut ne hiscere quidem auderent, præter
 “ ea quæ theologus aliquis non nisi ex probabilibus asseruit, et nun-
 “ quam fuerunt tanquam de fide a quoquam recepta, aut ab ecclesia
 “ *sufficienter definita.*” De Repub. Ecclesiastica. Vol. ii. Lib. v.
 Cap. 8. P. 75. The words *non sufficienter definita*, might carry an inquisitive man a good deal farther than Marc Anthony intended. He could not but know, that the Florentine Canon contained a *definition sufficient* to muzzle the popish divines, of which indeed he did not acknowledge himself to be one. He considered his liberty, on this occasion, as arising from the expunction of the fortieth of King Edward 6th's articles, in 1562. Some of our modern divines will needs have it, that the church of England hath sufficiently defined her belief of the activity of the separate soul in some other parts of her established forms. But if the church is inconsistent with herself, that is her own fault. If the church espouses an article of faith in one place, which she hath expunged in another, I am at liberty to say, that she hath not sufficiently defined that article, but hath left me free to form my own judgment upon it. Things, about the time in question, were done in a hurry. Had there been time for it, no doubt but they who corrected the articles would have conformed the liturgy and homilies to those corrections.

“fering, no understanding, no affection, nor
 “any exercise of mental operation ; conse-
 “quently no consciousness.”

He distinguishes this opinion, however, from the arabian heresy, importing, “that the soul
 “died, perished, and was corrupted with the
 “body, which it seems was confuted by Origen,
 “and was then lately revived by certain crazy
 “anabaptists.”*

By the way, as our author hath acknowledged, that the second and third of these opinions were not established in any definitive article of faith, and that the first might, on that account, be freely discussed, it must be deemed an innocent, though an erroneous opinion. This, according to his judgement, was not the case

* The patrons of a separate existence have made a wonderful figure with this *Arabian heresy*, and I suppose the reprobation of it by Origen, Austin and others, may have intimidated most of those who have held the sleep of the soul, from acknowledging any concern with it. There is however one exception of an honest man, who had no scruple to express himself thus. “He mentions also the *Arabian heresy* in the third century. And I grant that the account given by Eusebius of that Arabian tenet, agrees very well with my opinion before expressed. The region of Arabia, lies compassed by Chaldæa, Ægypt and Judæa ; and in that and future times, produced men of as much wit and knowledge as any other place we read of. Those who then opposed this their opinion, conscious perhaps that they could not maintain the contrary, called Origen out of Ægypt to their assistance, as a man most famed for learning in that time, but a full and resolved Platonist ; and he so managed that council, as therein the opinion of the soul’s dying with the body, was judged to be an error, and branded with the term of heresy, which seems not sufficient to convince my understanding, that it was so much as erroneous ; because I read, divers other general councils (as well as that) have been mistaken in their judgement and canons, on the like occasions. The reasons and scriptures which moved the Arabians of that time so to think, have never been

of the arabian heresy, espoused by the mad anabaptist. But where is the difference? or what is the partition that divides them? A soul deprived of all its essential functions, without sensibilities or affections of any kind, is as like a dead soul, at least as a cropp'd horse is like a horse with no ears. But as the author has not discovered in what he places the distinction between the innocent and the obnoxious opinion, we shall not inquire after it; but go on with him.

The other extreme opinion he mentions is, that "the soul, immediately after death, either obtains complete felicity, and is crowned with eternal glory, or is thrust down into gehenna, and is tormented with eternal punishments." Here, he says, "the papists interpose their purgatory, for the use of a second sort of these good souls, serving them for a state of expiation, before they are admitted to their final glory." How he came to tack this to an extreme opinion one cannot easily guess. This, however, is all he says of it in this place.

The middle opinion, he tells us, is, "that the souls of the elect do indeed immediately pass into eternal glory and the enjoyment of it, but not fully and completely, being in a state of expectation, waiting for the completion of their felicity after the resurrection.

"quite forgotten or retracted since that time, and do rise up now as fresh as ever, for the maintenance and support of that Arabian tenet, which by Origen's assistance was condemned." *Observations on Mr. Broughton's Ppsychologia, Part. ii. p. 48. By Henry Layton, Esq.*

“ In like manner, that the souls of the wicked,
 “ are consigned to eternal punishment, imme-
 “ diately after the death of the body, which
 “ punishment however they do not feel com-
 “ pletely, and are only to have the full mea-
 “ sure of it, after the resurrection.”

How he moderates among these different opinions we shall see presently. I don't find however that any of the Psychopannychists before him ventured to give this horrid picture of divine vengeance with respect to the intermediate state of wicked souls. Calvin, as we have seen, would only answer for the souls of the elect; he saw the consequence of applying his hypothesis to the case of the wicked, and most of his followers seem to have seen it as well as he. I do not think that *De Dominis* could cite any respectable authority for the latter part of this middle opinion. He seems however to have seen, that partial punishment in an intermediate state, was the unavoidable alternative of partial happiness, and that the one was the inevitable attendant upon the other.

With respect to the second and third of these opinions, it is to be observed, that most of the fathers, upon whose authority our author chiefly regulates his conclusions, agree to condemn the notion of any beatific vision or glorification of the good, or real positive torments of the wicked, before the general judgement, as heretical; and, on that account, provide several limbos for patriarchs, prophets, infants, &c. as places of rest and inactivity for departed souls, till the appointed time of redemption. These two opinions lay no difficulties in our author's way.

But though he calls the first extreme or the sleeping hypothesis, an intolerable opinion, it is plain, it is that which creates his chief embarrassment, as being countenanced by the greatest number, and the most express texts of scripture, which to do him justice, he is not backward to exhibit. And having produced those remarkable passages of David, Solomon, Hezekiah, and Job, which imply a total suspension of thought, understanding, activity, and consciousness after death, he freely confesses, that they speak as if the soul was mortal.

Unwilling, however, to leave these portions of scripture in possession of their plain meaning, or to trust for a diminution of their force, to the qualification of a naked metaphysical hypothesis, he casts about for an old testament interpreter, whom he finds in the second book of Apocryphal Esdras. “He acknowledges
 “indeed that these books are not canonical ;
 “nor, except for the purpose of confirming
 “doctrines, are of any authority ; but as they
 “are of great antiquity, they give an air of
 “probability to things, [*suam dant rebus probabilitatem*] and sufficiently discover what
 “was, in those days, the tradition of the church.”

And what says this Esdras? Why, “he
 “speaks of certain *promptuaria animarum*,
 “not only of the fathers before Christ, but
 “also after Christ : for he affirms that these
 “*promptuaria* or repositories shall give up the
 “souls that are in them.” Chap. iv. 41, 42.
 vii. 32.

But Esdras in these passages makes no distinction between the souls of the fathers, and

the souls of other men. The giving up, is general in both passages ; particularly in the latter, where the earth and the dust are represented, as well as these *promptuaria*, as delivering what was committed to them. Without this imaginary restriction of these *promptuaria*, to the use assigned by the fathers, Esdras is as unfavourable to our author's hypothesis, as David, and Solomon.*

* As these *promptuaria* are mentioned more than once and on different accounts, and as this fictitious Esdras is by some honoured with the title of prophet, it may be expected we should give these passages a particular consideration. Chap. IV. v. 35. is thus exhibited in the old Latin. *Nonne de his interrogaverunt animæ justorum in promptuariis suis dicentes usque quo &c.* Castellio, who polished this book with his critical style, gives it, *animæ justorum in penetrabilibus suis*. But Junius who came after him, turns it, *justi ipsi in suis cellis*, and adds in the margin the following note. *Hunc locum ita redidimus, quia Hebraismus ita fuit reddendus, animæ justorum, pro justis ipsis. Nam de piorum cum viverent expostulatione hic agi, evincit ipsa expostulationis forma. Cellas autem eorum sic dicit, ut conclavia dixerat Jeschaiah. xxvi. 20 : quem locum hic non dubitamus respici ; sic infra V. 9.* And thus likewise the editors of the Paris bible of 1564 appear to have understood it, referring to Jeremiah xii. 1. where we find the Prophet expostulating in much the same strain. The learned Daubuz and others, refer to this passage as paralel to Apocal. iv. 10, where we have the expostulation of the *souls under the altar*. But to whatever this passage is an allusion, we learn no more from it, than we do from the passages alluded to in our canonical scriptures. At verse 41. of the same chapter the vulgate runs thus. *In inferno promptuaria animarum, matrici assimulata sunt ; quemadmodum enim illa festinat quæ parit effugere necessitatem partus, sic et hæc festinat [festinant] reddere ea quæ commendata sunt.* Here Junius instead of *promptuaria animarum*, gives it, *cellæ mortuorum* ; upon what grounds we shall see presently, Chap. V. 9. we have in the old latin, *Et abscondetur tunc sensus, et intellectus separabiter in promptuarium suum, et quaeretur a multis, et non invenietur.* For *promptuarium*, Castellio has, *penetrabile*, and the rest as the old latin. But Junius gives it, *Et tunc latebit prudens, et intelligens separatus manebit, tanquam in*

Our author having thus settled matters to his satisfaction with respect to the writers of the old testament, proceeds to consider what may be learned from those of the new.

cella sua conditus. The sense is much the same either way, and the writer only meant that when wickedness and impiety are exalted, wise and understanding men, or wisdom and understanding are in obscurity. [see Dan. xii. 10. Prov. xxviii. 12, 28.] nor does *promptuarium* signify any thing here, but a place of retirement.—Chap. vii. 32, we find in the vulgate, *Et terra reddet quæ in ea dormiunt, et pulvis qui in eo silentio habitant, et promptuaria reddent quæ eis commendate sunt animæ.* For which Castellio has, *Et cellæ depositas apud se reddent animas.* But Junius more roundly, *Et cellis, redentibus cadavera quæ sibi fuerint commendata;* in which he was undoubtedly in the right. In the english translation of this book from the arabic, communicated to the public by the learned Professor Ockley, this last cited verse is thus rendered. *And the earth shall cast forth those which slept in it, which I committed to it to keep, and the secret repositories shall restore the souls that are in them.* The other texts are not in the arabic. Upon these passages Mr. Arnold hath the following observation. “ Chap. iv. verse 35, 41. “ mention is made of souls departed in a state of grace, being kept in “ chambers, or secret store-houses till the day of judgment, agreea- “ bly enough to Apoc. iv. 9. 10. which has been objected to, as “ seemingly countenancing the doctrine of purgatory, and it must be “ confessed the catholics have so applied it; but without reason, as “ nothing therein is said, or intimated of their being detained there by “ way of punishment, or to be purified by it.” How should there, if this 35th verse is paralel to Apoc. iv. 9. where the expostulation is ascribed to the souls of martyrs, with which above all others, purgatory is never understood to have any thing to do? nor do I know that any catholics have so applied the passage, the whole book being uncanonical even among them. On the other hand, verse 41 has nothing in it to lead us to suppose, that these chambers or repositories are allotted to souls in a state of grace, exclusive of others. The very similitude taken from child-birth, shews that these chambers comprehend the souls of all, good and bad, which shall be given up as necessarily as the human *fatus* is brought into the world from its *promptuarium*, the womb. What seems to have misled Mr. Arnold and others in this matter is the expression, *reddere ea quæ commendata sunt.* But where is there any

And here he allows that when our Lord brought the expression, *I am the God of Abraham, &c.* to prove the resurrection of the dead, he did not consider God, as the God of Abra-

intimation in the book, that these supposed souls are more especially committed or commended to these repositories, than the bodies of all men are committed or commended to the earth? On the contrary, the variety of expression, Chap. vii. 32, which denotes the future restoration of the dead, shews that the word *commendata* relates equally to those who sleep in the earth, and who dwell in the dust in silence, as to the *animæ in promptuariis*. So the arabian translator understood the matter, and accordingly gives it, as we have seen, *the earth shall cast forth those which slept in it, which I committed to it to keep, &c.* And Junius, perceiving that the whole verse was only descriptive of death and the grave, or of the general state of the dead, and their universal restoration, very sensibly and properly renders the last part, *et cellis reddentibus cadavera quæ sibi fuerint commendata*, knowing that the last clause is equally applicable to the several periphrases by which the general state of the dead is signified. I have said nothing of the authority of this book. They who think it makes for the doctrine of a conscious intermediate state may find the arguments for its authenticity at full length in Whiston's Essay on the Apostolical Constitutions. p. p. 38. and 137. Edit. 1712. Sir John Floyer's preface to, *the prophecies of the second book of ESDRAS, explained and vindicated.* Edit. 1721. But more particularly in Dr. Francis Lee's ΑΠΟΔΕΙΧΜΕΝΑ, where there is a long and curious dissertation on this book and its contents. The book, though allowed to be interpolated and otherwise corrupted, has had great respect paid to it by many learned men. Dr. Hickes seems not to have been pleased with bishop Bull for not making use of its testimonies in his sermon on the middle state, [See his letter in Mr. Nelson's Life of that prelate. p. 535.] I have in my possession a manuscript of a very learned man who is of opinion, that the Apostle Paul borrowed what he says of the introduction of sin into the world by Adam, and the *labes* left thereby upon his posterity, from this book of Esdras. Scaliger said, he had an admirable and divine compendium of this book in the Syriac tongue: [see Sir John Floyer's Epistle to the reader. p. iv.] "From a number of paralel passages to those in the "new testament," says Mr. Arnold, "it seems necessary to conclude, "either that Jesus Christ and his apostles copied from hence, or that "this writer copied largely from the other." But why might not all copy from one and the same original? ESDRÆ quartus, says Scaliger, *est coacervatus ex multis veterum scriptis.* And why

ham's soul, but as the God of Abraham the compound man : and acknowledges, that if our Saviour had rested his proof on the separate existence of Abraham's soul, his argument would have fallen short of the point to be proved, viz. *the resurrection of the dead*, or, as he there hath it, *of the body*. And the reason he gives is, that " God would not be called " the God of a *naked soul*, because the soul " without the body is but in an imperfect state, " and not capable of that happiness which is " intended for the human *individuum* after the reunion of soul and body." This happiness he calls the fruition of God: and he supposes that the naked soul, being incapable of that fruition, must lie wherever it is, without any operation, that is indeed, without any consciousness or sensibility.

He goes on next to St. Paul, who, he says, seems plainly to suppose that the souls of dead men sleep till the resurrection; and to shew this, he gives a comment upon 1. Cor. xv. 19. which makes it utterly incredible to any one who agrees to his interpretation, that the apostle should ever have supposed any thing else. He likewise urges other passages to the same purpose, and lastly observes, that none of the persons who are said in the gospel history to have been raised from the dead, ever made

might not *Jesus* and *Paul* have access to these, as well as the *Pseudo-Esdras*? I call him so after Junius, who has proved him to be such, by his blundering account of the genealogy of the true Esdras, and who justly observes, that his credit is but small, till supported by some better authority than his own. But there is no occasion to enter deeply into this disquisition. It appears, that what he says of the *promptuaria* of departed souls, relates only to the common repositories of the dead of all characters.

mention of what happened to themselves or others, or what was the state of souls after death; from whence he says, some people may be apt to conclude, that whilst they were out of the body, they neither observed nor understood any thing.

“By these and the like proofs,” he tells us, “some of the holy fathers were induced to believe, that the souls of men were shut up in certain receptacles or store-houses [*promptuariis*] expecting the resurrection, neither doing nor suffering any thing in the meantime. Some of them supposing that the souls of good men, patriarchs, prophets, &c. were somewhere under the earth expecting the advent of Christ: others holding that the souls of all men, good and bad, were in the same state, without either punishment or glory.” For which opinions he cites Irenæus and Chrysostom respectively.

Having thus done with the scriptures, he betakes himself to philosophy, and speaks of the necessity of bodily organs to thought and memory, and says, that as the soul of an infant is a mere *rasa tabula* wherein nothing is written or engraved, so is the same soul, when it is departed out of the body, reduced to the same state of a mere blank: that is to say, without consciousness, thought, or intellectual furniture of any kind.

Now when it is understood that all this while this writer is only stating objections which he proposed to answer, the reader who interests himself in disquisitions of this sort, must be curious to know, how he gets rid of so strong a state of the case as he hath here given us on

the side of his opponents. Having then acknowledged, that it is very difficult to destroy the foundations of this opinion (the sleep of the soul,) *tamen*, says he, *solvenda sunt, quia veritas in contrarium omni objectâ dubitatione, penitus convincit hominem fidelem et catholicum. Scripturæ porro, veritatem hanc aperientes, plures sunt.* These scriptures he goes on to produce; and to those texts which appear to countenance the sleep of the soul, he opposes Phil. i. 23. containing St. Paul's desire to be with Christ as *far better* than to *abide in the flesh*, and some others, supposed by him to prove a separate and active existence of the soul, at the same time that he affirms, the scriptures never speak of the soul and body as separate from each other, but as in union, making up the person. *Non corpus humanum*, says he, *proprie resurgit, sed homo, sed individuum, sed personâ, et aliud est a corruptione separari, aliud resurgere,—cui resurrectioni est per accidens quod partes reuniendæ manerent, vel non manerent.* Quod igitur ait David, et Ezekias, et Sapiens de mortuis, eos non laudare dominum, sed vivos, &c. intelligenda sunt de hominibus in eorum personis. Verum enim est, hominem mortuum ante resurrectionem, omnino in suâ personâ non esse, et consequenter, neque posse, in suâ personâ, post mortem laudare Deum ante resurrectionem, aut quicquam facere.

The saving distinction here is, *aliud est a corruptione separari, aliud resurgere.* But how comes it that the sacred writers do not mark this distinction? Whence is it that they take no notice of any thing separated from corruption at the death of the body? Is it

sufficient for the solution of the difficulty to say, as this author does, *sed anima seorsim interim viva est PRO SUO MODULO*, upon no other proof but a metaphysical hypothesis, supported by the arbitrary notions of Justin Martyr, Origen, Chrysostom, and Augustin, concerning the several limbos where these unembodied, unemployed, shapeless beings, these blank ingredients of the human composition are deposited, till the period of their reunion. Upon this view of the intermediate state, the *modulus* of the separate soul of man, is not at all more considerable than the *modulus* of the soul of a plant, which, for ought we know, may have its modulus of life to serve the purposes, if not of reunion to its identical body, yet possibly, of transmigration into some other.*

* “ The Creator, in the opinion of these [*hermetic*] philosophers, “ has fixed in every thing a seed for its multiplication, not excepting “ metals themselves; and that in this seed, lies concealed a small spark “ which animates and directs the seed to form only the particular “ kind of being peculiar to its own species. This little spark of “ life or animation, assigned by nature, is the more firm or permanent, as the life of the being is required to be more constant; and “ therefore every thing which is produced out of the seed is to be “ assigned chiefly to the *aura*, or animating spark thereof.” *Hermippus Redivivus*. p. 220. Nor will this appear to be so very extravagant an hypothesis, when we consider the surprising exhibitions of nature in vegetables. “ Wherever,” says the learned professor Watson, “ there is a vascular system, containing a moving “ nutritive succus, there is life; and wherever there is life there may “ be, for ought we can prove to the contrary, a more or less acute “ perception, a greater or less capacity for the reception of happiness; the quantity indeed of which, after we have descended below “ a certain degree of sensibility, will, (according to our method of “ estimating things, which is ever partial and relative to ourselves) be “ small in each individual.—It should be well weighed by the “ metaphysicians, whether they can exclude vegetables from the possession of the faculty of perception, by any other than comparative “ arguments; and whether the same kind of comparative reasoning

Such were then, and such ever will be the efforts of those, who must solve all difficulties merely to accommodate the faithful and the catholic with an orthodox creed. It is easy enough to see what were the real sentiments of this ex-bishop of Spalato. But something was to be granted on the part of the Psychopannychists to serve the purposes of the wizards and conjurers of those days, otherwise the sagacious monarch, by whose bounty he profited so much, might have taken it into his head to have burnt *De Dominis* for an heretic at one stake, while the witches and their imps were frying at another.

“ will not equally exclude from animality, those animals which are
 “ provided with the fewest and the obtusest senses, when compared
 “ with such as are furnished with the most and the acuteest.” *Essay*
 on the subjects of Chemistry. p. 18, 19. And see what follows in
 this masterly tract.

C H A P. XIII.]

Brevis Disquisitio, a work of Joachim Stegman.

The occasion and scope of it. In Bayle's opinion, did more harm than good. A passage from the eighth chapter of it. Misrepresents Luther. But right in the general reasoning. An argument of Cardinal Perron for praying to saints. The premises not controverted by all protestants of these times. And strenuously contended for by the late Dr. Watts. Another passage from Stegman's eighth chapter. Censured by Bp. Warburton, without reason. Who misunderstands Grotius and Episcopius in his turn. And censures Le Clerc undeservedly.

BUT as the papists were steady to their interest, and, for the most part, uniform in the support of a point upon which so much of it depended, they had a great advantage against the protestants who were divided, not only upon this, but upon other subjects.

Among others who attacked them upon the score of their divisions, was a capuchin friar, called *Valerian Magni*, who in the year 1628, published a book at Prague, intituled, *De A Catholicorum regula credendi*.*

This book was answered by *Joachim Stegman*, a socinian divine, in a tract intituled, *Brevis Disquisitio, an et quomodo vulgo dicti evangelici pontificios, ac nominatim Valeriani*

* Bayle's Dict. vol. 5th. p. 741. edit. 1738. and Desmaizeaux Life of Hales, p. 4. 5.

*Magni de A catholicorum credendi regulâ judicium solide atque evidenter refutare queant.**

The scope of Stegman's work is to shew, that the protestants, by adhering to the peculiar system of Luther, Brentius, Calvin, Beza, &c. &c. had, in many instances, offered weak and improper arguments against popery, which had laid them under needless difficulties. His advice is therefore to discard all human authority, and stick to the scripture only, as explained and understood by right reason, without having any regard to tradition, or the authority of fathers, councils, &c.

Mr. Bayle says this book did more hurt than good, not because it was not well written, but because it tended to disparage the reputation of the first reformers, broke in upon their several systems, and what was worse than all the rest, was manifestly the work of somebody tainted with the heresies of Socinus and Arminius.†

* There is an English translation of this book in the *Phoenix*, vol. 2.

† For a sample of the opinions of the orthodox concerning this book, take the following account of it in a letter from Dr. Samuel Ward to Archbishop Usher. "There is a little book intituled *Brevis Disquisitio*, which I suppose your Lordship hath seen. It containeth in it fundry, both socinian and pelagian points; as also that the body which shall be raised in the resurrection, is not *idem numero*; also souls do not live till the resurrection, besides fundry other points. It is printed *Eleutheropoli*. It is said it cometh out of Eton-College, and that *Alefius* [John Hales] should be the author, who was at Dort with us. I am sorry such a book should come thence." Parr's life of Usher, p. 473.---Such is the illiberal voice of established system. Could more seasonable or wholesome advice be given to protestants? Was not this the very method afterwards adopted by our incomparable Chillingworth? Did not the papist feel the effects of it from his able hand with the utmost regret. "It is a *new shift*, says the absurd *Cressy*, which, how far other

In the eighth chapter of this tract the author observes, “ that Luther and Calvin teach such
 “ things, as are injuriously defended, not only
 “ against the papists, but also against the very
 “ life of the christian religion, true piety. Of
 “ the former sort is that opinion wherein they
 “ hold that the dead live. For they suppose,
 “ that the souls of men, in that very moment
 “ wherein they are parted from their bodies
 “ by death, are carried either to heaven, and
 “ do there feel heavenly joy, and possess all
 “ kinds of happiness which God hath promised
 “ to his people; or to hell, and are there tor-
 “ mented and excruciated with unquenchable
 “ fire. And this they attribute to the mere
 “ souls separated from the bodies, even before
 “ the resurrection of the men themselves, that
 “ is to say, while they are yet dead.—Now this
 “ is the foundation, not only of purgatory,
 “ but also of that horrible idolatry practised
 “ among the papists, while they invoke the
 “ saints that are dead.*”

“ Protestants out of England will approve I know not.” Whether they approved it or not, is very immaterial. Whatever may become of their methods, Chillingworth’s method will remain an impregnable bulwark, not only against that wicked and sordid superstition, but against all attempts to overthrow christian liberty, from any other quarter, as long as his book shall last.

* Phoenix, vol. ii. p. 334. Not having the original latin, I am obliged to make use of the bad translation in this collection. The *Disquisition* is here ascribed to Hales of Eton: concerning which mistake, see Desmaizeaux, Hist. & Crit. Account of his life, p. 4. &c. Stegman says, “ Nor need we go far for an example” (viz that the scripture teaches contrary to the current doctrine) “ since we have a pregnant
 “ one in the argument of Christ wherein he proveth the future re-
 “ surrection of the dead from thence, that God is the God of Abra-
 “ ham, Isaac, and Jacob, but is not the God of the dead, but of the liv-
 “ ing: whence he concludeth, that they live to God, that is, shall be

Stegman, whatever inferences he might draw from Calvin's principles, certainly misrepresents Luther, as will be seen in the Appendix. He is however quite right in saying, that if the system above recited is admitted, you cannot easily overthrow the invocation of saints.

“ recalled to life by God, that he may manifest himself to be their
 “ God or benefactor. This argument would be altogether fallacious,
 “ if before the resurrection they felt heavenly joy ; for then he
 “ would be their God or benefactor, namely according to their souls,
 “ although their bodies should never rise again.” The right reverend author of the Divine Legation of MOSES, &c. says, “ this is a mere
 “ complication of mistakes,” that is to say, it contradicts his interpretation of this argument of our Saviour, by which, he supposes, our Lord intended to prove the resurrection of the dead, through the medium of a separate existence of the soul ; no such medium however is to be found in the argument. But least it should appear to be a mere *gratis dictum*, the R. R. interpreter appeals to the wise and excellent HUGO GROTIUS, who says, our Saviour confuted the Sadducees on this occasion, *non verbis directis, sed ratiocinando* ; whence the R. R. author infers, that Grotius agrees with him, that our Lord here made use of an indirect argument. Whereas Grotius only meant (as appears by the context) that our Lord did not alledge any plain and express words out of the Law of Moses, containing a promise or assurance of eternal life, but only reasoned with the Sadducees upon a passage which implied it. Shall we say that the R. R. author did not understand the wise and excellent HUGO GROTIUS ? or rather that he did not chuse his readers should be made acquainted with the whole of Grotius's wisdom and excellence ? For Grotius immediately adds, *quanquam ea ratiocinatio mihi videter esse apertior quam multis putator. Nam resurrectionis quaestionem ab immortalitate, Sacrae Literae non divellunt. Imo idem valent ἀνάστασις [resurrectio] et ζωὴ αἰώνιος [vita eterna] ipso Christo docente.* Epist. 130. Therefore the sacred scriptures do not in the opinion of Grotius, make use of the immortality of the soul, through which, as a distinct proposition, or if you please, as a medium, to prove the resurrection of the dead. For the rest, Grotius concludes from our Saviour's argument exactly as Stegman does. *Therefore they, [these Patriarchs] will be restored to life, that God may be emphatically and peculiarly, their God.* Grot. in loc. As for the R. R. author's citation from Episcopus, it is very clear from the passage of Grotius's epistle above quoted, compared with it, that these two

Cardinal du Perron, for example argues thus.
 “ It is certain that the devils themselves know
 “ all things that pass in our imagination, as all
 “ these things are thoughts. For the maxim
 “ of St. Austin is undubitable, *oportet intelli-*
 “ *gentem speculari phantasmata* :* which being
 “ so, there is no room to doubt, but that an-
 “ gels and happy spirits clearly understand and
 “ know the prayers, even the mental ones, of
 “ those who call upon them.—If the dæmons
 “ hear the prayers of those who call them up,
 “ how is it that the saints are believed to be
 “ deaf to the prayers of those who invoke
 “ them ?†

Against this reasoning it would be in vain to
 argue, as the protestants did in their confessi-
 ons, and elsewhere, “ that if the saints heard
 “ the prayers of their votaries, they must be
 “ omnipotent.” There was hardly a protes-

learned men had very different ideas of our Saviour's argument. Gro-
 tius, we find, thought our Saviour's reasoning plainer and more obvi-
 ous than Episcopius supposed it to be, who will have the conclusion
 to depend upon our Lord's intimate knowledge of the divine intenti-
 on, hidden under those general words, *I am the God, &c.* than
 which nothing could be more obscure to his hearers, supposing them,
 as Episcopius does, to have no notion of eternal life in a future state ;
 which, whatever it might be in the days of Moses, was certainly not
 the case at the time this argument was urged to them. The compli-
 cation of mistakes (which however the R. R. author does not venture
 to unfold) is not therefore in the *Brevis Disquisitio*, but in the *Divine*
Legation of Moses demonstrated. The R. R. author is not at all
 more happy in his censure of Le Clerc, who is in exact agreement
 with Grotius in his interpretation of this text. See a *Review of some*
passages in the Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated. Ed. 1758,
 P. 35—50.

* Austin had the maxim from Aristotle. Vid. Pomponat. Chap.

iii. Νοουντα δε φαντασματα θεωρεν.

† PERRONIANA *au motte* DIABLES.

tant amoung them, that in those days, would venture to deny the indubitable maxim of St. Austin, and having once placed the saints in heaven, nothing would disparage them so much as to suppose they had not as much spiritual intelligence as the devils.

But what do we talk of *those-days*? A divine of our own times, of no small reputation, has not only granted the premises, but left as much room for the consequences, as the papists themselves could desire. “He says, that separate
“spirits become conscious of one another’s
“thoughts and volitions, by some unknown
“way that God has appointed;—and that
“doubtless, there is a way, which God, the
“creator spirit, has ordained, whereby created
“spirits which are social beings, shall main-
“tain society and friendly communion with
“other created spirits, when they are in their
“native state, separate from their material en-
“gines.”* And then, if to this we add another of his positions, “that the soul acts separately from the body, even whilst the body
“is alive,” it may as certainly have communication with its kindred disembodied spirits, and in the same unknown way, as those disembodied spirits have communication and society one with another; and this being admitted, what is there to hinder Cardinal Perron’s conclusion from taking immediate effect? Or what occasion to ascribe omnipotence and omniscience to this spiritual society, seeing the creator spirit confers upon them knowledge

* Watts’s Philosophical Essays, 8vo. 1733. p. 176.

and capacity enough in Dr. Watts's way, to qualify them for intecessors, and to keep open the communication, by a chain of intelligence from embodied spirits to disembodied, from those to angels, &c.

CHAP. XIV.

The system of Des Cartes. Explodes the doctrine of Substantial Forms. Controverted by Gassendus. Des Cartes's hypothesis stigmatised in the Roman Index. Whilst Gassendus remains uncensured. Mr. Arnauld's complaints thereupon. Arnauld's and Bayle's supposition concerning Des Cartes's doctrine. Examined and refuted.

DR. Watts's theory is that of Des Cartes, 1640 which he adopts in order to confute Mr. Locke's principle, that the soul does not always think. And as the French philosopher comes next under our notice in order of time, we shall now take a short view of his operations and success.

Des Cartes's aim was to confute the doctrine of *substantial forms*, which imported, “ that
 “ natural bodies are made up of two substan-
 “ ces, matter, and form. That the form of all
 “ natural bodies, man only excepted, is a cor-
 “ ruptible being, which never fails to be de-
 “ stroyed, when the compound perishes, that
 “ is whenever a stone, or a tree, or a dog, are

“ converted into natural bodies of another
“ species.”*

To shew how man came to be excepted out of this general law of nature, was the business of the schoolmen, who however did not give universal satisfaction to some philosophers prior to Des Cartes.

It was observed, that they who followed this system, could give no proofs of the immortality of the soul ; for in order to that, they should make it appear that the soul is immaterial ; which the very notion of its being the substantial or essential form of a material body, would not admit of.

The scholastic hypothesis indeed, was thus effectually overthrown, but the church could not spare the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, or its conscious existence in a separate state, and they who had sense enough to demolish the hypothesis of Aristotle and Aquinas, never attempted to find out another that would answer the same purpose.

This honour was reserved for Des Cartes, whose *Meditations* appeared in the year 1640. The sum of his system is “ that all thinking
“ substances are distinct from matter, from
“ whence it necessarily follows, that the soul
“ of man is a spirit, or a simple indivisible
“ being, and consequently immortal.” Hence it followed again, that a substantial form, being co-extended with the body, to which it belonged, and consequently divisible, must be incapable of thinking.

* Bayle POMPONATIUS. [F.]

This doctrine of Des Cartes was immediately controverted by the great Gassendi, who maintained, that “ though it should be granted, “ that mind and body may be conceived apart, “ it would not follow that they are two distinct “ substances, and,” he says, “ Des Cartes neither has proved, nor can prove from reason, “ (for he grants the fact in compliment to the “ church) that thought and extension may not “ go together, constituting one being or *compositum*, and that all Des Cartes’s pretended “ demonstrations, are mere affirmations, and “ *petitiones principii*. He derides the notion “ of an unextended substance, receiving extended images, and being itself spread “ through, commixed, or united with the body, “ acting on, and feeling from each part, and “ being either *totum in toto* or *totum in quolibet parte*, &c. &c.”*

It was to little purpose that Gassendi paid this compliment to the church, namely to grant the existence, of the soul in a separate state, if, as Mr. Arnauld affirmed, the reading of Gassendi’s book led some persons at Naples, into the error of Epicurus, concerning the mortality of the soul. And as Arnauld himself was a zealous Cartesian, no doubt but he was persuaded that Gassendi’s reasoning had this impious tendency.

The church, however, to which these gentlemen belonged, thought very differently from Mr. Arnauld. The inquisitors of Rome put Des Cartes’s book into their *index expurgatori-*

* Gassend. Opusc. philosoph. Tom. iii.

us, but did not at all concern themselves with that of Gassendi ; which provoked Arnauld to exclaim, “ Is not this to permit men to swallow poison, and prohibit them from taking the antidote ?”*

“ No,” would the inquisitors have replied, “ you quite mistake the matter, the poison is in the book of Des Cartes. His demonstrations have a tendency, to set aside the most solemn decisions of the church.† An immaterial substance can suffer nothing in *our* purgatory. We desire to stick to *substantial forms*. And we give you fair warning, that whatever philosophical system most favours the peculiar doctrine of the church, will always have the greatest merit with us, whatever reason, truth, or good sense there may be in that which opposes it.”—Was not Mr. Arnauld aware of this ? or did he dissemble his knowledge of it ?

Mr. Arnauld supposes, that if Gassendi and others would not have opposed Des Cartes’s system, but have left it to its natural operation, it might have been of infinite service in convincing the most incredulous, that nothing can be more contrary to reason, than to assert, that the soul perishes with the body. “ This,” says Arnauld, “ Des Cartes made appear by laying down from clear principles, and such as are only grounded on natural notions,

* Bayle. POMPONATIUS, rem. [G.]

† Des Cartes’s principles were demonstrated to be contrary to the doctrine of the church of Rome in the article of transubstantiation, in a book published at Paris, 1680. See Mr. Bayle’s Letters. Let. xxxi. Edit. Amsterdam 1729. See also *Journal des Scavans* for February, 1666. pag. 250. Amsterdam, 1679.

“ which men of sense cannot but acknowledge,
 “ that the soul and the body, that is, what
 “ thinks, and what is extended, are two sub-
 “ stances wholly distinct ; so that it is impos-
 “ sible that extension should be the mode of
 “ a thinking substance, and thought the mode
 “ of an extended one. This being well proved,
 “ (as it is in Des Cartes’s Meditations) no liber-
 “ tine, if he has any justness of thought can
 “ remain convinced, that the soul dies with
 “ the body.”

“ This passage of Mr. Arnauld,” says Bayle,
 “ shews what advantage may accrue to reli-
 “ gion from the hypothesis opposed by Pom-
 “ ponatius.* It may be made use of against
 “ some libertines, who will see before they be-
 “ lieve, and who despise the obscure argu-
 “ ments alledged by divines. Nothing can
 “ more effectually reclaim these men, than to
 “ convince them of the immortality of the
 “ soul. It is an inlet to the right way, and
 “ this first step may be attended with happy
 “ consequences.”

I beg these gentlemen’s pardon; they are quite mistaken. The supposition is ill ground-
 ed, and is confuted by the matter of fact every
 day. The more any man is convinced of the
 immortality of the soul, from the principles of
 Aristotle or Des Cartes, the less will he con-
 cern himself about the truth or falsehood of the

* The hypothesis opposed by Pomponatius, and the hypothesis of Des Cartes, went upon very different principles, as Mr. Bayle very well knew. They were however so far the same, as that both pretended to demonstrate the separate existence of the soul upon metaphysical principles; and that is what Mr. Bayle means. An hypothesis which does not want the aid of revelation,

gospel-account of futurity. The conscious existence of the soul after its departure from the body, and its capability of happiness and misery in a state of separation, is an obvious and known prejudice against the doctrine of a resurrection of the dead. For to what end is a resurrection, if rewards and punishments may be dispensed without it?

Arnauld, who was a warm disputant, might not be aware of this consequence. But Mr. Bayle, if he was in earnest, is absolutely inexcusable in making such a reflection; inasmuch as by admitting elsewhere, “that, with respect
“to the proof of a future state, the dernier
“resort is to revelation, when the proof from
“reason and philosophy fails,” he must admit that the one sort of proof, is totally distinct from, and incompatible with the other. If the principles of reason and philosophy proceed to demonstration, how can it be conceived these principles should be an inlet to a sort of proof which throws reason and philosophy quite out of the question? Are there any principles of reason and philosophy by which it may be demonstrated that the dead shall be raised? He supposes a certain sort of men would not believe the immortality of the soul, except it could be made plain to them by the principles of reason and philosophy. Why so? “Because,” says he, “the arguments of divines
“are obscure.” Do then the proofs from philosophy make these arguments clear and perspicuous? By no means. These arguments are of the same weight and force, whether Aristotle, Aquinas, and Des Cartes are right or wrong. The arguments of divines, i. e. argu-

ments founded on scripture for the immortality of man, are so far from borrowing any aid from reason and philosophy, that they refer to the *power* and *will* of God, exemplified in a matter of fact, the resurrection of Jesus, which reason and philosophy can neither explain nor account for. If the promises of God may be depended upon, and if he is able to perform them, men may, and certainly will be raised from the dead at the appointed time, whether the soul has or has not enjoyed its consciousness from the period of death, to that of the resurrection. But on the other hand, if it may be demonstrated by philosophical principles, that there is one part of man, which never dies, and which may be delighted or afflicted, rewarded or punished, by the means of its own peculiar feelings or sensations, in a state of separation from the other part, it is hardly credible that God should restore that other part to life, to accomplish a purpose which may be brought about without it,

CHAP. XV.

A tract intituled, Man wholly Mortal, &c. by R. O. two editions of it. The author unknown. Probably a dissenter, from the establishment. Presumptive proofs of it. Not free from controversial prejudice. Attacks the hypothesis of one Mr. Woolner and Ambrose Parey. Quotations from his book. Whether Adam was created immortal? General contents of R. O's book. Note on Mr. Bulkley's explication of Luke xvi. 19—31. Critical Reviewer commended. R. O. met with an adversary. Uncertain who he was. A bad and obscure reasoner. An instance of it. Avoids meddling with R. O's scripture testimonies. Depends wholly upon other sorts of authorities. Postscript to R. O's book. A passage of Pliny there cited. Remarks upon it.

1644. **W**HILE these disputes were going on abroad
 1655. between *Des Cartes* and *Gassendi*, and their
 ~ ~ ~ respective followers, a countryman of our own,
 who distinguished himself by the initials R. O.
 wrote a sensible little tract, which he intituled
Man's Mortalitie, or a Treatise wherein it is
proved, both theologically and philosophically,
that whole man (as a rational creature) is a
compound wholly mortal, contrary to that com-
mon distinction of soule and body; and that
the present going of the soule into heaven or
hell is a mere fiction; and that at the resurrec-
tion is the beginning of our immortality, and

then actual condemnation and salvation, an not before. With all doubts and objections answered and resolved both by scripture and reason; discovering the multitude of blasphemies and absurdities that arise from the fancie of the soule, &c. Amsterdam, printed by John Canne, anno dom. 1644. quarto.

In the year 1655, another edition of this book was printed at London in 24to. with the title a little altered, viz. *Man wholly mortal, or a treatise wherein it is proved both theologically and philosophically, that as whole man sinned, so whole man died, &c.* In this edition, said to be by the author corrected and enlarged, there are many alterations and variations from the former, particularly in the disposition of the chapters.

In the following account of this book, the second edition, is chiefly cited.

Who or what R. O. was, cannot now be traced. A copy of verses prefixed to the quarto edition, compliments him as a *young man*. As to his principles, his adversary (to be introduced by and by) supposes him to be a limb of that “martial devil called *Abaddon* or *Apollyon*, “forasmuch,” says he, “as the designs of all “such as have disturbed our peace of late days, “are generally for ruin or destruction; the “former acts were for destruction of pelacy, “or power ecclesiastical; the latter for sub- “version of regality, or sacred rights of prin- “ces, &c.”

The man guessed well, yet he did only guess. For R. O. in his first edition (the only one his opponent had seen) gives no hint of his enmity

to prelacy, or of his sentiments on the established religion.

In his second edition indeed, we have the following argument.

The immortalists held, that man was compounded of a mortal body, and an immortal soul. “If so,” says R. O. “man must be
 “partly mortal, and partly immortal, and
 “consequently, must have two lives or beings;
 “for if that which is partly mortal, partly immortal, have not two lives or beings, then
 “that being must be all a mortal being, [and
 “then whole man dies,] or else all an immortal being, [and then whole man lives for
 “ever,] or else his flesh is no more part of him
 “than a tree is part of an house; and so when
 “the heads-man chopt off the bishop of Canterbury’s head, he cut off no part of the
 “man.” p. 24, 25.

Again, having confuted the common notion that the body was only the soul’s instrument of action, from the absurdity of supposing the instrument only to be doomed to death, while the conscious agent is left alive, he says, “I
 “hope the soularly champions, the priests of
 “the church of England, may be ashamed
 “longer to assert the soul to have all life in
 “it, and the body to be but the soul’s instrument, whereby it acts and moves; and hence-
 “forth cease to delude, and stop the mouths
 “of the people with a bare verbal resurrection;
 “that the end of their faith may be suitable
 “to Christ Jesus, the foundation on which it
 “is built, both real and infallible.” p. 52.

These may be considered as specimens of R. O’s reasoning on his subject, as well as of his

church principles. By the way, we have here a double instance of controversial prejudice. R. O. could not but know, that there were *soularies* as he calls them, who were *not* of the church of England, and who were no better friends to archbishop Laud than himself. On the other hand, his adversary takes it for granted, that every one who espouses any doctrine contrary to the established system, must be a destroyer of ecclesiastical foundations. When he considered R. O. as an imp of *Abaddon*, he could not know what were his sentiments of the bishop of Canterbury, or the priests of the established church. And he could not but know, that many of those whom he accused of “destroying and prophaning sacred and religious edifices, and ruining cathedral and collegiate churches,” were, in the article of the immortality, or separate existence of the soul, as orthodox as himself. But it is the infirmity of all ecclesiastics who are taking their repose on the bosom of an establishment, to be jealous of all innovations, and to connect in their ideas, the demolition of an intermediate limbus, with the ruination of “all sacred and religious edifices,” as if the soul-sleepers would not be as glad to take a nap in the stall of a cathedral as themselves.

But to return to R. O. of whose manner of treating his subject, we shall give a few examples.

The modern hypothesis which he attacks is that of one Woolner, and of Ambrose Parey. He gives no hint of his acquaintance with the principle of Des Cartes, though he most effec-

tually confutes it in the course of his engagement with his other opposites.

Woolner, it seems, wrote a book on *the original* of the soul, wherein he will have the soul to be an *aerial* substance.

On which R. O. thus reasons. “Whatsoever is *aerial*, is *elemental*. Ergo, this soul is *elemental*, and so *finite*. If this immortal spirit,” says he “have an aerial body, I wonder what would become of it if a living man were closed up in a vessel, which were so solid every where, that the air could not possibly evacuate, and there the man die; either it must perish with the man, or else remain there, through which there is no passage for its aerial body. So that he so martyred, hath an ill favoured paradise for his soul.” p. 8.

But Woolner, who went upon the school-system of substantial forms, availed himself of a distinction between the substantial form of the body, and the body itself. The schoolmen considered the form as *primative permanent*, and *incorruptible*; the body, or the matter, as a machine, enlivened and actuated by the form, upon which the machine or matter could have no reciprocal influence; consequently the *form* being withdrawn and separated, the *body* became lifeless, corrupted, and resolved into its original element.

To this R. O. answers. “The *form* is so in the *matter*, and the *matter* is so in the *form*, as thereby, and not else, is an existence or human entity. And their being is in this union, and their union is in this being. So that, take away the form, and the matter

“ ceaseth; take away matter, and the form
 “ ceaseth.—The form, is the form of the mat-
 “ ter; and the matter, the matter of the form;
 “ neither of themselves, but each by the other,
 “ and both together, make one being. There-
 “ fore if one be by the other, and thereby both
 “ together, then one cannot consist without
 “ the other; they must both perish together;
 “ for nothing can consist without that by
 “ which it is.” p. 9. 10. And thus he pays
 them in their own coin, jargon for jargon.
 There is more of the same sort to the end of
 the chapter; but this may suffice for a sample.

In the second chapter our author proceeds
 to *Considerations from the creation, fall, and
 resurrection of man, &c.* and begins with the
 expression, *God breathed into his face the
 breath of life.*

“ That which was breathed,” says he, “ be-
 “ fore it was breathed, was not a *living soul*;
 “ but that which was breathed upon, became
 “ the living soul. No living soul was ascribed
 “ to man before that; so that man was formed,
 “ and man became a living soul, as Paul saith,
 “ 1 Cor. xv. 45. *The first man, Adam, was*
 “ *made a living soul*; which was his natural
 “ body, as verse 44; of whom was the woman,
 “ both innocent and free from sin, and so from
 “ death and mortality; for *the wages of sin is*
 “ *death*; Rom. vi. 28. Therefore before sin
 “ there could be no death, * *but as by one man*

* Whence, it seems, some have concluded, that Adam was cre-
 ated immortal. Against whom the late ingenious critic, Mr. John
 Alexander, in his note upon, 1 Cor. xv. 44. thus argues. “ What
 “ becomes of the assertion, that Adam was created immortal? And

“ *sin entered into the world, even so, death by*
 “ *sin.* Rom. v. 10. And, by the offence of

“ how will it be made consistent with the apostle’s decision in this
 “ place, concerning the priority of animal to spiritual bodies, in the
 “ order of time ? ” Might not this question be answered by asking
 another ? What becomes of the assertion that Adam was created
 mortal ? And how will it be made to consist with the apostle’s de-
 cision in another place, that the introduction of death or mortality was
 posterior to Adam’s receiving his natural or animal body ? If Adam
 was created mortal, death did not come by man, but immediately by
 man’s creator. Mr. A. goes on. “ For if Adam was created im-
 “ mortal, he must have had a spiritual and heavenly body, and not an
 “ animal, earthly, and corruptible one. Then it follows, that the spi-
 “ ritual constitution was before the animal, contrary to what the apos-
 “ tle asserts.” Either this is mere *logomachy*, or it must suppose
 that God could not create an incorruptible animal body. And yet
 we read of an animal body which *saw no corruption* ; and that this
 was an animal body, we know by its having flesh and bones, after it
 was delivered from corruption. We cannot therefore argue, Adam
 was created with an animal, therefore a corruptible body. If it should
 be said, that the body of our Lord was rendered incorruptible by an
 extraordinary act of divine power ; I would ask, whether this power
 was superior, either in its exertion or its effects, to the creative power
 of God ? If not, is it not conceivable that Adam might be created
 with a body like unto our Lord’s resurrection body ? Paul says in-
 deed, *the first man is of the earth, earthy*, which agrees with the
 words by which the sentence of death pronounced upon the same first
 man is introduced, *dust thou art*. But the sentence itself, *unto dust*
shalt thou return, does by no means imply that the returning to dust,
 was the natural consequence of Adam’s having a body originally from
 the dust. It was, we know, the effect of a sentence denounced upon
 the transgression of a positive law, which, if the first man had conti-
 nued innocent, had never been passed upon him. This sentence
 therefore, effected a change of constitution in the animal body of man,
 which was not natural or original, but as much out of the course of
 his created nature, as the incorruptibility of the animal bodies of
 Enoch, Moses, Elijah, and Jesus, was out of course of the fallen
 nature of man. The result is, that though Adam had an animal
 body (*σάρκα ψυχικόν*, a term, by the way, of great latitude) a body com-
 posed of flesh, blood, and bones, it will not follow that Adam was
 created mortal and corruptible. Otherwise, Adam was in no worse
 condition *after* the sentence of death, than he was *before* it ; contrary
 to the express accounts both of Moses and Paul.

“ one man, judgment came upon all men unto
 “ death, v. 18.—and 1 Cor. xv. 21. By man
 “ came death. Therefore man was created
 “ free from the power of death, so to conti-
 “ nue; but in the day he did eat the forbidden
 “ fruit, he became mortal; and as he was made
 “ a living soul, 1 Cor. xv. 45, so by trans-
 “ gression, a dying soul, &c.” p. 30.

R. O's adversaries held, that the soul was the very life, had all life in itself, and that the body was only its instrument. Whence he argues, that it must be the soul that sinned, and consequently, the soul that must die. “ If
 “ otherwise,” says he, “ the efficient cause was
 “ less punished than the instrument, as if the
 “ magistrate should hang the hatchet, and
 “ spare the man that beat a man's brains out
 “ with it.”

To this it was answered, that the punishment of the sinning soul was not that kind of mortality to which the body became subject, but that which is called in scripture, the second death, i. e. the pains of hell.

R. O. replies, “ condemnation in hell, is
 “ not properly, but remotely the reward of
 “ Adam's fall. For, properly, condemnation
 “ (under the gospel) is the wages of infidelity,
 “ or unbelief in Christ, as salvation is of be-
 “ lief. 2. If the soul be of a distinct being
 “ from the body, and sinned as the body, and
 “ thereby incurred the condemnation of hell,
 “ then must the soul have a particular re-
 “ demption from thence as the body from the
 “ grave; or else it must perish there for ever;
 “ and if Christ redeemed us from thence, then

“ he must suffer the same eternal torments ;
 “ that is, the worm of conscience, despair,
 “ everlasting chains of darkness, &c. But
 “ these he never suffered.” p. 38.

Again. “ If the soul (as they say) be the
 “ very life, or have all life in its self, and the
 “ body but its instrument, then the body now
 “ hath no more life in it, then when it is re-
 “ duced to the earth ; but is as dead as a door
 “ nail ; and so at the resurrection, cannot be
 “ raised from death ; for that which never had
 “ life cannot be raised from death, and the
 “ union of it to the soul at the resurrection
 “ they fabulate on, is but an addition of corpu-
 “ lency, or gross matter to the soul ; which,
 “ in truth, is no resurrection at all from the
 “ dead, no more than the restoration of the
 “ flesh lost by famine, sickness, &c. For the
 “ resurrection from death, is not the addition
 “ of gross matter to life, but the restoration of
 “ life from death. So that the restitution of
 “ lost flesh *now* to the soul, is, in quality, as
 “ much a resurrection from the dead, as the
 “ addition of the whole body to the soul at the
 “ last day ; which is to say with the Sadducees,
 “ there is no resurrection from the dead. But
 “ the *Soularies*, I know, are loth to be branded
 “ for *Sadducees*, which how they will avoid I
 “ cannot see. For if the soul live separate from
 “ the body, the body cannot be raised from
 “ the dead, except the body had a life of its
 “ own, differing from that of the soul, and so
 “ a man must have two lives (as they say a cat
 “ hath nine) the one mortal and the other im-
 “ mortal, and at the resurrection have two im-
 “ mortalities.” p. 38.—40.

The two next chapters, the 4th and 5th, contain, 1. *Scriptures to prove this mortality.* And 2. *Objections extorted from [other] scriptures, answered.* In which are the common texts alledged on each side, with the common answers and interpretations respectively.*

Chap. v. intituled, *Of Procreation, how from thence this mortality is proved*, contains the examination of an old saw, concerning the

*The parable of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke xvi. had hitherto passed as an uncontrovertible proof of an intermediate state ; at least I have met with none prior to this R. O. who were disposed to dispute it. But this writer, besides shewing the absurdity of the literal sense so applied, observes very sensibly, that the parable was intended to prove, “ that nothing is more effectual for conversion than “ the ordinary preaching of the word by the true ministers or am- “ bassadors of God ; such as Moses and the true prophets of old, “ and as Christ, his apostles and prophets, and true ministers since.” p. 88. The scenery which introduces this doctrine, hath accordingly been considered, either as totally fictitious, or merely accommodated to the conceptions of the vulgar on the subject. See Grotius and Le Clerc upon this parable. And Bishop Warburton allows, that the parable gives the representation, not of the *intermediate*, but the *final* state of the righteous and the wicked. On the other hand, Mr. Charles Bulkley, in some late *Discourses on the Parables* of the N. T. derives a proof of an intermediate state from the circumstances of this narrative. And having distinguished parables into two kinds, by a sort of learning not very intelligible, he determines this of the rich man and Lazarus, to be of the sort which *seem to require a greater strictness in the explication of them* ; and yet he immediately adds, *though it is not to be imagined, that even in these every minute circumstance of the story was intended to convey some distinct and separate truth.* But this being admitted, who shall draw the line between the strictness and the laxity of explication ? and what, in the event, may become of Mr. Bulkley’s distinction ? For example, he says, “ The immediate transition of the soul into one or “ other of these two different states is very strongly described by the “ immediate transition observable in the narration or parable itself, “ from their death, to this their succeeding state of happiness or mis- “ ery.” Here indeed the immediate transition is strictly described in the narration, but that, taken along with other strict descriptions, will by no means permit us to take this to mean the immediate transi-

origin of the soul, viz. *creando infunditur, et infundendo creatur* ; a disquisition too indelicate to be dwelt upon. If the common principles allowed on each side are indecent, absurd, or ridiculous, no wonder the reasonings on both sides should be so too. I take this to be the case with this particular branch of the dispute, and therefore leave it as I found it.

Chap. vi. is intituled, *Testimonies of scripture to prove that whole man is generated and propagated by nature.* Of which as above.

R. O. was not long in meeting with an answer, of whom I am not able to give any account, farther than from the contents of his book, the copy of which in my hands hath no title-page. The passage transcribed above from his introductory chapter, speaks him to have been a passionate admirer of sacred edifices, and consequently of sacred revenues, both which were in those days in some peril. He imagines R. O's hypothesis would help on the destruction of these holy things, and expresses his resentment against him accordingly, calling the writer *a worthless pamphleteer,—a sorry animal, who had stepped into the croud of scribblers, in defence of an old rotten heresy, condemned and suffocated by consent of the wise, almost at the hour of its birth.*

There is so little precision in the reasoning of this writer, that I can hardly promise to extract a passage from him by way of specimen, which

tion of the soul. Which looks as if the ingenious writer had contrived his distinction on purpose to accommodate his explication, reserving to himself exclusively, the privilege of using the free or the strict method of interpretation, as occasions should arise. To what Mr. Bulkley further advances upon this subject, a judicious and complete answer is given in the *Critical Review* for November, 1771. p. 356.

I understand myself. However to gratify those who have more penetration, I have here selected one or two periods from his second chapter, *in answer to R. O's first class of arguments.*

The said R. O. as we have seen above, insisted, that in a being compounded of matter and form, the matter and form either existed together, or perished together.

To this it is here answered, “ that as matter
 “ throughout all mutations, remaineth uncor-
 “ rupted; so also, according to the judgment
 “ of sundry knowing men, and diligent inqui-
 “ rers into the works of nature, and transmu-
 “ tation of natural compounds, natural and
 “ material forms themselves also, do not perish
 “ at their parting from their matters, but only
 “ are dissolved, and dissipated, lying after that
 “ in their scattered atoms within the bosom of
 “ nature, from whence they were before, by
 “ force of the seed, extracted, the result of whose
 “ union was the form. So that the entity of
 “ the form remains after corruption” [of the
 matter, I suppose] “ though not in the essence
 “ or formality of a form, or totally and com-
 “ pletely.” p. 5. And having given us his au-
 thorities, for this doctrine, such as the author
 of *Religio Medici*, *Daniel Sennertus*, *Democri-
 tus*, *Anaxagoras*, [two Atheists according to
Cudworth] *Kircher* and *Aristotle*, with his own
 remarks and explications, he concludes, “ thus
 “ his main argument is answered, after which
 “ all the rest will fall down headlong, with
 “ any light touch, though but of a finger,”
 p. 6. Which answer, asserting the dissolution
 and dissipation of the soul, as the substantial
 form of the body, gives up the essential princi-

ple of those who hold the conscious existence of the separate soul, viz. its indivisibility.

With respect to R. O's scripture-proofs, this author saith, " His places cited out of scripture in " favour of his error, are so impertinent, " as that it were no small piece of folly to examine them one by one. They all of them " signify that man shall die, or sometimes, " that Joseph or Simeon is not, as Gen. xlii. " 36. all which, how they are to be expounded " and understood, may sufficiently appear by " that which has been said in the precedent " chapter." p. 7. 8. Whence, it seems, we are to understand, that Democritus, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle were commentators on the scripture, as well as heathen philosophers. And accordingly in the next paragraph he brings in a passage of Seneca's Troades, by way of explaining Solomon's meditations, Eccles. iii.

In fine, this author depends much more upon his authorities, than upon his own penetration into the subject ; and accordingly endeavours to smother poor R. O. with a whole cart load of philosophers, divines, poets, orators, schoolmen, pagan, rabbinical, papistical, mahometan, and what not ; who were just as much in agreement with each other, as he was with R. O. as may be understood by his citing Des Cartes along with Aureolus a disciple of the angelic Doctor, as agreeing in their notions concerning the soul.

He might, if he had chose it, have saved himself all this pains. R. O. had exhibited a comfortable groupe of these *soularies*, in the very entrance upon his subject, together with a touch of their respective doctrines, and what

he said of these may serve for a compleat reply to his opponent. viz.

“ Divers other conceptions and fancies there
 “ be to uphold this ridiculous invention of the
 “ soul, traducted from the heathens, who by the
 “ book of nature understood an immortality
 “ after death; but through their ignorance how,
 “ or which way this invention (reported to be
 “ Plato’s) was occasioned, and begot a general
 “ belief: and so they, and after them the
 “ christians, have thus strained their wits to
 “ such miserable shifts, to define what it is, but
 “ neither conclude with any certainty, or give
 “ satisfaction therein.” p. 4.

In the postscript however to the second edition, R. O. shews, from a chapter in Pliny’s natural history, Lib. vii. cap. 55, of which he gives a translation, that there were among the ancients, many who deemed men to be wholly mortal. Pliny himself ridicules the notion of separate souls, and among other things, is severe upon the practice of paying divine honours, under this notion, to dead men.

R. O’s translation of this chapter, is not accurate, but gives the general sense of Pliny, with tolerable exactness. The translator however, hath left his quotation short. There is a circumstance in the original that may be worth mentioning.

Pliny having said, that these documents concerning a future life, were childish dotages, and the figments of mortality, desirous of never ceasing to be, adds, *similis et de asservandis corporibus hominum, et reviviscendi promissa Democrito vanitas, qui non revixit ipse.* This is not easy to understand. Democritus was an

atomical atheist, and denied the existence of incorporeal substance,* and according to Pliny's account, this preservation of dead bodies was in order to reviviscence, which taking his account of the common notion of souls, must be by the reunion of that spiritual or incorporeal substance to the lifeless carcase, which had been separated by death. Mr. Bayle thinks this place of Pliny may be explained by a passage in *Varro*, which imports, that, “ the advice of *Haracledes Ponticus*, who taught that “ dead bodies ought to be burned, was better “ and wiser than the prescription of Democritus, who would have them preserved in honey.”† Here is indeed a confirmation of Pliny's assertion, that Democritus prescribed some way of preserving dead bodies ; but there is nothing in *Varro's* comparison to tempt us to believe, that he knew that a reviviscence was proposed by this particular method of preserving them. Some of the old philosophers held, that the atomical seeds of the soul remained in the dead body, whereupon *Lucretius* forms this dilemma. “ Either these seeds do or do not remain in the dead carcase. If they do, the “ soul does not depart with its whole substance, “ if they do not, whence comes the brood of “ worms in the putrified carcase ?‡” Democritus's principles led him to suppose, that the seeds of the soul were left in the dead body, and by their jumbling, generated and enliven-

* Cudworth Intel. Syft. Chap. 1.

† Bayle Democritus, Rem. [H]

‡ Lib. iii. v. 701.

ed the insects. But the worms destroyed the form and organs of the human body, and the *reviviscence* here, was only of a multitude of nauseous insects. Whereas if the form and mechanism of the human body, could be preserved by burying it in honey or otherwise, it might be supposed that these seeds of the soul would work the reviviscence of the man, with all his faculties and functions. *Nugari liceat et nobis,*

CHAP. XVI.

Thomas White's *book De medio animarum statu*. A. Wood's *account of the author*. The occasion of this book. Opposes the common doctrine of purgatory. Substitutes a different account of it. Remarks. His notion of praying for things predestinated. The opinion of an English divine on that subject. Difficulties upon White's system. White's solution. Remarks. Strikes at the number of masses. His apology. Inconsistent with his doctrine. Postpones real rewards and real punishments till the day of judgment, without intermediate purgation. Appeals to fathers and liturgies. Differs from Hardouin concerning the latter. Many nominal protestants have thought of an intermediate state, as White did. Archbishop Wake quoted. And Archdeacon Chapman. Remarks. White's opinion of the nature of the soul in a state of separation. Adopts that of Aquinas. Remarks. His second treatise, intitled, *Responsa ad exceptiones*. Declares for the *Philosophia Digbæana*. More of a protestant in it, than in his first tract. Reasons for the length of this article. An account of White's broils with the college at Douay. And of the censure of his book in the English parliament.

I HAVE said above, that the papists were always steady to their interest, and, for the most part, uniform in the support of a point upon which so much of it depended. I am now

about to exhibit one or two writers of that communion, who ventured to depart from the received system, with such savings, however, to the authority of the church, and such respect to the head of it, as an establishment, armed with the terrors of a burning or a starving inquisition, may be supposed to create.

The first of these in order of time, was THOMAS WHITE, of whom Anthony Wood gives the following account:

“ He was the son of Richard White, of Hat-
 “ ton in Essex, Esq. by Mary his wife, daugh-
 “ ter of Edmund Plowden, the great lawyer in
 “ the reign of Queen Elizabeth; which Tho-
 “ mas White, having been always from his
 “ childhood a roman catholic, became at length
 “ a secular priest, and a most noted philoso-
 “ pher of his time, as his published writings,
 “ much sought after by many, shew. Hobbes
 “ of Malmsbury had a great respect for him,
 “ and when he lived in Westminster, would
 “ often visit him; and he and Hobbes but sel-
 “ dom parted in cool blood, for they would
 “ wrangle, squabble, and scold about philoso-
 “ phical matters, like young sophisters, though
 “ either of them was eighty years of age; yet
 “ Hobbes, being obstinate, and not able to en-
 “ dure contradiction, (though well he might,
 “ seeing White was his senior) yet those scho-
 “ lars who were sometimes present at their
 “ wrangling disputes, held that the laurel was
 “ carried away by White; who dying in his
 “ lodging in Drury-lane, between the hours of
 “ two and three in the afternoon of the 6th
 “ day of July, an. 1676, aged 94 years, was
 “ buried almost under the pulpit in the church

“ of St. Martin’s in the fields, within the li-
 “ berty of Westminster, on the 9th day of the
 “ same month. By his death, the roman ca-
 “ tholics lost an eminent ornament from among
 “ them; and it hath been a question among
 “ some of them, whether ever any secular priest
 “ of England, went beyond him in philosophi-
 “ cal matters.” Athen. Oxon. Vol. ii. Col. 665.

This, Thomas White, it seems, had thrown
 out something, either by word or writing, against
 the common doctrine of purgatory, and a report
 was raised, that he had been censured for it by
 the titular bishop of Chalcedon [Richard Smith]
 who at that time presided over the secular
 priests that were in England. To obviate there-
 fore the prejudices which might arise from mis-
 representation, and to explain himself more
 fully on the subject, he published a little latin
 book with this title, *Villicationis suæ de medio*
animarum statu, ratio Episcopo Calcedonensi
reddita a Thoma Anglo ex Albiiseast saxonum,
Parisiis. 1653.

In the year 1659 an english translation of
 this book was published, done, as I suppose,
 by White himself, the initials T. W. being
 subscribed to the dedication, though what is
 called the translator’s preface, affects to ascribe
 it to a by-stander. Upon this persuasion, I
 shall give the english citations from this trans-
 lation, subjoining at the same time the latin in
 the margin, that the reader may judge for him-
 self.

The author lays it down as a foundation,
 that “the church hath defined nothing more,
 “ than that there is a purgatory, and that the

“souls there detained, are relieved by the
“prayers and suffrages of the faithful.” p. 2.*

He then states the common doctrine of purgatory, as follows: “that the deficiencies of
“men are some mortal, and punishable with
“eternal misery, others venial, and expiable
“by temporary sufferings. Mortal lapses, if
“repented, they” [the modern divines] “ab-
“solve from eternal, condemning them not-
“withstanding to time-limited torments. So
“that suppose an imperfect christian departed,
“whose venial sins no satisfaction at all hath
“cancelled, whose mortal an imperfect one
“hath diminished, these doctors admit him not
“to the beatifical vision, but provide for him
“a subterraneous cave, filled with flames and
“horrid instruments of torture, which his there
“confined and imprisoned soul, must, till ex-
“piated, endure. And these pains they thus
“far suppose like to those we here experience,
“that they are inflicted by extrinsical agents,
“and against the will of the patient, conceiv-
“ing moreover, that they take their propor-
“tion from the measure and nature of the
“crimes committed in the body, according to
“the estimate of divine justice. Nor can
“these torments, by any industry or force of
“the soul itself, be evaded, though by our
“prayers who survive, they may be mitigated,
“and before the otherwise due and prefixed
“time, determined. The same relief they
“fancy from the satisfaction or merits of the

* Purgatorium esse, animasque ibi detentas, fidelium suffragiis
juvari.

“ saints, if by the church to that intent ap-
 “ plied.” p. 3. 4.*

It will be absolutely necessary to give White’s answer to this representation, not so much to shew his dexterity in demolishing this horrible furnace with all its crucibles, as to exhibit the accommodation he provides for separate souls in the room of it.

“ Thus these later divines ; from whom in
 “ this discourse I must, for the most part, take
 “ leave to dissent. I acknowledge in human
 “ failings a difference betwixt mortal and ve-
 “ nial, nor do I deny an imperfect remission
 “ of mortal impurities, but I place not this
 “ imperfection in that the sin is totally can-
 “ celled, the pain only remaining, but in the
 “ change of an absolute into a conditional af-
 “ fection, as it were instead of, *I will*, substi-
 “ tuting, *I will not ; but oh that I lawfully*
 “ *might!* This sinner therefore concludes,

* In hanc itaque modernorum theologiæ cultorum vulgus fere conspirat sententiam. Hominum non undequaque sanctorum, defectus alios esse mortales, et æternitatis pænosa inductivos, alios veniales, et temporarii cruciatus mercede compensabiles. Mortales defectus, si pænitiæ lachrymis macerentur, æternis quidem absolvi suppliciis, sed finiendis nihilo minus esse obnoxios torturis. Moriatur itaque imperfectus Christi cultor, venialibus nullâ, mortalibus incompletâ satisfactione minutis, aiunt ad visionem beatificam non admitti ; sed esse subterraneam quandam caveam, ignibus aliisve cruciatuum instrumentis refertam, in quam detrusus, animâ tenus, similibus expietur vindictis. Has pænas credunt in eo comparari iis quas mortales experimur, quod invitos premant, quodque ab extrinseco agente imprimantur. Easdem autumant, ex divina existimatione proportionem, ad perpetrata in corpore delicta, accipere : neque ab ipsâ animâ quâcunque vi evitari posse, sed precibus nostris qui superstitibus illis sumus, mitigari, et terminum destinato citiorem accipere. Tantundem sibi persuadent ex sanctorum satis passionibus, modo per ecclesiam applicentur, effici posse. Hæc Neoterici differunt,

“ that an eternal good is to be preferred before
 “ that which he abandons, and in his life and
 “ actions, prefers it; but looks notwithstand-
 “ ing back upon it as amiable with a wishful
 “ glance, not unlike the cows which bearing
 “ the ark did bellow to their calves shut up at
 “ home. The affection or inclination he had
 “ to temporal good, is restrained, not extin-
 “ guished; of mortal become venial; changed,
 “ not destroyed.”

“ Being therefore, by the operation of death,
 “ as it were, new moulded or minted into a
 “ purely spiritual substance, he carries inse-
 “ parably with him the matter of his torment,
 “ in the like manner as he also doth, who takes
 “ leave of the body with his affections only
 “ venially disordered. We have no occasion
 “ here to employ infernal architects, to invent
 “ strange racks and dungeons, since the innate
 “ and intimately inhering strife and fury of
 “ the affections bent against reason, perform
 “ alone that execution, which is therefore pro-
 “ portioned to the sins, because springing and
 “ resulting from them, nor ever otherwise,
 “ possibly capable to cease and determine, un-
 “ less the soul, by a new conjunction with the
 “ body, become again susceptible of contrary
 “ impressions. This, in the resurrection, is
 “ performed by a twofold operation of fire, one
 “ corporal, which aptly disposes the matter of
 “ bodies for the ministry of angels, and re-
 “ union with their spirits; the other spiritual,
 “ to wit, the judgment of Christ, that is, the
 “ bodily and mental intuition of him, which
 “ transfers the disposition of souls from the

“ distortion acquired by the commerce of the
 “ body, into that state which is the immediate
 “ aptitude for beatifical vision. In this we
 “ conceive to consist the remission of pains,
 “ or (as the scripture terms it) sins; for the
 “ procuring whereof in due time, we acknow-
 “ ledge the efficacy of the prayers of saints,
 “ either such as are already glorified, or such
 “ as daily press on towards that happiness.
 “ These, to my best apprehension, are the sum-
 “ mary heads of both opinions.” p. 4. 5. 6. 7.*

* Me opposita in plerisque detinet sententia. Mortalium a venialibus defectibus actionis humanæ dissidentiam, agnosco; solvi quoque lethalem impuritatem imperfecte, non inficior. Sed non in eo consistere hanc imperfectionem, quod culpa plenè sit deleta, manent pœnarum reliquiae; sed quod affectus absolutus in conditionatum sit translatus. Quasi dicas, pro, *volo*, substitutum sit, *nolo*, sed *ó si liceret!* Existimat, itaque, talis homo præferendum esse æternum bonum, et hoc vitâ et actione perficit. Sed ipsum vitandum adhuc amabile quasi retorto oculo intuetur; et ut vaccæ arcum reportantes, ad vitulos domi clausos remugit. Compressus itaque est ad bonum temporarium, non extinctus; factus est ex mortali venialis; mutatus, non penitus ablatus.

Hic ergo, cum mortis prælo in spiritum subsistentem fuerit expressus, secum fert unde torqueatur, sicut et qui aliis affectibus venialiter detortis obsessus, egreditur corpore. Non itaque locum uspiam tartareis oppletum ferculis cogitamus, quibus animæ, ab extrinseco torture lanienam patiantur, sed intimam, et viscitum ingenitam affectuum contra rationem, rabiem et furias horrescimus. Hanc peccatis propterea proportionatam esse, quia ab iis prognatum; alioquin indelibilem, nisi anima, mediante corporis conjunctione, patiens evadat. Hoc in resurrectione per duplicem ignis actionem in actum perducitur; corporei, qui corporum materiam ad angelica ministeria, et adaptationem corporum ad unitatem cum spiritibus præparare sit idoneus; et spiritalis, qui est iudicium Christi, seu visio corporea et mentalis Christi Domini, quæ transfert animarum dispositionem ab eâ distortionem quæ ex corporeo complexo remanserat, in eam quæ sit ad visionem beatificam congrua præparatio. Et in hoc consistere pœnarum vel (ut scripturæ loquuntur) peccatorum remissionem. Preces porro sanctorum, sive jam Deo fruuentium, sive in corpore, aut extra corpus adhuc

Hitherto the hypothesis is equally arbitrary on each side, nor hath Mr. White any more reason to laugh at the architects of a material purgatory, than the architects had to smile at his *squeezing out* a spiritual substance from the human body, by the press of death. This spiritual substance, we see, he supposes to be conscious of its intimately inhering affections which are contrary to reason, and to be horribly tormented with their rage and fury in its separate state, till the time of its reunion with the body. —Whence it follows, that there is no remission of sins, no remission of this mental torture till the resurrection, nor any intermediate purgatorial fire, tending to such remission, by cleansing or purifying the separate soul from these evil affections. For he plainly supposes the resurrection body absolutely necessary for the double operation of his purgatorial fire, to prepare the man, first, for his adaption to his angelic ministry, and secondly, for the beatific vision.

But then, as this purification was not to be accomplished, or indeed to commence, till the day of judgment, what is the efficacy, or what is the use of those prayers which are put up for these souls in their intermediate state? The church hath declared, that the souls detained in purgatory, are relieved by the prayers of the faithful. To this proposition Mr. White hath assented. It remains then that he should reconcile it to his hypothesis.

in ænigmate peregrinantium, ad hunc effectum valere, suo tempore præstandum. Hæc sunt, quantum ego capio, utriusque sententiæ capita. p. 3. 4.

It is a very incomprehensible supposition, that the prayers of the faithful should contribute to bring about this wonderful effect by any natural instrumentality, or indeed by any efficacy ascribed to them in holy writ. For if the effect is to follow as sure as there shall be a resurrection of the dead, and neither sooner nor later, and if, in the mean time, the sufferings of the spiritual substance are proportioned to the sins committed in the body, it should not seem, that the prayers of the saints, or of the whole church, should have any efficacy towards the accomplishment of an event, which, after all, is to happen only at a prescribed or predestinated period.*

This objection our author found so considerable, that he employed his whole twenty-second chapter to answer it.

In this chapter he begins with observing, that every good thing that befalls us is predestinated, and therefore if we may not pray for the relief of souls in an intermediate state, because the final period of their sufferings is predetermined, we may not pray for any good thing, nor even our own salvation.†

His adversaries still insisting, that we should only pray for those things which we do not know to be predestinated, he answers that whatever we *do not* know, this we certainly *do* know,

* Suo tempore præstandum.

† Adeone oblitus esse [Theologos] quacunque nobis prospere contingant, prædestinationis esse dictata; Quid de salute propriâ vel alienâ? Quisquamne prædestinationis effecta esse dubitat? Pro his, itaque non erit orandum. p. 96.

that unless what we pray for is predestinated, it will not be granted.*

He proceeds then to say, that these objectors dissemble, or do not consider, that the *means* are predestinated as well as the *end* :† and *prayer* among others. This he infers from 2 Pet. i. 10. where christians are exhorted to *make their calling and election sure*.

Some persons however have speculated upon this and the like texts so far as to make the predestinated end dwindle into a mere contingency; and there indeed, in my opinion, our author lands at last. - “Whatsoever,” says he, “is predestinated, so obtains the stability of its immutable arrest, (the liberty and contingency of second causes, by which it is brought about, not impeding) that if any one of them should fail, that very thing which we term predestinated, could not come to pass. And applying this assertion to our present purpose, if prayer should not be made for the dead, they would never be delivered, notwithstanding the irresistible force of predestination, through the imbecility of causes by which their delivery is promoted.”‡ *English Transl.* p. 202.

* Aiunt quidem, sed non pro iis orandum decertant quæ nobis constat esse futura. Sed idem nobis labor recursat; quantumvis enim ignari simus an sit prædestinatione sancitum quod petimus, hoc tamen ignorare non licet, nisi a prædestinatione flet non concessum iri quod petimus. *ibid.*

† Error itaque argumenti, vel proponentis, in eo latebat, quod considerabat sic prædestinatum esse effectum, ut dissimularet causas esse prædestinatas, seu vias per quas adiretur. p. 97.

‡ Quodcunque prædestinatum (ita non vetante libertate et contingentia causarum secundarum per quas originem capit) in sua salutem esse firmitate, ut nihilominus, si quidlibet eorum deficeret, non

But Mr. White, having laid it down as certain, that the time of final relief, the day of judgment, however predestinated, would not appear till the number of the elect should be perfected,* a formidable objection was raised upon this position, viz. the insignificance of offering prayers for particular persons, since this day of relief would break no sooner upon one than another. It might possibly happen, that some of the elect would have no prayers at all offered for their relief; in such a case, there would be an imbecility of second causes, which, with respect to these particulars, would prevent the end, however predestinated, from taking place. And then again, as these unprayed-for elect were of the number which was to be perfected or completed before the day of final relief, it would, from White's premises, follow, that the elect for whom the prayers of the faithful were put up, would be equally disappointed of the predestinated end, as the others.

esset futurum ipsum quod vocamus prædestinatum. Et, applicando ad nostrum usum hanc assertionem: Si oratio pro mortuis non fiat, non futuram esse liberationem, non obstante firmitate prædestinationis, ex imbecillitate, causarem per quas in rerum naturam progreditur. p. 98. A learned divine of our own times speaks to this point of the efficacy of prayer, with a more becoming modesty. "When God
" from the throne of celestial glory, issues out *that uncontrollable*
" *command to which all events are subject*, even your desires, humble christians, are not overlooked or forgotten by him. The good
" *man's prayer* is among the *reasons*, by which the omnipotent is
" *moved* in the administration of the universe." Ogden's Sermons on Prayer. p. 24.

* Non nisi impleto numero electorum, hunc diem, quem prædestinatum clamabat argumentum, nobis appariturum. p. 98. The same idea seems to be adopted by the church of England in her burial office—"Humbly beseeching thee of thy gracious goodness, shortly to

In answer to the latter part of this objection, (which indeed he does not formally state) he says, “ He that prays supplies what was wanting to the sufferings of the departed, without which supplement he could not be saved.”* Which is briefly to put all the dead who are not prayed for, out of the number of the elect.

The rest of the objection he answers by stating some intermediate benefits which separate souls receive by the prayers of the faithful, which it will be best to give in his own words. “ He,” says our author, “ who is the occasion that more prayers are offered to that intent, hath, as it were, a greater right to that day, than he for whom fewer are offered. Whence to him, it will arrive more grateful and honourable, than to the other, *who less contributed to its advance.* But besides, these pious offices and affections of others, *being known by the person departed whom they concern,* beget a disposition in his soul, by which, when time shall serve, his love to God, and consequently his beatitude will be increased. Moreover, by way of impetration, they become occasions to the divine providence of

“ accomplish the number of thine elect and to hasten thy kingdom, that we with all those who are departed in the true faith of thy holy name, may have our perfect consummation and bliss both in body and soul in thine eternal and everlasting glory,” which is praying for the dead, according to White’s system, in the aggregate. The common prayer book before the restoration, had it, *that we with this our brother, and all others, who, &c.* which was praying, for the soul of a particular.

* Orans itaque supplet quod deerat passionibus defuncti, sine quo supplemento non salvaretur.

“ disposing many things which otherwise
 “ would be differently ordered, that in the
 “ day of harvest they may enlarge his either es-
 “ sential or accidental happiness. If any thing
 “ of this happens through the good deeds of the
 “ person himself departed,” [I suppose he
 means by leaving money for prayers and mass-
 es] “ it is to be accounted among his merits,
 “ or the rewards due to his merits. But if
 “ such prayers spring not from any root which
 “ he himself did, whilst living, plant, but
 “ purely from the charity of some propitious
 “ persons, they are the effect of God’s provi-
 “ dence, whose mercies are numberless.” Eng.
 Transl. p. 203, 204.*

I have only two observations to make on
 this passage, leaving the rest of it to be confuted
 by the systematical purgatorian catholics, whom
 it chiefly concerns.

1. Mr. White, by supposing that the day
 of judgment is advanced or promoted in pro-
 portion to the prayers of the faithful, must
 suppose likewise, that it is proportionably re-
 tarder and kept back by the want of them.

* Respondetur hoc saltem negari non posse, quin plurimum quam
 pauciorum precum votario, magis debebitur illa dies eò itaque ho-
 noratior et gratior ei adveniat, *quam minus eam promoventi*. Præte-
 rea *hi pii affectus aliorum pro ipso, cogniti a mortuis*, suam vim et
 dispositionem in animam introducunt, qua fortior, cum tempus afflux-
 erit, in amorem Dei assurgat, et in potiori beatitudines sede collocetur.
Sunt etiam in genere impetrativo occasiones divinæ providentiæ,
quibus plura sic disponat, ut gaudium, sive essenziale, sive acciden-
tale, in die messis augeant, quæ aliqui secus disponenda forent. Et
 cum ex bonis et benefactis ipsius defuncti hæc accidant, inter merita
 ipsius, vel meritis debita præmia, computanda erunt. Et si forte non
 ex his quæ ipsemet gessit, sed ex bonitate alicujus alterius personæ ei
 propitiæ, hæc eveniant, in divinam id providentiam refundendum est,
 cujus misericordiarum non est numerus. p. 98, 99.

2. By allowing that the departed souls, are conscious of the prayers that are made for them, or what is the same thing, of the pious affections of those who offer them in their behalf, must allow, that this consciousness continues as long as these prayers continue to be made for them. The use I make of these observations will appear presently.

One cannot wonder that this perplexed account should be very unsatisfactory to the general run of popish supplicants for the souls in purgatory. They expected very different things for their departed friends as the fruits of their prayers, namely, speedy deliverance from their pains and tortures, and, in the mean time, some cooling refreshment under them. They would by no means understand what it was that Mr. White offered them in lieu of these benefits; and whatever it was, they would think it too long to wait for it till the day of judgment.

On these heads Mr. White found it necessary to give the plaintiffs some satisfaction, and begins it with saying, that, “we should not regard what people *do* expect, but what they *ought* to expect.—If the metaphorical fire makes deeper impressions upon the vulgar than metaphysical truth, let them enjoy their own notions; they may use the expressions of the fathers, and councils, that souls are tortured, and are relieved by prayer, without mentioning any time, concerning which fathers and councils are silent.”*

* Sed neque nos sollicitos tenere debet, quid sit quod eos moveat, sed quid oporteret eos movere.—Sed et si vides affectus magis metaphoricis ignium, et aliarum poenarum explicationibus commoveri, dici possunt quæ concilia et sancti nos docent, torqueri animas, et precibus relevari; de tempore fileatur tanquam ignotum. p. 99.

“Are you still unsatisfied,” says he, “and
 “urge an immediate releasement? I am con-
 “tented, let it be the very next moment after
 “your prayer; for whatever time intervenes
 “betwixt it and the restauration of the world,
 “is, to them, but as one moment.” Eng.
 p. 205.*

But if so, what becomes of the doctrine above, that the day of judgment is advanced or retarded in proportion to the prayers that are or are not made for departed souls? What becomes of the continued consciousness in the separate soul, of the pious affections of its intercessors, and the improvement it makes in its happiness by the benefit of that consciousness? The spiritual substance, according to this philosopher, when squeezed out of the body by the press of death, carries with it the materials of its torture in its unpurified affections; this torture he calls horrible, and says it is proportioned to the sins committed in the body. Is it possible to suppose, that all this torture can be inflicted, all this improvement made, in a moment of time? In the church of Rome, prayers are made for the dead, the moment the breath is out of the body, and prayers for the deliverance of the departing soul from the pains of purgatory, even before its actual departure; whence it must be supposed, that not even a single moment is allowed for all this purgatorial discipline, † upon the system of father White.

* *Necdum satisfactum est? et adhuc poscis subitaneum solatium? Eja fiat secundo post preces momento. Quodcunque enim inter illas et mundi instaurationem intercedit iis, momenti duntaxat rationem habet.* p. 99.

† Dr. Conner thought the soul did not depart from the body till after death: it may be entertaining to the reader to subjoin his ex-

And if this system had any solid foundation, a very few and very short prayers would do the business, and a great deal of the money might be spared which was expended on the vicarial prayers and masses of monks and friars. A consideration, which, as it would militate with more effect against his hypothesis than a thousand syllogisms, he takes care to obviate as follows:

“ In fine, if I be thought the occasion of
 “ restraining the profuse abundance of alms in
 “ this particular, I shall withall have the sa-
 “ tisfaction to have checked the daily increa-
 “ sing swarms of unworthy priests, who qua-
 “ lified neither with knowledge nor good man-
 “ ners, live like drones upon this stock, to the
 “ disgrace and contempt of their function, to
 “ the abuse of souls, and the common scandal
 “ both of those who live in and out of the
 “ church. Catholic faith shall from hence-
 “ forth be no longer the subject of the derision
 “ of *externs*, whilst her children vainly labour
 “ to defend against heretics those things which

planation of this matter, in a very honourable audience. “ I owned indeed,” says he, “ that in death the soul was actually separated from
 “ the body, but I could not allow, that that separation was the cause
 “ of death. But that the death of the body was the cessation of the
 “ motion of the heart, of the blood, and of the spirits, which cessa-
 “ tion could not proceed from the separation of the soul, since these
 “ do not at all depend upon it, as I proved before, but it was occa-
 “ sioned by some defects in the organs and fluids of the body, which,
 “ losing their due disposition, and their mutual correspondence one
 “ with another, all their actions cease; which cessation is properly
 “ called death; so that the soul finding them incapable of receiving
 “ its influence and obeying its commands, quits the body after it is
 “ dead; by which it appears that the separation of the soul is not pro-
 “ perly the cause of death, but that the death of the body is the cause
 “ of the separation.” Biogr. Britannica. Vol. iii. p. 1450.

“ have neither ground nor proof, but are introduced from the customary expressions of law-courts and exchanges, not from the language of nature, or christian tenets.” Eng. Trans. p. 206.*

Here the reconciliation of White with White, becomes impossible. He had said above, that it could not be denied that the day of judgment would be more honourable and more welcome to him for whom more prayers are made, than to him for whom fewer are put up. He had said in the same page, that if there were a deficiency of means, not even the predestinated end could be brought about. By the means, he understands the prayers of the faithful, and of the church; by the end, the day of judgment. Hence it follows, that the more mass priests there are, and the more they are employed, the better it will be for the departed souls. If it should be said, that these priests are improperly employed in this service, he himself furnishes us with the answer. He himself contends that the forms of the church used in these services, are conformable to his doc-

* Tandem si non adeo affluentes sint eleemosynæ, neque tam multi erunt, sacerdotes, cætera indigni et scientiâ et moribus, hoc uni freti stipendio, in dedecus et contemptum ecclesiæ, in deceptionem animarum et scandalum tum intra ecclesiæ claustra, tum extra degentium. Non submittetur fides catholica irrisioni exterorum, dum filii ipsius ea conantur aduersus hæreticos propugnare, quæ neque defendere possunt, neque probare, cum sint ex vocibus a foro et mercaturâ, non a naturâ vel christianis dogmatibus mutuatis, introducta. p. 100.—By the cast of this censure, one would be tempted to think that White intended to condemn the practice of praying for the dead in the gross. But in truth this was only a fling at the monks who had in a great measure engrossed these alms to themselves, and with whom White and his brethren the secular priests, were, in those days, at perpetual war.

trine, and though they should be differently understood, yet as he tells us, that not what is, but what ought to be understood, should only be regarded, the efficacy of the *opus operatum* takes place upon the general principles of the church, which puts the ignorance or the immorality of the officiating priest quite out of the question.

It should seem, that an ingenious man could hardly be driven into these inconsistencies, but for the sake of qualifying his real sentiments with such doctrines of the received system, as he could not, with any safety, disavow. He could not but be sensible, that the consciousness of a moment, would not admit of the orthodox hypothesis, which made provision for ages of sufferings. If it should be said, that the omission of prayers for the dead leaves an interval of consciousness proportioned to the length of that omission, it is answered, that his position is general; the momentary consciousness, as we shall see presently, when he comes to philosophize on the nature of the separate soul, does not arise from the prayers put up for it immediately upon its departure, but from a want of succession of ideas in the simple and instantaneous apprehension of the soul its self.

What this author chiefly asserts in this tract is, that the purification of the separate soul, its deliverance from its sufferings, and its access to beatitude, are only accomplished at the day of judgment and final retribution; and to this, he says, that all those passages to be met with in the scriptures, in the writings of the fathers, in the liturgies and offices of the church, which seem to favour a purgatorial fire, and a deli-

verance from intermediate pain, do evidently refer. He attempts to shew, that the most respectable of the fathers are clearly of this opinion, and that the rest of them, who seem to favour an intermediate purgation, are misunderstood by those who cite them in support of the vulgar hypothesis. He lays great stress upon the expressions in ancient liturgies, and infers that the sense of those who composed them was, that the separate soul was not to receive the fruit of those prayers which were put up for it, till the last day.

Among these expressions, we find such as these, *qui obdormierunt, in fide Christi—in spe resurrectionis,—qui dormiunt in somno pacis*, and the like. These expressions, without all doubt, exclude all notion of intermediate purgatorial pains, and as they are to be found in the prayers that are made for all, they must be supposed to take in the case of all for whom such prayers are properly made, and among the rest, for those who are gone off the stage unpurified from the affections of venial sins only.

But then (to observe it by the way) they equally exclude White's notion of separate souls, tortured with impure affections, in proportion to the sins committed in the body.

However he cites other expressions in present use with his church, which are not so favourable to his hypothesis. But to these he will not allow an early, and consequently an universal practice, but says, they only obtained general practice from the times of Odilo, abbot of

Clugny,* and were not authorised by the practice of the Greek church, the decisions of the Florentine Council, or any precedents earlier than the times of Bede and Gregory.

Even these passages, however, our author, by a dexterity of interpretation, (which it is of no importance to examine) brings about to a friendly agreement with his scheme of futurity.

In fine, to make all things meet, he comes to this conclusion, that all these expressions of the saints, which, taken separately, (that is without his glosses and comments) smell so strong of heresy, on a sudden, put on a new

* He hints that these forms took their rise from some revelations which are believed to have been made to the monks of Clugny; but which we may suppose, White himself did not believe. If these were fictitious revelations, the services to which they gave occasion are impositions upon the church, and want authenticity, and those only are to be accounted authentic, which were in general use before the eleventh century when Odilo's forms took place. But all these agree with White's hypothesis, *ergo*, &c. How different are the conclusions of Father Hardouin? who having occasion to prove that all the offices of the church were forged, or at least interpolated, brings the following instance: *Nuper editum Rituale Parisiense* [Perhaps about the year 1712] *orationem exhibet in exsequiis defunctorum, qualiter fiunt in Ecclesia Metropolitana, quæ docet aperte animas gloriam percipere tantum supremo die judicii.* Prolegom. apud Vailant, 1766. p. 105. One may be certain that Mr. White would have insisted that this was a proof, of the authenticity of the Ritual; but the Jesuit exclaims, *Hæccine propterea dicenda est Ecclesiæ Parisiensis fides?* Certainly, or what shall we say to the Bishop of Meaux on the chapter of variations? Whatever that prelate might think of White's interpretations, he would hardly agree with Hardouin, that the church had for so many ages, worshipped by fictitious rituals. White himself indeed allows that the ancient liturgies had been partly interpolated, and partly castrated by different prelates, but this he thinks an inconsiderable objection in the present case, and that this doctrine, being uniformly inserted in so many of them, must have been the constant doctrine of all former ages.

face, and come forth adorned with truth and candor, particularly these three propositions.

1. That *the saints may lawfully be prayed for.*

2. That *they are yet detained in the entry, or porch, or avenues of heaven.*

3. That *they are all to pass through the fire of the last judgment, whereby themselves shall be approved, and others suffer detriment, and finally be saved, yet so as by fire.*

“All which, from our grounds,” says the English, “are convinced of manifest truth” and with a grateful return give no less testimony to our doctrine, placing it under the protection of christian discipline and defence, and with their impenetrable files securing it from all hostile attacks.” p. 77.*

The translator, observe, is a little puzzled what to make of this *atrium* of departed souls, and therefore gives us three words to chuse, the *entry*, the *porch*, and the *avenues*, hoping, perhaps, that one of them might be reconciled to what is said in the original, namely,—*esse in loco corporibus tantum competit.* p. 14.

And now, give me leave to ask, what does this man pretend to hold concerning the intermediate state of departed souls, more or less than a hundred nominal protestants who execrate

* Respectanti modo quæ deducta sunt, non expectatum promicat miraculum, tot et tam vulgatas sanctorum sententias, crimini hætenus suppositas, clarissimâ veritatis et honestatis luce vestitas, in manifestum occurrere; Has potissimum tres proloquor. *Orari posse pro sanctis; Sanctos in atrio adhuc detineri; et transiuros per ignem supremi judicii, atque eo esse ipsos examinandos, cæteros detrimentum passuros et quasi per ignem salvatum iri.* Quæ tria ex doctrina data manifesti luminis et veritatis conscia peraguntur. Neque minus doctrinæ datæ per hanc suam manifestationem vicem et testimonium reddunt, eamque in tuto collocatam sub christianæ disciplinæ protectione, muniunt et circumvallant. *Cap. ix. p. 37. 38.*

the soul-sleepers, have held, taught, and written on various occasions, save only that they avoid the word purgatory, while they assert the thing in terms at least as strong as White himself makes use of?

Perhaps you will ask me does any protestant teach that the dead, saints or others, may be prayed for?

Judge for yourselves, good people, from the sayings of a man, of whose protestantism you may have depositions upon oath from numbers of grave, reverend doctors, professors and preachers of the present period.

“If any one,” says Archbishop Wake, “will put up his particular requests for the dead, for any of those ends, for which the primitive christians did, we shall not condemn him.”

Primitive christian, is a denomination of great latitude, nor hath the line been drawn with such precision as to enable us to say, where the exclusion of *non-primitive christian*, begins. Dr. Chapman, Archdeacon of Sudbury, allows indeed, that, “prayers for the dead were in use among the ancient christians, but,” he adds, “not such as will help the modern popish cause;” which is happily enough distinguished from the ancient popish cause, save only that it may leave a suspicion, that the latter is not in so much disrepute with the Doctor as the former.* Be that as it may, the learned Arch-

* Dr. Middleton brings a passage from Tertullian (the instance from Origen is rather a jewish than a christian notion) which plainly and expressly mentions the custom of praying for refreshment for the departed soul, in the interim between death and the resurrection.

deacon of Sudbury brings down primitive christianity, so far as relates to this article of praying for the dead, to the end of the fourth century.

Let us now return to Archbishop Wake, and consider the ends, for which, according to him, the primitive christians prayed for the dead.

“Some of the primitive christians,” says his grace, “prayed for the bodies resurrection, “others for their acquitting at the day of “judgment, supposing it to be no way unfit “to pray to God for those very blessings which “he has absolutely promised and resolved to “give.” Exactly agreeable to what we have cited above from White, concerning prayers for what is already predestinated. The Archbishop goes on. “Some thought, that an increase of “glory might be obtained to the righteous by “their prayers.” And under this idea he informs us, that “the primitive church made “prayers—for the best of men, for the holy apostles, the martyrs or confessors of the church, “nay even for the blessed virgin herself, all “which, at the same time, they thought in

Introductory Discourse, 1747. Quarto, p. 18. What says Dr. Chapman to this? why, he first ascribes it to Middleton's great seeming zeal to serve the Romanists; I suppose he means by pointing out the passage to them. But was the Archdeacon ignorant, that this instance of primitive practice had been cited to authorize the doctrine of purgatory, before Middleton was born? by no means. He was only unwilling that Tertullian should be branded for his ancient popery, being so substantial a pillar of Dr. Chapman's church, that he could not possibly be spared. And the great esteem he has for this primitive father and his authority, makes it utterly impertinent in him to alledge in the second place, that “this was only a private opinion.” What! not in the mouth of this great primitive oracle? See Jesuit-Cabal farther opened, p. 31.

“happiness, and who, the papists themselves
 “tell us, never touched at purgatory.” Which
 are the very same ends and uses of prayers for
 the dead assigned by White.

His grace farther informs us, that “all be-
 “lieved this [praying for the dead] testified
 “their hope of them, and manifested their faith
 “of that future resurrection, which they waited
 “for, and in the meantime, maintained a kind
 “of fellowship and communion between the
 “members of Christ yet alive, and those who
 “were departed only, not lost by death.”*

He says, indeed, that “Some of these ends
 “were only the private opinions, which the
 “particular christians of old had concerning
 “the reason and benefit of praying for the
 “dead.”†

But what all believed, could not be the pri-
 vate opinions of particular christians only: and
 it would be strange enough, if the primitive
 christians in praying for the dead, should never
 think of any of them, but such as the papists
 say never touched at purgatory. By the Arch-
 bishop’s own expression, it appears, that some
 prayed for one end, and some for another. Was
 there not one of these primitive christians, who
 remembered in his prayers the condition of those
 poor souls who went out of the world in their
 sins? We are assured by Tertullian, that there
 was; and that a *refrigerium* was solicited for
 such souls in their intermediate state.

But be this last, if you please, the practice as
 well as the opinion of particular christians only;

* Wake’s 3 Tracts against popery, Sect. iii. p. 31, 32.

† Ibid.

it is still a practice which Archbishop Wake does not condemn ; “ he does not condemn any “ one who puts up his particular requests “ for the dead, for any of those ends, for which “ the primitive christians did.” And if such persons are not condemnable, what Dr. Chapman says to exculpate the primitive church from Dr. Middleton’s charge of superstition in this instance, namely, “ that those opinions which “ countenanced a purgatory, were only the “ private opinions (or conjectures rather) of “ certain writers, while the general doctrine of “ the churches admitted no such refinements,” is wholly impertinent. These opinions or conjectures, according to Dr. Wake, were not to be condemned, why then should not the churches admit them ? I repeat it then, that Dr. White did not go farther in his speculations on an intermediate state, than, (perhaps hardly so far as) some protestant doctors, so called, have done.

Hitherto we have exhibited this same Dr. White only in the light of skirmishing with his adversaries upon church principles ; it remains now, that we produce his positive opinion of the nature of the soul in a state of separation, and this opinion he gives *ex professo*, in his 17th chapter.

He there adopts the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, who held, that discourse, and composition of ideas, have their origin from the body, and are not to be looked for in immaterial beings ; because in them, there is none of that successive impetus upon the phantasy which arises from the bodily organs, consequently the knowledge of these pure spirits, all comes by imme-

diat intuition, which shews principles and connexions at once, without deduction or succession of ideas, and this intuition exhibits nothing to the separate spirit but the naked truth, divested of all those fallacies which arise from the reasonings of the fallible man, and the interposition of material substance.*—Hence it is likewise concluded, that there is no change in these immaterial spirits, because there are no instruments, no diversity of parts, one of which might act upon another, no distinction of the matter acted upon, from that which acts upon it; all which are necessary to effect mutation.†

But then, as our author concludes from this state of the case, that the soul, in this state of separation, sees nothing but the naked truth, as it is not susceptible of false opinions, a considerable objection arises, namely, how it comes to pass that the soul should be freed from the false opinions it entertained in this world, and not at the same time be divested of those affections which depended upon them?

It will be best to give his answer in his own words. “This happens,” says he, “not through any discourse, but by the precise stroke of

* Docet [Aquinas] in spiritibus abstractis, neque discursam esse, neque compositionem, sed simplicem duntaxat apprehensionem. Scilicet existimat S. Doctor hæc ex corpore originem trahere, in immaterialis non esse expectanda. Experimur siquidem compositiones et discursus ex succedentibus memoriæ in phantasiam impetibus nasci, quos si tollas, impossibile est successionem inter indivisibilia contingere. Omnia itaque uno quasi oculo et ictu, spiritus nudos necesse est conspiciari. p. 74.

† Et hæc est ratio quare immutabilis sit, quæcunque resolutio facta, quia scilicet, nulla sunt instrumenta nulla diversitas partium, quarum una in alteram agat; nulla materiæ et agentis distinctio, quæ omnia requisita sunt ad mutationem. p. 75.

“ death. For it being impossible to a spiritual
 “ nature, at one and the same time to assent
 “ to two contradictories, seeing and compre-
 “ hending the contradiction, and nothing, as
 “ hath been said, being able to escape the
 “ knowledge of the separated soul, it is evident
 “ that truth must overcome falsity, and since
 “ one of them only can take possession, truth
 “ must abide, and error give place, and this
 “ through the very disposition of the soul it-
 “ self by death. But that the affections, on
 “ the other side, being not contrary to each
 “ other, nor of contrary objects, may at the
 “ same time subsist in the soul; death framing
 “ its creature according to the predisposition
 “ of the subject it works on.” Engl. p. 155,
 156.*

If any one desires to know how the separate
 soul becomes *the creature of death*, Mr. White
 gives him the following account.

“ The soul, when first infused into the body,
 “ is such as the quality of the matter it is
 “ united unto, exacts and determines it to be;
 “ because a natural action, that is, [an action]
 “ which doth not exceed the rank and limit of
 “ causes, cannot but act according to the ex-
 “ istence of the subject, and do that which is
 “ conformable thereto, and apt to be produced

* Hoc non contingere ex discursu aliquo, sed ex præciso mortis
 ictu; cum enim impossibilis sit spiritalis natura quæ simul semelque
 assentiatur duabus contradictoriis videns volensque ipsam contradi-
 ctionem, nihilque, (ut dictum est) latere possit animam, clarum est veri-
 tatem fortiolem esse falsitate; et cum una tantum inesse possit, eam,
 falsitate deficiente, ex vi ipsius constitutionis animæ, per mortem ipsi
 inesse: affectus autem, cum non sint contrarii, neque contrariorum,
 simul in mente subsistere, quia vis mortis, secundum subjecti præpar-
 ationem, suam molitur creaturam. p. 75; 76.

“ thereof. But death also is a natural action,
 “ making that which of a man can be made,
 “ to wit, a spiritual substance which we call a
 “ soul. And as the disposition of the embryo
 “ or seminal concretion, delineates the future
 “ man, so that man, to have had in the course
 “ of his whole life, these and these thoughts
 “ and affections, designs and points out by the
 “ impressions left, the future conditions of the
 “ soul. So that death produceth such an en-
 “ tity, as, from the man so disposed, is natu-
 “ rally producible. And the entity so made,
 “ continueth such, till it be as it were new
 “ molded, which is the work of the resurrec-
 “ tion.” Engl. p. 153. 154.*

This personification and plastic activity of death, puts one in mind of a certain epitaph.

*Do all we can,
 Death is a man
 That never spareth none.*

But now, with all this *simplicity of apprehension*, this *immediate intuition of truth*, this *discernment of principles and connections*, and above all, with this *want of contrariety* of af-

* Animam, cum primo corpori infunditur, talem esse, qualem materiei qualitas exigit; quia scilicet actio naturalis, hoc est, seriem causarum non prætergrediens, non potest nisi ex subjecti existentia agere, et hoc facere quod ex subjecto fieri natum est. Est autem Mors et ipsa quoquæ naturalis actio, faciens quod ex homine natum est fieri, Ens, puta, spiritale, quod Animam dicimus, Sicut vero dispositiones Embryi, vel seminarii tuberis designat futurum hominem, sic hominem tota vita talia vel alia [f. talia] cogitavisse et voluisse, per relicta vestigia, futuram designat animam. Facit itaque Mors Ens quale ex sic affecto homine natum est prodire; et Ens factum tale est, donec denuo contingat quasi referri, quod in resurrectione demum expectatur. p. 75.

fections, how shall we account for that *conflict* of *these same* affections, which according to our author, make so considerable a part of the torment of the separate soul? In his outset he holds, that the departed soul is beset with those affections which infected it during its union with the body, but which it resists in practice; and this he compares to the cows which drew the ark to *Bethshemesh*, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left, but lowing after their calves that were shut up at home; and accordingly represents the man thus drawn different ways, as saying to himself, *Nolo, sed ó si liceret!* How can it be said, that these affections are not contrary to each other? Here is the affection of a blessed futurity, which carries the man practically on the right road, but here is likewise an affection for things forbidden, to which, according to White, he is perpetually looking back; and this retrospective oblique affection remaining in the soul after its separation, can never be reconciled to the affection for future happiness, which remains likewise. This therefore can be considered no otherwise than as an hypothesis invented at pleasure, to evade the censures of those who espoused and profited by the received doctrine; and to substitute for the absurd and ridiculous notions of a material purgatory, something like an end to which prayers for the dead might have respect; which would puzzle the stupidity of his adversaries, just as much as if his system was capable of the strictest demonstration.

He found himself however under a necessity of defending his doctrine in another treatise, which is intitled, *Responsa ad Excepti-*

ones, Lond. 1662, in which he seems to me to leave even his own purgatory out of his hypothesis.

In this tract, he declares for the *Philosophia Digbæana* * which determines, *nullo modo dicendum mutabilitatem aliquam esse in animabus post mortem*, p. 50. He brings a passage from Cassiodorus, importing, that souls, after death, do neither good nor ill, but persevere quietly in their natures; and another from St. Austin, in these words, *Dormit omnis mortuus, et bonus et malus, unisquisque cum causâ suâ dormit, cum causâ suâ surgit, cum ab hoc somno evigilabunt, simul omnes quod promissum est, accepturi sunt*. p. 78. He says however afterwards, that this same Austin was the first who mentioned the deliverance of a soul before the day of judgment, conceiving in his mind that such a thing might be, but openly confessing, that he knew nothing of the matter. p. 99.

Lastly, he brings fresh proofs from ancient liturgies, that prayers for the dead were only put up, that they might find mercy and reward in the day of judgment; and then adds, by way of conclusion, “this single consideration would
“be enough to induce me to adhere to my
“opinion, even against the otherwise highest
“authority, as I am persuaded that this was
“the constant and perpetual sense and judgment of the catholic church, (that is of the
“church diffusive at all times, and in all pla-

* He was an intimate friend of Sir Kenelme Digby, some of whose latin works he translated into English. Biog. Brit. Digby [Ken.] Rem. [G] and Wood's Ath. Ox. Vol. ii. Col. 353. He likewise wrote a latin preface to a tract of Digby's, which somebody else translated into that language from the english. Ibid.

“ ces) and that the opposite opinion was brought
 “ forth in the night, and nourished with a blind
 “ pretext of piety, in the darkness of vulgar
 “ ignorance, till it had gained some strength
 “ by numbers, and then broke out in the ec-
 “ clesiastic pulpits and scholastic chairs.”*

White's peroration is remarkable, which I shall therefore put in the margin.†

He had, in his former tract, reprobated the miracles and pretended visions of former times, which had been the chief support of the purgatorial doctrine, even those related by St. Gre-

* Hæc sola consideratio fatis foret mihi, ut adversus ingentem cæteroqui auctoritatem, in meas quæstionis partes inclinarem, persuasus, esse perpetuum et constantissimum ecclesiæ quatenus catholicæ, (hoc est, et omni tempore, et omni loco diffusæ,) sensum et sententiam; oppositamque opinionem nocturno partu editum, cæco pietatis prætextu inter vulgi et ignorantiae tenebras educatum, donec multitudine aliquam potentiam acquisivisset, tum demum in Cathedras tum ecclesiasticas, tum scholares, irrupisse. p. 80.

* Nunc quid mihi superest nisi ut per te, Sapientissime Domine, obtester amicum meum, si ex scripto meo clarum illi factum sit totum christianæ actionis vultum, a Christo, ab apostolis, a sanctis ad supremum judicii diem stare conversum, et hoc specialiter quoad bona et mala quæ mortuis apprecamur et deprecamur; si clarissime constet ex sacris scripturis quod flamma quæ mundum exscindet, eadem omnia omnium operâ sit examinatura, et mala opera super Christo ædificata consumptura; si peccata in futuro sæculo remitti, et vere purgari animas, et non tantummodo puniri pronunciet antiquitas; si nulla sit mentio liberationis ante diem judicii, ante Augustinum, qui primus aliquid simile possibile esse mente concepit, sed aperte professus est se nescire; si evidentissimum est ex authore dialogorum, ex privatis revelationibus irrupisse in hominum mentes hanc persuasionem, si hoc agi cæperit postquam revelationi quæ catholicæ fidei sit fundatrix, nullus relictus est locus; si in libris ecclesiasticis Romanæ Ecclesiæ non sit vel una oratiuncula quæ diserte petat liberationem ante diem Judicii, sed tota eorum negotiatio circa diem Judicii versetur, &c. p. 99.

gory and venerable Bede.* Here he seems to go farther when he says, that this doctrine of intermediate purgation did not arise, *till all occasion for revelation in the church had ceased.* If so, and if we date the origin of this doctrine in or before the days of Tertullian, what must become of the cause of those worthy protestants, who, in contradiction to Dr. Middleton, bring down the post-apostolical miracles and visions, some centuries lower? Why should they be less ingenuous than a sensible papist, who must be conscious, when he made this declaration, that three fourths of the trumpery of his church could only be supported on the contrary supposition?

I doubt not but the reader will be curious to know why so much more pains and paper are spent upon this Thomas White, than upon some others who, he may think, equally deserve it.

If the subject of his book, and his manner of treating it, will not sufficiently account for this, I beg leave to add, that, with respect to the history of the controversy, Mr. White proved to be a more consequential writer than was imagined when his system came first under consideration. To explain this it will be necessary to give some farther particulars of this gentleman's personal history.

At the time of the restoration, and for some years before, there were great animosities among the popish doctors concerned in the several missions for propagating the roman catholic religion in England. There was a community of them in this kingdom, who stiled themselves

* Chap. xviii. xix.

the Dean and Chapter of the catholic clergy in England. White seems to have listed himself in this body, and to have been their principal champion, particularly in opposition to Dr. George Leyburn, president of the college at Douay, a seminary which, according to the said Leyburn, was founded purposely to supply the English mission ; consequently this chapter of seculars, erected in England, was looked upon by the president and his society at Douay, as interlopers, and schismatics, the encouragement of whom must tend to the annihilation of the seminary at Douay, which Leyburn represents to have been founded by Cardinal Allen, as an asylum for the exiled priests driven out of England in the reign of Queen Elizabeth,* and since that time [1568] had sent above a thousand pastors into England ; and he represents it as the nursery, or mother house, from whence had gone out the chiefest of their regulars, such as Campian, Barlow, &c.†

It was Leyburn's business, therefore to re-

* The foundation here spoken of, was intended from the beginning, as a seminary for popish controvertists, and particularly for missionaries to England. It does not appear that there was any particular view, in founding this society, of affording refuge to priests banished from England. See Thuanus B. cxxvi. at the beginning ; Alan's article in the Biogr. Britannica. Text. p. 77. and 78. Rem. [E.]

† This Dr. George Leyburn was the first English priest who was sworn chaplain to Queen Henrietta, and to her he appeals for the innocence of his conduct towards the state, which it seems the chapter had called in question : and this the queen might attest with as much safety, as Leyburne bore testimony, upon the credit of her Majesty's confessor, that she had never been guilty of any mortal sin. Kennet's Register. p. 373. 374. He complains that his adversaries had endeavoured to make him a very rogue, by several accusations brought against him in a kind of pastoral letter, intituled, "*An Encyclical Epistle to our brethren of England*, and subscribed by " Master Dr. Ellis, Mr. Peter Curtis, Mr. George Warhame, " Mr. Robert Manly, Mr. Lawrence Plat, Mr. John Holland, " Mr. Charles Cansfield, Mr. John Singleton, and Mr. J. Medcalfe,

present this English chapter in as dark colours as possible. We have only to consider his attacks upon White, particularly concerning the doctrine of his book on the intermediate state.

WHITE, who went by the name of BLACKLOE, had been informed, that the Bishop of Chalcedon had commanded Leyburn to cry against his books, and seems to have expostulated with the bishop on that surmise. To which the bishop in a letter to Blackloe, dated July 6, 1652, answered as follows :

“ What apparent ground, you had to write,
 “ that I commanded Layburn to cry against
 “ your books, was no true ground, seeing I
 “ commanded him the contrary.— Divers
 “ saints and learned men have (*Salva Chari-*
 “ *tate*) dissented in their opinions even in mat-
 “ ters of divinity, and so may you and I doe,
 “ if wee will, and God willing it shall be so on
 “ my part.”

This is written in a blank leaf at the beginning of my copy of White's book, which seems to have belonged to some friend of the catholic dean and chapter; for thus the transcriber goes on :

“ Theaforesaid instances do evince, that Dr.
 “ Layburn hath manifestly overlashed, in ap-
 “ pearing like a new lawgiver to all christians,
 “ to damn without sense and contrary to in-
 “ junction, Mr. Blackloe's opinions.”

This, it is certain, does not concern the book

“ which stile themselves the dean and chapter or church of the ca-
 “ tholic clergy in England.” Leyburn replied to this in an *Encycli-*
cal answer, dedicated to Queen Herientitta Maria, wherein he apolo-
 gizes for his own conduct, and recriminates upon his adversaries of
 the chapter, with great bitterness. Kennet. *ibid.* and p. 385. See
 also p. 407, 408.

De Medio Animarum Statu, because White mentions it in his dedication of that tract to the bishop, whom he styles, *Catholici in Anglia Gregis Pastor*. Probably it may relate to White's opinion, delivered in some other piece, for he wrote much.

But, whether with or without authority, it is certain Leyburn did open his mouth wide against this doctrine of White. He says, in his *encyclical answer*, published in 1661, "The
" apostolic seat does harbour no good opinion
" of Dr. Blackloe, for that Dr. Gage, their
" agent," [i. e. agent for the chapter] " in his
" letter of Feb. 20. 1661, shewn to our seniors,"
[at Douay] " hath these express words: Mr.
" Blackloe's doctrine is in so great detestation
" here," [at Rome] " that neither that of Lu-
" ther or Calvin ever was in a greater." And then he adds, " It has been censured by the
" university of Douay, as scandalous, hereti-
" cal, and impious."*

But Leyburn in his wrath, acquaints us with a fact which is remarkable enough. He says, that John Holland, a member of the chapter, and a convert to popery, who had been secretary to the bishop of Durham, embraced Blackloe's profane novelties, and being a nimble, active penman, and industrious in spreading Blackloe's new doctrines, was made secretary to the chapter; and he adds, that Dr. Ellis made this Mr. Holland a priest, for the great zeal he had shewn at Lisbon towards Mr. Blackloe's new notions in philosophy. Kennet. 353.

The dean and chapter of the catholic clergy in England, were in their situation a considerable, and probably a numerous body, and it

* Kennet's Register, p. 382.

is no little credit to Blackloe alias White, that his notions found such reception among them.

White, upon some occasion, found it expedient, to submit his doctrines to the judgment of the pope and the church, as appears by Kennet's Register. p. 625. His first submission is dated May 8. 1657, but was thought insufficient, as it might mean, that he only submitted his doctrine to the church aggregate, and not to the pope alone as the head of it. Upon this objection, he subscribed another July 2, in the same year, importing, that he willingly submitted all his writings to the particular see of Rome, and St. Peter's successor the pope, even out of a general council. This the people of Douay called the recantation. Whereas in truth this was no more than a piece of formality, by way of shelter from the accusation of heresy, to which all the writers of that communion, who have struck ever so little out of the common road, have had recourse. Had White meant to recant in either of these rescripts, he would hardly have published his *Responsa ad Exceptiones*, five years after, viz. 1662. It appears indeed, that in that very year he wrote a letter to the pope, wherein he professes, that, "if his holiness should proceed to the punishments mentioned in a certain decree, without any further form of law, he would not contend, but undergo them with as much humility and patience as he was able."

This letter is dated February 3, 1662. and probably before his *Responsa*, &c. was published. It appears however, that the pope made a decree against him, and that a decree of condemnation. What does White say to this?

Does he recant ? No ; no more than the Smithfield-martyrs in Queen Mary's days. *He would submit to his punishment with patience and humility ;* and so did they.

No body indeed can wonder at such a decree, when it is considered how White had shaken the pillars of purgatory to their very foundations by these two books. But that either of these books, should be censured by protestants and particularly by a british protestant parliament, as blasphemous, atheistical, and profane, will, I imagine, be matter of surprize, to those who have either read them, or taken an idea of their contents from the foregoing summary.

When I first read in Anthony Wood, that White's book of Purgatory was censured in parliament along with *Hobbes's Leviathan*, in October 1666, * I imagined that sedulous biographer must have been mistaken in this instance ; but I thought the fact was curious, and worth a farther inquiry.

And having an opportunity of consulting the journals of the house of commons, I found as follows.

Anno 1666.

“ *Die Mercurii. 17^o Octobris, 18^o Car. II^{di}.*

“ *Ordered*, that the committee to which the
 “ bill against atheism and profaneness is com-
 “ mitted, be impowered to receive information
 “ touching such books as tend to atheism,
 “ blasphemy, and profaneness, or against the
 “ essence and attributes of God, and in parti-
 “ cular the book published in the name of one
 “ White, and the book of Mr. Hobbes called

* *Ath. Oxon. Vol. ii, col. 644.*

“ the Leviathan, and to report their opinions
“ to the house.”

In those days, to call in question the natural immortality of the human soul, was always understood to imply atheism. White's book had certainly a tendency to weaken the arguments for that immortality, by weakening the common proofs of the soul's consciousness in an intermediate state; but had nothing in it to authorise the conclusion.

I cannot find that this bill against atheism and profaneness was ever passed, though it came upon the carpet several times during that session of parliament. Nor does it appear, that the house proceeded farther in their censures of White and Hobbes. Nor do I think that White would have been censured for his theological notions in that place, if he had not been obnoxious to the politicians of those days on another account.

To understand this, it will be necessary to observe, that White was a disciple of Sir Knelme Digby, not only in philosophy, but also in politics. The Knight has been accused, and upon very authentic evidence, of intriguing with Cromwell, to the prejudice of the exiled Stuarts.* Whether White was in the depth of the secret or not, it is probable he knew something of the transaction, and that Digby, (who is called by Layburn, Mr. Blackloe's Mecænas) † might set him to work with his pen, in favour of Cromwell's government.

* See his Article in the Biographia Britannica, Rem. [L.]

† Kennet's Register. p. 286.

Be this as it might, White wrote a book, about that time, intituled, *The Grounds of obedience and government*, wherein he held, *that the people, by the evil management, or insufficiency of their governor, are remitted to the force of nature to provide for themselves, and not bound by any promise made to their governor. That the magistrate by his miscarriages, abdicates himself from being a magistrate, and proveth a brigand or robber, instead of a defender.—That if he be innocent and wrongfully deposed, and totally dispossessed, it were better for the common good to stay as they are, than to venture the restoring him, because of the public hazard.**

I have carried on Mr. White's article to such a length, that I shall not attempt to support any conjectures how far this state offence might influence the parliament to censure White at any rate, nor will I inquire why they chose to fall upon his theology, rather than his politics.

It is sufficient for my purpose to shew, what were the leading sentiments of mankind at particular periods on the subject before us. This Mr. White, had entered into it with more precision and greater abilities than any man of his time; and I think it very clear, from the inconsistencies he ran into to save the reputation of his orthodoxy, that if the word purgatory, had been out of his way, he would have found no difficulty to dispose of the separate soul in a state of absolute unconscious rest.

* Kennet's Register, p. 222.

C H A P. XVII.

Nicholas Perrot, (*Sieur d'Ablancourt*) *his opinion how we gain the knowledge of the soul's immortality. His contempt of the current philosophy. Yet allows it to be useful to confirm the doctrine of revelation on this point. His supposition compared with that of Arnauld and Bayle. Remarks upon all three.*

NICHOLAS PERROT, Sieurd' Ablancourt, 1663. died in the year 1664. He was an intimate friend of the learned and ingenious Olivier Patru, a celebrated advocate, and member of the French academy. At one of their meetings, a question was started concerning the immortality of the soul. Perrot held, that, "it is religion, and not natural reason, that teaches us the immortality of the soul;" something had dropped from Perrot, in the course of the debate, which scandalised Patru, and seems to have given him some suspicions concerning his friend's orthodoxy, or, as the word is in Perrot's letter, his catholicism.

To clear himself of these suspicions, Perrot put down his sentiments in writing, with the title of a *Discourse*, &c. which he sent to Patru, and which is published in a collection of Patru's pieces, that appeared in 1692.* Here he represents the reasonings of philosophers on

* Les Oeuvres diverses de Mr. Patru De L'Academie Françoise. 2 Tomes. A Amsterdam Chez George Gallet, 1692. Perrot's Discourse is in Vol. 2. p. 354.

the soul, not only as inconclusive, but as full of contradiction and confusion. “Some of them,” he says, “concluded, that the soul died with the body; and if others believed that the soul was immortal, they drew their conclusions from false conjectures, and ridiculous grounds.” He instances in Aristotle, “who though he was of so penetrating a sagacity in other subjects, when he came to reason upon the nature of the soul, his discourses are so confused, that sometimes he speaks for, and sometimes against, its immortality.” There is no doubt but he was well aware how the peripatetic philosophy had been refuted by the Cartesians, though he neither refers to their system, nor makes any exception in favour of it, and indeed must be understood to pass sentence upon that among the rest; for he says, “take a view of ALL the schools of philosophy, consider what they do and teach there. You will find presumption in some, obstinacy in others, and ignorance, error, and weakness in them all.” He says farther, that “provided he believes that God, by his infinite power, can do things that are impossible to nature, he may be allowed to say, that, speaking as a natural philosopher, the resurrection of the dead is impossible.”*

Would you expect after this to find that this very man has admitted, that arguments out of these philosophical schools, which abound with presumption, obstinacy, ignorance, error, and weakness, are good to confirm a soul in-

* Discourse. p. 358.

lightened with grace, in the belief of the immortality of the soul? What! when upon the principles of that very philosophy, the resurrection of the dead (a doctrine of *grace*) is absolutely impossible? Upon the principles of this philosophy, the soul is capable of existing in a separate state, conscious, active, and percipient of good and evil, pleasure and pain, happiness and misery; by which hypothesis, all the moral purposes of a future account are completely answered, and a resurrection of the dead rendered thereby, useless, as well as impossible.

How is it possible that one of these doctrines should be subservient to the confirmation of the other? What connection can a revelation which insures a resurrection of the dead, have with a philosophy which demonstrates such resurrection to be impossible?

I cannot help remarking upon this occasion, the two different suppositions of Messieurs Arnauld and d'Ablancourt. The former thinks the philosophical demonstration of the natural immortality may be of use, to bring unbelievers to the knowledge and belief of a future state, as revealed in the scriptures; inasmuch as they are a sort of men who will admit nothing but what may be known by the light of reason, and who are unwilling to begin with *faith*.*

These men then we will suppose, begin with studying the peripatetic or, if you please, the cartesian philosophy. Here they find, according to d'Ablancourt, that upon these principles, the resurrection of the dead is impossible. And the honour of God in the moral government

* Bayle. POMFONATIUS. II. 8.

of the world, being sufficiently secured by the hypothesis of a natural immortality, they will be as little disposed to end with the point of faith, as to begin with it.

The *Sieur d'Ablancourt* on the other hand, thinks it necessary to begin with the revealed doctrine of a future state ; and after the mind is sufficiently enlightened by the doctrines of grace, to confirm the faithful by the additional testimony of philosophical conclusions, i. e. the conclusions of a philosophy full of presumption, obstinacy, error, and ignorance, and which teacheth that the doctrine of grace to be confirmed by it, is an utter impossibility.

There is however, in all this, one consideration entirely overlooked both by *d'Ablancourt's* piety, and *Bayle's* scepticism. They put the credibility of man's immortality, as revealed in the scriptures, to the account of faith, without any respect to the reasonableness of it, in consequence of certain facts, which in the same scriptures connect it with the history of man from the first origin of the species. They consider not, or conceal, that the doctrine of the gospel, refers us back to the fall of man, when his title to immortality was forfeited, and that this their forfeiture is inconsistent with any natural inherent principle of life, after the sentence of death should be executed. To this transaction the resurrection of the dead has respect, and is therefore considered in the light of redemption, a reversal of the forfeiture, and a restoration to the privileges of life and immortality. Now nothing plainer than that a philosophy which asserts a conscious, active and passive life to the soul of man, in a state of separati-

on from the dead body, during the interval between the fall of Adam, and the appearance of the redeemer, totally overturns the whole christian scheme of salvation, as it must suppose that either the sentence of death, pronounced at the fall, was null and void from the beginning, or that it was, some way or other reversed without the interposition of a redeemer. And the case will still be the same, whether you begin with the philosophical argument as Arnauld proposes, or end with it, as Perrot advises. If you begin with it, and find that kind of proof decisive and satisfactory, you preclude all attention to a system founded on facts diametrically opposite to these philosophical demonstrations. If, on the other hand, you are disposed to believe and acquiesce in these facts, you can expect nothing from these philosophical disquisitions, but to be thrown back into a state of doubt and sceptical uncertainty, to which of two opposite systems you must give your assent.

CHAP. XVIII.

Bishop Bull's controversy with Truman. Four propositions of the Bishop's importing, No immortality for man but of Grace through Christ. Truman's allegation of the Law of Moses to the contrary. Bp. Bull in attempting to answer, overthrows the doctrine of his own propositions. This occasioned by his fear of passing for heterodox. A Reflection on such situations. Bishop Bull's two Sermons republished by Professor Chappelowe, 1765. Mr. Nelson's opinion of these two Sermons. The propositions in these Sermons, subversive of the doctrine of those in his Harmonia. Is contradicted by his Editor [Chappelowe] with respect to the fullness of scripture testimonies in proof of his doctrine. And by Tillotson. Neither Bull nor Tillotson sufficiently guard against the doctrine of purgatory. Bishop Bull mistaken in the interpretation of his text, Acts i. 25. Not supported by the authorities he quotes. Remarks on the words τοπος ιδιος. And on the death of Judas.

1669. **I**N the year 1669, Mr. (afterwards Bishop) Bull published his book intituled, *Harmonia Apostolica*, the design of which was to reconcile St. Paul and St. James on the article of justification. The subject engaged him of course in a controversy with several divines of different sentiments, and among others, with one Mr. Joseph Truman, a learned minister among the dissenters.*

* See Nelson's *Life of Bishop Bull* from p. 89. to p. 255.

Mr. Bull had advanced the following propositions.

“ 1. The covenant of life made with Adam
 “ in his state of innocence, was, by his trans-
 “ gression of the same, made void, not only for
 “ himself, but for his posterity also ; so as now,
 “ all the children of Adam, as such, are the
 “ children of death, that is, are excluded
 “ wholly from all promise of immortal life, and
 “ are subjected to the necessity of death with-
 “ out any hopes of a resurrection.”

“ 2. All those of the posterity of fallen
 “ Adam, who are altogether destitute of divine
 “ revelation, and to whom the new covenant
 “ of life [i. e. the christian covenant] hath
 “ not yet been manifest, are under the obliga-
 “ tion of no law, but that of nature.”

“ 3. The law of nature, which is the dictate
 “ of reason so far as it is considered in fallen
 “ man, as destitute of the spirit, and of divine
 “ revelation, doth not prescribe the most per-
 “ fect and absolute virtue, nor is an immortal
 “ and heavenly life due to the observation of
 “ this law.”

“ 4. God never entered into any covenant
 “ of eternal life with the posterity of fallen
 “ Adam, but what was confirmed and estab-
 “ lished in our saviour Christ ; and must con-
 “ sequently have been the very gospel itself ;
 “ according to that of the apostle, *The gift of*
 “ *God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ*
 “ *our Lord.*”*

In these propositions it is asserted, that man-
 kind after the fall of Adam, could have no eter-

* Nelson, p. 197, 198.

nal life or immortality but by a new covenant, the covenant of grace in Christ ; that neither the law of nature, nor the law of Moses, had any such covenant ; that there could be no hopes of immortality, without the hopes of a resurrection revealed in Christ : consequently by the term death in the first proposition, Mr. Bull must have meant an extinction of the whole man without any reserve or saving of the life of the separate soul ; otherwise if either jew or gentile, had any assurance (whether by promise or any other means) of a future life in a separate state of existence, they would, upon that assurance or proof, ground some hope of such future life, to which they would as certainly refer in the course of their obedience to their respective laws, as if it had been an express sanction of them.

And thus Truman appears to have understood him, namely, as excluding both jew and gentile from all hopes of future life under their respective laws, and necessarily consigning them to the fate of fallen Adam, viz. of utter extinction by death.

Whereupon Mr. Truman remonstrates, on the behalf of the law of Moses, “ that this was
 “ putting an indignity upon it, and was in
 “ effect, a reflection upon God himself, the author of it ; alledging, that Mr. Bull had
 “ misrepresented St. Paul, by making him say,
 “ that the law did not promise such things,
 “ as that a man had need of faith, *the evidence*
 “ *of things not seen*, to believe them, but promised only things of sense, not of faith,
 “ which made the law of mount Sinai, a dis-

“pensation of servitude, fit only to beget in
 “men a mean and servile disposition of mind.”*

Mr. Bull it seems could not stand against this reproach, and therefore bethought himself to say, “that providence took sufficient care
 “that the jews should not stick in the letter
 “of the mount Sinai law, but look beyond it,” which he makes out thus.

“God provided that the tradition of life to
 “come, derived down from the patriarchs,
 “either immediately from himself, or otherwise,
 “might flourish under the law; and be both
 “expounded and confirmed by the sermons of
 “the prophets, whom he raised up in the several
 “ages, for instruction and conduct to his
 “people. He (Mr. Bull) saith, the patriarchal
 “condition [I suppose he means of existing in
 “a separate state] is clear, both by the prophecy
 “and example of Enoch; and that the
 “subsistence of the soul after the death of the
 “body, was hence believed by the most ancient
 “jews who lived after the delivery of the
 “law of Moses. And this he especially gathereth
 “and confirmeth from the history of
 “king Saul; consulting the pythoress of
 “Endor, and seeking of her, that he might
 “have some discourse with Samuel that was
 “then dead, which he would never certainly
 “have done, had he not believed the soul of
 “the deceased prophet to survive. He (the
 “same Mr. Bull) argueth also to the same effect
 “from the original of necromancy, the

* Nelson, p. 202.

“ most ancient of all divinations, founded on
 “ the separate subsistence of the soul.”*

Not having Bishop Bull's book at hand, I transcribe this from Mr. Nelson, who calls the propositions to which Truman objects, “ the
 “ pillars upon which Mr. Bull's superstructure
 “ doth subsist.” These pillars however, we see in the last citation, he was obliged to demolish, and to bury his whole hypothesis in the rubbish of them. For,

1. By setting the two cases together, it appears, that though God entered into no covenant of life with the jews, but that, as sons of Adam, they were notwithstanding their law, subjected to the necessity of death, yet that they were provided, and by God himself, with a tradition of life to come, in the doctrine of the separate subsistence of the soul, to which they might trust as safely as an express covenant, it being expounded and confirmed, by the sermons of their prophets. Hence,

2. It follows that the jews were under a necessity, and no necessity of death at the same time. And,

3. That the unbelieving jews were not so far wrong in rejecting the gospel, as christians are apt to suppose ; inasmuch as they had, if not a covenant, yet a confirmed and established tradition, provided by God himself, of a future life, which as it would keep their hopes alive, would likewise influence their obedience, equally with a new covenant, which differed from it only in the circumstances of a resurrection. And,

* Nelson, p. 203.

4. That the gentiles had just as much reason and encouragement to look beyond the law of nature, as the jews had to look beyond the law of Sinai : for they too, if Mr. Bull is right, had the tradition of the separate subsistence, and, it should seem, in as great perfection as the jews. For necromancy undoubtedly had its original among the idolatrous gentiles, and if, as Mr. Bull imagined, it took its original from the separate subsistence of the soul, that doctrine must have been as clearly expounded and confirmed among them, as it was among the jews.

Besides these infirmities in the reasoning part, Mr Bull seems to me to have made a little too free with scripture history, in deriving this tradition to the jews.

He says, the jews derived the belief of the separate subsistence from the prophecy and example of Enoch. What prophecy he refers to, I cannot so much as conjecture ; I am sure there is none such in the bible ; and if the jews derived the belief of the separate subsistence from the translation of Enoch, they derived it from an example where the soul and body were never separated at all. The bishop of Gloucester has retailed this notion, after bishop Bull, in the *Divine Legation*, &c. and says it could not be but the jews might infer a separate existence from the story of Enoch. As if some men, in certain cases, were under a necessity of drawing conclusions where they have no premises !

Again, I should be glad to know upon what scriptural grounds Mr. Bull affirmed, that necromancy was founded upon the doctrine of

the separate subsistence of the soul. He tells us indeed, that “Saul believed the soul of the prophet Samuel survived his body, otherwise he certainly would not have sought of the pytho-
 ness of Endor to have some discourse with Samuel who was dead.” But the history gives him no authority for this. The soul of Samuel is not once mentioned during the whole transaction, and in what manner the charms and incantations of those times were understood to operate upon the dead, I will venture to affirm, no body knows.*

But admit the Jews had the tradition of life to come, by the way of a separate existence, of what use was it to them? which of them appears to have been induced by it to look beyond the letter of the mount Sinai law? The Right Reverend author of the *Divine Legation*, &c. who allows that the Jews adopted the tradition, tells us they made no interesting speculations upon it, and that it was a doctrine which floated idly upon their minds.† And indeed we should have reason to be satisfied that this was the worst, if Bishop Bull had not told us, that the doctrine of the separate subsistence of the soul was the parent of necromancy, one of the abominations which the Jews were most

* No one more likely to know this than our great Selden. Yet he, giving an account of this matter, only says, *A mortuis autem et expectabant ut, per insomnia de rebus quas sciscitabantur juxta sepulchra pernoctantes, fierent certiores; et Pythonissarum ope etiam evocatas eorum species, uti de Samuele traditur, consulebant.* De Dis Syris. Syntag. 1. Cap. 2. And Maimonides, whom he immediately quotes, seems to have been no better informed. See likewise Bp. Clayton's chronology of the Hebrew bible, p. 248---252.

† Div. Leg. Vol. ii. part ii. p. 188. edit. 1758.

expressly forbidden to practice,* and they would hardly be guiltless in entertaining any tradition that should encourage it.

Thus it too frequently happens, that learned men, being struck with the plainness and perspicuity of gospel truth, and ardently disposed to do justice to it, being met in their road by some unlucky systematical point, have been obliged, in apprehension of church-censure, to turn out of their way, and either to retract and desert their cause, or to compromise matters so, as to render the most valuable part of their labours of no effect. This, it seems, was the unhappy case of good bishop Bull. “So that “after all,” says Mr. Nelson, “the difference “betwixt Mr. Truman and Mr. Bull, will be “found very inconsiderable.”

Why, truly, not more considerable than the difference between Mr. Bull and himself. For, though it is a little out of our chronological order, as we have this worthy divine upon the carpet, it will not be amiss to exhibit his sentiments delivered in two sermons, which were republished in the year 1765, by the late Mr. Chappelow, Arabic professor in the university of Cambridge, who being grievously scandalised, that the heresy of the sleep of the soul, should have taken root in the said university, gave the public a new edition of these two sermons, as a proper and seasonable antidote for this narcotic poison. †

* Deut. xviii. 11th.

† Mr. Chappelow's commentary on some passages of the book of Job had been quoted by the bishop of Carlisle, in support of the sense his Lordship had put upon Luke xvi. 19. Confid. Appendix. p. 392. Edit. 1755. This publication of Bishop Bull's two sermons

Upon what particular occasion Bishop Bull preached these two discourses, is not material. Mr. Nelson, speaking of this bishop's sermons, says, "there are some points handled in this collection, which at first sight, and from a superficial view, may be thought to border too much upon curiosity."* And his first instance is, the doctrine of these sermons concerning the middle state of departed souls. But this sort of objection vanishes with respect to bishop Bull, when we consider, with what confidence he thinks he proved the propositions he undertook to discuss. For no religious question can be a matter of mere curiosity, but such a one concerning which the scriptures have left us totally in the dark.

Bishop Bull, therefore had not by far so much occasion to consider, whether his proposed inquiry was a matter of mere curiosity, as to consider, whether the propositions he undertook to prove in these sermons, were not totally subversive of his doctrine of *the covenant of life made with Adam in his state of innocence, which, he insists upon it, was by his transgression, made void, not only for himself, but for his posterity also, who thereby became subject to the necessity of death, without any hopes of a resurrection.* And this we learn, continued to be the case, till the publication of the gospel, or of the new covenant of eternal life, confirmed and established in our Saviour Christ.

might possibly be contrived to acquit Mr Chappelow of all suspicions of heterodoxy, which that quotation would tend to countenance.

* Mr. Nelson, p.281.

For the propositions to be proved in these sermons, are, 1st, “ the soul of man subsists
 “ after death, and when it is dislodged from
 “ the body, hath a place of abode provided by
 “ God for it, till the resurrection of the body
 “ again. 2dly, “ the soul of every man, pre-
 “ sently after death, hath its proper place and
 “ state, allotted by God, of happiness or mi-
 “ sery, according as the man hath been good
 “ or bad in his past life.” *

Now this soul must be understood to be in-
 dued with thought, perception, and conscious-
 ness, after the death of the body, otherwise it
 could not be sensible of happiness or misery :
 and as this subsistence is stated to be the con-
 dition of the soul of every man, independent
 of any covenant, it is natural to ask, of what
 use the covenant of life could be, which im-
 ported the utter extinction of man’s life, with-
 out any reserve or exception to the life of the
 soul? If, therefore, I could believe that bi-
 shop Bull had proved these two points, I must
 believe, that his account of the lapse of Adam,
 and the sentence pronounced upon him for his
 breach of the covenant of life, is a mere fiction ;
 it being impossible that God should be the au-
 thor of two contradictory and inconsistent dis-
 pensations. And I should certainly have
 thought, upon reading these sermons, that bi-
 shop Bull had deserted his doctrine of the co-
 venant of life, which he laid down in his *har-*
mony, if Mr. Nelson had not apprised us, that
 the bishop still stuck to this covenant of life

* Two sermons, published by Chappelow, p. 7. 8.

made with man in his state of innocency, in a discourse composed, as it should seem, long after these sermons.*

As the bishop, by his first proposition, subverts the doctrine of the covenant of life made with Adam, so by his second, he equally subverts the doctrine of the covenant of eternal life, confirmed and established in our Saviour Christ. That covenant imports a restoration to life by the way of a resurrection from the dead only, at an appointed day or time, of which the pledge and assurance to mankind is, the resurrection of Christ himself; and then and then only, are men to be judged in righteousness, and dealt with according to the deeds done in the body.

But here, in the bishop's second proposition, this restoration to life, and this judgment in righteousness, is not referred to any future or any appointed day, but are immediately consequent upon the death of the body, and that without respect to any covenant whatever, but as it were in the course of nature, or the ordinary course of God's providence, which would have brought things about just as the preacher represents them, though Adam and Christ had not existed.

Is it credible, that God, having allotted and provided a place or state for every man's separate soul respectively, with a portion of happiness or misery to each, according as the man had been good or bad in his past life?—Is it credible, I say, that the same just and wise God should have made a covenant with Adam the first man, previous to his transgression, that he should surely or utterly die, in case of

* Nelson, p. 536.

such transgression, without the least mention of any place or state for his separate soul? Is it credible, that after inflicting pains and penalties upon some, and conferring happiness upon others, according to their obedience or transgression respectively, presently after death, the same good and wise God, should, in virtue of another covenant, appoint a future day of judgment and retribution, merely for the purpose of augmenting the happiness or misery of these objects of his wrath or his mercy respectively, and that without any new instances either of their obedience or their transgression?

It is true, the bishop means to distinguish between the life of the separate soul, and the life to be restored at the resurrection, the one being a life inherent in the soul, the other a life which is the effect of a positive covenant. But to what purpose a covenant for any life, when there was a life already secured to man by nature, not controlled by any covenant, which answers all the ends of life proposed by a resurrection?

The bishop says in his harmony, that “all
“ the children of Adam, as such, are the chil-
“ dren of death, that is, excluded wholly from
“ all promise of immortal life, and are subjected
“ to the necessity of death, without any hopes
“ of a resurrection.”

But of what consequence is it, if they have immortal life by nature, whether they have it by promise or not? What does it signify, whether they have hopes of a resurrection or not, if they are sure of a life by provision and allotment, without a resurrection?

When bishop Bull sets about the proof of his first proposition, he says, “this proposition I shall manage so, as to prove it chiefly by testimonies of scripture.”* The proposition is, *the soul of man subsists after death, &c.* as above. Accordingly, in quoting and urging the texts that he supposes tend to prove his point, he has such words as these. *In the old testament we have a full testimony given to this truth.—The new testament very often, and most expressly delivers the same doctrine.*

But according to his editor, Mr. Chappelow, the bishop was mistaken in this matter. For thus he states and answers an objection to the usual scripture-proofs in favour of the separate subsistence of the soul.

“As to scripture, it is suggested, no sufficient argument can be drawn from thence to prove, that the soul continues in a thinking state, when separated from the body. To which it may be answered, that the reason why we do not find in those sacred writings, particular arguments to prove the truth of this doctrine, is, because there was no occasion for them. For to what purpose need we have recourse to arguments, when in the tenour of any discourse or subject that is treated of, the doctrine itself is all along supposed and taken for granted.”

But there is a wide difference between taking a doctrine for granted, and proving it by express testimony. According to Mr. Chappelow, the scriptures only suppose and take for granted, the doctrine of the separate existence

of the soul. According to bishop Bull, the scriptures give full testimony to it, and expressly deliver it.

Mr. Chappelow borrowed his answer to the objection he states, from archbishop Tillotson, who, in one of his sermons on Heb. xi. 6. says, "I do not find, but that these also," [the immortality of the soul and a future state] "are rather supposed, than expressly revealed in the bible." Bishop Bull, it seems, was of a different opinion; and indeed the good archbishop seems to be aware that he had gone rather too far, for he immediately adds, "Indeed the immortality of the soul may be inferred from several places of scripture, and the tenour of the whole bible." Of these inferences his grace gives several examples in the extracts from his other sermons, selected in this pamphlet of Mr. Chappelow. It is indeed astonishing that a man of sense should be driven to go so far, as the archbishop does in these extracts, for his inferences, when his premises might be found in the tenour of the whole bible. But the case was, that this eminent and worthy prelate had puzzled himself in the sermon on Heb. xi. 6. by confounding the ideas of immortality and a future state, as revealed in the scriptures, with the ideas of immortality and a future state, as discovered by what he calls the light of nature, which are as different as light and darkness.

But Mr. Chappelow wisely avoided giving us any extracts from this sermon, being aware of the examination it had undergone, and how little adapted it was to support the reasoning of the archbishop in these extracts.*

* See Remarks upon a paragraph in one of archbishop Tillotson's sermons, in a pamphlet, intituled, *No Proof in the Scriptures of an intermediate State, &c.* In answer to Mr. Goddard's sermon, &c.

It is remarkable, how these two eminent divines, Bull and Tillotson, apply their system to the confutation of the popish purgatory. It is not sufficient for them to guard against the doctrine of purgatory being grafted on their hypothesis, but they will needs have it, that their doctrine of an intermediate state, militates directly against the doctrine of purgatory. Their chief argument is, that the souls of good men are represented in scripture, to be in a state of happiness immediately upon their departure from the body, which the papists themselves allow to be the case with those, upon whom (to use a phrase of the late Dr. Jortin) the church hath conferred ecclesiastical knighthood, commonly called saintship. But what must become of those who are neither good enough to be immediately happy, nor bad enough to be finally miserable? Which I think are the sort of mortals for whose accommodation the papists (according to bishop Burnet) contrived these purgatorial mansions. Bishop Bull should have laid down a third proposition, in order to shew, that such as these were in some neutral place or state, as not belonging to either class of those to whom happiness or misery is allotted respectively.

It is not my intention to examine how bishop Bull, the doctors Tillotson, Whitby, and Smallridge, make out their theory from the texts they cite, and from which they reason.* I shall only make a remark or two upon bishop Bull's and Mr. Chappelow's interpretation of the text of these sermons, viz. Acts i. 25. *That he might go to his own place.*

* They are all of them explained by the bishop of Carlisle in his *Appendix*.

Bishop Bull, in the first place rejects the reading of those who put the words, ἐξ ἧς παρεβη τοῦδε, in a parenthesis, and who consequently interpret the word, τοπον, of the place [the apostleship] which Matthias was elected to fill.

I agree with Dr. Bull in this opinion, because I think the construction of the passage will not admit of the parenthesis ; nor can I possibly see how τοπος ιδιος, or if you will, δικαιος, can be here spoken of the apostleship which Matthias was elected to fill in the room of another. For if the place was his own, or a place due to him of right, as the word, δικαιος, seems to imply, why was he not chosen to fill it at the first?

This interpretation, however, shews, that these learned and worthy persons, (among whom was Dr. Hammond,) who espoused it, were a little shocked at the common interpretation, which consigned Judas immediately to a place of torment, supposing, and very justly, that the apostles would pass no such peremptory sentence upon him.

But I should not reject this interpretation, as bishop Bull does, on account of its supposing or implying, that “ every apostle had his distinct and proper place and province in the apostleship.” It is true as the bishop very justly observes, “ the apostleship and every part of it, was common to every apostle, who might do all the same things in any place that any other apostle did. But τοπος might here signify, not any part or province of the apostleship as such, but the place, region, or country, in which a particular apostle should be allotted to preach the gospel, and exercise

his ministry, as the practice was, when the apostles were afterwards dispersed into the several provinces of Greece and Italy ; nor does it at all avail to say, as the bishop does, “ Sure I am, “ there was no such distinction of provinces at “ the time of this election ; for then the apos- “ tles executed the same office all in the same “ place and country, among the jews, to whom “ alone they were at first to preach the gospel :”

For the words of the text, πορευθῆναι εἰς τὸν τόπον, τὸν ἰδίον, would relate evidently to a future migration, if this exposition was right, and not only to the time of the election : and of this migration the apostles would be sufficiently aware, from the warning given them by Christ himself, v. 8.—*And ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judæa, and in Samaria, and UNTO THE UTTERMOST PART OF THE EARTH.*

This exposition then being laid aside, the words, τόπον ἰδίον, must belong to Judas, and are, by the bishop, made to signify *the place and state of lost reprobate spirits, and damned souls.*

To support his opinion he first quotes the Alexandrine manuscript, which instead of ἰδίον, reads δίκαιον. But this is the single authority for that reading, and is not now of that reputation as in the days of the good bishop. However we shall see presently, that even the word δίκαιος does not necessarily denote what the bishop would have it in this passage.

In the next place he builds upon the sense in which some of the fathers, Polycarp, Clemens Romanus, Barnabas, Ignatius, Irenæus, &c. use the words, τόπος ἰδῆος, τόπος ὁ φειλομένος ὠρίσμενος, &c. and these being men of the apostolic age, must he thinks, know what the apostle meant by an ex-

pression which was then commonly used to signify *a man's going presently after death, into his proper place and state, either of happiness or misery, according to the life which he had before lived.*

1. But, in the first place, the bishop had no right to foist in the word *presently*, for no such word appears in any of the passages he hath cited.

2. None of these citations speak of the migration of the separate soul, but of the migration of the man, and may therefore refer to the general resurrection. The quotation from Ignatius, fairly cited, runs thus, *Seeing therefore that all things have an end, two things are proposed, or laid down, life and death, and every one will hereafter go to his own place.** That is to say, when the end of all things, shall arrive ; alluding probably to 1. Pet. iv. 7. But the bishop thought it not so well to give us the first part of the sentence.

3. It is not necessary to suppose that these fathers were infallible interpreters of the apostles. Many of them entertained jewish and even Pagan ideas of futurity. The Rabbins, speaking of Balaam, who is said, Numbers xxiv. 25. to go to *his own place*, determine *this place* to be *Gehenna*. And upon Job ii. 11. where it is said that Job's three friends *came every one from his own place*, this is their comment, *Non scriptum est ex domo suâ, aut ex urbe suâ, aut ex terra suâ, sed, ex loco qui munitus erat illis in Gehenna, expulsi et liberati sunt.*

* Επει οὖν τέλος ἡ πραγματῖα ἔχει, ἐπικείται τὰ δύο ὁμοῦ ο' τε θάνατος καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἕκαστος εἰς τὸν ἴδιον τόπον, βέλλει χωρεῖν.

Again, upon Eccles. vi. 6. *Do not all go to one place ?* The gloss of the *Targum* is, *Die mortis suæ descendit anima ejus in Gehennam, in locum unum, quo omnes peccatores abeunt.**

This is precisely Bishop Bull's sense of the case of Judas, and might possibly, be the sense of some of these primitive fathers, but no man shall persuade me it was the sense of the apostles, who had heard their master say so much of the time of punishing the wicked, and rewarding the righteous ; which they would hardly think was dispensed with, for the sake of hastening the punishment of Judas, notwithstanding the enormity of his transgression ; concerning which, more in its place.

I cannot but observe here, that many of our commentators, besides those who apply τόπος to the apostleship, are tender of sending Judas immediately to his punishment ; among these are Erasmus, Grotius, and Le Clerc, who all of them agree in expounding the passage, by *a place fitter for him than the apostleship*, without determining what place that was.† But Bengelius furnishes an hint which bids the fairest to lead us out of the labyrinth, and contributes much to confirm the maxim, that the scriptures are the best explainers of themselves.

This commentator refers us back to v. 18, where we read, οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐκλήσθη χωρίον ἐκ μαθήτων τῆς αἰδουσίας. e. q. s.‡ Wetstein says this verse is no part

* Vid. Wetstein. in Acta. i. 25.

† Ἰδίου, i. e. *proprium*, velut ante occupasset alienum. Eras, qui ipsi melius conveniebat quam apostolica functio. Grot. Ou il méritoit d'être, plutôt que parmi les Apôtres. Le Clerc.

‡ Bengelius's note is this. *In locum plane proprium, devotum a ceteris apostolis, quæsierat ιδίου, proprium quiddam ; v. 18. proprium locum, superstitum oculos fugientem, in regione mortis nactus est, Gnom.*

of Peter's speech, but an explanatory observation of Luke the historian, and consequently should be read in a parenthesis.* Be that as it may, the word ἐκκλησία points out this field for the τοπος ιδιος of Judas ; *His own possession*, which, after all his endeavours he could not alienate by returning the money.† Nor will it alter the case if we should read, with the Alexandrine manuscript, τοπος δικαιος for δικαιος is a forensic term, and is frequently applied in the scriptures to *legal rights and claims*. See Matth. xx. 4. Eph. vi. 1. Col. iv. 1. where undoubtedly the word refers to the laws made to enforce the obedience of children to their parents, and to ratify covenants made between man and man. And so according to the ideas of those times, Aceldama was the legal property of Judas, his δικαιος τοπος, or δικαιον χωριον, even after he was dead ; and more especially as his dead carcase, had taken possession of it by burial.‡

Limborch's paraphrase is this, *In horrendum illud exitium quod sceleri ipsius juste debebatur*, for which he certainly had no authority from the apostle's words.

I must own it hath ever appeared to me, that the divines, who have so peremptorily decided on the fate of Judas, have been too rash in their judgment, and have not sufficiently allowed for the boundless mercies of God to sinful man. Whether the arguments they use,

* Weststen in locum.

† Ἐκτήσατο χωριον, acquisivit agrum, (Sc. Judas) quæ de eo dicuntur, habita, non voluntatis, sed eventus ratione. Pasor in voce κταομαι. Ed. 1717.

‡ See the authorities brought by Wetstein from prophane authors, upon verse 18.

conclude for the final condemnation of Judas or not, it will not follow from them, that the passage in question refers to it; those arguments are chiefly taken from what our Saviour says of this treacherous apostle, from whence, perhaps, his fellow apostles did not draw the same consequences that we are apt to do in these days.

1. Our Lord denounces a wo upon him.* But so does he likewise upon others, whom we cannot suppose he meant to consign to eternal misery.

2. He adds, *it had been good for him, if he had not been born.* But this likewise is said in the scriptures of some, on account of the bitterness of their afflictions, and of others who had reaped nothing from a life of prosperity, but vanity here, and oblivion hereafter. †

3. Our Saviour calls him likewise, *the son of perdition*, υἱὸς ἀπολείας; but so does Isaiah call the idolatrous Jews, but with plain intimations in the context, that there was room left for their repentance and restoration to favour. Besides our Saviour does not seem to mean here *eternal perdition*, but a *violent and immature death*, in consequence of being his follower; when he says of his apostles, that he had kept them all, except Judas; he means, kept them from being put to death or destroyed in this world; but that Judas a son of *perdition* was not so kept, that the scripture might be fulfilled. This scripture is quoted by St. Pe-

* Matth. xxvi. 24. Mark xiv. 21.

† See Job iii. 10, 11, 12. and Ecclef. vi. 3.

ter, Acts i. 20. but not a word in it, of any perdition but of the temporal kind.

4. “ But Judas destroyed himself with his own hands, which shewed his desperation, and consequently, his final condemnation.” I deny the fact, and require more explicit proof of it than hath yet been given. St. Peter, or if you will, St. Luke, gives a different account of his death, and appeals for the notoriety of it to all Jerusalem. And this account is totally inconsistent with the sense which translators, critics, and commentators have given of the word ἀπνύξατο, * and some of them have even made themselves ridiculous by their several schemes of reconciliation.

In this I have Daniel Heinsius for my voucher, whom I have never yet seen, nor expect to see, confuted. It was indeed attempted by the younger Gronovius, † but without success, as he failed in reconciling the suicide of Judas, supposed to be signified by the word ἀπνύξατο, with the account of his fate in Acts, which the historian tells us, was notorious to all Jerusalem, and this Grotius confesses, will

* See Grotius In loc.

† In a tract intituled, Jacobi I. F. F. Gronovii Exercitationes Academicæ, de perniciæ et casu Judæ τοῦ προδοῦτος. Lugd. Batav. 1683. Having said, with respect to the word ἀπνύξατο, that it never signifies any thing but strangling with a rope, he adds, *absit ut tot laborum qui ad illustrandas linguas impensi sunt, non alius sit fructus, nisi ut tantum dici possit, hujus et illius vocis hanc videri significationem esse, non vero certe possumus adfirmare, hanc et non illam esse.* On which confidence in his critical infallibility, Mr. Bayle rallies him with some humour. *Nouv. de la Republ. des Lettres.* May, 1684. p. 281.

not consist with the supposition that Judas laid violent hands upon himself.*

* In Matth. xxvii. 5. None of the critics I have met with pay sufficient attention to the words which precede ἀπεγξάλο. They stand thus, ἀνεχώρησε, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου ἀπηνέγκαστο, which our translators very imperfectly render, *departed, and went and hanged himself.* ἀνεχώρησε does not mean simply to depart, and in this passage the word so taken is tautological—He departed and departed, or, he went and went. It is translated better in other places, by *turned aside, give place, or retire, withdrew himself*; and in the lxx, Num. xvi. 24. we have, ἀναχωρησάτε κυκλῶ ἀπὸ τῆς συναγωγῆς κορε. *Get ye up from about,* &c. Engl. *Ascendite a circuitu tabernaculi,* &c. Arias Montanus. *Ut separetur a congregatione.* Vulg. And agreeably to this meaning, H. Stephens gives, *Regredior, Secedo, Recedo, Redeo.* And Bengelius speaking of the Magi, Matth. ii. 12. explains the word by, *itinere seorsum flexo.* Valla translates it by *secessit*, and rejects the rendering of the vulgate, *recessit*, and Erasmus observes, that this is right, and says, *Dicti Anachroritæ, ex secessu.* In Matth. xii. 15. We are informed by Cunæus, that persons afflicted, and penitents, took a *circuit* on entering into and going out of the temple, different from others. *Qui in luctu fuere, quive ejecti ex Judæorum communione erant,—iis circuitio facienda a sinistra, dextrorsum fuit.* De Repub. Hebr. ii. 13. And see Wetstein on Job. ix. 22. In this sense, and to denote this action, St. Matthew seems to have used the word ἀνεχώρησε, and ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου should have been rendered, *going away, in actione abeundi, ἀπηνέγκαστο suffocatus est*; he was suffocated, not by any voluntary and deliberate act of his own, but by the effect of his extreme grief and remorse; in which case the accidents mentioned, Acts i. 18, might happen as attendants upon that kind of death, and this catastrophe falling out, either in the temple, or in some public street, *became known to all the inhabitants of Jerusalem*, which could not have been the case, had the man retired to some unfrequented corner to put an end to his life, as most suicides, even lunatics, are apt to do. *Raphelius.* Annot. Philolog. [in N. T. ex Polybio et Arriano collect. p. 102] endeavouring to moderate between Gronovius and Perizonius, seems to me to have left the matter just where he found it. For though he leans to the side of Gronovius in giving the sense of ἀπηνέγκαστο, yet it is plain that in some of his authorities, particularly those from Xenophon and Arrian, it is equally disputable whether the word means a voluntary or involuntary suffocation, as in the passage of St. Matthew. Nor, be that how it may, do these instances at all invalidate those brought by Perizonius.

But however all this may be, it will do little towards the support of Bp. Bull's interpretation of *τοπος ιδιος*. I shall therefore bid adieu to his lordship, and his editor Mr. Chappelow.

CHAP. XIX.

The controversy between Messieurs Jurieu and Saurin. Jurieu's objection to the philosophical proof of the soul's immortality. Saurin's answer. Disliked and rectified by Mr. Bayle. The proof still imperfect. A conjecture why Saurin left his answer short. Farther remarks on that answer.

BETWEEN the years 1692 and 1694, Messieurs Jurieu and Saurin were engaged in much theological altercation on various subjects; and among other things incidentally, on the proof of the natural immortality of the soul. Jurieu charged Saurin with latitudinarian principles, in ascribing too much to reason, and the principles of natural religion, in demonstrating the truths of the christian scheme, which Mr. Jurieu considered as points of faith. With respect to the immortality of the soul, he saith, "that though he himself believed, that
 "matter is not capable of any sensation or
 "knowledge, yet he had no distinct idea, no
 "clear perception of that truth, nor could he
 "prove it to those who should deny it. What
 "I perceive in it," says he, "is confused and
 "indistinct. Can Mr. Saurin and his *rational*
 "colleagues say in conscience, that they have

“ a clear conception, and distinct idea of the
 “ immortality of the soul? *

Saurin answers, “ I have a clear perception
 “ and a distinct idea of the immortality of the
 “ soul. I know that the soul is a spiritual and
 “ indivisible substance, which can only be de-
 “ stroyed by annihilation.—Must a christian
 “ philosopher be less orthodox than Plato?
 “ Must he give the preference to Epicurus,
 “ when he draws up a parallel of the ancient
 “ philosophers?”

Every one knows in how many instances Saurin was victorious in his disputes with Jurieu. Every one knows too, that Bayle omitted no opportunity of exhibiting Saurin in his triumphal carr, with the unfortunate Jurieu bound to the wheels of it. In the present case, however, Mr. Bayle is candid enough to acknowledge, that Saurin's answer is weak and impertinent, and therefore he [Bayle] undertakes to rectify it.

“ Mr. Jurieu,” says he, “ plainly supposes
 “ that in order to have a distinct idea of the
 “ spirituality of the soul, we must clearly ap-
 “ prehend that matter is not capable of any
 “ sensation or knowledge. How comes it then
 “ that Mr. Saurin leaves this unanswered?
 “ Should he not have said, that he has a dis-
 “ tinct idea, and clear perception, whereby he
 “ knows that an extended substance cannot
 “ have any sensation?”

But how would this have mended the matter? For this, at best, is but a negative idea, importing that Mr. Saurin knew not that ex-

* Bayle, POMPONACE. [F]

tended substance can have any sensation: and he would certainly have been told that his ignorance of the capability of corporeal or extended substance for thought and sensation, could never exhibit to him a clear and distinct idea of the spirituality of the soul. Mr. Saurin was therefore in the right to affirm positively, that he had a clear and distinct idea of the immortality of the soul, without entering into particulars. This put the question entirely upon Mr. Saurin's powers of conception, of which no other person could be a judge. No one could contradict him, any more than if he had affirmed, that he distinctly conceived the sun to be a large globe of ice.

Mr. Bayle goes on. "2. It is not sufficient
 "to know that the soul cannot be destroyed
 "but by annihilation, for the same may be
 "said of extension, and yet trees and beasts
 "are mortal. Mr. Saurin should therefore
 "have expressed himself thus. *I know the*
 "*soul cannot subsist without thought; the dis-*
 "*tinct idea I have of a thinking substance*
 "*teaches me, that if it were deprived of thought,*
 "*it would cease to exist.*"

But would not Jurieu have immediately asked him, whether he was conscious that his soul thought in the profoundest sleep? And whether, without this consciousness, he could be sure that the soul always thinks? This however Dr. Watts himself, who ventures as much for his hypothesis as any man, durst not affirm; but contents himself with saying, "that the
 "soul may think in the profoundest sleep, and
 "yet the remembrance (i. e. the consciousness)

“ of that thinking, may, to the waking man, be utterly lost.”* Jurieu would have laughed at Saurin for pretending to have a distinct idea of a substance, whose existence depended upon a circumstance impossible to be ascertained.

But most probably, Saurin, whatever he might think, had another reason for not answering in the manner suggested by Mr. Bayle. To say that the soul ceases to be as soon as it is deprived of thought, is to place the substance of the soul in the *actus cogitandi*, after the Cartesians, who had occasionally been pressed by their adversaries so far, as to find themselves obliged to acknowledge, that the *actus cogitandi*, stood in need of such immediate and continual support from God, as amounted to a continual creation.

And here the remonstrants struck in, and demanded, how God could be continually creating the *actus cogitandi*, without being the immediate author of evil as well as good thoughts? †

What would Jurieu have said, had Saurin given this opening to the common enemy? It is true Mr. Saurin, by his tergiversation, subjected himself to a suspicion, that his clear and distinct idea of the soul was nothing better than an idea formed upon an argument *ab ignoto*. But this was a small matter in comparison of the clamours of a consistory, inflamed by Jurieu's remonstrances. Mr. Saurin therefore acted wisely in touching the philosophical argument as tenderly as possible; and in shield-

* Essays 8vo. 1733. p.

† Curcellæus Rel. Christ. Instit. lib. iii. cap. 2. sect. 9.

ing himself in the moral argument, drawn from the divine justice, unequal distributions, &c. even though he could not be ignorant, that these principles equally favoured the restitution of the whole man, after a period of insensibility; and have indeed no particular tendency to illustrate those physical qualities upon which the natural immortality of the soul is supposed to depend.

“Must a christian philosopher,” says Mr. Saurin, “be less orthodox than Plato?” Was Plato’s philosophy then, and the christian philosophy taught in the new testament, the same? So it seems thought Mr. Saurin, in this point at least; and so indeed have thought most of the curators of orthodoxy, from the reign of LEO X. to this present moment.

CHAP. XX.

Mr. Locke’s controversy with Bp. Stillingfleet. The Bishop’s objection to Locke’s position. Mr. Locke’s reply. The compilers of Biographia Britannica censured. Pretended demonstrations of the natural immortality subversive of the Christian doctrine. Mr. Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity, commended.

BUT about the year 1697, upon occasion of 1697. Mr. Locke’s dispute with Bp. Stillingfleet, christian philosophy began to be a little better understood. Mr. Locke had said, that the immateriality of the soul could not be demon-

strated. The bishop alledged, that such a supposition lessened the credibility of the immortality of the soul. Mr. Locke replied, that, “that was to suppose, that divine revelation abates of its credibility, in all those articles it proposes, proportionably as human reason fails to support the testimony of God. Your Lordship,” continues Mr. Locke, “says, you do not question whether God can give immortality to a material substance: but you say, it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality, if it depends wholly on God’s giving that which of its own nature it is not capable of. To which I reply, any one’s not being able to demonstrate the soul to be immaterial, takes off not very much, nor at all from the evidence of its immortality, if God has revealed that it shall be immortal; because the veracity of God, is a demonstration of the truth of what he has revealed: and the want of another demonstration of a proposition that is demonstrably true, takes not off from the evidence of it. For where there is a clear demonstration, there is as much evidence as any truth can have that is not self-evident.”*

The compiler of Mr. Locke’s article in the *Biographia Britannica*, who seems to have an inbred aversion to Mr. Locke’s political, as well as theological principles, calls this a sophism, and says, that, “Locke substitutes here the veracity of God, instead of scripture evidence, which only amounts to high probability.”

* Essay on Hum. Understanding, 8vo. vol. ii. p. 155, ed. 1715.

But the critic forgot that Mr. Locke was here disputing, not with a sceptic or an infidel, but with a christian bishop, who acknowledged the scripture to be a really divine revelation, and nothing can be more disgraceful to the memory of Dr. S. than to suppose, after all he has written on the subject, that he considered the scriptural evidence for christianity, as amounting only to high probability. But for this malevolence the biographer has been chastised elsewhere.* But what is it these demonstrators would be at? Will they pretend that they can demonstrate the immateriality of the human soul? One of them indeed has undertaken it; and on that score, has merited a fulsome eulogium from a noted doctor who need not be named; but with this most unlucky drawback, “that the immateriality of the souls of brutes
“may be demonstrated by the very same process,” and consequently the immortality of brutes proved by the very same medium.

On another hand, when you have demonstrated, the immateriality of the human soul, what is it to the purpose of proving its consciousness,

* See a pamphlet intituled, *A Review of some passages in the last edition of the Divine Legation of Moses* demonstrated; printed for R. Baldwin, in Pater-noster Row, 1760, p. 64, 65. The Jacobites of the last age received the scriptures, and many things of less value, as of divine authority, on the sole testimony of the church. But Bolingbroke, their guide, philosopher, and friend, having deserted this strong hold, they seem to attend him in these last days, with equal eagerness into the regions of infidelity. Whether our biographers are of this clan I presume not to determine. Let their works speak for them.

unless you can demonstrate that the immaterial soul, as such, always thinks? But this, I presume, the most sanguine Cartesian of the present age, would not answer for. And what moral purpose can it answer, or indeed what purpose at all, to prove the immortality of a soul whose consciousness, for ought that appears to the contrary, may be suspended for an indefinite number of ages.

It has always appeared to me extremely strange that christian divines should have been so zealous for these metaphysical arguments for the natural immortality, which, if I understand the scriptures, are by no means consistent with the account those sacred records give us of the immortality of man.

The doctrine of the new testament is, that men shall become immortal by the way of a resurrection of the dead, a restoration of the whole man to life ; and the N. T. is so far from acknowledging any intermediate consciousness in man, between death and the resurrection, that it always speaks of that interval as a sleep, which implies a suspension of the thinking faculty, a rest from those labours, which require thought, memory, consciousness, &c. during which those faculties are useless.

But this is not all. The scriptural system of immortality, supposes that man had forfeited his original title to immortality, and would never have recovered it, but for the interposition of a redeemer. The consequence of this doctrine is, that between the time of the forfeiture, and the actual appearance of the redeemer, the dead could have life in no sense at all : and

that neither before, nor after the appearance of the redeemer, dead men were, or would be restored to life, otherwise than in the way revealed by the redeemer, namely a resurrection of the dead.

Hence to suppose the souls of dead men to be alive, conscious, and active, and capable of happiness and misery, from the death of the first man, to the resurrection of the very last, and to pretend, to demonstrate this by reason and philosophy, is plainly to overturn the whole christian system.

Pomponatius therefore was not so insolent, as Mr. le Noble would make him, when he said, that “ whoever went about to prove the “ immortality of the soul by philosophical arguments, does not deserve the name of a “ christian.”* We see there are good reasons for this censure. It was properly and justly turning the tables upon those who had dignified him with the name of *heretic* and *impious*.

Whoever carefully peruses Mr. Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, will perceive, that the same conclusion may be drawn from the positions of that greatman, who brought upon himself the irreconcilable enmity of infidels and bigots, as much perhaps by that immortal work, as by his metaphysical disquisitions. They first found themselves dislodged by it from their strong hold whence they had so long combated the *cui bono* of revelation, which however was a small matter with the artificial theologians, who found their account so many

* Bayle. POMPONACE (G) cit. 62.

different ways in the doctrine of the separate existence of the soul. A doctrine of which they are so extremely tenacious, that they fail not to impute infidelity, and even impiety to every one who attempts to deprive them of it, even upon the authority of scripture. Of which the next article affords a most remarkable example.

C H A P. XXI.

Dr. Coward's book, intituled, *Second Thoughts, &c. The Doctor's regard for the scriptures. Injuriously ranked among infidels. An account of his opponents. A conjecture why he was reputed an infidel. His argument taken from the Hypostatic Union. Dr. Coward a man of learning. A. Wood's account of him. A citation from his Ophthalmiatria. His answers to Mr. Turner and Mr. Broughton. And to others in his Grand Essay.*

1702. **I**n the year 1702, Dr. William Coward, a Physician, under the fictitious name of *Estibius Psychalethes*, published a book intituled *Second Thoughts concerning human soul, demonstrating the notion of human soul, as believed to be a spiritual, immortal substance united to human body, to be a plain heathenish invention, and not consonant to the principles of philosophy, reason, or religion. [But the ground only of many absurd and superstitious opinions, abominable to the reformed churches, and deroga-*

tory in general to true christianity] Printed for R. Basset, at the Mitre, over against Chancery-Lane, Fleet-Street.*

This book the doctor dedicated to the clergy of the church of *England*, professing at his setting out, “that the main stress of arguments, either to confound or support his opinion, must be drawn from those only credentials of true and orthodox divinity, the lively oracles of God, the holy scriptures.” And again, in answer to the question, *Doth man die like a brute beast?* he says, “Yes in respect to their end in this life; both their deaths consist in a privation of life (for which he quotes Eccles. iii. 19). But then,” continues he, “man has this prerogative or pre-eminence above a brute, that he will be raised to life again, and be made partaker of eternal happiness in the world to come.”

But notwithstanding these, and as many other proofs of a firm and serious attachment to the authority of the christian scriptures, as it is in any man’s power to give under his hand, this same Dr. Coward has commonly made one in the list with, Toland, Tindal, Collins, &c. reputed to be the most rancorous and determined adversaries of christianity. And such is the malignant nature of indiscriminate calumny, that some worthy persons of the present times, who think as Coward did, (though probably for reasons a little different from those he gives) have found themselves obliged to disown all

* The words within the brackets are omitted in the title-page of the second edition, printed for A. Baldwin, near the Oxford Arms Inn, in Warwick Lane, 1704.

acquaintance with him, and indeed have sufficiently made it appear (by the imperfect accounts they give of his book, retailed from informers who certainly never read it) that wherever they had their principles, or their materials, it could not be from Dr. Coward.*

The doctor in his day, met with opponents of different complexions, and abilities, among whom were Dr. Nicholls,† Mr. John Broughton,‡ Mr. John Turner,|| &c. who, however different, with respect to their materials and manner of attack, all agreed that the doctor was an heretic, and as such gave him no quarter. The reader will find an answer to this accusation, in the next section. But Coward himself had obviated this charge more particularly, by shewing, that the opinion he held was not heresy, either by the law of God, the ecclesiastical law of the land, or the common municipal law, as laid down by Coke, &c. and therefore calls the imputation of heresy in this case, “a scandalous calumny raised by prejudice and ignorance.”§

* See the learned Mr. Peckard's Farther Observations, &c. p. 30. 31.

† *Conference with a Thief*; concerning which, says a certain writer, “I do not fully approve of our doctor's manner of handling this point, in his usual manner of dialogues, arguing in the names of divers several persons, because that in such sort of arguing, the same person must always be supposed to tell the tale and give the answer; and let the strength of the argument fall upon which side it will, we must always be sure that the knight must overcome the giant.”

‡ *Pfychologia*, or, An account of the nature of the rational soul, in two parts, by John Broughton, M. A. Lond. 1703.

|| *A Vindication*, of the separate existence of the soul from a late author's *Second Thoughts*. By John Turner, M. A. Lecturer of Christ-Church, London.

§ *Second Thoughts*, 191—195, 2d. Edit. 1704,

I had often wondered, after reading Dr. Coward's Second Thoughts, what could be the motive of so many of our modern churchmen for charging this writer with heresy, and even ranking him with a set of infidels, till, talking one day on the subject with an eminent divine, I was by him informed, that he was understood to have made free with the mystery of the *hypostatic union* of the two natures of Christ.

As this term is a little out of the present use, being merely of the technical class, and of little importance, even to the orthodox, in the present times, the reader may be desirous to know what Coward said of it, which I shall therefore transcribe.

“ We account, and justly too, the hypostatic
 “ union, above the reach of our understanding,
 “ and the union of God and man in Christ
 “ Jesus, a mystery worthy our adoration, and
 “ as a mystery, to demand our belief. Now,
 “ if the *modus* of that union be unconceivable
 “ and unintelligible by our weak understand-
 “ ing, as unquestionably it is, I presume the
 “ grounds of it is from the inadequate con-
 “ ception we have, or can form to ourselves,
 “ of the conjunction of finite with infinite, ma-
 “ terial with immaterial. But now by the doc-
 “ trine of the *Psychomuthist*, that difficulty
 “ seems to be taken away, and it ceases to be
 “ a mystery, if we allow this conjunction of
 “ body and soul to be the union of an immor-
 “ tal immaterial spirit, to a mortal material
 “ body. Where is then the mystery of the hypos-
 “ tatic union ? The union of the soul and body,
 “ no man ever yet allowed to be a mystery of
 “ religion, therefore either both must be re-

“puted so, or neither; which God forbid the
 “former should not be believed to be so, by
 “all good christians, as that the latter should
 “give us grounds to question the former.”*

Whether Coward was in earnest in laying this stumbling block in the road of the Psychomuthists, or no, it was certainly very provoking to reduce them to the alternative here proposed. History will inform us, what the consequence would be of robbing the church of a mystery, in these early days of Queen Anne,† and there was no avoiding it, if an easy, natural account could be given of the union of an immaterial immortal substance, with a material corruptible one, upon the principles of philosophy. On another hand, the hypostatic union, being the foundation on which Deity is ascribed to Christ by the orthodox, and consequently on which the worship paid to him is defended, if the union of soul and body in mere man was to be put upon the same mystical footing, the notion might be productive of superstition, and be “an inducement,” as he says, to unwary souls, “to put up prayers, for “the dead, or to invoke saints deceased.”‡

After all, these were but arguments *ad hominem*, and the readers might think of Dr. Coward’s faith as they chose, without doing much injustice to his memory. Accordingly, while the zealous sons of the church were treating the doctor, as an impious infidel, another gentleman, of a different persuasion with respect to

* Second Thoughts, p. 152. 2d. Edit.

† 1702.

‡ Epistle Dedicatory.

the divinity of Christ, exclaims against him as a bigotted *churchist*, *evidently fond of mystery*,* being affected in his turn, with the difficulties Coward's book had laid in the way of an hypothesis this gentleman had excogitated, of which some account will be given in the last chapter of this book.

Dr. William Coward was certainly a scholar, and hath left sufficient memorials of his learning in his own profession. Anthony Wood, mentions his tract, *de Fermento Volatili Nutritio*; and a latin translation of Dryden's *Ab-salom and Achitophel*. For the first of these pieces, he had an honourable approbation from the president and censors of the college of physicians. For the other, he was, as Wood informs us, "schooled in the college [Merton]," whether publicly or by particular persons, is not said. Wood, dying in 1695, had no opportunity of schooling him for his *Second Thoughts*, which came not out till seven years after. But it is somewhat extraordinary, that they who had the care of his posthumous pieces, should not give additional accounts of the authors who were living at Mr. A. Wood's death, (of whom Dr. Coward was one,) as they could not want materials, and might have found scribes of sufficient industry and abilities to put them in order.† Dr. Coward appears to have studied the scriptures, at least as far as related to his subject, with application, and hath exhibited every text alledged in favour of the natural

* See a tract, intituled, A Survey of the search after Souls, by Caleb Fleming, p. 22.

† Among Dr. Coward's works was one intituled, *Licentia Poetica discussed, or the true test of Poetry*, 1709; on the publication

immortality of the soul, examining each of them fairly enough, but sometimes without that accuracy and precision, with which they have been since discussed.

In the year 1706, Dr. Coward published his tract intituled *Ophthalmiatria*, which he dedicated to his patron Manuel Sorrel, Esq. In this dedication he compliments Mr. Sorrel as a man of learning and judgment, in whose approbation of his works he declares himself satisfied and happy, and enabled to despise the idle and profane mob of sciolists, whom certain

of which he received the following epistle from the celebrated Mr. Gay.

The vulgar notion of poetic fire
Is, that laborious art can ne'er aspire,
Nor constant studies the bright bays acquire. }
And that high flights the unborn bard receives,
And only nature the due laurel gives.
But you, with innate shining flames endow'd,
To wide Castalian springs point out the God;
Through your perspective we can plainly see,
The new discover'd road of poetry.
To steep Parnassus you direct the way,
So smooth that vent'rous travellers cannot stray.
But with unerring steps rough ways disdain,
And, by you led, the beauteous summit gain.
Where polish'd lays shall raise their growing fames,
And with their tuneful guide enroll their honour'd names.

See the *Gentleman's Magazine*, for July, 1778. p. 312. where we learn that this little piece was one of the earliest productions of Mr. Gay's pen. But it is not produced for the excellency of the poetry, but to shew that Dr. Coward's reputation should not be estimated by the character that super-orthodox divines in their holy wrath, are pleased to give him.

pious agents of sedition had encouraged to calumniate him.*

There can be no doubt but he here means the herd of writers who attacked his *Second Thoughts*, and were so liberal of their abuse of the author.

In his first chapter, intituled, *De Oculo, ejusque Partibus*, speaking of the manner in which vision is performed and accounted for, he diverts himself with the notion of an immaterial substance residing in the pineal gland, by the help of which, he tells us the philosophers of the day accounted for every phænomenon relating to sensation ; and having exposed this empty unphilosophical hypothesis, so far as it relates to vision ; he adds, that he hath said enough on the subject elsewhere, and exhorts the learned of all countries, to examine, thoroughly and candidly, what absurd and ridiculous, and almost blasphemous opinions, follow from this doctrine of an immaterial substance ; hinting, that his domestic adversaries, not being able to confute him by reasoning, had endeavoured to silence him by fire and faggot.†

* Quæ scripsi vir optime, novisti, et, ut opinor, legisti omnia, et eum judicii tam accurati trutina librata, et tam sagaci examine penitus excussa et approbata intellexerim, ignavum ego protinus, et profanum sciorum vulgus odisse et arcere cepi, quod nonnulli *pii seditionis satellites* in me concitarunt, ut ore pleno calumnias emugirent.

† Sed de his satis alibi scriptum est ; unice jam hujus solummodo voti compos fieri valde exopto (quoniam hic tractatus forsan ad externos perveniat) ut literatus aliquis, sive literatorum societas, bene perpendat, candide examinet, et penitus excutiat quam absurdæ, quam ridiculæ opiniones, tam philosopho quam Christiano indignæ, et tantum non in confinio blasphemiarum positæ, *Substantiæ istius immateri-*

Dr. Coward, we may suppose, found a sufficient excuse in this temper of his adversaries, for suffering them to enjoy their own triumphs. He had one comfort indeed ; these pious Satellites could not, even in Sacheverel's days, plague a physician, as they might a theological brother of their own order, and therefore contented themselves with giving him an ill name. One of them, however, ought to be excepted, namely, Mr. John Turner, whose *Vindication*, &c. written against the *Second Thoughts*, is called by Dr. Coward's partizans, rational and moderate ; and that probably induced the doctor to reply to it in a pamphlet intituled, *Further Thoughts upon Second Thoughts*. He wrote afterwards his *Grand Essay*, proving, that an immaterial substance is a philosophic imposture, published in 1704, at the end of which is *An Epistolary Reply to Mr. Broughton's Psychologia*, from which we shall have occasion, by and by, to give an extract.

alis notionem (Deo excepto) necessario consequantur ; quia confutari avidus sitio, et nonnullorum mos est veritatem quam pudet non posse argumentis refutare, fumo flammâque, (sicut apes sulphure suffocatæ) suppressere, et in solidæ ignorantiae testimonium, populari aurâ ratiocinantibus oppedere, *Ophthalmiatria*, p. 28.

C H A P. XXII.

A short account of Henry Layton, Esq; author of A Search after Souls. His profession and studies. Not professedly Dr. Coward's advocate. His works little known. His answers to certain objections taken from the mischief arising from his writings. Of the same complexion with the objections of papists against the writings of protestants.

DR. Coward had the good fortune to be seconded by a very able advocate, who replied separately and distinctly to the three writers above mentioned, not overlooking Mr. Turner's reply to *Second Thoughts*.

This advocate was Henry Layton, Esq. a gentleman of an ancient family, and a handsome estate at Rawden, in the county of York. His father is said to have been master of the jewel-office to K. Charles I. Henry his son was educated at Oxford, and afterwards at Grays-Inn, in the study of the law, and was called to the bar; but made no other use of his profession, (in which however he was very able) than to do good offices among his neighbours, without fee or reward.

His disposition led him to speculations of another kind, particularly to a long and laborious disquisition into the nature of the soul, chiefly with respect to its separate existence; the evidence for and against which, he investigated with the utmost avidity of coming at the truth, examining every thing he could

meet with, ancient and modern, on the subject; and having found reason to determine for the negative, he made no scruple of opposing the sentiments of some of the greatest heroes of his own time.

I have called this writer Dr. Coward's advocate; not that he was professedly such, but because, as he entered upon the controversy before Coward, so he pursued it after him, in confutation of those opponents whom Coward's book had set to work: declaring however, that he had no view but to the general question, without making himself answerable for Coward's arguments or expressions, or becoming bound by his or any other persons concessions or qualifying reserves. It is indeed doubtful whether he ever read COWARD'S *Second Thoughts*. It is certain, at least, that when he wrote his *Observations on Nichols's Conference with a Theist*, he did not know that *Estibius*, one of the speakers in it, was the name subscribed by Coward to the declaration of his *Second Thoughts*; but rather seems to have imagined, that himself was the person intended by Nichols to be confuted under that appellation.

I have been the more particular in this account of Mr. Layton, as it is probable his works, though printed in two volumes quarto, were never formally published, or exposed to sale under the patronage of a bookseller; and I am inclined to believe, that the few copies now to be met with, were originally presents to his friends. He complains in one place, that he could not procure an imprimatur for his observations on Dr. Bentley's second sermon at Boyle's lecture. And as the rest of his

pieces have in them the same *heretical taint*, we may suppose that they stole into light through some private press. It is hardly accountable otherwise, that a writer of Mr. Layton's learning and abilities, should have remained for so long a time in such obscurity, that it is questionable whether his name or writings were ever mentioned in any printed book, before Dr. Fleming undertook to give an account of them, as the works of Dr. Coward.*

As Mr. Layton considers and answers every argument that had then been advanced in behalf of the immortality of the soul, at full length, there is no giving an abstract of his disquisitions within any reasonable compass: I shall therefore only exhibit one or two of his answers to such popular reasons as his friends offered, by way of deterring him from an undertaking that was likely to be so offensive to the million.

“ You say, (says he, to one of them) *the opinion is bold, singular, and heretical.*

“ That there is a degree of boldness and singularity in it, I do not deny; but I say it is not so great a degree of either as I took it to be when I writ my treatise; witness the many quotations, reported in this writing. It fared with me as it did with Elijah, who thought he was the only true servant which God had in Israel; but it was revealed to him, that there were seven thousand such left in Israel, although he knew nothing of them.

* In his *Survey of a Search after Souls.*

“ To the word *heretical*, I read in K. *James*
 “ the first his apology, fol. 302. of his works,
 “ *that he thought himself acquitted of that*
 “ *charge, by his professing to believe the scrip-*
 “ *ture, and the three most ancient creeds; his*
 “ *submission to the four first great or general*
 “ *councils, and to what the fathers of the first*
 “ *five hundred years did agree upon as neces-*
 “ *sary to salvation.*

“ Here are *your* rules for examination of
 “ heresies, and none of these trials do I refuse.
 “ But till proofs rise from some of these
 “ grounds, my answer to this expression shall
 “ be the words of Moses. Numb. xvi. 7. [*Ye*
 “ *take too much upon you, ye sons of Levi.*]

“ ——— You say, *the opinion opens a gap to*
 “ *atheism, and disobedience; and encourages*
 “ *men to prefer their private fancies, before the*
 “ *wisdom and authority of the church.*

“ To this I say, our primitive reformers have
 “ (in answer to their popish superiors) fully
 “ answered this objection; and to them I refer
 “ you for an answer, with this addition, that
 “ if your proposition were irrefragable, errors
 “ grown general, would prove irremediable.

“ You say, *the opinion tends to promote*
 “ *vice, and that the soul's separate subsistence*
 “ *is the strongest foundation of piety and re-*
 “ *ligion.*

“ But I cannot grant any of these conse-
 “ quences to be necessary or probable; but do
 “ say, that our Lord's direction, *to fear God*
 “ *who can both kill and cast into hell*, stands
 “ firm and unshaken: and the passing an in-
 “ termediate time betwixt death and judgment,
 “ (which time to the dead is nothing) doth

“ no way infeeble the certainty of future re-
 “ wards and punishments; but places the ex-
 “ pectation of them upon a right and a firm
 “ foot or foundation, maintained by a concur-
 “ rent testimony throughout the scripture,
 “ and fortified by the articles of our several
 “ creeds; a truth of which, since Christ’s time,
 “ there never was any doubt; nor can be by
 “ any who do acknowledge the authority of
 “ the scripture.

“ You say, *men may except against the re-*
 “ *surrection also.* And I grant it: for some
 “ do it daily, against the being or government
 “ of the Deity. But this doth not strengthen
 “ your inference, that, because men question
 “ and explode an opinion which appears to be
 “ not well grounded, therefore they will do
 “ the same by another opinion that is well
 “ grounded, and founded upon a rock.

“ True it is, that our churches, for about the
 “ last 1200 years, have been so possest with
 “ the conceit of a separately subsisting soul,
 “ that they have made little use of the resur-
 “ rection in their exhortations. And in truth,
 “ if the soul, parting from the body, go pre-
 “ sently to heaven or hell, our article of the
 “ resurrection, can be but of small use in the
 “ church. If souls get amongst blessed an-
 “ gels in heaven, what need can there be to
 “ them of a resurrection? It seems rather a
 “ loss and harm to them to enter again into
 “ bodies, and come out of heaven to inhabit
 “ on earth again, although it be a new earth,
 “ *wherein dwells righteousness.* There have
 “ been testimonies all along in the church
 “ against the separate subsistence of souls, ex-

“ cept in the 600 years wherein the thick dark-
 “ ness of popish ignorance overspread the
 “ christian world, viz. from An. 600 till An.
 “ 1200.”*

Thus far Mr. Layton, who was, we see, obliged to answer his opposers in the same language which our first reformers used to the papists. Strange that these men, who called themselves protestants, should not see the impertinence of alledging the authority of the church, and of imputing heresy, libertinism, and even atheism, to an opinion, merely because it was not backed by the sanctions of a human establishment. They should have considered however, that those we call reformers, in the days of queen Elizabeth, sufficiently expressed their scruples concerning the state of the soul after death, by expunging an article of religion which condemned the opinion espoused by Mr. Layton and others; and I have little doubt but they saw, that the separate existence of the soul, being one of those doctrines which popery borrowed from paganism, and also so necessary to support so great a part of the impious and absurd superstitions of the church of Rome, should have been discarded among other errors of the same tendency, and that it was to little purpose to set about demolishing the superstructure, while the foundation was acknowledged to be sound and orthodox. They little dreamt, that by this oversight, they would give their posterity the trouble of fighting the papistical battle over again with some of their nominal protestant

* Search after Souls. Part ii. p. 21, 22, 23.

successors, who have found their temporal account in building again many things which these reformers thought, in the simplicity of their hearts, they had sufficiently destroyed.

CHAP. XXIII.

Mr. Hallett's *discourse, shewing the impossibility of proving a future state by the light of nature. Remarks on some passages in it. Controverted by Mr. Grove. The Biogr. Britan. censured. A short account of Mr. Grove's book. A passage from another of his pieces unfavourable to his attempts to establish immortality by the light of nature. Remarks upon it. Mr. Hallet's Defence. Incumbered with difficulties not to be got over.*

I PASS by innumerable multitudes of tracts 1729. on the immortality of the soul, which were published for twenty years after the period last under consideration; partly because they were aimed at infidels, who were not supposed to acknowledge any future state at all, and partly because they contained little more than repetitions of what had been said an hundred times before; and pass on to the year 1729, when the learned Mr. Joseph Hallet, jun. published among other tracts, *A discourse shewing the impossibility of proving a future state by the light of nature.* A sensible performance, and sufficient to afford satisfaction to any one who

does not give his prejudices the dominion over his common sense.

But some prejudices are irradicable, and then most of all when there is any fear that our convictions against them, may put us upon ill terms with our fellow members of the same communion. And such, I am sorry to observe, seems to have been the case with this ingenious writer, so far as to have led him into what appears to me to be a plain contradiction. For having brought some circumstances to prove, that the power of thought depends upon the body, he adds, “what I
“ have here said does not prove, that the soul
“ cannot think out of the body, for I am sure,
“ from revelation that it can.”* And again,
“ the will of God is made known to us two
“ ways, by nature, and by revelation; by this
“ latter way, God hath undoubtedly made
“ known his will to be, that our souls shall
“ continue to think when the body is dead.”†

And yet he expressly asserts the doctrine of revelation to be, *No resurrection, no future state*, which, commenting upon 1 Cor. xv. 32. he thus makes out, “*If the dead rise not, let us
“ eat and drink, for to-morrow we die*, that is,
“ says Mr. Hallet, we shall perish; there will
“ be an end of us; we shall neither be happy
“ nor miserable. It is evident, this must be
“ the meaning of the word *die* in this place,
“ because else the reasoning of the apostle
“ would not appear to be good and just. If
“ by the expression *we die*, he only meant *our
“ bodies die*, while our souls shall be happy in

* Discourses. Vol. I. p. 214. † Ibid. p. 221.

“ another state, the argument would have no
 “ force, it would be a mere tautology.” And
 then, proceeding to paraphrase the apostle’s
 discourse upon the supposition, that he means
 only that our bodies die, he concludes thus.
 “ This paraphrase contradicts itself; and I
 “ know not how to prevent a contradiction in
 “ the paraphrase of this verse, provided we do
 “ not understand the apostle as arguing upon
 “ the supposition, that, if there is no resur-
 “ rection, there will be no future life even for
 “ the soul.”*

But if we understand the apostle to argue
 upon that supposition, we must, I trow, under-
 stand him to argue against the passage or pas-
 sages of revelation, which, according to Mr.
 Hallet, “ give undoubted assurance that our
 “ souls shall continue to think, after the body
 “ is dead.” For in that case, there must be a
 future life of the soul, which has no connection
 with the resurrection of the dead, and which,
 according to revelation itself, makes the resur-
 rection unnecessary.

I have supposed above, that this concession
 might be nothing more in Mr. Hallet’s inten-
 tion, than a *sop* for the elders of his church,
 inasmuch as he does not once attempt to point
 out, what text or texts of scripture they were,
 which made him sure, that the soul continues
 to think, after the body is dead. But Mr.
 Grove, having laid his finger upon this weak
 place, Mr. Hallet was under a necessity to ex-
 plain himself farther upon it, (as we shall see
 by and by) but still without citing any revealed
 authorities.

* Disc. p. 319, 320.

I have given one instance of the anger of our British Biographers against this argument, so friendly to revelation, in the case of Mr. Locke, and am now about to exhibit another of their malevolence to Mr. Hallet, for the same offence.

“The same year, [1730] he [Mr. Henry Grove of Taunton] published *Some thoughts concerning the proof of a future state from reason*, in answer to the Rev. Mr. Hallet, jun. who, in his great zeal for the christian revelation, and to make it appear absolutely necessary, had endeavoured to weaken the arguments from reason for a future state.”*

It is not easy to discern whether this spiteful sneer is aimed more immediately at Mr. Hallet, or the christian revelation. Let us turn the tables upon Mr. Grove, and say, “who in his great zeal for the moral government of God, hath endeavoured to weaken the arguments for a future state, taken from revelation, by endeavouring to shew, that the christian revelation was not absolutely necessary.” Is the zeal of Mr. Grove in one case, more laudable than the zeal of Mr. Hallet in the other? To have any advantage against Mr. Hallet, Mr. Grove must prove, that the christian revelation was not absolutely necessary: and that, supposing it to be absolutely necessary, the moral government of God must want to be vindicated. We shall however see presently, that, upon Mr. Grove’s own principles, if the christian revelation is in any degree necessary, the moral government of

* Biog. Brit. Art. GROVE.

God will stand just as much in need of vindication, as if the gospel of Christ was absolutely necessary.

With respect to Mr. Grove's arguments, it is just sufficient to observe, that he beats the old hoof of the *vis inertiae*, and the divisibility of matter, after Dr. Clarke; of man's being an accountable creature, present unequal distribution, &c. produces some of the old texts, intermixing here and there a sarcasm, which is nothing to the purpose. His great strength seems to lie in fighting against Locke's supposition of thought being super-added to matter, from the mere logical terms of thought's being an absolute, primary, and numerical quality, simple, and therefore not compatible with a compound being, or one that has parts; which, after all, is mere scholastic jargon, of no weight either to prove or disprove the fact.

Mr. Hallet replied to this answer, and, "Mr. Grove, though very averse to controversy, yet this being with him a favourite subject, and, as he apprehended, of the last importance to vindicate the moral government of God, determined to review the debate," * which he began to do in a tract intituled, *The weight of tradition concerning a future state*; but lived to finish only one chapter of it.

How well Mr. Grove might be supposed to acquit himself on this favourite subject, and in the defence of the moral government of God, we may learn from an anecdote preserved by the compilers of the *Biog. Brit.* who, I dare say, will lay under no suspicions of misrepre-

* *Biog. Brit.* Art. GROVE,

senting their hero, with those who read his article.

“ Mr. Grove,” say they, “ was much conversant with Cicero’s philosophical works,—
 “ and thought his discourses of the nature of
 “ the Gods, and the immortality, an UNANSWERABLE DEMONSTRATION of the GREAT
 “ NECESSITY and advantage of the christian
 “ revelation, against those who would pretend,
 “ that when Christ appeared to enlighten and
 “ reform the world, he was not wanted, and
 “ that unassisted reason was sufficient for this
 “ end : for the great uncertainty in which
 “ Cicero, one of the greatest geniuses of paganism, was involved, and represents all
 “ their philosophers as involved, with regard
 “ to one of the most important doctrines, of the
 “ existence, perfection, and providence of
 “ God, and their own future existence and
 “ state, is an argument FROM FACT, which
 “ overturns all the specious theories of modern
 “ deists, and shews too their great ingratitude,
 “ who enlightened by the gospel, and thus enabled to think more clearly and justly on
 “ these subjects, refuse to own their obligations, and employ as an argument against revelation, the light they really receive from
 “ it.”*

Now I would desire to know how the moral government of God could be vindicated, in making Cicero an accountable creature, and at the same time leaving him under his great uncertainty concerning his being, providence, &c. and his own future condition, more than

* Bieg. Brit. GROVE. rem. B.

if Cicero, an accountable creature, had been left in absolute ignorance of these particulars? It appears to me, upon Mr. Grove's own shewing, that it was impossible for Cicero to get out of this uncertainty, without the aid of the christian revelation, or something equivalent to it. Were the pagans after Cicero, in less uncertainty? By no means. The christian revelation therefore was not only greatly, but absolutely necessary to dispel the clouds and darkness of this uncertainty; and Mr. Grove is just so much the more disingenuous than the modern deists, as he plays an hypothesis in his dispute with Mr. Hallet, against a fact which he certainly knew and acknowledged to be true.

These inconsistencies are not uncommon; they are the necessary consequences of attempting to prescribe fitnesses and rules of moral government to God. Dr. Clarke fell into them, as hath been shewn by Mr. Hallet and others, and Mr. Grove who followed him, *sed longo intervallo*, could hardly hope to escape them.

But I return to Mr. Hallet, who, having inferred from St. Paul's argument, 1 Cor xv. 32, that if there was to be no resurrection, there would be no future state; and having said likewise in the same treatise, that he was assured from revelation, *that the soul should continue to think after the body was dead*, was called upon, as well he might be, by Mr. Grove, to explain himself; Mr. Grove, supposing that the scriptures he himself had brought to prove the separate existence of the soul, were utterly

inconsistent with Mr. Hallet's axiom, *No resurrection, no future state.**

To this Mr. Hallet answers, "That the same sacrifice purchased, and the same God promises at once all these three things together, the separate existence of the soul, the resurrection of the body, and the future state beyond that, and consequently if there had been no resurrection purchased, there would have been no future state. The connection between the resurrection and the future state, in this last view of things [i. e. as exhibited by revelation] is not natural, but is derived from the will and wise appointment of God, who has determined, (not to give men their full recompence in a separate state, but) both to awaken men's souls, and to raise their bodies, and to give them a recompence in a state of union. If God had not determined to raise men's bodies, from the dead, it does not seem likely that he would have determined to awaken men's souls immediately upon their dying, or to have given them either happiness or misery, after the destruction of this world. The connection here between a resurrection and a future state, is founded on the will of God, and on their being both revealed together in the same promise."†

Now, here it is remarkable, that Mr. Grove, from a number of texts which he produceth to prove the separate existence of the soul, concludes upon the authority of scripture, that the soul is of a distinct nature from the body, and consequently would not naturally die

* *Some Thoughts*, p. 119.

† *Hallet's Defence*, p. 63.

with the body, or, which is the same thing, would naturally survive the body, although there should be no resurrection. And then, as Mr. Grove held, that no sentence of death was passed upon the soul, it followed, that God did not interfere in this matter, but left the soul's future existence upon the powers and capacities with which it was originally endowed.

But Mr. Hallet, we see, insists that the separate existence of the soul was matter of purchase by the sacrifice of Christ, as well as the resurrection of the dead, and that both were purchased and promised at one and the same time, and consequently, there was no separate existence of the soul, before the promise took place, or, in other words, before the price was paid. It does not indeed appear, whether Mr. Hallet was assured of the separate existence of the soul by the same texts of scripture which Mr. Grove produces, forasmuch as the former produces no text to this purpose at all.

But as Mr. Hallet says, that, “these texts
“did not concern him, who had declared his
“firm belief that the soul is a distinct substance
“from the body, upon the authority of the
“new testament,” these must be the same texts upon which he grounded his said belief.

Now since these texts speak so obscurely and uncertainly of the separate existence of the soul, that two very learned and ingenious men cannot agree whether the separate existence they speak of is natural to the soul, or only accidental by way of purchase, favour, or promise, is it not presumeable, that when these texts come to be rightly understood, they may be found not to speak of any separate existence at all?

But Mr. Hallet, in his explanation of his meaning, hath incumbered himself with a difficulty, which I see not how it is possible for any one who espouses his hypothesis to solve. Mr. Hallet says that Christ purchased, and God promised a separate existence of the soul, the resurrection of the body, and a future state beyond that, AT ONCE, all three together. If this be so, how does it appear that this promise shall not be performed *at once*? Where does it appear by any promise either in the old or new testament, that God is determined to awaken men's souls, before he raises their bodies? A promise relates to something future; and therefore when this promise was made, it must be understood, that the souls of dead men were not awakened, nor as a purchase by sacrifice was to be made of this privilege, could they be, till the sacrifice was offered. Now, where is there a text to be found, which shews, that in consequence of this sacrifice, men's souls, which till then had been asleep, should be immediately awakened, and that from thenceforward, all the souls of men should pass into a state of separate conscious existence, immediately upon their disunion from the body? I do not here make use of Mr. Hallet's expression, of *awakening men's souls immediately upon their dying*, as it is not sense; for what occasion to awaken that which, *ex hypothesi*, never was asleep?

CHAP. XXIV.

A Pamphlet intituled, The Materiality or Mortality of the Soul of Man. An account of it. The author's proofs all from scripture. Proper to qualify Mr. Hallet's concession. Mr. Grove claims all the clear and obvious texts as favouring the natural immortality of the soul. Dr. Law makes the like claim in favour of the sleep of the soul.

IN the same year in which Mr. Hallet's discourse-1729. appeared, viz. 1729, a small pamphlet was printed for Noon, intituled, *The materiality or mortality of the soul of man, and its sameness with the body, asserted and proved from the holy scriptures of the old and new testament, shewing, that upon the death of the body, all sensation and consciousness utterly cease till the resurrection of the dead.*

The author of this very sensible and decisive discourse, instead of amusing himself with the metaphysical dreams of the immortalists, confines himself wholly to the scriptures, and his book may be considered as a proper supplement to Mr. Hallett's discourse, which left the matter short, by a concession, which as I hope, now appears, ought not to have been made. In one word, this writer not only establishes his principle, on the firm and stable foundation of the word of God, but shews the futility of those conclusions drawn from certain texts of scripture, which are supposed by Mess. Grove,

Hallet, and others, to speak of the soul as a substance distinct from, and wholly independent on the body and its organization.

Mr. Grove having made such use of the scriptures, as he thought conducive to the proof of his point, goes on to say, “the sacred scriptures being thus clear and express in this matter, if there are any obscure passages, which seem to speak a contrary language, they ought to have their meaning fixed by such more plain and obvious ones as those which have been now quoted.”*

But what must we do with those clear and plain passages, which not only seem, but certainly do speak a contrary language; not to the texts themselves cited by Mr. Grove, but to his interpretation of them? That such passages there are, we are informed by the writer of the pamphlet just mentioned, and by others whose interpretations we have somewhat more reason to rely upon, than the interpretation of those who are for squaring the word of God by the twinkling light of a sort of natural religion, from which they themselves are obliged occasionally to turn. On another hand,

The learned Bp. Law having in his *Appendix* to his *Considerations*, examined the whole number of those texts which Mr. Grove calls clear and express for the natural immortality of the soul, and offered some rational explanations of them, concludes thus.

“This may serve for a specimen of such texts as are usually alledged on the other side of the question, [i. e. in favour of a separate exis-

* *Some Thoughts, &c.* p. 118.

“ tence] all which, I believe, appear even from
 “ these short remarks upon them, to be either
 “ quite foreign to the point, or purely figura-
 “ tive ; or lastly, capable of a clear and easy
 “ solution on the principles abovementioned :
 “ *Nor can such ever fairly be opposed to the con-*
 “ *stant, obvious tenor of the sacred writings, and*
 “ *that number of plain express passages already*
 “ *cited.*”*

Let the reader judge from their respective writings which of these learned men has more right to this argument.

CHAP. XXV.

Bp. LAW's Appendix to his *Considerations on the Theory of Religion. Fatal to the cause of a conscious intermediate state. Produced a number of Answers. Dr. Goddard. Mr. Steffe. Dr. Morton. The Examiner of Bishop Sherlock's Sermons. Bishop Warburton. Replies to these by Mr. Peckard, Dr. Benjamin Dawson, and in some anonymous tracts.*

BP. Law's Appendix to his *Considerations on* 1755. *the Theory of Religion, &c.* made its first appearance in the year 1755. In this Appendix were examined, under several heads, all or most of the texts where the words soul or spi-

* Dr. Law's *Considerations. Appendix, p. 414, ed. 1759.*

rit occurred in the scriptures, and the significations of them in the original languages explained from the several contexts to which they belonged.

The cause of the conscious intermediate state, was so shaken from its very foundations by the scriptural testimonies brought together in this Appendix, that numbers of its partizans ran in a hurry to lend a hand to support the tottering edifice. It happened in this case, as it does in some others from which the metaphor is borrowed, that the crowd of assistants confounded each other, and by the variety of their expedients, proposed as it were all in a breath, made themselves utterly unintelligible to those who should have taken their directions. To report the several hypotheses they adopted, would swell this book to ten times its intended bulk. I shall therefore content myself with a short account of some of the forwardest of this class of writers, and of the tracts which were written in answer to them.

Dr. Peter Stephen Goddard, since master of Clare Hall in Cambridge, led the way, in a sermon preached at St. Edmund's Bury, February. 25, 1756. The title of which, was, *The Intermediate State of Happiness or Misery between Death and the Resurrection, proved from Scripture.* This sermon was answered by the Rev. Mr. Peter Peckard, in his accurate *Observations on the doctrine of an Intermediate State between Death and the Resurrection*, printed for Davis and Reymers, 1756, and afterwards more minutely in an anonymous pamphlet, intituled, *No Proof in the Scriptures of an Intermediate State of Happi-*

ness or Misery between Death and the Resurrection, printed in the same year for *Bladon* in *Paternoster-row*. This writer likewise took into his answer to Dr. Goddard, a small tract, intituled, *Remarks upon a late Treatise* [Dr. LAW's Appendix] *relating to an Intermediate State*. A miserable performance, fathered however upon a dignitary of no little eminence in the established church. There are likewise at the end of this pamphlet, *Remarks on a Letter in the Gentleman's Magazine* for April, 1756, and on Abp. Tillotson's Sermon on Heb. xi. 6.

In the year 1757, appeared, *Five letters, &c.* by John Steffe. In the two first of these letters are contained, as we are told in the title page, *Scripture proofs of a separate intermediate state of existence after death; with an answer to the principal objections to that doctrine*.

In the Monthly Review for May, 1757, were published, *Remarks on Mr. Steffe's Letter concerning the state of the soul after death*. Signed B. D. To these Remarks the Reviewers subjoined marginal notes, by way of objections to B. D's. interpretation of certain texts, and in aid of Mr. Steffe.

The next year, 1758, Mr. Steffe published, *Two letters on the Intermediate State*, in the first of which he attacks Dr. Law's Appendix; in the other, he defends the first of his five letters, against the attack of B. D.

On this defence B. D. made some farther remarks, which were published in *the Grand Magazine* for April, 1758. In the year 1765, the two Tracts containing remarks on Mr. Steffe's Letters, &c. were republished, at the end of the learned Dr. BENJAMIN DAWSON'S

Illustration of several texts of scripture, particularly those in which the LOGOS occurs. Being the substance of eight sermons preached at Lady Moyer's lecture, 1764 and 1765. And thus the public became acquainted with Mr. Steffe's masterly opponent, who had before lain hid under variety of uncertain conjectures. It may be necessary to mention that the Annotations in the Monthly Review of May, 1757, and some others of the *Billingsgate* family (on which I shall presently bestow a particular section) are properly noticed, and justly and genteely censured, in the republication of these two tracts.

In the year 1757, Dr. Thomas Morton, rector of Bassingham, and formerly fellow of C. C. C. Oxon; addressed, *Queries to Dr. Law, &c. relative to what he had advanced on the soul of man, and a separate state, with a few remarks on Mr. Peckard's Observations, &c.* Lincoln, printed by W. WOOD.

To these *Queries and Remarks*, Mr. Peckard returned an answer in his *Farther observations on the doctrine of an intermediate state*, published the same year.

Dr. Morton does not depend so much upon any theory or discovery of his own, as upon the authority of Grotius, Dr. Warburton, Messieurs Peters, Pierce, and Rogers, chiefly with respect to their exposition of the texts of scripture brought to support the doctrine of an intermediate state. But as these interpretations had been considered, and the arguments founded upon them obviated by Dr. Law, Mr. Peckard applied himself more particularly to the examination of the authorities brought by Dr.

Morton from the fathers and philosophers, with such effect, that Dr. Morton did not think fit to pursue the controversy any farther. And indeed, such was the merit of these two tracts of Mr. Peckard, that, a few slight cavils excepted, they still remain unanswered, except in a way which, for the credit of the parties respondent, would be better forgotten than remembered.

About this period, and by some accident, not hitherto publicly accounted for, Dr. Law, the present bishop of Carlisle, incurred the displeasure of one of Dr. Warburton's seconds, who in a pamphlet, intituled, *A Free and Candid Examination of the principles advanced in the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of LONDON's very elegant sermons lately published*, took occasion, peevishly enough, to remark, that "Dr. Law had revived the old exploded hypothesis of *the sleep of the soul*," adding something, which it may be supposed he intended for a confutation of the said hypothesis.

This chastisement of Dr. Law, (which, whether with or without grounds, was supposed not to have been inflicted without the approbation of the principal) gave occasion to a pamphlet, intituled, *Remarks on Dr. Warburton's account of the sentiments of the early Jews concerning the soul, &c.* printed for M. Cooper, London, 1757.

The account of Dr. Warburton, which was the object of these remarks, was delivered in the third edition of the *Divine Legation of Moses*, 1742, and was shewn to be so little different from the account of others, (particu-

Illustration of several texts of scripture, particularly those in which the LOGOS occurs. Being the substance of eight sermons preached at Lady Moyer's lecture, 1764 and 1765. And thus the public became acquainted with Mr. Steffe's masterly opponent, who had before lain hid under variety of uncertain conjectures. It may be necessary to mention that the Annotations in the Monthly Review of May, 1757, and some others of the *Billingsgate* family (on which I shall presently bestow a particular section) are properly noticed, and justly and genteely censured, in the republication of these two tracts.

In the year 1757, Dr. Thomas Morton, rector of Bassingham, and formerly fellow of C. C. C. Oxon; addressed, *Queries to Dr. Law, &c. relative to what he had advanced on the soul of man, and a separate state, with a few remarks on Mr. Peckard's Observations, &c.* Lincoln, printed by W. Wood.

To these *Queries and Remarks*, Mr. Peckard returned an answer in his *Farther observations on the doctrine of an intermediate state*, published the same year.

Dr. Morton does not depend so much upon any theory or discovery of his own, as upon the authority of Grotius, Dr. Warburton, Messieurs Peters, Pierce, and Rogers, chiefly with respect to their exposition of the texts of scripture brought to support the doctrine of an intermediate state. But as these interpretations had been considered, and the arguments founded upon them obviated by Dr. Law, Mr. Peckard applied himself more particularly to the examination of the authorities brought by Dr.

Morton from the fathers and philosophers, with such effect, that Dr. Morton did not think fit to pursue the controversy any farther. And indeed, such was the merit of these two tracts of Mr. Peckard, that, a few slight cavils excepted, they still remain unanswered, except in a way which, for the credit of the parties respondent, would be better forgotten than remembered.

About this period, and by some accident, not hitherto publicly accounted for, Dr. Law, the present bishop of Carlisle, incurred the displeasure of one of Dr. Warburton's seconds, who in a pamphlet, intituled, *A Free and Candid Examination of the principles advanced in the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of LONDON's very elegant sermons lately published*, took occasion, peevishly enough, to remark, that "Dr. Law had revived the old exploded hypothesis of *the sleep of the soul*," adding something, which it may be supposed he intended for a confutation of the said hypothesis.

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larly Mr. Whiston) who “supposed the ancient
 “ Jews might conceive the soul to be in a state
 “ of inactivity during the interval between
 “ death and the resurrection,” * that it might
 be affirmed of Mr. Whiston, Dr. Warburton,
 and Dr. Law, that they equally espoused the
 old exploded hypothesis of the sleep, or what
 is just the same thing, of the inactivity of the
 soul, between death and the resurrection.†

Whether Dr. Warburton took any hints from
 these Remarks or not, one cannot say; but the
 fact is, that in the fourth edition of the *Divine*
Legation of 1758, he altered the mode of ex-
 pressing his account of the sentiments of the
 early Jews, &c. probably with a view of elu-
 ding the force of some observations made in the
 Remarks on his account, in the former edition.

This alteration, and an additional explana-
 tion of his hypothesis, looking like the seeking
 of a subterfuge, the author of the Remarks
 found it expedient to publish a *Review of some*
passages in this fourth edition of the *Divine*
Legation,‡ wherein this explanation, and the
 above-mentioned modifications were examin-
 ed, and shewn not to have mended matters
 with respect to the former account in the least
 degree.

And here rested the controversy till the
 year 1765, when a new edition of the *Divine*
Legation was presented to the public, the
 learned author of which was by that time pro-
 moted to the episcopal bench.

In the fourth volume of this edition, p. 376,

* Free and candid examination, p. 60.

† Remarks, p. 9, 10.

‡ Printed for Cooper, 1760.

the learned and Right Reverend author brings the espousers of the sleep of the soul to their *amende honorable*, in a way, favouring rather of the sentence of a Sorbonne doctor, than of the meekness and moderation recommended by St. Paul to Timothy and Titus, in their episcopal admonitions and reproofs to those who oppose themselves. From the severity of this sentence the partizans of the bishop of Carlisle, desire to appeal, at the bar of the public, in the next section, which, though a little out of the rules of strict history, will, we hope, contribute to give the reader some useful intelligence concerning the present state of the controversy.

CHAP. XXVI.

Examination of Bishop Warburton's Strictures on the doctrines of the Sleep of the Soul. His premises more honourable to the Sadducees, than advantageous to himself. Imputes a precarious Sadducean principle to Dr. Law and his partizans, without grounds. His reasoning liable to be retorted upon him. Forges a sophism for the Polytheists, in order to abuse his antagonist, under the pretence of a parallel case. Grossly misrepresents the bishop of Carlisle. The futility of his Polytheistical sophism. The supposition that the natural immortality of the soul is taken for granted in scripture, ridiculous and false. Gross abuse of his opponents. Handsomely reprov'd for it by an ingenious writer. Insults Dr. Taylor of Norwich, with rudeness, and without reason. Properly reprov'd for it. Proposes to prove the resurrection philosophically by an argument which ends in the good pleasure of God. Mistakes the meaning of St. Paul. Confutes nonsense of his own making. Puzzles himself with his speculations on the sameness of the human frame. Is at odds with his authorities. Banter his opponents. Writes with the zeal of a Proselyte, apprehensive that the sincerity of his conversion may be suspected.

1765. **T**HE reader of the passage of the *Divine Legation* here referred to, will doubtless remark, that some particulars, in it, relative to the origin of the controversy concerning an intermediate state, are perfectly new, and such as they who have heretofore adhered to my Lord of

Gloucester's side of the question, never once thought of. These novelties, I apprehend, are not such as his Lordship would have chosen to exhibit, if he could have avoided it. But having, in the former editions of this book, framed an hypothesis concerning the sentiments of the early jews on the subject of the human soul, which had suffered some rude shocks from his Lordship's opponents, it became necessary in the event, to support the said hypothesis by something which should at least, have the appearance of a matter of fact, however strange and incredible.

Accordingly his Lordship having said, that "the early Jews simply concluded, that *the soul survived the body, without any interesting speculations on that survivorship,*" proceeds to inform us, that "from this uninteresting state in which the doctrine concerning the soul remained amongst the early jews, the SADDUCEES concluded, that their ancestors believed the extinction of the soul on death."

Nothing surely can be more honourable to the Sadducees than this testimony. The Right Reverend author, here represents them as diligent and serious examiners of the scriptures, in order to find what were the sentiments of their forefathers concerning the soul, and makes them draw their conclusion from premises which his Lordship must allow to be strongly marked with the characters of truth. For the difference is hardly preceptible between a survivance of the soul, in which no one is interested, and the extinction of the soul on death.

And then again, the probability that the Sadducean conclusion was righter than his Lord-

ship's, will clearly appear from the circumstance of the times in which they were respectively drawn. His Lordship holds, that the early Jews believed the survivance of the soul on the death of the body. Whence did his Lordship derive this opinion? Plainly from the scriptures. The Sadducees held, that their early ancestors believed the extinction of the soul on the death of the body; and this likewise was the result of their searching the scriptures. Now the most authentic date of the rise of the Sadducees, is the high priesthood of Onias, 240 years before the christian æra.* Whether therefore may we suppose the Sadducees, or his Lordship, who lives and writes at two thousand years distance from their first appearance, to be better acquainted with the sentiments of the early Jews concerning the soul? For to say nothing of the comparative correctness of the copies of the scriptures of those two periods, we may conclude, that the most ordinary jews must have understood the language in which their scriptures were written, much better than the most accomplished orientalist does now.† And if it should be said, that the Pharisees, who held the survivance of the soul, must have understood the scriptures as perfectly as the Sadducees, we have only to appeal to the R. R. author of the *Divine Legation* of Moses. The Pharisees, it is well known, not only derived from their early ancestors their belief of the survivance of the soul, but their belief that the doctrine was highly interesting; in which, so far as the scriptures were concerned, his Lord-

* Basnage. Hist. des Juifs, liv. 11, ch. 6. Prideaux places the rise of this sect a little earlier.

† See the Critical Review for August, 1759. p. 99.

ship assures us they were mistaken, not to mention, that three parts in four of their creed consisted of unwritten traditions.*

With these presumptions in favour of the Sadducæan conclusion, we may now venture to face the R. R. author's genealogical table, in which he derives the late revivers of the doctrine of the sleep of the soul, from the Sadducees in a lineal descent.

“Hence likewise,” says his Lordship, (that is to say from forming the same sentiments of the early jews, that the Sadducees did) “came
“some late revivers of this opinion of the ex-
“tinction of the soul, though maintained under
“the softer name of its sleep between death and
“the resurrection, for they go upon the Sad-
“ducæan principle, that the soul is a quality
“and not a substance.”

* The following passage of *Lucas Brugenfis*, which according to a certain writer, contains the *Ichnography of the Divine Legation*, may serve to shew, whether the Sadducees or the Pharisees had the better authority for their respective opinions. Hæ [sectæ] ortæ fuisse videntur sub tempora Machabæorum, occasione quæstionum quæ tunc moveri cæperunt, de animæ humanæ immortalitate, corporis resurrectione æternis bonorum præmiis, et malorum suppliciis. Cum enim plures eo tempore florerent scribæ (quorum collegium ab Ezra exordium sumferat) qui sapientiæ studerent, et ut iugo Græcorum subjacebant, nonnumquam audirent Græcorum his de rebus fabulas; factum est ut cæperint quæstionis de his rebus in medium adferre, et inter se ventilare, atque a se mutuo dissidere, aliis ista adstruentibus, qui vocati fuere Pharisæi, aliis negantibus, qui Sadducæi, Act. xxiii. 8. — Ante hæc tempora, non videtur populus Israël quidquam de his rebus doctus fuisse, aut quidquam publice de illis prædicatum: eó quod Lex harum rerum disertam mentionem non faceret, terrenas duntaxat spes, minasque bonis malisque ob oculos ponens. — Quanquam errarent Sadducæi et quidem graviter, [Matth. xxii. 29] nunquam tamen a veteri synagoga declarati sunt hæretici, hoc est desertores fidei, aut legis a Deo traditæ, &c. in MATTH. iii. 7.

Had his Lordship made the Scribes and Pharisees, who besotted themselves with the Greek philosophy, talk of substances and qualities, it would not much have surprised one. But to ascribe this kind of scholastic distinctions to the Sadducees, who drew their conclusions wholly from the scriptures, and only a part of those, where there is no subject of philosophical speculation, argues a willing mind on the behalf of his party, and a readiness to advance any thing, which he may hope he shall not be put to prove. The truth is, all this is only a spice of theological artifice. If the revivers are found to hold that the soul is only a quality, that opinion must by all means be a Sadducean principle. His Lordship is too experienced a polemic not to know, that if he can make the revivers to be esteemed Sadducees, even in one principle, the obsequious multitude will take it for granted, they must be Sadducees in every article of sensual and immoral conversation, which ignorant zeal, ancient and modern, hath ascribed to that denomination.

These insinuations, however, are not, in my opinion, among the most politic arts of controversy, inasmuch as they commonly subject those who use them to reprisals. And so in the present case; the revivers of the sleep of the soul may insinuate in their turn, that the doctrine of the survivance of the soul is a Pharisaical doctrine, derived from the Greeks, and founded on that principle which gave birth to the worship of Dæmons. Hence came some late revivers of the doctrine of the survivance of the soul, under the popular and plausible pretence of its natural immortality; going upon

the Pharisaical principle, that the soul is a substance, and not a quality. After which the public may, if they please, apply whatever is said in the new testament, of the pride, avarice, hypocrisy, and superstition of the Pharisees, to those who borrow their opinion on this subject, and perhaps with something more than equal propriety.

But to proceed with the R. R. author of the *Divine Legation of Moses* demonstrated. “ In support of this opinion the revivers of it proceed on the sophism which the Polytheists employ to combat the unity of the Godhead. *All philosophical arguments*, says the Reviver, (after having quoted a number of wonderful things from scripture, to prove the soul a quality and mortal) *drawn from our notion of matter, and urged against the possibility of life, thought, agency, being so connected with some portions of it, as to constitute a compound being or person, are merely grounded on our ignorance.* * Just so the Polytheist.”

If the reader, in turning over the bishop of Carlisle's Appendix above cited, should expect to find any number of these wonderful things, quoted from scripture, for the purpose of proving the soul to be a quality and mortal, he will be grievously disappointed. On the contrary, the judicious and candid author of that Appendix, expressly appeals to these quotations as evidence, “ that the scripture never seems to countenance these nice speculations, by treating man in any such intricate abstracted

* See the Bishop of Carlisle's *Appendix* to his *Considerations*, &c. p. 398. ed. 3d.

“way.” Indeed the worthy author employs a number of these wonderful things, (and that with the utmost pertinence and perspicuity) to shew that the words for soul and spirit, signify in the scriptures, many things very different from the idea of soul and spirit, suggested by Clarke, Baxter, and Bishop Warburton. And if these scripture senses happen to imply, that what is called soul and spirit by the sacred writers is neither a distinct substance, nor immortal, who can help it? Not the Right Reverend author of the *Divine Legation*: I can assure the reader, his Lordship hath already been made sore on this subject, and will be far enough from entering upon a disquisition, which may once more drive him into the risque of unhinging his whole demonstration.*

But this is not all. As the R. R. author of the D. L. hath misrepresented the use that the bishop of Carlisle makes of his quotations from scripture, so hath he curtailed the bishop's supposed SOPHISM, in a manner by no means becoming a fair and generous adversary; by which device he hath concealed from his reader two very material circumstances. 1. That the bishop of Carlisle goes on to strengthen his argument, by an examination of some metaphysical topics expressed in the very terms of Clarke and Baxter, overthrowing all their curious reasonings, by an appeal to daily experience. And all this exclusive of his appeal to scripture. Whence it follows, 2. That the Polytheist would be contemptibly ridiculous to

* See, *A Review of some passages in the Divine Legation*, &c. p. 18.—23.

go to support his argument *ab ignorantia*, in the manner the Bp. of Carlisle hath done. This would have shewn that the two cases have as little similarity to each other, as the understanding of certain controversial writers has to their honesty. But now for the sophism of the Polytheist.

“ Just so the Polytheist. All arguments for
 “ the unity from metaphysics, are manifestly
 “ vain, and merely grounded on our ignorance.
 “ You believers,” says he, “ must be confined
 “ to scripture. Now scripture assures us,
 “ *There are Gods many*, which, by the way, I
 “ THINK, is a stronger text, certainly a di-
 “ recter, against the unity of the Godhead, than
 “ any this learned writer has produced for the
 “ sleep of the soul.”

True ; and, *This is my body*, is a stronger, certainly a directer text for transubstantiation, than any the author of the *Divine Legation* hath produced to shew, that the early Jews did not believe the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. And if you go to natural light, the ancient Jews must have believed it ; for that God is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him, is as demonstrable by the light of nature, as that he is, or is ONE. But in what age or country must this Polytheist have been born and bred ? Or is he a phantom which appeared to our author in a dream ? The Polytheists of Greece and Italy (and none else were likely to attack believers from their own scriptures) understood their own language at least, and would hardly have urged this clause as a concession of St. Paul, as the R. R. author understands

it, because they would have known that the word, λεγόμενοι, belonged as much to the parenthesis, as to the foregoing words, and from that circumstance would have perceived, that instead of being a direct text, it was no text at all in proof of Polytheism.

Well. “But what say believers to this? “They say, that scripture takes the unity, as “well as the existence of the Deity, for granted; takes them for truths demonstrable by “natural light.”

Which, to be sure, would be very satisfactory to a Polytheist, who should be disposed to stick to his text, which (as the R. R. author understands it) would be a proof, that scripture does not only not take the unity of God for granted, but expressly asserts the contrary.

But of what class, one would be glad to know, are those believers who would subscribe to this answer? An answer which evidently supposes, that there is no strong or direct text in the whole scripture, for the unity of God; and that, with respect to proof, the doctrine stands upon no other foundation than natural light? I have heard of some, who profess to be believers, that pretend they have bibles of their own; and, what may or may not be found in those bibles, it would be hard to say. But surely real believers of common sense, with the authentic scripture before them, would hardly let the Polytheist go off with an answer which gives so considerable a blow to the whole tenour of revealed religion.

Let us suppose this conversation to have passed between the bishop of Gloucester's Polytheist, and Dr. Samuel Clarke. The doctor

appeals to the light of nature for the unity of God; and the idea of this unity, which the light of nature gives Dr. Clarke, excludes all possibility of a trinity of persons in the same one individual substance. The Polytheist, we will suppose, observes this to Dr. Clarke, and tells him, this is a very different idea from what the light of nature, and metaphysical lore gives to orthodox christians, and that the consequences arising from this difference are too visible and important, for any man to suppose, that they could proceed from any uniform light of nature, or metaphysical demonstration. What is the result? Dr. Clarke appeals to the scriptures, and thither the orthodox are obliged to follow him: for they are very sensible of the advantage the doctor would have, if the light of nature and metaphysical deduction were to be the dernier resort. The appeal itself supposes, that the true notion of the unity cannot be settled but by the scripture, and that again implies that the scripture does not take the unity for granted, or a truth demonstrable by natural light; but expressly takes the demonstration upon itself. And the orthodox are obliged to confess, that all arguments for the unity, as they explain it, taken from metaphysics, are incomprehensible, which is only saying in other words, that they are grounded on our ignorance. And so here is an end of the sophism of the Polytheist: and now for the parallel case.

“ Just so it is with regard to that immaterial substance, the soul. Scripture supposes
 “ men to be so far informed of the soul by the

“ same light, as to know, that it cannot be
 “ destroyed by any of those causes which bring
 “ about the destruction of the body.”*

Let us illustrate the force of this argument, by a case which was once mooted between two celebrated disputants, Messieurs Jurieu and Le Clerc.

Jurieu put himself in a passion with Grotius for interpreting the passage of Job, *I know that my Redeemer liveth*, &c. of a temporal deliverance or restoration from his present calamity, and for supposing it to have no respect to a resurrection from the dead: “it is impossible,” says Jurieu, “to deny that the church of that
 “ time had a clear knowledge, and a firm be-
 “ lief of the immortality of the soul, and of
 “ rewards and punishments in a world to come.”

“ How comes it then,” says Le Clerc, “that

* “ He [Mr. Broughton] says further, *the scripture may be*
 “ *allowed to suppose the separate subsistence of souls, as well as to*
 “ *suppose the being of God.* Reply. I deny that the scripture
 “ only supposes the being of a God, and say, that the scripture so
 “ clearly proves and demonstrates the certainty and being of a God,
 “ as that no man who reads it with belief that it is a true history, can
 “ possibly doubt of the being of God. And let Mr. B. and his abet-
 “ tors make a fortieth part of the proof of their separate souls, as I
 “ will undertake to make out of scripture of the true and certain be-
 “ ing of a God, and I will then be ready to subscribe to their opi-
 “ nion, and yield them the conquest in this dispute.” Layton’s Ob-
 servations upon Broughton’s *Psychologia*, Part 2d. p. 40. Here
 is a fair challenge to the abettors of this Mr. Broughton, among
 whom I beg leave to rank our R. R. author, who, I think, must
 allow, that wherever the being of God is clearly proved in scripture,
 there the unity of that being is something more than supposed.
 And if the R. R. author is disposed to take up the gauntlet, I doubt
 not but he will meet with an adventurer as hardy with respect to the
 proof of the unity of God, as Mr. Layton was with regard to the
 proof of his being.

“ these things are not expressly spoken of in
 “ any part of the old testament?”

“ Because,” replies Jurieu, “ the ancients
 “ thought it needless.”

“ Thank God,” says Le Clerc, “ that our
 “ Lord and his apostles were not of the same opi-
 “ nion; otherwise we must have been strangely
 “ perplexed to know what would become of us
 “ after death; and must have gone to the phi-
 “ losophers to learn this great truth, and not
 “ to the holy scriptures. But, pray, reverend
 “ Sir, why was it needless?”

“ Because,” says Jurieu, “ these truths are
 “ principles which are presupposed in every
 “ religion, and without which it would be im-
 “ possible to establish any true fear of God in
 “ the mind of man.”

“ It is for this very reason,” rejoins Le Clerc,
 “ that one should speak of these things, when
 “ the business is to comfort the miserable, or
 “ to exhort men to piety,” (which, by the way,
 was the business that Job’s friends had with
 him at that time) “ instead of speaking,” (as
 these friends did) “ of temporal rewards and
 “ punishments only. Besides, that these are
 “ things of which our senses do not inform us;
 “ nor can the common people acquire the
 “ knowledge of them by reasoning.” i. e. by
 those metaphysical deductions to which the
 author of the D. L. refers.*

Let us now suppose that the bishop of Glou-
 cester knows a better reason, why future re-
 wards and punishments are mentioned in the
 new testament, and not in the old, than Mons.

* Le Clerc, Biblioth. Choisie. Vol. v. p. 365.

Jurieu was aware of; what reason will he give, why the separate existence of the soul is not mentioned either in the old, or the new testament? The cast of his answer to the sophism of the soul-sleepers requires, that the jewish and christian scriptures should be equally silent concerning this doctrine. Will he adopt Mr. Jurieu's silly reason that it was needless? But here he must encounter Mr. Le Clerc's difficulties, and indeed, much greater difficulties arising from an hypothesis of his own, namely, that our Saviour, in his reasoning with the Sadducees, deduces his argument for the resurrection of the dead, through the medium of the separate existence of the soul; which is utterly inconsistent with the silence of the scriptures concerning this separate existence; or with their only taking it for granted as a doctrine demonstrable by the light of nature.

For the present however, the soul-sleepers pin him down to this silence of the new testament concerning the separate existence; it is a concession too considerable not to be accepted; for as it cannot be supposed to have been concealed with any regard to, or prospect of a future dispensation, the consequence will be, that, according to the scriptures, a resurrection of the dead, and a future state of rewards and punishments will be accomplished without it.

But should the R. R. author be disposed once more to desert this silence, and to bring the separate existence of the soul on the stage as a medium, through which, to deduce the proof of a resurrection, it will be expected that he will cite a text as express for it, as the soul-

sleepers may do for the unity, namely, *to us there is but one God the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him.* Till when his Lordship will do well to keep his polytheistical sophism for some future occasion.

“Our dreamers,”* continues his lordship,

* From this word we are referred to the following marginal note :
 “*St. Jude's filthy dreamers only defiled the flesh*, these defile the
 “spirit.” Perhaps there would be as much wit, and much less absurdity in the application, should these dreamers retaliate upon his lordship the last clause of the 15th verse of this short epistle of Jude. But instead of making reprisals in this way, let us have recourse to the manly and decent reprehension his lordship received from the pen of a writer, who did not think his great abilities, as a scholar and a reasoner, at all debased by using the stile and address of a christian and a gentleman. “Will the R. R. author of *The Divine Legation of Moses*, be thought to have exercised this same talent of
 “wit, either in a manner worthy of himself, or, indeed, with innocence? It can surely be deemed but a vulgar pleasure his lordship seems to take, in calling the controverters of the doctrine of an
 “intermediate state, by the name of *Dreamers, Sleepers, Middlemen, &c.* Such language is more worthy of that inferior and popular class of writers, (to which indeed it has hitherto been chiefly
 “confined,) than that eminence which the bishop of Gloucester holds in the learned world. These gentlemen too, with whom his lordship makes so merry and so free, have been too long dinned with
 “such sort of names, to have their sleep broken by a repetition of the rude noise. Nor can the R. R. author be thought to have acquitted himself with more decency and propriety of character, in
 “making a very serious expression from a sacred writer, serve the purpose of a witty sarcasm. *St. Jude's, filthy dreamers, only defiled the flesh; these defile the spirit.* But, though we cannot
 “suppose that St. Jude and the bishop are equally serious, yet it is not so clear, that his lordship, in bringing this charge of spiritual
 “defilement against the dreamers, is altogether in jest. Certain it is, that, however unwilling his lordship might be to suppress so
 “jocular a sentiment, he is willing we should consider the doctrine in a serious light, as of a dangerous and defiling nature. For the
 “learned author of *Considerations on the Theory of Religion*, is represented as a Reviver of the Sadducæan opinion of the
 “extinction of the Soul on death, his valuable quotations from scripture scornfully termed a number of wonderful things: and this scrap

“ are aware of this, and therefore hold with
 “ unbelievers, that the soul is no substance,
 “ but a quality only, and so have taken effec-
 “ tual care indeed, that its repose shall not be
 “ disturbed in this which we may call the sleep
 “ of death.”

Aware of what? Why, that the scripture supposes men to be so far informed of the nature of the soul, as to know that it cannot be destroyed by ANY OF THOSE CAUSES which bring about the destruction of the body.

The dreamers then must be aware that the scripture supposes men to be informed of a position by the light of nature, which the same scripture, even as interpreted by his lordship and his party who are so *broad awake*, most expressly contradicts. For the scripture is positive that the soul may be destroyed by ONE of those causes, which bring about the destruction of the body; namely, a GEHENNA of fire, Matth. x. 28. We leave his lordship to dispute the point with certain adversaries of the *Divine Legation of Moses*, whether the soul is here considered as a substance or a quality.

His lordship proceeds. “*We can never prove, (says another of these sleepers) “that the soul
 “ of man is of such a nature, that it can and
 “ must exist and live, think, act, enjoy, &c.
 “ separate from, and independent of the body.
 “ All our present experience shews the contra-
 “ ry. The operations of the mind depend con-*

“ of scripture, there be gods many, judged by the R. R. author, to
 “ be a stronger text against the unity of the godhead, than any this
 “ learned writer hath produced for his opinion.” Dr. Dawson’s
 Remarks on Mr. Steffe, p. 293—295.

“stantly and invariably on the state of the
 “body; of the brain in particular. If some
 “dying persons have a lively use of their rati-
 “onal faculties to the very last, it is because
 “death hath invaded some other part, and the
 “brain remains sound and vigorous. *ibid.*
 “p. 401. This is the long exploded trash of
 “Coward, Toland, Collins, &c. and he who
 “can treat us with it at this time of the day,
 “has either never read Clarke and Baxter, (in
 “which he had been better employed than in
 “writing upon it) or never understood them.”

This *et cætera* was well put in. Coward, Toland, and Collins, are names execrated by numbers who never read them, and by numbers who having read them, never understood them, at least upon this subject. Among the latter I make no scruple of ranking the author of the Divine Legation, who, I will venture to say, suppressed some other names that have retailed this long exploded trash, merely because it was not for his purpose, that they whom he calls the *Revivers*, should appear in more reputable company. A most contemptible artifice from a man who knows by woful experience, that there are some opinions of unbelievers, which cannot be either exploded or confuted, merely by calling them trash; and there can be no greater indiscretion, not to say, folly, in any controversial writer, than to cite such passages as that above, and then to have nothing to oppose to them, but — a few scurrilous ebullitions of an angry spirit. Here is an appeal to experience, that the faculties of the soul depend upon the state of the body. What has the R. R. author to set against this?

Even the testimony of Clarke and Baxter, who, instead of weakening the presumption arising from the want of, and the apparent contrariety to experience, treat us with a metaphysical hypothesis, where they are obliged to beg the question at the outset, and to take for granted the principal point in dispute, just as the scriptures are represented to do by the Right Reverend prelate. And matters being thus upon an equal footing as to proof, the Revivers think it more becoming the modesty of believers, to search the scriptures, than to consult Clarke and Baxter, or even the Right R. author himself, who have an equal chance of erring in following what they call the light of nature, as the Revivers, in following their experience, and depending upon the silence of the scriptures, supposing that to be the case.

In the mean time they who are conversant in the writings of the late learned Dr. Taylor, of Norwich, may perhaps be of opinion that he was full as capable to direct the studies of the R. R. author of the Divine Legation of Moses, as the latter was to prescribe a course of reading to Dr. Taylor.*

The R. R. Censor goes on. “So far as to

* “The late worthy Dr. Taylor of Norwich,” (says the above cited judicious Remarker on Mr. Steffe) “is called, *Another of these sleepers*, and a very sensible quotation from him has the following “*decent* reflection passed upon it. *This is the old exploded trash of* “COWARD, TOLAND, and COLLINS. And yet, I dare say, “his Lordship will think this writer as honourably classed in point of “authorship, with Coward, Toland, and Collins, as the bishop of “Gloucester would be, should some one ill-naturedly pleasant, and “availing himself of his Lordship’s decent expression, class his performance on this subject, with the old, popular—~~Trash~~—of God- “dard, Steffe, and Fleming.” Remarks. u. s.

“ the abstract truth. Let us consider next
 “ the practical consequences. Convince the
 “ philosophic libertine, that the soul is a qua-
 “ lity arising out of matter, and vanishing on
 “ the dissolution of the form ; and then see if
 “ you can ever bring him to believe the chris-
 “ tian doctrine of the resurrection.”

Convince him ! Why, my Lord, he is, ac-
 cording to your Lordship, already convinced,
 if he is an unbeliever ; for your Lordship sure-
 ly cannot have forgot what you so lately ad-
 vanced, viz. that “ the revivers of the doctrine
 “ of the sleep of the soul, hold that the soul is
 “ a quality, in common with unbelievers.”

Well, but he is convinced, and under that
 conviction will never be brought to believe the
 christian doctrine of the resurrection. Can the
 reader guess what may be his Lordship's true
 reason, for this ? No other, at the bottom,
 than that the resurrection cannot be proved, ei-
 ther scripturally or philosophically, but through
 the medium of the separate existence of the
 soul. For otherwise it would only be a natu-
 ral and necessary inference, that the power
 which first created, and afterwards dissolved
 the form, might reproduce it. And the form
 being reproduced, the qualities would be resto-
 red of course. Convince him, on the other
 hand, that this medium is the separate existence
 of a thinking, conscious, active substance, ca-
 pable of pleasure and pain to indefinite de-
 grees, and then indeed he might find insupera-
 ble difficulties in drawing the conclusion in fa-
 vour of the christian doctrine. But then his
 comfort would be, as it is at present, that there
 would be no occasion for it.

For we are told, “ While he held the soul
 “ to be an immaterial substance, existing as
 “ well in its separation from, as in its conjunc-
 “ tion with the body, he could have no reason,
 “ from the principles of true philosophy, to
 “ stagger him in the belief of the revealed doc-
 “ trine.”

He must then never have read, or never have understood those *true philosophers* CLARKE and BAXTER, who equip this immaterial substance with something besides a bare existence. They form very interesting speculations on this separate existence of the soul; on its consciousness, activity, perception of good and evil, in one word, on its capacity for as exquisite happiness and misery, as the mind of man can conceive. Is it possible that a man, with these convictions upon his mind, and who is taught to have no such convictions with respect to the material substance, should be able to see either a physical or a moral reason for the revealed doctrine? Since in the one view, all the ends of life are answered in the state of the separate soul, and in the other, all the ends of putting the man into a capacity of reward and punishment.

To help out his argument, the R. R. author cites 1 Cor. xv. 36. *Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die*, which, his Lordship informs us, “ is good philosophy,
 “ as well as good divinity. For if the body,
 “ instead of its earthly nature, were to have
 “ an heavenly, it must needs pass through
 “ death and corruption to qualify it for that
 “ change.”

Very well, we are obliged at length to have

recourse to scripture. And for my part I do not see where the Unitarians might not have argued in the same manner with his Lordship's Polytheist, and have told him, that St. Paul's doctrine, *To us there is but one God the father, of whom are all things, and we in him*, is good metaphysics, as well as divinity: and so have cut short the sophism at once, without risking the credit of holy writ in that wretched unsatisfactory account he gives of its testimony to this grand article, the UNITY OF GOD.

But indeed, I have observed, that when true philosophers, through some defect in their own sort of reasoning, condescended to quote scripture, it is commonly ominous, either to the scripture quoted, or to the merit of their argument. And thus in fact it is in the very case before us. *The grain that thou sowest* says the Apostle, *is not quickened except it die*. This the R. R. prelate, will have to be a philosophical argument, that the earthly body of man must needs pass through a state of death, to qualify it for its change into a celestial body. Whereas the philosophical reason of this change was what the fool demanded; and concerning which the apostle thinks fit to gratify him no farther, than by referring him to the case of the reproduction, of grain, which hath, as Le Clerc observes, “a resemblance of the resurrection of the dead, and is not less surprising;” but instead of giving him a philosophical account of this reviviscence, he refers him to the power and will of God, who *giveth it a body as it hath pleased him*. On another hand, the human body is sown in corruption and raised in incorruption; which is not the case

of the grain. So that though a philosophical account might be given of the reviviscence of corn, after its dissolution in the earth, upon the common principles of vegetation, yet would not this afford even an analogical reason why “the human body must needs pass through death, to be qualified for the change that is to be wrought upon it at the resurrection ;” for no principles of vegetation will account for such a change, and perhaps the R. R. author has the only head into which such an imagination ever made its way. It is in truth an hypothesis which is contrary to matter of fact. The translations of Enoch and Elijah, the transfiguration of our Lord, and what happened at his ascension, are sufficient proofs that there is no necessity, other than what arises from the power and will of God, that the human body should pass through death, to qualify it for a change of its earthly, into a celestial nature. Whether the R. R. author understood St. Paul, or chose to misrepresent him, let others determine.

“But,” continues this learned philosophical divine, “when this body died, what occasion was there for the soul, which was to suffer no change, to fall asleep ?”

It was but just now that the R. R. author talked of some *dreamers* who *defile the spirit*, and perhaps he may read in his own bible, that there is a *filthiness of the spirit*, as well as of *the flesh*, and it would not be easy to understand, how such a spirit can be purified and made fit to inhabit a celestial body, without undergoing some change. If then he will not permit this filthiness and defilement to be purged off in a state of sleep, I am afraid he will

find no expedient for the purification of these dreaming rogues, but to send their poor souls to purgatory. If he will not allow this filthiness to be an occasion of change, we should be glad to know how he would dispose of it without it.

“ But,” says the R. R. author, “ their sleep
 “ of the soul is mere cant, and this brings me
 “ to the last consideration, the sense and consistency of so ridiculous a notion. They go,
 “ as we observed, upon the Sadducæan principle,
 “ that the soul is a quality of the body, and
 “ not a substance of itself ; and so dies with
 “ its substratum. Now sleep is a modification
 “ of existence, not of non-existence, so that
 “ though the sleep of a substance hath a meaning, the sleep of a quality is nonsense.”

An author who, like this before us, is reduced to the necessity of quibbling upon mere words, is never employed with more satisfaction to himself, than in confuting nonsense of his own making. He has been called upon a thousand times to prove, that the Sadducees held the soul to be a quality of the body. This proof never appeared, and it is from circumstances in the sacred writings, next to certain, that the ascription of this doctrine, to the Sadducees is a mere forgery. And that the Revivers of the sleep of the soul hold that the soul is a quality of the body, depends entirely, in the R. R. author's chain of reasoning, upon the proof that the Sadducees held it so before them. Will not the candid and sensible reader be apt to think, that a writer who from such premises, fathers a nonsensical conclusion upon his adversaries, is lost to all feelings of modesty, and all sense of ingenuity.

They whom he calls the *Revivers*, &c. have over and over disclaimed the consideration of the soul under the abstract notions of substance and quality. What they affirm, is, that the scripture does not speak of the conscious survivance of any part of MAN between death and the resurrection. The state in which the scripture represents MAN to be in this interval, is a state of sleep. And this sleep being a scriptural term, there is no nonsense in the use of it ascribed to the Revivers, which will not bring the same imputation upon the sacred penmen, as will presently appear.

In the mean time be it observed, that when they make use of the term soul, to denote something distinct from, or independent on the body, it is in mere compliance with those ideas impressed upon the vulgar by the R. R. author and his partizans, meaning only to denominate that power of thought and action which results from the organization of the living man.*

“And,” continues his lordship, “if ever this soul of theirs re-exerts its faculties, it must be by means of a reproduction.”

Remember, kind reader, that this soul of theirs is but a quality, and yet, it seems, has faculties; and what is more, is a quality capable of exerting those faculties, and upon a reproduction may re-exert them. I wonder whose nonsense this is. Most assuredly not the Revivers’.

Well, but in order to this re-exertion, it

* One of them, namely R. O. has put in his caveat against being misunderstood on this head. “Whereas,” says he, “in several places scattered thorow the book” (intituled, *Man wholly mortal*) “the use of the word soul, may seem to some to imply that which I deny, let such know, it is for argument sake, not intending in the least any self-distinct being by it.”

must be reproduced. And what then? Why then, reproduction, and a mere awaking, are two different things, “and they may as well “talk of the sleep of a mushroom, turned again “into the substance of the dunghill, from “whence it arose, and from which not the “same, but another mushroom shall in time “arise.”

To make this comparison of use to the R. R. prelate, it must be supposed, that this departed mushroom is a non-existent; and that its non-existence is owing to its being turned again into the substance of the dunghill from whence it arose. But whatever the state of this dead mushroom is, the same must be the state of the dead human body, for that too is turned again into the substance of the earth from whence it was taken, and consequently ceases to be; and consequently again, to talk of the sleep of the dead body thus dissolved, is equally nonsense, as to talk of the sleep of a quality of that body.

“By no means,” will the R. R. author say, “for it is the same body that is to be restored, “but not the same mushroom.” But what is that to the intermediate state of dissolution? If the mushroom, upon its being turned again into the substance of the dunghill from whence it arose, loses its existence, so does the human body, upon being resolved into its kindred element, during which its component parts can be no more distinguished than those of the mushroom; and the selecting these from the common mass, and restoring the human form, is as much a reproduction, as the raising a different body from the same mass would be. So that we see this formidable objection ends at

last in a most ridiculous and contemptible logomachy, and that, very unfortunately for the objector, not without its share of nonsense. For the reproduction not of the same mushroom, or quality (which was reduced to non-existence) but of another mushroom or quality, (which never had existed) must be a curiosity indeed!

And thus he follows his blow. “In a word, “neither unbelievers nor believers will allow “to those *Middle-men*, that a new existing “soul, which is only a quality resulting from “a glorified body, can be identically the same, “with an annihilated soul, which had resulted “from an earthly body.”

Would the R. R. author be understood, that the substantial soul, which had heretofore been united to the earthly body, will be identically the same, when united to the glorified body? I pass by the enlightening idea of identical sameness. I only mean to ask, will the substantial soul undergo no change upon its reunion with the glorified body? If this is the converse of his lordship's proposition, I am afraid his lordship must have some altercation with Mr. Baxter, who talks of a limited or confined perceptivity of the soul, during its union with the earthly body, and of an enlarged life of the soul in its state of separation from it.* Baxter does not indeed tell us what the case will be when this soul shall be united to a glorified body. For having made the soul in a state of separation, a *pure percipient substance*, without any limitation or confinement, he

* Baxter, Vol. 1. p. 296. note (o).

might not see what purpose it would answer, once more to circumscribe its powers within any body however glorified; and from discerning the no necessity, might put a quære to the fact; as some people have supposed he really did.

But the orthodox have made us ample amends for this omission. They inform us, that “the
“souls of all the faithful, immediately after
“death, enter into a state and place of bliss,
“far exceeding all the felicities of this world,
“though short of that most consummate per-
“fect beatitude of the kingdom of heaven,
“with which they are to be crowned and re-
“warded at the resurrection. And so on the
“contrary, that the souls of all the wicked are,
“presently after death, in a state of very great
“misery, and yet dreading a far greater misery
“at the day of judgment.”*

Would it not be marvellous, if the soul, in passing through this progression from one degree of perception to another, and from less to greater happiness and misery respectively, should undergo no change? So that possibly the R. R. author might find as many difficulties with respect to the identical sameness of his substantial soul inhabiting an earthly and a glorified body respectively, both among believers and unbelievers, as the middle-men would do, even if they should suppose the soul to be only a quality.

But let us return for a moment to the R. R. author's proposition. “It will not be allowed,

* Bishop Bull, apud Chappelow, p. 49.

“ that a new existing soul which is only a
 “ quality resulting from a glorified body, can
 “ be identically the same with an annihilated
 “ soul, which had resulted from an earthly
 “ body.”

Why no, neither will it be allowed that a *Rochet*, which is only a quality resulting from an *episcopal* body, is *identically the same* with an *annihilated surplice* which had resulted from a merely sacerdotal body.

Where is the marvel that a new existing soul, should not be the same with an annihilated soul? And will not the proposition be equally true, whether the soul is considered as a substance or as a quality?

The truth is, the R. R. author did not understand his master, who states the case with which his lordship hath been puzzling himself and his readers, as follows:

“ If the soul be not a permanent substance,
 “ but only a quality or *crasis*, which, when
 “ the body dies, perisheth, and is extinguished
 “ with it, it is impossible that the same nume-
 “ rical man should rise after death, because
 “ the form or soul which perished, cannot be
 “ numerically the same, with the form or soul
 “ which is restored. For this is numerically
 “ another, because between that which perish-
 “ ed, and this which is restored, there inter-
 “ vened a *nihilum*, a non-entity. Now when-
 “ soever between two extremes, a medium of
 “ a diverse kind is interposed, those two can-
 “ not be numerically the same, though they
 “ may be the same specifically.”*

* See Bishop Bull's Sermons, published by Chappelow. p. 17, 18.

Now both the master and the disciple employ their reasoning respectively to prove, that the soul is a permanent substance, and not a quality of the body. And their medium is, the absurdity that a being which had been extinguished, or had perished, should ever be restored to the sameness which only would make it accountable in a future state. Why so? says the objector. Because, says the disciple, an annihilated soul cannot be identically the same with a new existing soul. And there he leaves us to laugh at his nugatory conclusion, therefore the soul is not a quality, but a substance.

But the master knew a little better what he was about; and he tells us, that if the soul is a quality, and is extinguished with the body, it is impossible that the same NUMERICAL MAN should arise after death, because the FORM or soul which perished, cannot be numerically the same, with the form or soul which is restored; and his reason is, that between the two extremes, of the soul extinguished, and the soul restored, there intervenes a medium of a diverse kind, viz. *A Non-entity*.

Here the master gives us some hold of his system, and we are enabled to reason with him upon his own principles, and proceed to observe, that if it is necessary that the same numerical man should arise after death, it is equally necessary that he should arise with the same numerical body. But this cannot be, except the body arises with the same numerical qualities with which it was endued before death. In which case the soul being, *ex hypothesi*, only a *quality*, or, if you will, a *crasis* of the body, must be numerically the same after the resur-

rection of the body, that it was before the death of the body. It will not at all avail this subtle schoolman to say an intervening non-entity will prevent this numerical sameness of the soul; for having grounded this on a general maxim, viz. that “whensoever between two “extremes, a medium of a diverse kind is interposed, those two cannot be numerically “the same,” we join issue with him, and say, the death or corruption of the body, is such a medium, interposed between the two extremes of life and motion, before death, and after the resurrection; and will as effectually prevent the numerical sameness of the body at its resurrection, as the intervention of *non-entity* will prevent the numerical sameness of the soul.

If he should say, that it is not necessary that the same numerical body should arise; we infer from thence that it is not necessary that the same numerical man should arise; for bishop Bull assures us in the very next page, “that “the body is an *ESSENTIAL* part of man, a constitutive part of that compounded thing which “we call man.”

Whether the R. R. author saw the dilemma into which his scholastic master had drawn himself, must be left to his own conscience, but this he certainly saw, that the term, numerically the same, would not do for his glorified body; and therefore substituted the idle tautological term, identically the same. And what has he gained upon those who hold the soul to be a quality by this expedient? Nothing, but that, as the glorified body cannot be identically the same with the earthly body, so neither can the qualities of the glorified body be identically the same with the qualities of the earthly body.

But the R. R. author and these middle-men must not part without a spice of his Lordship's humor.

“ Perhaps,” says his Lordship, “ as Hudibras
 “ had discovered the receptacle of the ghosts
 “ of defunct bodies, so these gentlemen may
 “ have found the yet subtler corner where the
 “ ghosts of defunct qualities repose.”

It was not well done of his Lordship, to laugh at poor Hudibras, whose discoveries were undoubtedly grounded on the theory of his Lordship's fore-elders in the same system, who, being not so subtle as his Lordship in finding out, that, death is no place but only a privation,* provided receptacles for the ghosts of defunct bodies; and Hudibras was not worse employed in endeavouring to ascertain the *ubi* of those mansions, than many wiser men. For the rest, the middle-men must of necessity fly to the excuse that Mr. Thomas Edwards makes for himself, in answer to a charge of dulness brought against him, by the facetious author of certain notes on Shakespeare; viz. “ every
 “ body has not the wit of the ingenious Mr.
 “ Warburton; and I confess myself not to be
 “ his match in that species of it which he
 “ deals out so lavishly in his notes upon all oc-
 “ casions.”†

And now, candid reader, hath the R. R. author of the *Divine Legation of Moses*, made out his case so clearly, as to acquire a right to throw out all this strange abuse upon a set

* Notes upon Hamlet. Vol. viii. Warburton's Edition, p. 142.

† Preface to Canons of Criticism, Edition 1758. p. 11.

of honest men, who certainly are no otherwise intituled to it, than because they differ from him? Do they, for believing all and no more than they can find in the scriptures, concerning a future state, deserve to be classed with *Polytheists*, *Infidels*, *Filthy Dreamers*, writers of *Trash* and *Nonsense*, *Middle-men*, men, I suppose, who are neither believers nor unbelievers?

There are in the world very serious and sincere christians, who think it of no great moment, whether a man believes that the soul sleeps, or is conscious, in the interval between death and a resurrection, provided a resurrection of the dead, and a judgment to come, are articles of his creed. The R. R. author himself hath acknowledged, that believers rest upon the supposition that the scripture takes the separate existence of the soul for granted, and he gives this for a reason why the doctrine is not expressly mentioned in the sacred writings. Have not the Revivers as good a chance of being in the right, in arguing from the silence of the scriptures, that the sacred writers owned no such doctrine, that they laid the whole stress of the argument, for a future state, upon the resurrection of the dead; and that all the silly jargon of the body's wanting a soul, or having a soul united to it, not numerically the same, deduced from the supposition of no separate existence, are sufficiently obviated by resolving the whole into the power and will of God.

Indeed the R. R. author's friend, Baxter, hath steered clear of all these absurdities, but it is only by keeping silence concerning the re-

union of the soul with a glorified body. Will the R. R. author be pleased to supply Baxter's deficiency, and inform us at the same time, why this admired orthodox philosopher was not more explicit, upon this important article of the christian faith?

To be plain with the R. R. author, a zeal like this which he exhibits, without any just provocation from the parties it is intended to scorch, looks extremely like the zeal of a proselyte endeavouring to wipe out every stain of his old exploded errors, by being proportionably warm in defence of his newly adopted opinions. Is it impossible?—Is it without all precedent, that a forgetive genius, foreseeing the obstructive consequences of an unpopular opinion, should vere about, even with some little violence to his own conviction, and embark in the more fashionable vehicle, in order to be wafted down the stream with safety and approbation to the haven where he would be? looking one way, while he is rowing another, and dealing out ill language to all who sail by him, whom fortune hath not favoured with so good a birth, or so respectable a fare as himself. But there are some people who can give dignity, as well as wit, to their Billingsgate; and these we must leave to the honours of their triumph, on the peril of being called before our betters, for degrading the importance of the principal figure. We now turn to another M. R. author of a more serious cast.

CHAP. XXVII.

Archbishop Secker's xvith Lecture on the church catechism. Unfortunate in his apologists for his education and intolerant principles. Defends the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, by the common hackneyed arguments of men of much inferior reputation. Places the soul in the head. Refers his Catechumens to their Sensibility for the proof of it. Not supported in this by Cicero, to whom he appeals. Inconsistent with himself concerning the sameness of the soul. Argues weakly on the difference between soul and body. His Grace's proof of a future state of rewards and punishments. From an earnest desire of immortality. From the capacities of the soul for higher attainments. Begs the question. Mistakes the meaning of the word Sheol. Argues weakly on a passage in Deuteronomy. At odds with Bp. Warburton concerning the omission of future rewards and punishments in the old testament. Suspected of wilful misapplications. Differs from ABp. Wake, on the article of Saint-worship. Cannot rid his hypothesis of the idea of a purgatory. Scaliger's satisfactory account of the doctrine of the early christians concerning the departed soul. His Grace seems to add a new article to the Apostle's creed.

1769. **A**RCHBISHOP Secker had been bred among the protestant dissenters of the presbyterian denomination ; and continued long enough a

member of their community, to have fixed his principles on their system both of doctrine and discipline ; for it does not appear that he left them till he was admitted a scholar of Exeter college in Oxford, in 1721, which, if he was born in 1693 or 94, must have been in the 27th or 28th year of his age.*

When Dr. Secker became Archbishop of Canterbury, his friends and dependants thought it necessary to represent, that his connections with the dissenters had been extremely loose and unconfined. For this purpose they asserted, “ that he never took presbyterian orders, or
“ offered himself to be a dissenting minister,
“ nor ever received the communion in any
“ other than the established church.†

There were however some persons living not many years ago, who pretended to remember, that one Mr. S——r preached a probation sermon to a dissenting congregation somewhere

* Never man had more miserable apologists than Archbishop Secker. Dr. Nowell had said in his answer to *Pietas Oxoniensis*, that his Grace “ was admitted Gentleman commoner of Exeter College in April 1721, being then 20 (instead of 28) years old.” The author of *Goliath Slain*, p. 39, is inclined to suspect, that this was a designed mistake of Dr. Nowell’s notwithstanding his correction of it in the errata, for reasons there given. What says Dr. Nowell to this ? “ So it stands,” says he, “ in the matriculation book, “ on the authority of which I inserted it,” and then he gives the extract from the said book, p. 50 of his 2^d. Edition. This indeed is exculpating himself but it is at the expence of his client. The matriculation book is a public record, in which we must, for the honour of the university, suppose the entries are made with the utmost exactness ; and the suspicion of falsification will naturally fall upon the person matriculated, who in the present case might be desirous of concealing from the Oxford men, that he had been so long a dissenter.

† Biographia Britannica, Vol. vi. Part. ii. Art. BUTLER [Joseph] Rem. [D] note (9.)

in Derbyshire,* which implied a design at least of engaging in the ministry. On the other hand, if his grace never received the communion among the dissenters, he must never have received it till he was 28 years of age, which has the appearance of an objection to the ordinance itself, rather than to the mode of administering it among the dissenters. And indeed his Grace's preferring the medical profession to the evangelical, has, more than once, been ascribed to scruples, wherein modes and forms were not the only things considered; concerning which nothing, I think, can be inferred, but that he did well to exercise his own judgment in chusing either his creed or his profession, and in rectifying his choice from time to time, as often as his conscience in the one case, or his prudence in the other, suggested to him that he had been mistaken, and had chosen amiss.

If indeed, after he had made his last option, he discovered an inclination to abridge others of that liberty which he himself had taken, it might be inferred, that his Grace had not been equally sincere in his several transitions, from one confession of faith, from one mode of discipline, or from one profession to another; and that human policy had a share either in some of his own conversions, or in his endeavours to enforce conformity upon others to that system in which he himself thought fit finally to set up.†

* Bolfover.

† It is to this last point that his grace's advocates should have confined their apologies and defences, and have denied, and, if they

Be that as it may, in his Grace's situation, it had surely been his wisdom to have kept his hand off paper upon all such points as are exceptionable only as they are not conformable to the common notions of men, who have no better reason for their attachment to them, than the mere reputation of orthodoxy, unless his Grace had abilities to support them, as his brother of G——r has attempted to do, in the way of paradox and buffoonery.

could, falsified the facts from which his Grace's intolerant principles have been inferred with high probability. Instead of this, what do they? Why, truly, to shew how fit he was to be Archbishop of Canterbury, they content themselves with proving how little he had been of a dissenter, and what is still more ridiculous, how little he had been of a surgeon. What would the world have cared for all that, if his Grace had worthily fulfilled the duties of a truly CHRISTIAN pastor at the head of a PROTESTANT church? Or who, in that case, would have objected to him, either his early education among the dissenters, or his medical designation? If it had not been objected to certain aspirants to the ministry (in vindication of a cruel expulsion, of which his Grace was supposed not to be unconscious) that they had been bred to mean occupations, I am inclined to think it had never been mentioned in print, that his Grace was *educated in the profession of a man-midwife*. [See *Pietas Oxoniensis*, 1st. Edit. p. 19.] But this secret having taken air, it then became necessary for his Grace's friends to say, something to it, to prevent the rigid canonist from being scandalized. Accordingly Dr. Nowell, in his answer to *Pietas Oxoniensis*, p. 49. ed. 2. exhibited a narrative said by him to be drawn up with the Archbishop's own hand, wherein it is acknowledged, that "his Grace had attended one course "of Lectures in Midwifry at Paris." This injudicious step, (which, by the way, was ascribed to his Grace's declining faculties) gave occasion to the shrewd and sensible author of *Strictures on Dr. Nowell's Answer to Pietas Oxoniensis*, to observe, "that there is, in a "course of practical lectures on Midwifry, more dirty work to pass "through, than is annexed to the business either of a weaver, barber, "or tapster." p. 38. His Grace having likewise certified, that "he "attended those lectures without intending to practice that or any "other branch of surgery," mention was made, from another quarter,

To go into a disquisition of the nature of the separate soul, with no other materials than the hackneyed ones, employed and blunted in the hands of every minute essayist, and frothy declaimer on the subject, must give suspicions, that his Grace was urged to the contest by no other motive than the expediency of supporting the system of the church at all events, suspicions but too probably confirmed by the feebleness of his Grace's operations in his 16th lecture,

of a latin tract, intituled, *De Partu difficili*, where the proficiency of the writer appeared to be far beyond the accomplishment of a man who had only studied that branch theoretically. What was all this to the public? And how invidious and impertinent would such reflections have appeared, if his Grace had lent a compassionate ear to the petition of Mr. Grove, one of the expelled students, or if in answer to a letter said to have been addressed to him by the expellers, his Grace had signified his disapprobation of their proceedings, which indeed were condemned by every true friend to religious liberty in the kingdom? [See, *Goliath Slain*, p. 66, and *A letter to Dr. Nowell* by the author of *Pietas Oxoniensis*, p. 40. 41.] Again, that his Grace was bred among the dissenters, had never been remembered to his disadvantage, had not his Grace required subscription and retractation, without any warrant or authority, with respect to opinions no otherwise censurable than as they did not agree with his own system. One of these cases related to the doctrine of an intermediate state, which had been controverted in print by a learned and ingenious gentleman, who had afterwards occasion to apply to his Grace for a dispensation in order to hold a second living. His grace's behaviour upon that occasion was such, that one of his advocates thought it necessary to apologize for it in a monthly magazine. The circumstances, though not unknown to me, I take not upon me to give. The worthy sufferer is still living, and best qualified to judge how far it is expedient, either to publish, or to suppress them. With respect to another case, I am not under the like restraint; and shall therefore give it just as it was transmitted to me. "When the late
 " Mr. W. a clergyman of Kent, came to the Archbishop for a dispensation to hold a second living, his grace took occasion to examine him upon the subject of miracles, with regard to their duration in the church after the days of Christ and his Apostles. Mr.
 " W. frankly told him his opinion, that miracles ceased after the

which indeed appear to be below the mediocrity even of Goddard, Steffe, Morton, and the rest of the lower class of writers, whose abilities could not be supposed to come in any competition with his Grace, if one thousandth part of what his panegyrists have said of his Grace's talents, were true.

His Grace's proposition is,—*That the souls of all men continue after death.** And his argument is thus exhibited.

“ We are every one of us capable of per-

“ times of the Apostles, and the spreading of the gospel through the
 “ Roman empire. The Archbishop would have it, that they conti-
 “ nued some centuries afterwards, and insisted on his retracting his
 “ assertion in a formal writing under his hand.” Now what au-
 thority had his grace from any part of the constitution of the church
 of England, for exercising this pontifical tyranny over the consciences
 of these two gentlemen, with respect to either of these points? Is the
 church of England explicit in any of her forms of doctrine, either
 concerning an intermediate state, or the duration of miraculous powers
 in the church after the days of the apostles? Indeed an inquisitor of
 heretical pravity in the church of Rome, would have an interest in
 plaguing and forcing retractions from men who thus sapped the
 foundations of purgatory and saint-worship, and the credit of those
 monstrous legends, by which these infamous craftsmen have their
 wealth. But nothing can be a greater reproach to the protestant church
 of England than to suppose she puts it into the power of any of her
 governors to lay down arbitrary positions in theology, under the notion
 of preserving orthodoxy, and then to vex and distress those who
 refuse to agree with them, and that from a conviction in their own
 minds, that such positions have no grounds either in scripture or
 reason. These indeed are inquisitorial features which strike through
 the thickest varnish his grace's ingenious biographers can plaister
 over his natural complexion. And after these manœuvres got wind,
 is it any marvel that it should be remembered, his grace was a
 proselyte, and one of that zealous sort who are eager to prove the
 sincerity of their conversion, by persecuting all who are less pliable
 to their politics.

* Lectures on the catechism of the church of England, published by Messieurs Porteus and Stinton, 1769. p. 248.

“ceiving and thinking, judging and resolv-
 “ing, loving and hating, hoping and fearing,
 “rejoycing and grieving. That part of us
 “which doth these things, we call the mind
 “or soul. Now, plainly, this is not the body.
 “Neither our limbs, nor our trunk, nor even
 “our head, is what understands, and reasons,
 “and wills, and likes, and dislikes: but some-
 “thing that hath its abode within the head,
 “and is unseen. A little consideration will
 “make any of you sensible of this.”

This is pleasant. To refer his audience to their *senses*, to understand the nature of an *unseen something* in their heads! For had his Grace been interrogated farther on this matter, he would, doubtless, have acknowledged, that the soul could no more be heard, felt, tasted, or smelled, than it could be seen. How then could his Grace suppose, that a little consideration should make any of them sensible of all this? His Grace does not depend even upon his own sensibility for the verification of his assertion, that this something of a soul has its abode within the head, but sends us to Tully's Tusculan Disputations, L. i. c. 29. where the speaker without alledging his own sensibility, or appealing to that of others, only says, he could bring reasons for his belief.* But if we

* Such reasons, probably, as Erasmus brings. *Amputato pede intelligit animus.—At qui vehementem plagam accipit, in tempus capitis, aut in occipitium, concidit mortuo similis, omnique sensu suo vacat. Ex hoc colligis intra cranium esse intellectus, voluntatis et memoriæ organa, minus quidem crassa quam aures et oculi, sed tamen materialia. Quandoquidem et spiritus quos habemus in corpore subtilissimos, corporales sunt.* Colloqu. PUERPERA. If by such experimental reasoning as this we are made sensible that the

are to take Cicero's bare word for the seat of the soul, why not for every thing else that he says about it? His Grace says, "it is not the body which loves and hates, hopes and fears, rejoices and grieves; that part of us," saith his Grace, "which doth these things, we call the mind or soul." Cicero however informs us, that the mind or soul, when separated from the body, will be destitute of these things, and consequently incapable of doing them; and

soul is seated in the head will it not follow, that the soul is material? Where shall we draw the line of distinction between *animus* and *intellectus*, as Erasmus hath here stated the case? If it be said, that it is the operation of the immaterial soul upon these material organs that produces the intellectual faculty, we may be permitted to ask, why the operation of the soul does not produce the same kind or degree of intellect, from the same sort of organs in brute animals? Erasmus himself, in the latter part of this colloquy, says, that the Aristotelic definition of the soul agrees equally with the soul of a brute, and the soul of a man; and he adds, as of himself, *ne ratione quidem distinguitur bovis ab hominis anima, sed quod boum minus sapit quam hominum; quemadmodum videre est et homines, qui minus sapiunt quam bos.* It will hardly be sufficient to say, that the organs themselves are dissimilar in brutes, and in men. "Anatomists," says an ingenious and able naturalist, "whether they consider the brain as an instrumental or efficient cause of intelligence, are agreed in acknowledging a great resemblance between the contents of the human cranium, and those of quadrupeds; and Putius hath proved, contrary to the opinion embraced by Pliny, and commonly received, that we have not that medullary substance in greater proportion than other animals." Dr. Watson's Essay on the subjects of Chemistry, p. 41, 42. Sensibilities of this sort, obliged a certain writer, not overforward to make concessions, to acknowledge, that "the same arguments which prove the immateriality of the human soul, prove likewise, that the souls of all living animals are immaterial; and this too," adds the learned man, "without the least injury to religion." Whereupon he was asked, what system of religion would be injured, supposing the immateriality of the soul could not be demonstrated? To which no answer hath hitherto appeared.

that the agency of the body is necessary in all these operations.* The same is the account given by others of the heathen writers, who, with respect to the separate soul, were in a very different system from that here adopted by Cicero. So Virgil;

Ignæus est ollis vigor, et cælestis origo
Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.
Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudentque, &c.†

By which account the soul derives all its passions and affections, all its feelings and sensibilities, from the organs of the body. Out of its union with the body, it will neither have fears nor desires, joys nor sorrows, love nor hatred. And hence again it follows, that the body doth these things as much as the soul. And his grace having deserted his masters in these points, ought certainly to have brought something more than his own *ipse dixit* in proof of his doctrine, lest others, making use of their own liberty as well as his Grace, should take a fancy to assert, that the seat of the soul is within the Thorax.

“ Then further, says his Grace, “ our bodies
“ increase, from an unconceivable smallness
“ to a very large bulk, and waste away again
“ and are changing each part of them, more or
“ less, every day. Our souls, we know, con-
“ tinue all the while the same.”

According to this account, the soul must be

* Cumque corporis facibus inflammari soleamus ad omnes fere cupiditates,—profecto beati erimus cum corporibus relictis, et cupiditatum et æmulationum erimus expertes. Ibid. c. 19.

† Æneid. VI. 731.

as much the same, during the unconceivable smallness of body, as when the body is grown to its most considerable bulk; that is to say, it must be equally capable at both periods of perceiving and thinking, judging and resolving, &c. When his Grace, however, found it expedient to give a reason why it was necessary to lecture his congregation, he thought fit to say, “We all come into the world ignorant “of the rules and doctrines of religion,” (and consequently of every thing else,) “because “our faculties are so weak at the first, and “gain strength so slowly.”* Now what faculties are these? Evidently, the faculties of that something which perceives and thinks, judges and resolves, that is, according to the Archbishop, the faculties of the soul. Either, therefore, his Grace must be mistaken with respect to the weakness of these faculties at the first, and the ignorance thence resulting, or the soul can no more continue all the while the same, than the body can, unless he would have said, that the soul continues the same with or without its faculties. Till this point is settled, all that his Grace advances concerning the sameness of the soul after the amputation of limbs, an universal palsy, &c. is nothing to the purpose, and implies no more than, that in those cases, the common sensorium is left sound and unhurt.

“And though,” says his Grace, “some diseases do indeed disorder the mind, there is “no appearance that any have a tendency to

* Lecture 1. p. 2.

“destroy it. On the contrary, the greatest disorders of the understanding are often accompanied with firm health and strength of body.”

On the contrary, indeed! Had his Grace employed himself to prove, that the body might continue after the faculties of the soul are extinguished, this instance would have been to his purpose. But how it should appear, from these circumstances, that the extinction of the faculties of the soul hath no tendency to destroy it, is just as hard to conceive, as it is, that the body, “in firm health and strength,” should be diseased.

Again. “The most fatal distempers of the body are attended, to the very moment of death, with all possible vigour and liveliness of understanding.”

Is this universally true? Is it true in any case where the brain is affected? But perhaps his Grace might reply, that the head is no part of the body.

Well, and what is the conclusion? “Since, therefore, these two are plainly different things, though we knew no further, there would be no reason to conclude that one of them dies, because the other doth.”

But if they were ever so plainly different things, (which his Grace hath not proved) unless his Grace could have proved that they were two things independent on each other, there is sufficient reason to conclude, that one of them dies, because the other doth.

“But,” continues his Grace, “since we do know further, that it can survive so many changes of the other, this alone affords a fair

“probability, that it may survive the great
“change of death.”

The value of which reasoning depends on this, that the body does not survive the several changes mentioned above; viz. its increase from smallness to bulk, the loss of a limb, or the stroke of a palsy. For what argument can be drawn in favour of the continuation of the soul, from a survivance which is equally shared by the body as the soul?

“But we can perceive no change in the
“soul at the time when the body dies; to ima-
“gine, therefore, that the soul dies with it,
“must be groundless.”

His Grace, indeed, had taken sufficient care that we should not perceive any change in the soul, at that time when the body dies, by inclosing it in the head, where it remains unseen. But however, the hardest skulls are penetrable, and some have been laid open pretty widely before the death of the body; and the contents of others have been examined after the death of the body, with great accuracy of investigation. In neither case could I ever hear the soul was discovered, or the seat which she had occupied. It is in vain to inquire after the changes of a being, of whose existence we can bring no proof. But his Grace himself hath cut short the dispute. The faculties of the soul, he allows, increase from weakness to strength, as well as the limbs of the body, and in union with it. And this being allowed, it is not a negative argument that will prove, the soul does not die with the body.

“Almost as groundless,” quoth his Grace,
“as if having frequently heard the music of

“ an organ, but never seen the person that
 “ played on it, we should suppose him dead,
 “ on finding the instrument incapable of play-
 “ ing any more. For the body is an instrument
 “ adapted to the soul.”

Is it so ? Then how should the soul play without its instrument ? The Organist, indeed, may find another instrument ; but I do not think his Grace meant to prove transmigration. Besides if any man doubted whether the hitherto invisible organist were dead, he might be made sensible of the contrary, by a sort of proof, which the soul-sleeper would hardly expect from the Archbishop, viz. the exhibition of the organist himself.

“ His Grace has no reason to imagine the
 “ soul made up of parts, though the body is,
 “ and the accutest reasoners judge, that what
 “ perceives and wills, must be one uncom-
 “ pounded substance, and consequently, can-
 “ not be dissolved, and therefore, probably can-
 “ not die.”

Tully therefore must be mistaken who assigns place to the soul ; if place hath parts, so must the occupant of place, and as his Grace hath adopted Tully's hypothesis, the acute reasoners, he mentions, would certainly tell him, he had by that adoption, precluded himself from the benefit of their conclusions.

Here his Grace leaves his arguments for the separate existence of the soul, and betakes himself to the proof of a future state of rewards and punishments, though he cannot, even here, make good his ground without having recourse to revelation. His business had been to ground his proof upon “ the nature of the soul, and

“ the earnest desire planted in our breasts of
 “ immortality, and a horror at the thought of
 “ ceasing to be.”

Should not his Grace have said, “ planted
 “ in our heads.” An orator might be indulged in a figurative expression. But when a metaphysical reasoner, changes his terms, he throws all into confusion, as here, it is something in the trunk, and not in the head, which desires and abhors, contrary to what is asserted above.

“ It is true,” says his Grace, “ we dread
 “ *also* the death of our bodies, and yet we
 “ own they must die ; and that they shall live
 “ again, wonderfully improved.”

True, but whence do we know this ? From express revelation. And if this had not been sufficient to satisfy our earnest desire of immortality, revelation would have been equally explicit in teaching the separate life of the soul, which his Grace very well knew it is not, though his Grace intimates by the word *also*, that we dread the death of our souls, as much at least, as the death of our bodies.

His Grace's next flourish is upon, “ the capacities in our souls, for vastly higher improvements both in knowledge and goodness, than any one arrives at in this life. The best inclined, and the most industrious,” says his Lordship, “ have not near time enough to become what they could be. And is it likely that beings, qualified for doing so much, should have so little opportunity for it, and sink into nothing, without ever attaining their proper maturity and perfection?”

It must here be supposed, that the soul has

these capacities distinct from, and independent on the capacities of the body, that improvements in knowledge and goodness are wholly the work of the soul, and that the inclination and industry to become what the soul could be, if it had time, have nothing to do with the body, even as an instrument ; and then the consequence must be, that the soul's attainment of its maturity and perfection, will be in a state of separate existence. For the reader will observe, that it is only want of time, in his Grace's account, that prevents its attainment of maturity and perfection in this state of being, a want of time, which is occasioned merely by the decay and mortality of the body. A system which precludes all notion of the resurrection of the dead, as necessary to complete the felicity, and accomplish the perfection of the compound man.

But now if, in contradiction to this wild and arbitrary hypothesis, you admit the body into a share of these capacities, improvements, and industry, so as to create ever so inconsiderable a mutuality of operation between them, the presumption will be, that the capacities of the soul must follow the fortunes of the capacities of the body ; as indeed is evident from the decline, and sometimes the almost total extinction of the human capacities of all sorts, in extreme old age.

What follows, retailing only the common topics, of proving a future state of rewards and punishments, from the present unequal distribution of them, and retailing them in so loose and rambling a way, as doth no great credit to his Grace as a writer, may be passed by ;

reminding myself and the reader, that his Grace's position being, that *the souls of all men continue after death*, we have no occasion to accompany his Grace in his excursions from that point.

His Grace attempts, p. 225, to rectify a wrong translation in our English bibles, Genesis xxxvii. 35, where the Hebrew word, *Sheol*, [in the Greek *αἶδης*] is rendered *the grave*; “as if,” says his Grace, “he [Jacob] meant to have his body laid by him, [Joseph,] that could not be, for he thought him devoured by wild beasts; it means into the invisible state, the state of departed souls.” Where we are to suppose, departed souls have time to improve their capacities to maturity and perfection.

To this fancy it will be sufficient to oppose the sentiments of the learned author of *Considerations on the Theory of Religion*. Appendix, p. 406, edit. 1765.

“These phrases, since they are used of the whole generations, [Judges ii. 10.] as also of men who led very different lives, or, which, in this case, comes to the same thing, different from their respective ancestors, (as in the former text, Gen. xv. 15,) and whose bodies were disposed of in a different manner, (as in the latter, Gen. xxxvii. 35,) or deposited in places very remote from each other (as in both cases) can only mean the general state of the dead; in which they are as often said to sleep with their fathers, &c.” which is seconded by the authority of Le Clerc, Whitby, and Barrow.* And yet, though this

* “I say further,” saith Barrow, “that this word [Sheol, or *αἶδης*] according to ancient use, seems not to signify the place whither

is so plain a case, his Grace scuples not to send whole generations, good and bad, wise and foolish, to this invisible state of departed souls.

“ In the time of Moses, “ saith his Grace, “ we find, that even the heathens had a strong “ notion of another life. For they had built a “ superstitious practice upon it, of seeking to “ the dead, and inquiring of them concerning “ things to come. A foolish and wicked cus- “ tom indeed ; but however, it shews the be- “ lief was deeply rooted in them.” Lect. xvi. p. 256.

But, if their belief was well grounded, where was either the folly or the wickedness of the custom ? The belief was founded on the principles of their theology and philosophy ; the same principles on which the Dæmon-worship of the Pagans was, and that of the papists is supported to this day. And Moses was wiser than to condemn the custom, and yet acknowledge the truth of the principle, which must have been, according to his Grace, the separate existence of the soul ; for I suppose his Grace would hardly allow, that these people inquired of a dead carcase, or that they had the art to bring up from the dead, the compound man. I consider therefore this as only an instance of that universality of persuasion, *that the souls*

“ men’s souls do go, or where they abide ; for that it can hardly be “ made appear that the ancient Hebrews either had any name appro- “ priated to the place of souls, or did conceive distinctly which way “ they did go.” Works, 1700 Vol. ii. p. 365. Le Clerc like- wise having commented on this passage with great learning and precision, concludes his notes thus. *Quid autem de eo aut statu, aut loco mortuorum crederet, Jacobus, nulla ex historiæ circumstantia satis certo excudere, neque ex eo quod ea de re sentimus, de ejus senten-*

of men continue after death, which his Grace insists upon, p. 258. as including the Jews as well as the gentiles. Whereas from this instance, it appears, that whatever some of the Jews, who were deluded by the doctrine of the gentiles, might believe, such of them as believed the doctrine of Moses, must have utterly rejected the principle, as well as the custom. And indeed with respect to the heathens themselves, his Grace must have been very little conversant with the philosophic writers among them, or he would hardly have made the parade he does with this universality, or have ventured to derive it by way of tradition, from God himself.*

As to the reasons his Grace gives, why there *tia, tuto judicare possumus. In loc.* "When a man dies," saith Whitby, "his life in the scripture phrase, is said to go down to *Hades*, "to the *Pit*, or into the house of silence and when he is snatched "from the gates of death, his life is said to be brought or lifted up from "Hades, or the grave.—Thus Jacob saith, Gen. xxxvii. 35. I "will go down to Sheol to my son, mourning, *καταβησομαι εις αδου*, I "will descend to Hell, saith the seventy, *lebi chebortha*, to the sepulchre. So Jonathan, that I may be in a state of the dead, as my "son is." On Acts. ii. 26, 27. These authorities could hardly escape his Grace's indefatigable diligence, and he surely should have said something to take off the weight of them, before he had imputed so gross a mistake to the English translators. That there are mistakes in our English translation of the Bible is certain, and some have thought them so numerous and so material, as to call for a new version. His Grace had influence enough with the most prejudiced to promote so necessary a work, and one would hope he had a better reason for suspending his aid and his interest towards setting it forward, than I have heard alledged by some of his Grace's admirers, namely, that the Epistles and Gospels in the Common-prayer book must be conformed to the new version, which could not be done without some alteration of the Act of Uniformity, and that must not be ventured on any account.

* See Cudworth's Intellectual System passim,

are no direct promises in the old testament of future recompenses, if his learned editors are disposed to abide by his account, I must leave them to the castigation of the author of the *Divine Legation of Moses*, who, though he is disposed to say, that the natural immortality of the soul was sufficiently known to be taken for granted, will hardly admit, that this was the case with future rewards and punishments, as his Grace asserts, p. 256.*

It would be too disrespectful to the character of a prelate who was at the head of our christian community, to expose his Grace's mistaken interpretations of scripture, in this 16th lecture. In these we charitably hope his will was not concerned. But the same measure of tenderness is certainly not due to willful misapplications, from which he can hardly be excused in some instances; as, when citing, 2. Tim. i. 10, he adds the word perfect; as if the christian revelation was given, as a certain writer hath expressed it, only *to hold the candle to the figments of philosophy*. Nor could his Grace be ignorant, with the text, 1. Pet. i. 8, before him, that *the joy unspeakable and full of glory*, there spoken of, hath no relation to an intermediate state, but to the rejoicing of the faithful in this life, on the assurance of obtaining the end of their faith, the salvation of their souls or lives. Nor is his Grace more

* "A Life to come," says his Grace, "is not mentioned in the laws of our own nation neither, though we know they were made by such as profess firmly to believe it." If this be true I am afraid his Grace did not sufficiently conform to the laws of his nation, as often as process was issued in his name, touching the soul's health of the party who was cited to answer.

fortunate in applying the *looking for of judgment and fiery indignation*, Heb. x. 27, to the wicked in an intermediate state of misery, when it so manifestly belongs to those *who sin wilfully after they have received the knowledge of the truth, in the present life*. These can hardly be considered in any other light, than that of *deliberate misapplications* for the purpose of giving a colour among the ignorant and unwary *Catechumeni*, to a favourite hypothesis.

Among other things which have been objected to the doctrine of an intermediate state, the countenance it affords to popish saint-worship, and the doctrine of purgatory, is not the least considerable.

His Grace, to reconcile his system with the negative of these two points, takes into consideration several texts of scripture, usually urged by the papists in proof of their purgatory, and among the rest, 1. Pet. iii. 18, 19, 20, on which his Grace thus comments.

“ *The spirits in prison*, to whom St. Peter saith, *Christ by his spirit preached*, he saith also, were the disobedient in the days of Noah, with whom his spirit strove, whilst they were on this earth, and who, for their disobedience, were sent, not to purgatory, but to a worse confinement.”

What was this *worse confinement*? His Grace informs us below, *they were*, like the devils, *delivered into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment*, which he makes to be the intermediate condition of *all* the wicked.

On this concession, the papist observes very shrewdly, that Christ would hardly preach to any spirits under an impossibility of their re-

ceiving benefit by his preaching, which must be the case of those who are irrevocably doomed to final condemnation. His Grace, in avoiding the proof of purgatory grounded on this text, gives a most disparaging idea either of the want of power, or a perverseness of will in the gracious Redeemer of the world. If he could not deliver these spirits from their prison, to what purpose should he preach to them, unless it were to insult them in their misery? Indeed his Grace, by granting this intermediate confinement, to which he supposed this text to be favourable, brought himself into a strange dilemma. Had he granted, that repentance, and consequently deliverance, might be the fruits of this preaching, a purgatory was the consequence; and this consequence he could not avoid, but either by insisting, that this text has nothing to do with intermediate confinement, which would be disparaging his hypothesis, or by giving up the efficacy of the preaching of Christ in a case, where Christ was on the benevolent errand of giving deliverance to the captives.

Again. "When many of the ancient christians," saith his Grace, "prayed for the dead, besides that they had no warrant for so doing, it was only for the completion of their happiness, whom they apprehended to be already in paradise; it was for the apostles, saints, and martyrs, for the blessed virgin herself, whom they certainly did not think to be in purgatory. And observe, if they prayed *for* them, they did not pray *to* them."

Archbishop Wake however, imagined the ancient christians had some warrant for pray-

ing for the dead; for he says, “if any one
 “will put up his particular requests for the
 “dead, for any of those ends for which the
 “primitive christians did, we [protestants]
 “shall not condemn him.” Dr. Secker must
 have allowed, that they had the warrant of
 tradition, of that tradition at least, which de-
 livered down to all mankind the uniform doc-
 trine of a separate existence of souls, which, he
 thought, came from God.

Dr. Secker mentions one only end which
 these christians had in view, when they prayed
 for the dead, namely, “the completion of the
 “happiness of those whom they apprehended
 “to be already in paradise.” But Dr. Wake,
 who appears to have known a little more of the
 sentiments of these ancient christians than his
 successor, assures us, that they had several ends,
 and among others, the end “of maintaining a
 “kind of fellowship and communion with
 “them,” and we know from other hands, that
 they prayed for those, whom they did not ap-
 prehend to be in paradise.

His Grace says, “the ancient christians cer-
 “tainly did not think that the apostles, saints,
 “and martyrs were in purgatory.” But this
 is not quite so certain; as will presently be
 seen. “And observe,” says his Grace, “if
 “they prayed *for* them, they did not pray *to*
 “them.” How then could they maintain any
 kind of fellowship and communion with them,
 as they proposed to do by the intercourse of
 prayer? Unless Archbishop Wake was mis-
 taken.*

* If one may not say without offence, that Joseph Scaliger knew
 the sentiments of the ancient christians better than either of these pre-

Every man who loves his country, must wish to see the great offices in church and state

lates, we may at least be permitted to observe, that he hath given a more particular account of them, which the learned writer will not, perhaps, be displeased to peruse in his own words. Omnes veteres christiani, etiam infra ætatem Augustini, (pudet me ignorantiae) putabant animas tam piorum quam impiorum, in centro terræ, tanquam in quodam conceptaculo expectare diem iudicii, quod Tertullianus eleganter dixit, *in candida expectare diem iudicii*, ut candidati magistratum ambientes expectabant suffragia tribuum aut centuriarum. Tertullianus quater profitetur eam opinionem in libris suis, nimirum eam quæ tunc omnium fuit super ea re. Augustinus vero amplissime in Enchiridio; *tempus quod inter hominis mortem et ultimam resurrectionem interpositum est, animas abditis receptaculis continet sicut quæque digna est vel requie vel ærumna, pro eo quod sortita est in carne dum viveret*. Neque aliter Lactantius, et alii omnes; prærogativam tamen dant martyribus, quos uno saltu recta in paradysum deferri volunt; et hoc beneficio usum latronem illum, cui dominus eo die condixit. Quid alias ineptias patrum majorum gentium dicam, quæ non doctorum ecclesiæ, sed ne cuiuspiam de vulgo christianitatis esse deberent? Ex eo errore sero tandem propagata est Christi καταβασις εἰς ἄδου; et quicquid inscitia bonarum literarum solet περιεσεσθαι in christianismo. Quum igitur ita animati essent de carcere animarum piarum, impiarum, magna incessabat eos homines sollicitudo carore suorum, qui jam defuncti, in ea loca penetraverant, super suspiriis et anxio desiderio quo putabant eos conflictari, expectantes in candida diem iudicii, ut cum Tertulliano loquar. Ita unusquisque satagebat pro fratre, patre, sorore defunctis, et annua in die [f. afferebat] pro illis, et, ut ait Tertullianus, adpostulabat aliquod refrigerium in die resurrectionis; quod refrigerium quale sit, ne ipsis quidem puto constabat: ita bonis in eo carcere male esse, ne ipsi quidem putabant, ut etiam testatur Tertullianus, pro malis autem orare, ne animum quidem induxissent, pro caris enim afferebant [f. offerebant]. Quater aut quinquies illius vesaniæ meminit Tertullianus; eosque locos ineptissimi homines non verentur hodie objicere, cum oblationem pro mortuis et fabulam πυρκαϊσθηρίου defendunt. Neque enim advertunt non posse se locos illos probare, quin statim et carcerem animarum piarum et impiarum probent. Præterea, illis omnibus locis Tertulliani, Cypriani, Augustini probatur eam oblationem ευχαριστικὴν, non λειψικὴν fuisse. Et ut ait Augustinus, *non erat præsidium salutis, sed humanitatis officium, quo nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit*. Et tamen cum ita scripserit, alibi aliter dicit, oblitus sui scilicet in re nugatoria, quam

filled with able as well as upright men. And it cannot but mortify a well wisher to the public, to find an eminent prelate at the head of our ecclesiastical polity, so strangely inefficient upon a point, without the establishment of which, so many of our public forms of doctrine and worship must lie under the suspicion of error and unscriptural decision. Some people perhaps may think his Grace had done wisely to have abstained from meddling with the subject at all. Be that as it may, he certainly had

consuetudine, non autoritate scripturæ poterat defendere. *Pro valde bonis, inquit, gratiarum actiones sunt, pro non valde malis, propitiationes sunt; pro valde malis, et si nulla sunt adjumenta mortuorum, tamen vivorum consolationes sunt. Hæc valde nugatoria sunt. Igitur veteres putabant annuâ die orandum aliquod refrigerium suis, quamdiu expectabant diem judicii in illis specubus terræ abditissimis. Sed antiquius, puta propius tempora Apostolorum, nescio an par dementia fuit, offerre pro refrigerio carorum.* SCALIGER. Not. in 1 Cor. xv. 29. But mad as this practice was, and nugatory as St. Austin's account of it may be, we are to consider, that these circumstances afforded the two Archbishops the only evidence they had, that the primitive christians believed the separate existence of the soul. Dr. Secker seems to have taken his cue from his predecessor Wake, as far as he safely could. Wake thought the practice of the ancient christians a sufficient warrant for any thing. Dr. Secker chose not to go along with him in this, at least not so far as the opinion would have carried him. And yet he no sooner leaves him, than he falls into the grossest errors. Scaliger, as may be seen above, knew that by Paradise, the ancients meant the state of supreme felicity, and that they lodged the penitent thief there, as well as the martyrs. And so knew Dr. Wake, and on that account says, "they were not supposed to touch at purgatory." But Dr. Secker makes paradise an intermediate, incomplete state of happiness, unconscious of that hidden central *conceptaculum*, in which the ancient christians confined the departed souls of good and bad promiscuously, and to which their *postulationes et oblationes pro refrigerio carorum* had respect. Nor indeed do these ancient christians, at least according to Scaliger's account, seem to have had any conception of any other intermediate state.

done wisely not to have attempted to add a new article to the apostle's creed, namely, *the Continuation of the Souls of all Men*, for which the two articles at the head of his xvith lecture afforded him not the least temptation.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Dr. Jortin's sermons, vol. 2. serm. 19. *What weight and force in the philosophical arguments for the natural immortality of the soul. How far the early christians espoused this doctrine. The doctor acknowledges the scripture evidence for it rises no higher than probability. Some texts examined. What was the doctrine of the Sadducees. More texts examined. The testimony of the fathers of the church. Weakened by what the doctor himself says of it elsewhere. The evidence of ancient liturgies considered. The doctor not clear as to the intermediate punishment of the wicked. Proposes a compromise. An intimation in favour of Transmigration. Dr. Jortin more ingenuous concerning the intermediate state, than other writers on that subject. The doctor's argument grounded upon the history of Christ's transfiguration, considered. The Psychopannychists not much beholden to Dr. Jortin. His elogium.*

WE are now to exhibit a writer of far superior abilities, one who was completely qualified to do justice to any subject he undertook to handle, and to whose remains a kind of vener-

ation is due, even though they are only the *scriniorum quisquiliæ*, which zealous friends to deceased geniuses sometimes expose to public view, with less judgment than affection.

Among the posthumous sermons of the late excellent doctor JORTIN, appears one, * upon Matth. xxii. 32. *God is not the God of the dead, but of the living*, which words, the doctor tells his audience, “were spoken by our
“Saviour,—with a view to establish the doc-
“trines of the soul’s immortality, a future
“state, and a resurrection.”

There is not, however, a word or a hint in the whole context, concerning the soul’s immortality; and the future state which our Saviour’s argument in this place, tends to establish, is that future state only, which is subsequent to the resurrection of the dead. But this by the way.

From these words, the doctor takes occasion to discuss two important points. “1. That
“the soul of man subsists after death, and
“hath some place of abode allotted to it till
“the resurrection.—2. “That this interme-
“diate state is, in all probability, not a state
“of insensibility to the souls of the righteous,
“but of thought and self-consciousness, and
“consequently of content and happiness in a
“certain degree.”

In the next page, the doctor thinks, “the
“arguments taken from the light of reason,
“and the nature of the soul, considered as an
“active, simple, uncompounded, immaterial
“substance, have much weight and force.”

* It is the 19th, of the second volume,

If so, it may be questioned before hand, whether the arguments tending to prove the allotment of a place of abode for the separate soul, have any weight or force. For these masters of reason who are so intimately acquainted with the nature of the soul, explain the words, *simple* and *uncompounded*, so as to imply *indivisibility*. But what is indivisible is without parts, and not an inhabitant of place.

In the second proposition, the doctor hath expressed himself with modesty and diffidence. He grounds it only on high probability, and limits the self-consciousness of an intermediate state, to the souls of the righteous. The reason of which will appear by and by.

Having stated the opinion of those who think differently from him, he says, “this is not a
“ novel notion, and the product of our inqui-
“ sitive times. It was espoused of old by some
“ christians, though rejected by a great majo-
“ rity, and condemned as an heretical doc-
“ trine.” p. 371.

I do not believe the doctor meant it, but without doubt his audience would take him to mean, “that a great majority of the ancient
“ christians condemned the opinion of the
“ sleep, or insensibility of the separate soul,
“ as an *heretical* opinion.” Whereas, indeed, ecclesiastical history affords but one instance of any public decision of the question, at least as far as ever I could learn, and that was in a synod assembled in Arabia, where Origen was present, and by his disputation, prevailed with those who thought, “*that the human soul died*
“ *and was corrupted with the body, and would*
“ *be restored with the body at the resurrection,*

“ to change their minds.”* It does not appear, that any condemnation of that opinion, as heretical, was pronounced in that synod, nor is it mentioned, whether it was determined to be erroneous on scripture principles, or on those of the platonic system, for which Origen was a zealous champion. As the orthodox Arabians had sent so far for Origen, to maintain a cause, for the support of which they found themselves insufficient, they could do no less than give him the honour of the victory.

On another hand, if Scaliger and a hundred others, knew any thing of the sentiments of the ancient christians, their opinion was, that the situation of departed souls was so far from being a state of content and happiness, in any degree, that it was a state of great anxiety, the state of candidates, expecting the day of determination with conflicts of hope and fear, what might be their final lot. Add to this, that their place of abode, the subterraneous receptacle of souls, received the good and the bad promiscuously, martyrs excepted, whom they sent to paradise at once. The consequence therefore, drawn in Dr. Jortin’s second proposition, must, among these ancient christians, have smelled of the faggot.

The worthy preacher acknowledges, that there have been wise and good christians, persons of piety and abilities, who, at different periods, have held those opinions mentioned to be condemned as heretical.—These men and their notions he is far from insulting.

As if there were any thanks due to any man

* Euseb. Eccles. Hist. Lib. vi. cap. 37.

for forbearing to insult wise, and good, and pious, and able men! Or might the doctor mean this as a gentle reproof to those choice spirits who have insulted them, some of whom had occasionally insulted himself? Let those, however, whom it may concern, take this in good part, return civility with civility, and forbear to insult the doctor, and then all will be so far even, unless perhaps the doctor might think, that his moderation in this matter was no ordinary favour to persons charged more lately, as well as of old, with holding an heretical doctrine; if that was his sentiment, these men may easily get out of his debt, by forbearing to shew (what undoubtedly they have it in their power to shew) how directly the doctor's hypothesis leads to purgatory, dæmonolatry, and other catholicisms of that venerable family.

“The intermediate state between death and the resurrection,” says the doctor, “is a subject of inquiry, upon which the scriptures have not said so much as one would wish.”

Undoubtedly *not so much as one would wish*, who is desirous to prove an intermediate state from the scriptures; much less, as *one* would wish, who thinks the dispensation of man's redemption from death, imperfect without it. This latter, indeed, is what the worthy doctor does not think; but as he must have wished to prove his propositions, the concession is at least fair and candid, and leaves room to suppose, that if the sacred writers had thought the doctrine either true or important, they would certainly have treated it more directly and fully.

It seems, however, they have said enough upon it to make it a doubtful point; and what

they have said, appears so favourable to the doctor's side of the question, that "he is persuaded the probability lies there." And this he goes on to shew from a set of texts which occur in the new testament.

As these texts have been hackneyed by almost every professed writer on the affirmative side of this point, and all of them differently interpreted by their opponents, we shall make only a few remarks upon some of them, relative to the proper use which the worthy doctor says may be made of them; and we will begin with his text:—Matth. xxii. 32. *God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.*

Now to make a proper use of this text, it would have been but fair to have mentioned, that there is a clause added to it, Luke xx. 38. *For all live unto him*, which conveys a very different idea of our Saviour's meaning, from what it appears to be as the doctor's text stands alone in St. Matthew's gospel, and shews to demonstration, that our Lord had here no consideration in his mind, of the separate existence of the soul.

The doctor himself hath observed, that "another living state of the same person, after this, and besides this present state, is as much as the word resurrection, * considered in itself, ever implies."†

This *living state of the same person*, then, must have been (if this observation is just) what the Sadducees denied; and as, without doubt, they considered the persons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as in a state of death, it

* *nevertheless.*

† P. 376.

would not be sufficient to prove to them, that their separate souls or spirits, were alive, though their bodies were dead, unless the future living state of their persons could be proved. The question was concerning the restoration of these persons, supposed by the Sadducees to be dead, to a living state. Understand the text in St. Matthew, as Dr. Jortin appears to have understood it, and it would follow, that the restoration in question would never take place. For one part of the compound person was agreed on all sides to be dead; and God, being not the God of the dead, the power of God would not be employed to restore it to a living state.

But take in the clause of St. Luke, and the solution and proof are clear. “All persons
“live in the account of God, however they
“may appear to be dead to you.” This is the solution, and for the proof, they are referred to the power of God, and the declaration of his will in the scriptures.*

* *Πάντες γὰρ αὐτῷ ζῶντι.* Solutio objectionis tacitæ. Atqui mortui tunc erant. Sane; sed vivunt quoad Dei potentiam, quæ potest mortuos vitæ meliori reddere. Ipse enim est *οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.* Grotius. See also, Wetstein in loc.—And Grot. in Gen. xxxi. 42. who, upon the words, [*Deus patris mei Abraham, et timor Isaac,*] says, Non dicit Deus Isaaci, quia vivebat adhuc Isaac, non cognominatur autem Deus a quoquam mortalem adhuc agente vitam. How far this observation may be depended upon, is doubtful; we find the expression is varied, Exod. iii. When Moses carried his message to the elders of Israel, he was to say, *The God of your Fathers*, v. 16. But when to Pharaoh, *The God of the Hebrews*. LE CLERC says, Quærentibus autem quare Deus, Isaaci potius quam Abrahami terror dicatur, nihil est quod reponamus, nisi forte Isaacum ita loqui solitum. *in loc.* He says, the Rabbinical account, that the fear of Isaac alludes to the terror he was in when going to be sacrificed, is chimerical.—Alludit ad pavorem illum, quo, quasi fræno, cohibuit Isaacum, ne collatam in Jacobum benedictionem revocaret. *Fun. & Trem.* in loc. which conjecture is not destitute of probability. But if Grotius's observation should stand good, our Saviour's argument ends in a conclusion strictly logical.

This clause indeed disables the doctor's text, as an argument for the separate existence of Abraham's soul; and makes the supposition quite unnecessary to the explanation of our Saviour's reasoning. For it is not at all material, whether his soul survived his body or not, if his person lived in the account of God, as that circumstance insured to it a restoration to a living state at an appointed time.

“The Sadducees,” says the Doctor, “held, “that the soul was material and mortal, or rather, that a man was nothing more than a living thinking body, who entirely perished when he died. Upon this system of theirs a resurrection was indeed an impossibility, and a mere contradiction. It could only be a new creation of a new creature, which could have no relation to the man that was dead and gone.”*

The bishop of Gloucester tells us on another hand, that the soul, according to the Sadducees, was only a quality of the body: and he tells us this with confidence. Dr. Jortin is diffident and uncertain, whether the Sadducees held that the human soul was material and mortal, or whether they held a man to be nothing more than a living, thinking body; that is, without any soul at all. Dr. Jortin, I dare say, will be allowed by all competent judges, to have known as much of the matter as Dr. Warburton. But Dr. Jortin's conjectural expressions in this passage shew, that he was far from being certain what was precisely the system of the Sadducees. What the other knew of the matter, the reader has already seen.

Doth it not seem then to have been a want of candour, or a want of consideration, that disposed the doctor to say, “ that some interpreters had misunderstood the text, *I am the God of Abraham, &c. for want of attending to the principles of the Sadducees*, against whom he argues,”* when he himself is uncertain what these principles were?

The principles of the Sadducees are thus represented in the scriptures. *The Sadducees say, there is no resurrection. The Sadducees deny that there is any resurrection. The Sadducees say, that there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit.* That is to say, (that we may keep to the doctor’s interpretation of *αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ*) the Sadducees denied that *there would be another living state of the same person.* This therefore must be the point which our Saviour intended to prove, and to this proof interpreters apply our Saviour’s argument ; and make his conclusion to depend, as he does himself, upon the *scriptures*, and the *power of God.*

“ For,” continues the preacher, “ if his reasoning had been so subtle as they [these interpreters] “ have made it, the common people who stood by, would hardly have felt the force of it. But they perceived clearly from the text, as it was explained by him, that the holy Patriarchs—were still alive after the dissolution of their bodies, and they knew that this was an effectual confutation of the Sadducean notion, that there was no life besides the present, and that death put an end to the whole man.”†

* P. 375, 376.

† Ibid.

But if this was the way in which the common people understood our Saviour's argument, they would understand:—1. That there was no such thing as death. 2. That the body was no part of the person. 3. That the *αἰσθησις* of the patriarchs, the other state of life besides this present state, was not future, but a state of which the patriarchs were in actual enjoyment: and consequently, that there would be no other resurrection.

But then would they not wonder what our Saviour meant by talking of the resurrection of the dead, and of what men will or will not be capable, when they shall arise from the dead.* And, lastly, why he should offer the case of Abraham, &c. as an argument of a resurrection from the dead?

The Bishop of Gloucester, indeed, cuts this last Gordian knot with one nimble stroke of his critical scymitar, by saying that our Saviour's words. *Now that the dead are raised*, is not the proposition he meant directly to prove, but only the exordium to an indirect proof.

But if Dr. Jortin had any objection to the subtlety of an argument, I think he hardly would have adopted this interpretation. Besides, even this indirect argument, as Dr. Warburton manages it, ends in a proof of a resurrection of the dead at some time. A point to which Dr. Jortin's reasoning, I humbly apprehend, will not lead us. For thus he goes on.

“ It hath been said of our Lord's argument,
“ that it proves rather the permanency of the

* Mark xii. 25.

“ same person, and the life of the soul, than
 “ the resurrection of a dead man, according to
 “ the common notion of that word.”

Whoever said this, meant it, I conceive, as an objection to our Lord’s argument as exhibited by Dr. Jortin. This therefore is inaccurately expressed. The Doctor’s explanation is denied to be our Lord’s argument; the argument is his own, and he must support it as well as he can. Here follows his answer.

“ But, first, his argument was fully sufficient
 “ to confute the Sadducees with whom he had
 “ to do. And secondly, another living state
 “ of the same person, after this, and besides this
 “ present state, may justly be called a resur-
 “ rection, and is as much as the word resurrec-
 “ tion, (*ἀνάστασις*) considered in itself, ever im-
 “ plies.”

True; but the question was not concerning the meaning of the word *ἀνάστασις* considered in itself, but in connection with the word *νεκρῶν* and *ἐκ νεκρῶν*, which means a living state succeeding a dead state.

If our Saviour’s argument had tended to the conclusion Dr. Jortin draws from it, he would have said, *ye do err not knowing the nature of the human soul, nor the meaning of the word resurrection.* The clause added by St. Luke, but unnoticed by Dr. Jortin, affords a full solution of all the Doctor’s difficulties on this text, and a full confutation of his interpretation of it, *for all live unto him*, and St. Paul’s doctrine on the subject is preferable to his. *None of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die unto the*

Lord; whether therefore we live or die, we are the Lords. For this end Christ both died, and rose and revived, that he might be Lord both of the dead and living. Which clearly shews in what sense, *God is NOT the God of the dead.*

Our Saviour says, *Matth. x. 28. Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both body and soul in hell.*

Upon this text, Dr. Jortin thus argues, “ If
 “ the soul hath such a necessary dependence
 “ upon the body, that when this dies, that dies
 “ with it, then, he who kills the body, would,
 “ with the same stroke, kill the soul also. But
 “ our Saviour tells us, that this is impossible,
 “ because the soul remains after the dissolu-
 “ of the body, and is out of the reach of human,
 “ or of created power*.”

But our Saviour gives no such reason, nor meant to give it; for, on another occasion, he supposes it possible for human or created power, *ψυχὴν ἀπολεσθαί*; as Luke vi, 9. *ἐξέρχαι τοῖς σαββάσι — ψυχὴν σῶσαι, ἢ ἀπολεσθαί.* Where the question is concerning what is or is not lawful, the possibility of doing either is taken for granted. In Mark iii. 4. it is *ψυχὴν σῶσαι ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι*, and so is the reading in a great number of copies of Luke, both printed and Mss.

Our translators thought to avoid the contradiction, by translating *ψυχὴν*, Matth. x. by the word soul. But other translators had an equal right to render *ψυχὴν* in Mark and Luke by the same english.

It ought to have been translated by life, in

both places, and then in opposition to *σωμα*, Matth. x. 28, which means in many places, the present life, it would only denote the future life, to which the whole person was to be restored at the resurrection.*

But Dr. Jortin objects to this. “ If it be
“ said that our Saviour means the utter and
“ eternal destruction of the soul, which no
“ one can effect, because God hath promised
“ us a resurrection to a second life, this would
“ be a mere shift to avoid the force of a plain
“ text.”

The text became plain to Dr. Jortin, by his ascribing to our Saviour a reason why the soul could not be killed, taken from his own ideas of the nature of the soul, for which we say he had no authority. As to the *shift*, I do not know but St. Luke may come within his reprehension as well as other commentators, for he too avoids the force of the plain text of St. Matthew, by referring only to a future life in general.

The doctor goes on, “ for in this flat and
“ far fetched sense our Lord might as well
“ have denied, that men can kill the body,

* The French translation of *Mons* (by the Jansenists) give Matth. xiv. 25. thus, *Car celui qui se voudra sauver, se perdra ; et celui qui se perdra, pour l'amour de moy, se sauvera.* And then add this sensible note. *Il y par tout icy le mot d'AME. Qui voudra sauver son AME, &c. Mais le mot, selon la phrase Hebraïque, signifie la personne meme, comme, il paroist par St. Luc. xviii. 33 ; et ce que dit Jesus Christ, est fondé sur ces deux manieres de se sauver, et de se perdre ; l'une temporelle, et l'autre eternelle.* They might as well have put this note to the margin of Matth. x. 28 ; but for the fear of throwing cold water into purgatory, and of irritating such wasps as Maimbourg and Mallet.

“ knowing ourselves to be the same persons
 “ that we were before.”

Undoubtedly there was a sense in which our Lord did deny this. “ For,” (to use the words of a certain writer on this subject) “ I suppose
 “ Dr. Jortin himself would not have made the
 “ difference here intimated, between the power
 “ of God, and the power of man, to consist
 “ in the circumstance of destroying a dead
 “ carcase in hell*.”

The author just quoted, hath given particular answers to all Dr. Jortin’s interpretations of the texts he quotes, and to that author, I shall refer the reader for a farther detail, just noting a few inconsistencies in the doctor’s said interpretations, both with respect to his own positions, and the plain sense of other scriptures.

1. He brings these texts to prove an intermediate state of the separate soul of man, in some place of abode, allotted to it till the resurrection, which place of abode he supposes to be different from, and inferior to the state of supreme felicity allotted to the persons of good men after the resurrection.

To prove this, he brings, among other texts, Stephen’s invocation, our Saviour’s promise to the penitent thief, St. Paul’s extasy or trance, the same apostle’s willingness to be absent from the body, &c.

“ Paradise,” says Dr. Jortin, “ means not
 “ the kingdom of heaven, but the place of the
 “ good” [souls] “ after death and before the
 “ resurrection†.”

* No proof in scripture of an intermediate state of happiness or misery between death and the resurrection, p. 20.

† P. 373.

1. Now, if Stephen's prayer was heard, his soul was certainly received into the kingdom of heaven, far beyond the paradise of Dr. Jortin's separate souls. For *he saw the heavens opened, and Jesus standing at the right hand of God*; and to Jesus in that exaltation, he put up his prayer.

2. To ascertain *where* the penitent thief was with our Saviour *that day*, we should know where our Saviour's soul was between his death and his resurrection. But, in that interval, our Saviour *went to the Father*, John xvi. 16. Either therefore paradise was a place of supreme felicity, contrary to Dr. Jortin's notion, or we must place the Father in the inferior mansion of separate spirits.

3. St. Paul was taken up into paradise, but *whether in the body, or out of the body, he could not tell*. Paradise, therefore, for any thing this apostle knew, might be a receptacle for bodies as well as souls.

4. The same apostle was *willing to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord*. If this absence means a state of separation of the soul from the body, the apostle must have contradicted himself, for he was *not* willing to be *unclothed*, viz. in a state of separate existence of the soul only, but cloathed upon, viz. with a glorified body, that *mortality might be swallowed up of life*. Hence it appears, that the immortality of the unclothed or separate soul, is a mere pagan dream.

The rest of Dr. Jortin's comments are liable to equal difficulties when contrasted with those

plain texts which refer all future life to the resurrection of the dead, as may be seen in other places. Here therefore we drop our remarks upon his interpretations, and think it needless to consider what texts he brings in support of his second proposition, as if the separate subsistence of men's souls after death, and that some place of abode is allotted to them till the resurrection, may be proved, we shall make no scruple to allow, that they may subsist in such abode with as much thought and self-consciousness, as the doctor might be pleased to ascribe to them.

To these probable authorities of scripture, the doctor adds the testimony of the fathers of the church, who lived in or near the times of the apostles, who, he tells us, “were unanimous in this opinion, and persuaded that the soul of every man upon the dissolution of the body, died not, but had a proper place to go to, and accordingly this doctrine is to be found in the most ancient christian liturgies.”

It is impossible for a reader of this sermon, who has likewise read Dr. Jortin's remarks on ecclesiastical history, not to recollect what that excellent man hath said of the authority due to the fathers of the church.* The worthy preacher foresaw, comparisons might be made to the disadvantage of the testimony to which he here appeals. He therefore puts in a seasonable caveat in these words.

“This is an argument of weight; for though we are not obliged to adopt all the notions or reasonings which are to be found in the

* Remarks on Eccles. Hist. vol. ii. p. 163. ed. 1752.

“ primitive fathers, yet a due regard is to be
 “ paid to their testimony concerning doctrines,
 “ which they deliver as received by the church
 “ in their days.”

And of this we shall readily allow the most ancient christian liturgies are competent evidence, even as the liturgies of the papal church are evidence, that the doctrine of purgatory is received by that church in these days.

The proof from these *most ancient liturgies*, of the point in question, arises from the forms of prayer in which there is a commemoration of the dead, and a supplication that they may *rest*, who died in the peace of the church.*

Now, I apprehend, it will be a considerable diminution of the weight of this argument, that the most ancient of these liturgies is many years posterior to the times of the apostles. And if the compilers of them introduced doctrines for which they had no apostolical authority, the consent, or unanimity of the church or churches, which received them, will only argue, that these primitive fathers began very early to dogmatize from their own imaginations, and had the address to bring the congregations where they presided, into their particular sentiments.

If Dr. Jortin meant this for no more than an additional weight in the scale of universal consent, we think it sufficient to say, that traditional opinions, derived from education, &c. &c. are of little more value than popular pre-

* *Consuetudinem esse vetustissimam, ut in publicis ecclesiæ precibus commemoratio fiat defunctorum, et quies illis petatur a Deo, qui in pace ecclesiæ sunt mortui, pauci hodie ignorant.* Casaubon. *Epist.* 838. p. 501. ed. *Almeloveen*, 1709.

judices. They send us back indeed to their original authority, and by the value of that they must be estimated.

For the commemorations of, and prayers for the dead in these ancient liturgies, the compilers of them had no authority from the apostles, or apostolical times.* The first christians we are told, equipped their oratories in the manner, and with the furniture of the Jewish synagogues, † and no doubt, borrowed many of their liturgical forms from them. ‡ Whoever will be at the pains to peruse Vitringa's dissertation, *De Statu Ecclesiæ Christianæ, a Nerone, ad Trajanum*, will easily perceive, how little the fathers of the christian church, who lived during that interval, were likely to compose liturgies. Dr. Jortin knew this as well as Vitringa, and should not therefore have appealed to ancient liturgies, as containing the testimony of men *who lived in or near the times of the apostles*.

We are now arrived at the proof of the worthy preacher's second proposition, viz. "that
"the intermediate state is a state of thought
"and self-consciousness, and consequently of
"content and of happiness in a certain degree."

The doctor says, "as we find many intima-

* Licet fateatur rex, hanc consuetudinem antiquissimos auctores habuisse, a principio tamen, et temporibus apostolicis, unde omnis ecclesiæ antiquitas repeti debet, sic factum esse, nemo ad hanc diem potuit probare. Casaubon Epist. u. s.

† Bohmer, *Dissertationes Juris Ecclesiastici*, Dis. 2. § x. p. 46.

‡ The Jewish writers never mention their ancient prophets, without adding, *qui in pace quiescat*. See Vitringa, *Observ. Sacræ*, vol. ii. p. 846.

“ tions in the scriptures concerning this [intermediate] state of the good, and hardly any concerning the state of the bad, I shall confine my inquiries to the former.” *

“ He thinks it probable however, that the disquiet of the wicked, [in an intermediate state] if they feel any, will arise, not from punishment, but from the expectation of it, which is the natural result of a guilty conscience, and is indeed a most disconsolate and miserable situation.”

Divines, who think it absurd to suppose, that the final punishment of the wicked will be by material fire, suppose this *most disconsolate, miserable situation*, will be *all* the punishment to which the wicked will be doomed at the last day; which, added to the reflection that they are for ever shut out from the presence of God, will be sufficient misery, without the expectation of a farther punishment.

The doctor, however, thinks, there is a farther punishment allotted for them, for which this intermediate situation is only a state of reservation. And having stated this theory with respect to the wicked, he goes on thus.

“ And, for the same reason, it is likewise to be supposed, that the souls of the righteous receive not their proper and intended reward before that day, and that they rest in the joyful expectation of it.”

For what same reason? namely this, “ that the last being always described to us as the time of trial, sentence, and condemnation of the wicked, this induceth us to think, that

* Sermon, p. 378.

“such actual punishment will not be inflicted upon them before that time.”

If then this reason has any weight, all the doubts which the doctor forms concerning the feelings of the wicked, will incumber his hypothesis of a state of intermediate happiness for the good; for the last day is equally described to us, as the time of trial, sentence, and acquittal of the righteous, as of condemnation of the wicked.

In a note, p. 386. the doctor offers the soul-sleepers a compromise in this matter, “by allowing, that whilst the good enter into a state of peace and comfort, the wicked are properly condemned to an insensible condition till the last day calls them forth.”

“He would not however, have the wicked flatter themselves with the vain hope of sleeping to the day of judgment. If it should be so, the senseless interval will not in reality remove the fatal hour, but death and the resurrection will seem to them closely united together.”

But the very same consideration is offered to the righteous, as no discouragement or cause of discontent, even though they should sleep to the last trumpet. For, “in a sleep without sensation, be it long or short, the interval is as nothing.—It is like closing the eyes, and opening them again instantly.”

A state of expectation is a state of anxiety at least, if not of painful suspense. *Joyful expectation*, for the space of some thousands of years, is an idea of which the human mind can have no conception in its present connection with the body. They who preach up an inter-

mediate state, as a topic of consolation, and encouragement to the good and virtuous, should be able to give a good account “how, “and in what manner the soul acts, whilst it is “deprived of the body,” and not pretend to plead ignorance, whether it acts “by its own “natural powers, or by more subtle material “organs and instruments fitted to its separate “state.”* While this is left uncertain, and even inexplicable, their hearers will rather turn to the soul-sleepers, who encourage them to hope, that no interval more perceivable than the twinkling of an eye, will pass between their falling asleep, and being put in possession of supreme felicity.

We must not pass by a conjectural hypothesis of this incomparable writer, who had the art to recommend an hundred things to our serious attention, which a clumsy, confident, paradoxical adventurer would make perfectly ridiculous.

The passage occurs in a note, vol. i. sermon ix. p. 185. I shall transcribe it.

“What if we should suppose, that the souls
“of brutes are spirits who have misbehaved
“themselves in a former state, and are impri-
“soned in those bodies by way of punishment?
“You will say, perhaps, that punishment ought
“to be attended with a consciousness in the
“intelligent agent, that he suffers for passed
“transgressions. But how do you know that
“they have not this knowledge? And suppo-
“sing that they have it not at present, yet
“they may in another removal to another
“state, retrieve their consciousness and remi-
“niscence.”

* Sermon, p. 379.

This is offered by way of solving a difficulty in our present system, viz. why brutes, which being no moral agents, can have no demerit, should be subject to so much misery and suffering as falls to their lot in the present state of things.*

With this question we have nothing to do. Let the Cartesians look to it. We have only to consider what effect this supposition would have upon our author's compromise in the sixth sermon, vol. ii. under consideration, and upon the reason given for the intermediate misery of the wicked during their state of reservation, supposing their consciousness to remain.

The compromise is evidently offered through an apprehension, that the unhappy state of wicked souls in a conscious intermediate state, might look too like punishment, and imply a double condemnation, and a double punishment for the same transgressions. But this hypothesis of transmigration is inconsistent, either with the doctrine of an intermediate sleep, or with the sentence of the last judgment, as stated by the preacher in the sermon we have been examining.

If, by allowing consciousness to the imprisoned spirit, we determine this transmigration to be a real punishment, we must suppose it to supersede any future sentence at the last day. and if you admit a suspension of consciousness and reminiscence with respect to

* There are texts of scripture which seem to suppose a moral agency even in beasts, as where the blood of man is required at the hand of every beast. Gen. ix. 5: or at least where a respect is had to their innocence, as Jonah iv. 11. where the cattle seem to be reckoned among the infants, on whose account, as unconscious of good or evil, Nineveh was spared.

former transactions, yet the imprisoned soul must have some present sensibility of its sufferings in the brutal body, or the idea of punishment vanishes ; and such sensibility being admitted, there is no room for the compromise proposed above.

It has been observed in the course of this controversy, that writers on the behalf of a conscious intermediate state of the human soul, have been extremely shy of determining, what becomes of the separate souls of the wicked ? Calvin declared he would have nothing to say to them. Others have slipped them over without mention. And purgatory had stared in the face of every one of those zealots who disposed of them in an intermediate state of suffering. These last however could not avoid accounting for their notion by a parity of reason, with respect to the intermediate state of the righteous. And so far they are honest ; for a parity of reason there must be, whether the doctrine of a separate existence is contemplated in a moral, or a natural view.

The innate candour of Dr. Jortin has brought this part of the subject upon the carpet, in every view that can be taken of it, and he hath admitted a parity of reason, in deferring the complete happiness and misery of the righteous and the wicked respectively, till the last day. But he seems to have seen clearly, that by admitting the same parity of reason into the doctrine of the separate existence of the human soul, either a double punishment of the wicked, or something of the purgatorial kind must have been the inevitable consequence. And for this reason it was, that he was for compound-

ing the matter. Even his hypothesis of transmigration will admit of this parity of reason. For it is possible to suppose, that there may be innumerable animals which live and die without any of those sufferings to which others of them are subject; and why may we not suppose, that these are the receptacles of the spirits of the good, who, by this means, pass their time in ease and innocence, and even *in delight and happiness in a certain degree?*

Upon the whole, notwithstanding the superior talents of this great and good man, notwithstanding his strong attachment to the side of the question he espouses, we must be obliged to acknowledge, that his reasonings and interpretations have decided nothing, and that he hath left the controversy just as he found it.

Upon looking a second time over Dr. Jortin's sermon, I find there is a passage quoted which has not usually been brought in proof of a separate existence. It is the history of our Lord's transfiguration, "at which time the Evangelists inform us, Moses and Elias came and conversed with Jesus, and were seen and heard by those disciples who were present."

"As to Elias," says the preacher, "he died not, but, like Enoch before him, was taken up into heaven. But of Moses it is written, that he died and was buried. This account therefore, is a fair intimation, that good men continue to live and to act after they are released from this mortal body."*

But, 1. The death and burial of Moses is spoken of in such mystical terms, that there is

* Sermon, p. 385.

sufficient room to believe, that he was not released from his mortal body, as others are released. Josephus says, that though it is said in the sacred writings, that Moses died, yet he was certainly taken sway in a cloud, while Eleazer and Joshua were conversing with him, and conveyed into a certain valley ; and he says, the account given in Deuteronomy of his decease, was to prevent the Jews from presuming that he was *gone to God* [or become a divine being] upon account of his virtue.*

Le Clerc asks why it should be more dangerous for the jews to believe the divinity of Moses, than of Enoch and Elias, whose translations are related without reserve ? A very plain answer might be given to this question, if it were necessary, from the state and circumstances of the Jews at these several periods. But Le Clerc may be interrogated in his turn.

“ Upon the words, *No man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day*, Le Clerc says, *Ne scilicet ad ejus monumentum adoratum irent.*† Why was not the same caution used with respect to the monuments of Abraham and David, for whom the Jews had perhaps, the same veneration they had for Moses ?

2. Whatever was the condition of Elias on this occasion, the same was that of Moses. Luke says of them, that they *appeared in glory*.

* Antiq. Lib. iv. cap. viii. sect. 48. p. 176, Edit. Hudson.

† In Deut. xxxiv. 6. Grotius mentions, upon the authority of Origin and Epiphanius, a book intituled *Αναληψις*, or *Περί Αναληψεως* [*Μωυσεως*] of the *Assumption of Moses*, from whence he thinks Clemens took a certain narrative in his *Stromata*, which probably, in its turn, gave occasion to the curious things we read concerning the *Assumption* of the blessed Virgin.

Upon which Le Clerc notes, *C'est-a-dire, environnez de l'eclat, et de la Majestè qui accompagnent les corps glorieux, dans le sejour de la beatitude eternelle.* It was never doubted whether the children of the resurrection could live and act in glorified bodies, or not. The question is concerning separate souls, after the mortal body is put off, and before the glorified body is put on.

3. It is therefore hardly a fair intimation to infer, from this incident, that all good men continue to live and to act after they are released from this mortal body, and that in a state of separation of the soul from the body, because one man is there recorded to have put on a glorified body before the time appointed for the general resurrection of the dead, and particularly a man whose release from the mortal body, was so unlike that of any other man of whom history, sacred or profane, have made mention.

4. The appearances of these good men in glorified bodies, and the silence of the scriptures concerning any appearances of the unembodied spirits either of good or wicked men, is a presumptive argument at least, that the doctrine of the consciousness and activity of the human soul in a state of separation from the body, was not the current doctrine of the times when the sacred penmen wrote the scriptures. It is indeed inconsistent with their accounts of a future state. Such of the christian fathers as espoused it, derived it from the philosophy of their pagan masters ; and, unapprehensive of its consequences, with respect to the doctrine of the gospel, did their endeavour to accom-

modate it to several expressions in the new testament, and thereby left a precedent for their successors in latter ages, to proceed to still greater extravagancies of interpretation, whenever the subject came in their way.

I am in some doubt how far the Psychopanychists will think themselves obliged to Dr. Jortin for espousing their party. They will, no doubt, approve his interpretations of scripture ; but when they consider that he labours only for the probability of his opinion, that he is inclinable to a compromise with his opponents, on seeing the consequences of admitting intermediate misery for the souls of the wicked, that he more than hints at the possibility of a transmigration of wicked souls, to keep things upon a par with the intermediate content and happiness of the righteous, and lastly, his candid concession, that the righteous lose nothing, and the wicked gain nothing, by their intermediate sleep ; when these things, I say, are considered, there may be room to doubt, whether the patrons of a conscious intermediate state will be much edified by the doctor's operations on the question, and whether they will not rather chuse to abide by their strong hold of a natural immortality on philosophical principles, than accept of his aid on the terms he offers it.

Be that as it may, let the historian praise his candour in expressing his diffidence in a manner which shews, that he did not desire his interpretations of the texts he builds upon, should pass for infallibilities. Would to God I had the talents to perpetuate the rest of his excellencies to the latest posterity. But he rests

from his labours, and heareth not the voice of the oppressor, nor of the petulant scorner. His works will sufficiently speak for him, while there are any remnants of piety, learning, and good sense, among the sons of Britain, and will follow him to those mansions, where neither envy, malevolence, nor the dogmatical arrogance of ignorant supercilious criticism, will deprive him of his reward.

Dum juga montis aper, fluvios dum piscis amabit,
 Dumque thymo pascentur apes, dum rore cicadæ,
 Semper honos nomenque tuum, laudesque manebunt.

CHAP. XXIX.

Mr. T. BROUGHTON's Defence of the commonly received doctrine of an immaterial, and naturally immortal principle in man. Levelled at the Bishop of CARLISLE's Appendix, and the Historical View. On what Provocation. Combats the Bishop's texts by appealing to Cicero. Remarks. Whether Cicero believed a future state? Mr. Broughton's idle distinction between the end of the present life, and the beginning of the next. Surprised that Dodwell's controversy with Dr. Clarke is not noticed in the Historical View. Commends Mr. John Broughton's Psychologia. Extract from Dodwell. And from Dr. Coward's reply to Mr. J. Broughton. Censure of Mr. Thomas Broughton's Defence in a monthly Pamphlet. Mr. B. charges Soci-nianism on his opponents. His book called, a Prospect of Futurity. Compared to the speculations of Cyrano de Bergerac. And Don Quevedo. Talks of the pointing in Greek Manuscripts. And of other things of which he knows still less.

1766. **I** WAS just about closing the foregoing de-
 1768. tail, when I recollected, that there was one
 gentleman, and the only one I know of, who
 hath honoured the former edition of the *Historical View*, with his particular remarks. I mean
 the Rev. Mr. Thomas Broughton, Prebendary
 of Sarum, and vicar of St. Mary Ratcliff, and
 St. Thomas in Bristol.

This gentleman was set to work by a parti-

cular provocation. He had, it seems, upon the stocks, *Four Dissertations*, which were to be intitled, *a Prospect of Futurity, or the Life to come*. In the first of these dissertations, he proposed to give a prospect of *the state of the dead between death and the resurrection*. But as the publication of the *Historical View*, Dr. Law's Appendix, and another tract intitled, *Universal Redemption a scripture doctrine*, threatened not only to intercept his prospect, but "to destroy the very foundation of his first dissertation, and affect very much the reasonings employed in the rest," it became necessary for him to clear the way, in a precursory discourse, which he intitles, *A Defence of the commonly received doctrine of the human soul as an immaterial, and naturally immortal principle in man, against the objections of some modern writers*.

But though the notice Mr. Broughton takes of the *Historical View*, is the only reason I have for paying him this particular respect, I shall venture to leave that performance to bear up, as well as it can, by its own little merit, against the objections in this defence; and shall only give the reader a specimen of Mr. Broughton's manner of confuting the learned bishop of Carlisle's second proposition, viz. "The state to which death reduces us, is represented in scripture, as a state of absolute insensibility, a total privation of life and consciousness, or an utter extinction of being."*

One might say, that this, as Mr. Broughton hath stated it, is not the bishop's second

* Defence, p. 37.

proposition.* But we will take it, as Mr. B. for the benefit of his *Prospect*, hath chosen to represent it.

Mr. B. having applied the scriptures cited in the *Appendix* in proof of the proposition, solely to the death of the body, by an arbitrary *ipse dixit*, proceeds to give us a detail of Cicero's sentiments on the subject of a future state, by way of illustration of the scriptures appealed to by the bishop; in some of which Cicero expresses himself so, as to be understood to disbelieve a future state, though in others he asserts his firm belief of it.

Now, to say nothing of this new method of explaining the christian scriptures, we must, to make them useful to Mr. B. take these negative passages of Cicero, to relate only to the state of the dead body; as where he says, *Mortem—contemnere debebemus, propterea quod nullum sensum esset habitura.*† Mr. B. translates *sensum*, by *thought* and *reflection*. But if death puts an end to thought and reflection, no province is left for a “spiritual substance, “united with the body before its death, and “subsisting separately after it.” Not to mention, that upon Mr. B.'s plan, thought and reflection must be attributes of the body, and not of the spirit.

To these negations, Mr. B. opposes an affirmative passage, which he thinks expressive of Cicero's absolute belief of a future state. It is the hackney'd one in his discourse *De Senectute*. But here he finds himself committed with the two doctors Middleton and Warburton, who both

* See the bishop's *Appendix*, p. 367. edit. 1755.

† Cic. Epist. Fam. v. 21.

agree, though for different reasons, that Cicero, with respect to the doctrine of a future state, was a frank infidel.

What is Mr. B. to do now? For if the opinion of these two doctors is to pass current, what becomes of Mr. B.'s illustration.

To get clear of this incumbrance, Mr. B. has recourse to a distinction. "There are," says he, "two lights in which death may be viewed. It may be considered, either as the end of the present life, or the beginning of the next. Cicero plainly considers death in the former light only." That is to say as extinguishing all sense, thought, reflection and consciousness of what had happened in the course of that life to which death puts an end; or, to give it in Mr. B.'s emphatical words, "reducing us to a state of absolute insensibility with respect to the things of this world."

But what, in the mean time, becomes of the continued consciousness of the separate soul? or, of what is it to be conscious in that state of absolute insensibility of what is past? Here Mr. Broughton stands ready with the other member of his distinction, to tell us, that death is the beginning of a new life, and that there is no interval between the end of the first life, and the beginning of the second; but if this was Cicero's notion, he plays the trifler egregiously with his correspondent, by consoling him with the hopes of an utter extinction of all reminiscence of his present griefs, at the same time that he knew the beginning of a new life would restore, or rather indeed continue the consciousness of them in the separate soul.

If Mr. B. should be disposed to say, that

the objects of the consciousness of the separate soul, are different from those of which it had been conscious in the body, we will not be so illnatured as to ask him, how he knows this? or what those objects are, of which the separate soul is conscious at the very beginning of a new life. We only desire to know how he ascertains the identity of the soul in these two different states, and how he will reconcile himself to those of his party, who are so very confident, that the soul never undergoes any change?

“ If I have justly interpreted Cicero’s words,” says Mr. Broughton, “ I cannot but think, “ that by the same way of interpretation, we “ may as justly reconcile Dr. Law’s collection “ of scriptures, relating to the state of death, “ with the doctrine of the survivorship and im- “ mortality of the human soul.” Hardly. We shall forgive him for making Cicero talk like a fool, or a jesuit, or a politician, but we shall not think him so very just, in applying the same way of interpretation to the sacred writers.

Mr. Broughton is surprised, that our historian, meaning his humble servant, should not take notice of the controversy between Mr. Dodwell and Dr. Clarke. Perhaps a plausible reason might be given for this omission, and Mr. Broughton shall certainly have it, in exchange for any good reason he shall chuse to give, why, after mentioning his namesake Mr. John Broughton’s *Psychologia*, with the attribute of a learned and solid answer to Dr. Coward’s second Thoughts,* he forbore to mention the said Doctor’s Epistolary Reply to Mr.

* Preface to Mr. T. Broughton’s Def. p. 10.

Broughton, in which this *learned* and *solid* answerer, is hunted out of his subterfuges, in a manner which renders him an object of pity.*

Dr. Clarke's hypothesis of the natural immortality of the soul is so well known, and the arguments relating to it on the one side and the other, so sufficiently set forth in the *Historical View*, that the author might well think he should be dispensed with in not giving a parti-

* In hopes that this defender may grow wiser for the future than to call such heroes as Dr. Coward from the dead, to adorn his triumphal carr, we shall give him a specimen of the said Dr. Coward's talents at dealing with a pompous sophister, viz. the defender's namesake, Mr. John Broughton. "Good Sir," (speaking to Mr. Broughton), "do but consider without passion, how you have answered that argument, drawn from eternal life being the gift of God; *ergo* the philosopher ought not to give us an unwarrantable immortality. This is the substance of Estibius's argument. Ans. 1. *It is a superlative gift to have an immortal soul, p. 208.* 2. *We know it from scripture revelation.* 3. *Life denotes happiness in scripture; so by a new and full assurance, it is by scripture become a new gift.* 4. *The forfeited title to this happiness, was by the gospel restored to mankind.*—What is all this to the purpose? If I say, immortality to man is a superlative gift revealed from scripture only, and this immortality consists in an happiness of life after death which Adam forfeited and Christ restored, is not this as good divinity as yours? Nay, I am sure, yours has not that probability of truth, as mine has, because your first proposition is precarious and groundless, unless you make it appear, that God gave man an immortal soul at creation; and mine has the whole religion of the gospel to justify it. Sir, but one question more. Is immortal life a gift to an immortal being? Yes, say you, happiness super-added to immortal life, is a gift; and that is meant by immortal life in the scripture. Then pray do you interpret scripture, if your head can do it right, and tell us, that Christ promised his believer only happiness superadded to our immortal life in the next world, for he knew that we had an immortal life before. Can you, with any face, give such a gloss to the scriptures? Is not the whole intent and purport of the gospel to tell us, that though we had forfeited eternal life by Adam's transgression, yet by Christ we should be restored to that again, who else would have died eternally? Doth he not first

cular account of it, by a formal detail of his argument.

As to Mr. Dodwell, the historian had seen nothing of his upon the subject, except his letter to Mr. Kirk concerning the immortality of the soul, against Mr. Layton's hypothesis, wherein there is nothing to distinguish the doc-

“ promise life to a dead lump of earth, rotted in the grave after several thousand years, by which we are put in a state of being capable of happiness? And after this promise of life, then if you do well, you shall have happiness superadded to it, as a new gift. Away with your trifling with a text. Is life a gift to a dead carcase or no? If it be, it is a gift of God, and no being else can possibly give it. If it be not the gift of God, then the scripture is vain, and the promise of none effect. For as to happiness or misery attending that life, it is subsequent to it, and depends upon yourself for the most part, to perform the conditions of obedience God has set before you.” Epistolary Reply, p. 233. Again, proceeding to ferret this learned and solid answerer out of another of his lurking holes, he attacks him thus. “ Another argument like the former, is in relation to the curse denounced against Adam, in *the day that thou eatest thereof* (viz. the forbidden fruit) *thou shalt die*. What finned? saith Estibius. Soul as well as body, and therefore both were liable to death. But say you, by way of a nice question, *What is to be understood by, thou?* p. 279. Ans. The whole man, or person of man. Then, say I, whole man died.—No, *whole man may be as well understood for a part, as a part for the whole*.—This is rare philosophy indeed! Whole man died, therefore one half of him survived,” Epist. Rep. p. 239. Again. “ As to those arguments, Estibius urges from the nature and end of a resurrection and general judgment, I believe you foresaw them unanswerable, and therefore was forced to recur to an intermediate state.—This dream has indeed relieved you one way, but then it presses you very hard on the confines of purgatory. For what end are souls reserved in that state? If wicked, and in torments, then it cannot be less than a purgatory. If righteous, and in happiness, though but initial, as you term it, then you answer not well, for the justice of God, who has, by such his assignment, attested them to be so far innocent, as to be in a state of certain salvation, and certain happiness, and yet he still detains them from a perfect consummation and bliss, so many thousand years before a general resurrection. If any man had

trine Mr. Dodwell then held, from that which the common assertors of the immortality of

“ for that time no being at all, as Estibius avers it, it is no injustice to a non-existent man, because he is not capable of having
 “ injustice done him in a state of non-existence. Again, the scriptures every where, by the particle, then, relating to a fixed day
 “ of a general judgment, seem plainly to testify God’s ordination on
 “ my side. But for God to give our souls existence in an intermediate state, who knew that they will have a certain happiness
 “ full and complete in all degrees, yet to detain them from it so long,
 “ without shewing any ordination of his from scripture to justify the
 “ truth of your opinion, by your good leave, I think, seems a grand
 “ reflection and derogation to infinite justice; for which opinion you
 “ deserve lustration or purgatory at least.” Epist. Reply, p. 241.

The following advices of this sensible writer seem to be equally necessary for Mr. Thomas, as they were for Mr. John Broughton.

“ One word or two of advice to you, and I have done. 1. Whenever you write again, get a man of solid judgment and reading to
 “ supervise your papers before they come hastily into the world, that
 “ your expressions may always be sense, if they bear little or no
 “ weight in argumentation. 2. Take such a man’s judgment in
 “ examining the reasons you propose as demonstrative, and especially
 “ where you attempt to reduce the adversary to own absurdities,
 “ and to ridicule him. 3. Never use calumny for argument, by
 “ calling a man athiest, heretic, irreligious, &c. either by inueudo
 “ or express words. For it becomes such as are of your station, and
 “ of your function, to treat men with candour and mildness of temper
 “ (whatever latitude a layman may take) more particularly.
 “ This is a breach of good manners, and give me leave to tell you,
 “ that when you presume to call one athiest or heretic, who is known
 “ constantly to frequent the sacrament often in the year, and seldom
 “ fails public devotion in the week days, in the church of England,
 “ you, or any one else, do very ill to brand such an one with
 “ atheism, or irreligion, or as a broacher of heretical opinions.”

p. 246. So much for the *learned* and *solid* Mr. John Broughton, whose *Psychologia* Mr. Locke thus characterises. “ The other
 “ book you mentioned I have seen, and am so well satisfied by his
 “ 5th section, what a doughty squire he is like to prove in the rest,
 “ that I think not to trouble myself to look farther into him. He
 “ has there argued very weakly against his adversary, but very
 “ strongly against himself.” Locke’s Letters to Collins in Des Maizeaux’s collection of his pieces, p. 261.

the soul urged against such writers as Dr. Coward and Mr. Layton. At the same time he had seen Mr. Layton's excellent answer to Mr. Dodwell's letter; and now that a farther account of Mr. Dodwell's hypothesis hath fallen in the historian's way, he cannot help giving it as his opinion, that Mr. Dodwell being sorely pressed by Mr. Layton on this subject, found himself under a necessity of discarding the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, and substituting in its place, that hypothesis in his epistolary discourse, which so highly scandalised Dr. Clarke.* Whoever will compare Mr. Dodwell's letter and Mr. Layton's answer, with the beginning of the account of Mr. Dodwell's hypothesis of the immortality of the soul, subjoined to his life by Mr. Brokesby, will probably discern some foundation for this conjecture, upon which however no great stress is laid.

To give Mr. Broughton (who, it is probable, knew as little of Mr. Dodwell's hypothesis when he wrote his defence, as the author of the *Historical View*,) all the satisfaction he can reasonably expect, we here exhibit a short abstract of that hypothesis, so far as it is to be understood from Mr. Brokesby's representation.

“ There are three souls appropriated to man.
 “ 1. The *Choical* or elementary soul, common
 “ to man with all other animals, and perishing
 “ in man, as well as in brutes, at the death of
 “ the body. 2. The *προν ζωνς*, the in-breathed
 “ soul, which distinguishes him from the brute

* See, Mr. Dodwell's hypothesis of the immortality of the soul, at the end of his life, by Mr. Brokesby, 1715.

“ creation, and has a mere capability of im-
 “ mortality, but is not of itself immortal, or
 “ has any proper natural immortality in itself.
 “ 3. The ψυχη πνευματική, or the soul infused by
 “ the Holy Spirit, which is *suá naturá* immor-
 “ tal, but is imparted to those christians only,
 “ whom he calls the *Peculium* of Christ. All
 “ mankind have the *Pnoe*, and by that subsist
 “ in a separate or intermediate state, and by
 “ it are made capable, the good of eternal
 “ reward, the wicked of eternal punishment.
 “ The righteous are rendered immortal by the
 “ superaddition of the ψυχη πνευματική to the πνοη,
 “ in consequence of faith and repentance, by
 “ virtue of the redemption of the *Peculium* by
 “ Christ. This superaddition, however, is not
 “ to be had but by baptism, and is therefore,
 “ by Mr. Dodwell, called, *the baptismal im-*
 “ *mortalizing spirit*. Nor will any baptism
 “ have this immortalizing effect, but that only
 “ which is administered by the hand, or under
 “ the authority of a bishop. According to the
 “ reasoning of the best and purest ages, all who
 “ desire a solid title to the good and divine
 “ spirit, are obliged to depend on bishops.
 “ As to what becomes of the souls of the wick-
 “ ed and unbelievers, Mr. Dodwell does not
 “ speak with equal assurance. He seems to
 “ think they may be punished in the inferior
 “ mansions of their separate state. He tells
 “ us, there was an ancient tradition, that souls
 “ survived their bodies in vehicles, which were
 “ called εἰδωλα θανόντων; and that the primitive
 “ christians believed separate souls to have vi-
 “ sible bodies of the same shape with those
 “ wherein themselves lived formerly. Yet

“ they believed those bodies mortal, as being
 “ capable of sensible pain by the corporeal fire
 “ of hell. But elsewhere, he seems to be of
 “ opinion, that through the clear apprehension
 “ of the amiableness of the good, and the tur-
 “ pitude of vicious courses, conscience alone
 “ may more contribute to the grief or delight
 “ of naked souls, than the most exquisite im-
 “ pressions of our fleshly organs.”

It is no wonder, that these representations, with the sort of reasonings and authorities by which they are supported, should give so ingenious and accurate a reasoner as Dr. Clarke, great advantage in shewing the preference due to his hypothesis, in comparison with this of Mr. Dodwell, who, however found an advocate that was not sparing of his pains to retaliate upon Dr. Clarke, and sometimes with no bad success.* Why would not Mr. Broughton undertake the defence of Dr. Clarke's masterly and decisive letter against this formidable champion? I can assure him, the praises given to Dr. Clarke's letter by Bishop Hoadley, have not made such defence unnecessary.

But Mr. Broughton is indeed, but a poor defender. One of the monthly writers, about the time his defence came out, (no bad judge of such compositions), informs us, that “ Mr. Broughton has shewn a zeal in this defence, quite
 “ disproportionable to the knowledge he has of
 “ the subject.”† However let us do him jus-

* In two tracts, the one intitled, *Η χαρις δωρεῖται, The Holy Spirit the Author of Immortality, &c.* The other, *Immortality præternatural to human souls.* By a Presbyter of the church of England. Both printed for Sawbridge, 1708.

† Monthly Record of Literature for May 1767.

tice; he has learned so much of his trade, as to make up in spleen and calumny, what he wants in argument.

“ It may not be amiss,” says Mr. Broughton, “ to observe here, (what, perhaps, will create “ no great prejudice in favour of their doctrine) that the writers against the immortality of the soul, seem to have copied after “ Socinus and his followers; as we learn from “ Professor Herman Witsius.”*

If this wretched insinuation is *not amiss*, neither will it be *amiss* to observe, that Mr. Broughton seems to have copied after the popish defenders of purgatory and saint-worship, as hath been shewn by the only writer who took the trouble to examine this defence, upon its first appearance.†

Having thus made way for his *Prospect of Futurity*, Mr. Broughton found no difficulty to exhibit it to the public in the year 1768. It abounds with a variety of discoveries, of which the world hitherto had no conception, and in which his readers find themselves more or less interested, in proportion to their credulity.

Mr. Broughton proposes, “ to give the adventures of a human soul in its progress from “ time to eternity, its departure from its corporeal habitation, its intermediate residence “ in *Hades*, or the invisible region of disembodied spirits, its reunion with its former companion the body, its appearance before the “ tribunal of its heavenly judge, its arrival at

* Preface to Mr. Broughton's Defence, p. xvii.

† In a pamphlet intituled—*A Warning against Popish doctrines, or observations on the Rev. Mr. Thomas Broughton's defence of an inherent immortality in man.* 1767.

“ the destined place of its final abode, and the
 ‘ happy or miserable end of its peregrinations.”*

A certain critic hath compared Mr. B.’s speculations upon these subjects to those of Cyrano de Bergerac.† But when adventures are promised, why are we put off with speculations? By judiciously selecting from Don Quevedo and the said Bergerac, Mr. B. might have given us an entertaining detail of these adventures.

But let us amuse ourselves a little with his speculations. On Luke xiii. 43, he observes, that “ our Saviour himself was not to be in
 “ heaven till more than forty days after his
 “ crucifixion; and therefore the malefactor’s
 “ soul must have waited above six weeks be-
 “ fore it could be with Christ in that region.” And how does Mr. Broughton know, that our Saviour’s soul was sooner in paradise? He appeals to the text, *Verily I say unto thee, To-day thou shalt be with me in paradise.* But, say the soul-sleepers, the pointing in the common copies, is wrong, the comma should be after to day. “ You are mistaken,” says Mr. Broughton: “ All the manuscripts” (which have no points, and hardly any distinction between one word and another) “ are against you.”‡

Again, as to any moral use, or spiritual improvement, in the intermediate state, Mr. Broughton allows there is none, in the sense of improved merit, and he gives the reason, viz. The intermediate state, being no state

* Pref. p. 14

† Critical Review, April, 1768, p. 272.

‡ Diff. i. p. 93.

of probation, the state of the soul in it must be unalterable; and he affirms the same of heaven: (which however is more than he knows). But as to improvement in spiritual excellency and perfection, he makes no scruple to admit it, both into his intermediate state, and into heaven, and calls it, *being better qualified to go on unto perfection*.* Whence we learn, 1. That there is no merit in a soul's improving in spiritual excellency: and, 2. That a soul whose state is unalterable, may improve in spiritual excellency and perfection.

And then again, though he grants as above, that there is no moral use whatever for this intermediate state, yet he says, there MAY BE *a natural necessity* of the soul's existing somewhere or other, and some how or other, in the interval between death and the resurrection;† the wisdom of establishing which, as well as the manner of it, he would have the soul-sleepers take for granted; which indeed would be no unreasonable request, after they should have admitted the reality of such existence. And so having granted the whole, Mr. B. can easily get rid of some objections hinted in the postscript to the bishop of Carlisle's *Appendix*, and in the *Historical View*.

These instances we hope will convince the impartial, that we have given Mr. Broughton all the consideration he can reasonably expect.

* P. 139, 140.

† P. 141.

C H A P. XXX.

An essay in the Theological Repository, intituled, An Attempt to prove that the resurrection takes place immediately after death. The witchcraft of words. The author makes thought the essence of the soul. Knows every thing relating to the soul. His sound philosophy contrary to that of Mr. Locke. Asserts that the soul always thinks. His proofs examined. Begs the thing in question. Appeals to experience. The author's consequences upon the supposition that the soul does not always think. Consequences drawn by Mr. Locke from the contrary supposition. The author's interpretation of certain texts examined. Takes refuge in the quarters of the Psychopannychists. According to him, Abraham's whole unborn posterity must have been in a state of sensibility, at the time of Moses's adventure at the bush. Castellio's modesty. More texts examined. The author has a difficulty upon his hands which he did not foresee.

1770.  I AM told I cannot decently make an end of this detail, without some notice of an ingenious and spirited essay, exhibited in the *Theological Repository*, No. IV. vol. ii. p. 346. with the title of *An attempt to prove, that the resurrection takes place immediately after death.*

I was indeed willing to pass by this hypothesis entirely. Dr. Caleb Fleming first advanced it a few years ago, and it occasioned a controversy carried on with an acrimony very justly reprehensible on both sides, which I

could wish were buried in utter oblivion. But the subject being once more brought into view, upon principles, as it should seem, somewhat different from those of Dr, Fleming, I am induced to say something to the objections alleged in this attempt, against the hypothesis of those who contend for the sleep, or the insensibility of the soul, between death and the resurrection.

This task will be very short. The essayist has stated the difference between himself, and those who hold the sleep of the soul, as follows.

“ The only difference then lies here, that
 “ they have the gloomy prospect of being in-
 “ sensible for thousands of years, perhaps, be-
 “ fore their happiness begins; whereas I endea-
 “ vour to prove, that their happiness shall be-
 “ gin immediately after death.”*

There seems to be a kind of fascination in some words, with respect to their influence upon the spirits of some sorts of people. A prospect of any degree of evil for thousands of years, has a most alarming sound. And insensibility is taken by this author, as one of the greatest of evils. But when the real case comes to be considered, the prospect of insensibility for one single half hour, is just as gloomy as for a million of years.

This gentleman thinks, that if the soul or mind become insensible, it must be annihilated. “ When,” says he, “ all thought, re-
 “ membrance, activity, and every other pro-
 “ perty belonging to it are extinguished, I
 “ have then no longer an idea of it [the mind]

“divested of all its essential properties; it is
 “then destroyed, and exists no more.” p. 359.

But this writer has told us just above, that there is a substance in which these properties or qualities exist. If so the substance of the soul may remain, when the properties of it are no more. The absence of these properties imply indeed, that the substance would in that case, be in a state of insensibility. But still in a state of existence, and capable of receiving its properties again, whenever it should please the author of its being to restore them, unless indeed the gentleman uses substance only as a technical term, to be taken up for mere convenience, and laid by in a state of nonexistence, when it is not wanted.*

It has been said, that “all philosophical arguments, drawn from our notions of matter,
 “and urged against the possibility of life,
 “thought, and agency, being so connected
 “with some portions of it, as to constitute a
 “compound being or person, are merely grounded on our ignorance.”†

But this is a consideration of no weight with our essayist, who knows every thing about it.
 “He can form very clear and distinct ideas of
 “body and spirit, as the constituent parts of
 “human nature. He is acquainted with the
 “qualities of both, and tells you what each of
 “them possess.—He knows that these qualities are essentially different from one another, and, consequently, so are the substan-

* See Bp. Law's Appendix, edit. 1765, p. 420. Note (A).

† See Bp. Law's Appendix.

“ces in which they exist. He knows still
 “more. He knows that all the arguments
 “which have been offered to prove, that the
 “soul sometimes ceases to think, even while
 “we are yet alive, as in a fainting fit, a sound
 “sleep, &c. are vain.”

This knowledge our essayist derives from the principles of sound philosophy. There was a time when Mr. Locke was esteemed a sound philosopher, and he was of a different opinion from this gentleman, who would have done well to have pronounced with a little more diffidence for his own opinion, unless he could have brought a better argument to support it. Let us consider the force of it.

“All the arguments,” says he, “which have
 “been offered to prove, that the soul some-
 “times ceases to think, are vain. They only
 “prove, that we do not always remember what
 “we think. I do not remember one thought
 “that passed through my mind upon the first
 “day of January last. Will any one from
 “thence conclude, that I was in a state of in-
 “sensibility all that day? In short, it is one
 “thing to think, and another thing to remem-
 “ber what we thought.”*

At what distance of time from the first of January here mentioned, this writer penn'd this paragraph, we are not informed. Let us suppose it to be exactly three months after, viz. on the first of April. The question I would put to him, should be, not whether he remembered *what* he thought on the first of January? But whether he remembered on the first of April, that he thought at all on the

* Theol. Repos. u. s. p. 359.

first of January? Undoubtedly he would answer this question in the affirmative, for he seems not disposed to take it well, that any one should suppose he was insensible on that day. I would then ask him, on the same first of April, whether he remembered that he thought at all on the thirty-first of March, i. e. the day before? Here I should expect he would tell me, not only that he remembered that he thought but likewise the subject of many of his thoughts. I would then go on, and supposing him to have slept well on the night of the thirty-first of March, I would intreat him to tell me, what he thought on during that sound sleep? If he should say, he did not remember; I would then request he would favour me with a convincing argument, that, during that sound sleep, he thought at all; for though I can readily allow, that, to think, and to remember what we have thought at the distance of three months, are two different things, yet till I understand, from the sound philosophy of this gentleman, that I am mistaken, I shall be of opinion, that not to think, and not to be conscious that we think, is one and the same thing.

But, “thought is essential to the soul; if
“you deprive the soul of the faculty of think-
“ing, you annihilate the soul.”

But this, Mr. Locke says, is to beg the question; and the soul-sleepers are not disposed to give it up.

“We know certainly by experience,” says this great man, “that we sometimes think, and
“thence draw an infallible consequence, that
“there is something in us which has a power
“to think. But whether that substance per-

“petually thinks or no, we can be no further
 “assured, than experience informs us. For
 “to say that actual thinking is essential to the
 “soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what
 “is in question, and not to prove it by reason,
 “which is necessary to be done, if it is not a
 “self-evident proposition.”*

Let us try then how far experience will carry us in this disquisition. The idea of duration arises from a succession of ideas, and by that succession, duration is measured in our minds. “When that succession of ideas ceases,” says Mr. Locke, “our perception of duration ceases with it, which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour, or a day, or a month, or a year; of which duration of things, whilst he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him, and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance.”†

This, I apprehend, is matter of experience,‡ and to oppose it by saying, that the soul thinks

* Essay, book ii. chap. i. sect. 10.

† Essay, book ii. chap. xiv. sect. 4.

‡ There are numberless instances of this. A remarkable one may be seen in Mr. Peckard's Farther Observations on the Doctrine of an Intermediate State, p. 32. Another I shall transcribe from the Gazetteer, Saturday, September 28, 1771, which is brought me whilst I am writing on the subject. “Yesterday se’nnight the wife of a tradesman in May’s buildings, St. Martin’s lane, going to bed as usual, in good health, fell asleep, in which she continued till Tuesday morning, although several methods were taken to awake her, but without effect, till she awoke of herself, got up, and went about her household business, and it was with difficulty she could be persuaded it was any other day than Saturday.”

without any succession of ideas, or without perception, is something more than begging the question. It is playing an imaginary hypothesis against matter of fact. If this reasoning of Mr. Locke's does not convince this essayist, that the soul does not always think, I hope it will convince him, that it is not to be overthrown by barely saying, that such reasoning is vain. To say that a man does not remember what he thought at a particular time, when he is not, nor ever was conscious, that he thought at all at that time, is using a language which a sound philosopher would probably call jargon.

“ But,” says this gentleman, “ even suppose
 “ the souls of men to exist in such a state,
 “ what valuable end can it serve in the crea-
 “ tion? For God does nothing in vain. An
 “ immense multitude of souls in a state of in-
 “ sensibility, can be of no use to themselves;
 “ they can be of no use to others; they are of
 “ less use in the universe, than the meanest
 “ particles of matter are in the system of na-
 “ ture, &c. &c.” p. 360.

Every thing has two handles. When the author of this attempt has answered the following questions which laid in his way, as an incumbrance upon his hypothesis, it will be time enough to think of answers to his interrogatories.

“ If the soul has no memory of its own
 “ thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its
 “ use, and be able to recal them upon occa-
 “ sion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past,
 “ and make use of its former experiences, rea-
 “ sonings, and contemplations, to what pur-

“ pose does it think? They who make the
 “ soul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not
 “ make it a much more noble being than those
 “ do whom they condemn for allowing it to be
 “ nothing but the subtlest part of matter.
 “ Characters drawn in dust, that the first breath
 “ of wind effaces; or impressions made on a
 “ heap of atoms, or animal spirits, are alto-
 “ gether as useful, and render the subject as
 “ noble, as the thoughts of a soul that perish
 “ in thinking; that once out of sight are gone
 “ for ever, and leave no memory of themselves
 “ behind them. Nature never makes excellent
 “ things for mean or no uses; and it is hardly
 “ to be conceived, that our infinitely wise
 “ creator should make so admirable a faculty
 “ as the power of thinking, that faculty
 “ which comes nearest the excellency of his
 “ own incomprehensible being, to be so idly
 “ and uselessly employed, at least one fourth
 “ part of its time here, as to think constantly,
 “ without remembering any of those thoughts,
 “ without doing any good to itself or others,
 “ or being any way useful to any other part of
 “ the creation. If we examine it, we shall not
 “ find, I suppose, the motion of dull and sense-
 “ less matter, any where in the universe made
 “ so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.”*

That our essayist contrived his questions to
 be even with Mr. Locke, there can be little
 doubt. But his questions neither contain nor
 imply any answers to those of Locke. Let
 him answer Locke's questions in the first place,
 and I am persuaded he will then want no an-

* Locke's Essay, b. 2. chap. i. sect. 15.

swers to his own. It is not barely an occasional want of memory, that will account for the insensibility of a sound-sleeping man, with respect to his thoughts in that state. It is a total deprivation of all memory and consciousness of thinking, which, to support our author's hypothesis, must be made consistent with the actual power or faculty of thinking without intermission.

It is upon this hypothesis, that the soul never ceases to think, that our author's interpretations of the texts he makes use of, wholly depend. He supposes, that in fact, the soul exists not in a naked separate state for a single second of time. The resurrection-body, according to him, is put on immediately after the departure of the soul from the mortal body. Upon any other principle his expositions are mere arbitrary assertions, for which there are no grounds; the major part of his citations being, without this postulatum, equally favourable to a final and general resurrection and judgment of all the dead, at a particular period.

One or two of his interpretations will serve to make this plain.

“The apostle Paul,” says he, “evidently supposes, that the human soul can exist in a state of happiness immediately after its separation from the body.” And then having quoted, 2 Cor. xii. 23. *I knew a man in Christ,* &c. he goes on thus.

“It is true, indeed, the apostle was not dead and buried at the time when this happened; but if the soul becomes insensible when separated from the body, he never could have been in paradise, and heard such unutterable

“ things; and his uncertainty depended upon
 “ the possibility of a separate state of consci-
 “ ous existence.” p. 362.

I cannot well tell what to make of this. It seems to be an *an attempt to prove, that the resurrection does NOT take place immediately after death.* That is to say, to prove that the separate soul may be in a state of happiness without the resurrection-body, and if so, every thing may happen to the separate soul, which our author supposes to happen to it in conjunction with the resurrection-body, even a final judgment.

Had he turned this incident to the account of his system, he must have supposed, that Paul had, *pro hac vice*, a resurrection body conferred upon him, as a qualification for his admittance into paradise. And I do not see that Paul's uncertainty precludes this supposition, any more than the supposition of his soul's being in a state of separate existence during this exstatic vision.

But then, what must have become of Paul's mortal body, which, according to this *attempt*, was *neither dead nor buried?* And when Paul's soul returned to that body, what became of his resurrection-body?

These are difficulties which bear so hard upon this writer's hypothesis, that he found it necessary to give way to the *Psychopannychists* in one part of their hypothesis which contradicts his own, that he might avail himself of another part, viz. that the soul always thinks. For “ he finds in scripture, that all the promises
 “ of future happiness are to be accomplished
 “ only at the resurrection,” p. 352. a plain ar-

gument, that men will not be in a capacity to enjoy that happiness before the resurrection. But here is an inference drawn from the case of Paul, that there is not only a possibility that it may be otherwise, viz. that the separate soul may be made happy without any resurrection, but a necessity, that it must have been otherwise in the case of St. Paul, unless we suppose him to have had two bodies at the same time.

“Our Saviour’s argument,” says the gentleman, “against the Sadducees, is utterly inconsistent with a state of insensibility.” He then quotes Luke xx. 37. 38. *Now that the dead are raised, &c.* upon which he thus descants.

“From these words it is evident, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were then living in another world; and that all the past generations of men, though dead to us, and gone from the world, are nevertheless alive in the sight of God, and in another state, for all live to him, though they may be dead to us,” p. 363.

The reader will here be pleased to observe, that, “*even Moses shewed at the bush, that the dead are raised, and he shewed this by calling the Lord the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.*” This then was as good an argument for the resurrection of the dead, in the days of Moses, as in the days of our Saviour. And our observator is extremely right in extending the conclusion to be drawn from it, to the past generations of men, that is to say, to all the generations of men, which existed between Moses’s adventure at the bush, and the time when our Saviour

disputed with these Sadducees. For it is, I think, agreed on all hands, that the terms, *I am the God of Abraham*, imply a promise to Abraham, and all his posterity collectively. If, therefore, it is really true, that “our Saviour’s “argument against the Sadducees, is utterly “inconsistent with a state of insensibility,” it must be true, that all the souls of the past generations, i. e. of all the generations of men between Moses and Christ, were in a state of sensibility at the time of God’s appearance to Moses at the bush; for the words, *all live unto God*, considered as a consequence arising from the proposition, *I am the God of Abraham, &c.* must extend to those who were unborn, as well as to those who were dead, when Moses *shewed this* at the bush.*

“All live to God,” says our author, “though “they may be dead to us.” Which he understands to mean, that all live to God, *in another state, and in another world.* But *God who quickeneth the dead*, says St. Paul, *calleth those things that are not, as though they were*; which is indeed referring the life of those who are dead to us, to another state and another world; but it is a future world, which is no farther in existence, in the account of God himself, than that all things, past, present, and to come, are naked and open to his omniscience.

Castellio tells us, that when, in translating the new testament, he met with this passage, (Luke xx. 38.) he made no note upon it, be-

* See this matter more fully explained in a pamphlet, intituled, *Remarks on Dr. Warburton’s account of the sentiments of the early Jews concerning the soul*, p. 52——69.

cause *he did not then understand it.* (An example of modesty in this excellent person, which, in this instance at least, it would not have misbecome our author to follow.) But when he came to Rom. iv. 11,—17, he seems to have had a fuller insight into the meaning of our Saviour; and accordingly gives us his explanation under that chapter, which, because it seems to be full as clear and consistent as any I have met with, I put down in the margin.*

What our Author says of *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, being then living in another world,* is a mere arbitrary notion, resulting from his not understanding the style of scripture. They lived then in another world, just as much as their unborn posterity did, when this declaration was made at the bush. Castellio saw the absurdity of such an interpretation; he saw, that if our Saviour's argument proved only the immortality, or separate life of the human soul, it would be inconclusive as to the resurrection of the dead; and therefore rightly expounds the words, *for all live unto God,* (as

* *Viventium Deus est, non mortuorum: quippe cum ei vivant omnes.* De qua ibi (Sc. Luc. xx.) ideo nihil scripsi, quod eam nondum intelligebam: videbatur enim animorum immortalitatem ostendere, quum de resurrectione disputaret. Quanquam ne nunc quidem de ea affirmabo, tantum dicam quid mihi venerit in mentem. Quum dicatur Abrahami, Isaaci, et Jacobi, necesse est ut aut illi vivant, aut Deus sit mortuorum Deus. Atqui mortuorum esse Deum, est nullius esse Deum, quum mortui *non sint.* Necesse est ergo ut illi vivant. Sed non vivunt. Fateor, non vivunt hominibus quibus tantum præsens vita, præsens est. Sed vivunt Deo, qui eos in vitam revocabit; quæ vita nobis *futura,* Deo *præsens* est. Ergo erit mortuorum resurrectio. His Christus Sadducæos refellit, Castellio in Rom. iv. 11—17.

the passage suggests) of the all-comprehending mind of the creator, which takes in all futurity, with the same distinct intuition as things that are present.*

St. Peter, to assist our imperfect conceptions of this matter, reminds those to whom he wrote his second epistle, *that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day*, chap. iii. v. 8. As this text relates to the question, *Where is the promise of his coming?* v. 4. and was intended to account for the delay of it, the passage is so unfavourable to our essayist's hypothesis, that it was absolutely necessary for him to evade the conclusion to be drawn from it, if it was possible. Passing by therefore the four next verses, he settles upon the 13th, where it is said, *Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness*, which he interprets of those *mansions* which our Saviour spake of preparing for his disciples, John xiv. 2. 3. and in which he supposes them to be already placed. And this he calls, leading us to the apostle's meaning.

* Sed quid sit omnes Deo vivere, et ei omnia esse præsentia, adhuc manet obscurius. Nos sic conabimur exponere. -- Fluit aqua Rheni. Ejus parvula portio mihi nunc præsens est, quæ paulo ante præsens erat Schafusianis. Eadem paulo post præsens erit Argentinensibus. At Sol totum hoc spatium præsens habet, tamque ei præsens Argentina est, quam Basilea. Sic tempus fluit ut aqua; temporis pars ea, in qua sumus, nobis præsens est. At Deo qui maximus est et sempiternus, *universum tempus, et quod fuit, et quod est, et quod erit*, præsens est. Ita quod reviviscet aliquando, et vivet Abrahamus, id nobis absens et futurum est. At Deo id tempus, et proinde ea res, præsens adest. — Hæc ego caligantibus animi oculis dico, non affirmo. Castellio, ubi supra. ΚΑΤΕΝΑΥΤΙ ΘΕΟΥ, coram Deo. Quum coram hominibus nondum extarent illæ gentes. Bengelius in Rom. iv. 17.

But Peter seems to have known nothing of all this. Had he known that the promise was already fulfilled, he surely would not have set himself to account for the delay of it. His readers were impatient to have it fulfilled. To reconcile them to this delay, he tells them, that, *with the Lord, a thousand years are but as one day*, by which he means evidently to take off, what our author calls, *the gloominess of the prospect* of waiting for it in a state of death, for a thousand years. He then tells them, that *the Lord is not slack or tardy concerning his promise*, (the promise of his coming) *as some men count slackness*; but suspends it from his compassion and *long suffering, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance*. And this long suffering of God being indefinite, it might last for many generations beyond that in which St. Peter's disciples lived; and so long as it did last, so long would the coming of Christ, the day of the Lord, be deferred.

But now, upon our author's hypothesis, where was the propriety, or the pertinence of these topics of consolation addressed to these christians, unless some of them had a chance to live a thousand years, or as many thousands as the long suffering of God might dispose him to defer the coming of Christ? The final coming of Christ, according to our author, was nothing to any one, but to those who should be alive on the earth at that period. "The
 " dead, whether in Christ or not, immediately
 " ly after they died, arose from the dead, in
 " his account, appeared before the judgment
 " seat of Christ, and have received a sen-
 " tence according to the deeds done in the
 " body, whether they be good or evil," What

is the promise of the coming of Christ to all or any of these ? Was not the apostle, upon our author's hypothesis, amusing them with an account of an event in which they would have no concern, if they departed this life (as he plainly intimates they might do) before it happened, instead of comforting them with the assurance, that as soon as they departed this life, the promise would be made good to them, with all those effects which would attend its more visible performance, among the generations of men they should leave behind them ?

The common sense of every reader of the scriptures of the New Testament, must be shocked with the contemplation, that *the day of the Lord ;—the day which God hath appointed to judge the world in righteousness ;—the day when God shall judge the secrets of men ; the great day of judgment*, shall affect none but those who shall be living upon the earth at that period, that is to say, not a thousand millionth part of those to whom the promise of Christ's coming was made, and who according to the language of holy writ, are to be doomed happy or miserable by it.

From these two instances, without examining any others, it is presumeable that this ingenious observator's interpretations of the scriptures he quotes, are not sufficiently authentic to support the conclusions he would draw from them. And he has one difficulty upon his hands, which possibly he did not foresee. He has all the antisciptural consequences of a separate existence to account for, save one, that of a second judgment, to supersede which,

he is obliged considerably to darken the scriptural evidence we have, that there will be any future judgment at all.

C O N C L U S I O N.

Inferences from the foregoing Historical View. Advantages given to papists, by the groundless concessions of Protestants. An instance from Cardinal Alan's works. Calvinists who treat those who deny the natural immortality as atheists. Various instances of abuse thrown upon those who hold the doctrine of the sleep of the soul. Their adversaries not uniform. Churchmen and philosophers divided after a long alliance. The scriptures owned by the former to be the only criterion. Tillotson's concession on this head, unfavourable to his side of the question. Advantages given to unbelievers by the Psychologists. Metaphysical subtleties not to be regarded. The final appeal to the scripture only. An article of news from Copenhagen in the year 1762. A remark upon it.

I AM greatly afraid the foregoing detail will appear to be tedious; and yet there is little more taken into it, than seemed to me to be absolutely necessary to shew the rise and progress of those prejudices and that confusion, which, to this hour, perplex the question concerning an intermediate state. The account

might have been swelled to ten times its present bulk. What is here exhibited, seems to be sufficient to authorise the following conclusions.

First, That the notion of the soul's immortality as a truth independent on the christian revelation, was bred and nourished among the schoolmen of the twelfth, thirteenth, and a great part of the two following centuries, when senseless quibbles past for the productions of genius, and unmeaning jargon, for profound erudition. It will probably be said that the same conclusions have, since the revival of letters, and the cultivation of sound philosophy, been drawn from rational premises. Concerning this, every man may judge as he sees cause. I am unhappy enough to find no more demonstration in the reasonings of Clarke and Baxter for the natural immortality of the soul, than in the syllogisms of Lombard and Aquinas.

Secondly, That these scholastic subtleties were adopted by the popish divines, as the ground-work of the fable of purgatory, and the idolatrous invocation of saints. Hence the scholastic immortality was incorporated, or rather confounded with the immortality brought to light by the gospel; and both represented as affording mutual light and support to each other, and equally sanctified by the canons and decrees of the church, in order to deter those who were disposed and qualified to philosophize upon better principles, from pursuing their disquisitions to a fatal detection of these and other absurdities, which could not have subsisted otherwise than by retreating under the artillery of the Vatican.

Thirdly, That though the protestants, on all other subjects, rejected all doctrines which were not built on a scripture-foundation, they unhappily contented themselves on this, with the testimony of popish and pagan tradition, and being either unable or unwilling to investigate the real meaning of certain terms used in the scriptures, weakly concluded, from the mere sound of them, that the doctrine of the scriptures, and of the reigning philosophy concerning the immortality or separate existence of the soul, was one and the same. Hence,

Fourthly, in all their disputes with the papists concerning the superstitions grounded on purgatory and saint-worship, they directed their arguments to the wrong object; and instead of insisting, that the immortality subsequent to the general resurrection, was the only conscious future state allotted in scripture, either for saints or sinners, they embarrassed themselves with an hypothesis of departed souls, taken either immediately into heaven, or immediately thrust into a place of final torment, which it was not only impossible for them to verify, but exposed them to the reproach of deserting the most orthodox of the christian fathers, who had provided hidden receptacles and intermediate limbuses, for different classes of human souls, according to their deservings, till all should be finally set right at a general judgment.

The papists failed not to make their advantage of this weakness in their adversaries. They argued thus. “A middle state is what most protestants own; it is therefore more reasonable to believe what the church teaches about

“it, than to think at random in this respect.” Thus cardinal Alan expressed himself in a dispute with bishop Jewel concerning purgatory and prayers for the dead.* He was in the right. For the scriptures containing no account of this middle state, a man might as well take the church’s random account of it, as be at the pains to frame one of his own.

“Most protestants,” says the cardinal, “own
“a middle state.” Whence it may be inferred, that *all* protestants did not: and a great misfortune it was to the cause of the reformation, that they who did not own it, were not heard with patience and candour. Unhappily the protestants had made up their system, and fixed the boundary of orthodoxy, beyond which it was not permitted to pass: and in this matter, they acted just after the precedent the papists themselves had set them. Calvinists particularly treated all who questioned the natural immortality of the soul, as impious, heretical, and no better at the bottom than atheists, even to the end of the last century.

For example. “He who denies the immor-
“tality of the soul, denies effectually the being
“and providence of God, and the full expect-
“tation of recompenses to be distributed after
“this life, according to the actions which dy-
“ing persons have practised through the race
“of their mortality.”

This determination is to be found in the preface to a book wrote by Timothy Manlove and published in the year 1696, intituled, *The Immortality of the Soul, asserted.* The pre-

* Biog. Brit, ALLAN (William) rem. [C.]

face was written, at least subscribed by John Howe and Matthew Sylvester, names of renown in their day among the dissenters, among whom likewise Mr. Manlove was a minister.

In answer to this, Mr. Layton above-mentioned, in his observations on Manlove's treatise, reminds them, that "the certainty of a resurrection, and last judgment, rests not upon the belief of the soul's immortality, but upon the strong current and agreement of the gospel, and seems to be as true, evident, and well proved, as the truth of that text is, that *Jesus Christ came to save sinners*; although says Mr. L. Mr. Manlove, his elders and churches, and many others, take too little notice of them, and make mention of them accordingly." Meaning, that they undervalued the evidence of the scripture for a future state, in comparison of that drawn from the natural immortality of the soul.

And if this was not truly the case, what could Messieurs Howe and Sylvester mean by *the full expectation of recompenses*, as if such expectation grounded on scripture evidence was not sufficiently full, without the aid of a philosophical demonstration? And then, if the scripture is not sufficient in one case, why not insufficient in another? And if this insufficiency is to be supplied by traditions, why are not ecclesiastical traditions as availing as philosophical ones? Why should the immortality of the soul be believed rather than a purgatory? Or lastly, why should the papists be thought to argue more absurdly, and childishly, when they infer a man's atheism from his disbelief of their other doctrines, than such protestants as these, who draw the same consequence from the

disbelief or denial of the natural immortality of the soul?

In the same strain of illiberal, inquisitorial abuse (for it is no better) have these immortalists treated their opponents even to this very hour. Dr. Goddard calls them Socinians. But all sides seem to be agreed, that he knows little or nothing of the matter. A doctor of more importance, hath more lately stiled the sleep of the soul, A SEMIPAGAN DREAM. What may be meant by this phrase he best knows who invented it. But the doctrine so stigmatized, is supposed by some very competent judges, to be such a dream, that if it is not added to some other dreams in a book called the *Divine Legation of Moses*, &c. the main principle of that elaborate work, must effectually sink under a most manifest and mortifying incapacity of demonstration.

The same author hath said, on the same occasion, that “they who hold the soul to be
“ only a quality, and yet talk of its sleep be-
“ tween death and the resurrection, use a jar-
“ gon, which confounds all languages, as well
“ as reason. For such a sleep is an annihilati-
“ on, and the waking again, a new creation.”

As for the jargon, we freely resign it to whom it may belong. Whether the soul is a quality or a substance, if its conscious perception is suspended between death and the resurrection, you may call that annihilation, or whatever else you please, provided you will allow that God can create it anew. We are certain the Creator has the same power over the soul as over the body. The body returns to the dust from whence it was originally taken; and if

the same body is to be restored to its vital functions, or if another body is to be substituted out of the same materials, it is either way, as strictly and properly a new creation, as that of Adam was. But, according to our critic's principles, to say, such a body *sleeps, is using a jargon which confounds all languages as well as reason.* The comfort however is, that, even our adversaries being judges, it is the *jargon* of the *New Testament*.

For ought then that appears to the contrary, the doctrine of the sleep of the soul, may be a doctrine of the Socinians, and yet no heresy. It may be in the estimation of some people, a Semipagan dream, and still perfectly conformable to the scriptures, and their account of the power of God. It may ring, in some delicate ears, like jargon, and still have all the properties of good sense and sound reason.

But *Socinian, Semipagan, Idiot, &c.* are excellent words to throw an odium upon the persons and opinions of obnoxious adversaries, especially under the management of those who *have the art of giving wit and dignity to their Billingsgate,** and effectually terrify many feeble minds from examining into the real importance of any doctrines dressed out in these *Sanbenitos*.

Thus, for a long time, the decisions of pagan philosophers, and the affirmance of the natural immortality of the soul in the creeds and confessions of particular churches, went amicably hand in hand, and shared between them

* See Pope's works, vol. iv. ed. 1753. p. 82.

the glory of the universal assent and consent given to their respective demonstrations: till unhappily for themselves, the churchmen and philosophers fell out, and then *great was the force of truth, and it prevailed.* The philosophers would needs set up for themselves, and disclaimed all obligations to the church; and when the other saw that no better would be, they too tried to stand upon their own legs, and affected at least to acknowledge, that the controversy with the soul-sleepers could only be decided by the scriptures, and upon that principle pretended to join issue.

“ I have not, says one of them, called this
 “ [the sleep of the soul] an old exploded hypo-
 “ thesis with a design to intimate that any
 “ considerations of that sort, would be suffi-
 “ cient to overthrow it. Its truth or falshood
 “ as a scripture-doctrine, must be determined
 “ by the authority of scripture.”*

“ The point in question, says another, is to 1758.
 “ be decided by the sacred writings alone.”†

A third acknowledges, that, “ the eternity 1759.
 “ of the soul of man, *a parte post*, has scarce
 “ the shadow of reason to support it, and is
 “ obliged to fly to revelation to silence inquiry.”‡

Little did they consider to what distress this concession exposed them. They were not aware that the renowned Tillotson, a most able and zealous patron of their cause, had owned that,
 “ the immortality of the soul was rather sup-

* Examin. of the Bp. of London's Disc. p. 279.

† Steffe's five Letters, p. 7.

‡ Critical Review, August, 1759, p. 99.

“posed, or taken for granted, than expressly
“revealed in the bible.”*

The good archbishop indeed adds, that
“the immortality of the soul may be inferred
“from several places of scripture, and the te-
“nor of the whole bible.” But if the propo-
position is not expressly revealed, the right of
inferring is equal on all sides; and surely those
conclusions which are inferred from what is ex-
pressly revealed, should be at least as just and
as strong, as those which are inferred from
what is not.

“And therefore, in order to form a better
“judgment of this matter, we must examine
“the scripture language more particularly, and
“see what all those several terms and phrases
“may imply in the original, which are suppos-
“ed to include the doctrine above-mentioned.”

These are the words of the R. R. and worthy
master of Peterhouse, and express the design
of his *Appendix*, a work, which, by the cla-
mour that has been raised against it, a bystan-
der would suspect must have been planned with
an express and avowed purpose of subverting
the christian religion. Nor indeed is this the
worst. A very learned and candid advocate
for the doctrine of the said *Appendix*, having
upon account of his publishing his sentiments
relative thereto, undergone some such hard-
ships, as had not before been heard of, for many
years in this protestant country.†

* Sermons, vol. xi. 8vo. ed. 1744. p. 4892.

† This relates to the case of a learned and ingenious gentleman
mentioned chap. xxvii. who does not chuse to publish the particu-
lars, as was once expected.

But to return to the concessions above-mentioned. Both sides being thus agreed to appeal to the scriptures, one might have hoped the dispute would have been brought to a speedy and decisive issue. But it quickly appeared, that the appeal of the immortalists to the scriptures, was but affected. They began to perceive the scriptures were not to be trusted with the decision of so important and popular a point, without certain accommodations borrowed from their old friends the philosophers. And remarkable it is, that the very man who, as mentioned above, had put the cause upon the determination of the scriptures alone, without any savings to tradition, finding there was no managing Dr. Law's Appendix, or an acute and ingenious tract in the Monthly Review,* which had taken him to task, this very man, I say, did not scruple to call to his aid *Pythagoras, Homer, Theognis, Cicero, and Horace*; though, to save appearances, it was under the pretence of making them interpreters to MOSES, SOLOMON, JOB, PAUL, JOHN. What the success was of this expedient, may possibly appear upon some other occasion.

With the same consciousness that the scriptures were not to be relied upon for the proof of the natural immortality of the soul, have several contenders for that doctrine introduced the modern philosophers, *Clarke, Peters, Baxter, &c.* having the modesty, I suppose, to expect we should pay that respect to these moderns, which we had refused to their ancient masters, Plato and Aristotle.

* For May 1757, p. 402.

It had been happy for these gentlemen, supposing them qualified for the task, had they begun their lucubrations on this subject, with a previous examination, how far their ancient pagan doctors were to be depended on. That is to say, whether they do not contradict each other, and sometimes themselves? Whether the most dogmatical among them come up to the point to be proved, namely, the personal consciousness of the soul in a state of total disunion from the body? The future existence of the soul, incruited in corporeal particles, as some of them held, or, as others, in a state of refusion into the $\tau\omicron\epsilon\upsilon$, will not answer their end in citing them, in order, I suppose, to prove the unremitting consciousness of the soul in a state of separation from all body, a thing, in my humble opinion, which these ancient sages, never once thought of.

For the rest, it is well known that, upon the supposed demonstration, that thought and conscious perception are natural, inherent, and permanent powers in the human soul in every state, the deists build their several schemes of natural religion; and hence contend, there can be no occasion for any positive or particular revelation of a future state: consequently that no such revelation was ever vouchsafed. In this controversy, it is amazing to see with what alacrity christian writers, not only grant these premises, but assert them with great vehemence, as necessary for the honour and support of revelation. But when the question comes to be, what is the use and importance of a particular revelation? they begin to perceive their mistake, and the advantage their adversaries make

of these concessions. Immediately the proofs of a future state from reason and nature which before had been as clear and demonstrative as the noon-day sun, become obscure, insufficient, and erroneous, and totally incapable of leading men to the truth, without the aid of revelation. Thus have some of the most eminent defenders of the christian cause against deism, drawn themselves into such manifest contradictions, as, had not their reputation been supported by merit of another sort, must have derived upon them some degree of derision and contempt.

'Tis with great regret that I am obliged to mention, on this occasion, the great names of Tillotson, Stillingfleet, Sherlock, Clarke, Hoadly, &c. These have been followed by great numbers of the lower classes of writers, who seem to have taken it for granted they could not go wrong, while they took men for their guides, whose victories, gained over their adversaries in other provinces, had been so indisputable.

I do not add the late philosopher Baxter to the list, notwithstanding his pretences to obviate sceptical objections, and the praises bestowed upon him by a certain writer of undoubted orthodoxy. Baxter's sentiments, it seems, concerning revelation, became, towards the end of his life, extremely problematical. And indeed no wonder. In *his* system the soul is so exquisitely equipped with consciousness, activity, and perception, in and of itself, and put into so complete a capacity for happiness and misery in a separate state, as not to admit the least occasion for a resurrec-

tion of the dead, which accordingly is said not to have been an article in Mr. Baxter's creed.

These metaphysical subtleties we are however contented to let go for what men please to rate them at, provided they will allow, that God is able to suspend the natural powers and faculties of the soul, when, and for how long it may seem good unto him.

The question then will be, whether it does or does not appear, from the nature, progress, and end of his dispensations revealed in the scriptures, as well as from particular facts and declarations, that such a suspension actually takes place during the interval between death and the resurrection? And the affirmative of this question being established by the word of God, the patrons of the natural immortality may figure as much as they please with their demonstrations. We shall not disturb them in their amusements; though we shall certainly think them no better employed than the irrefragable and angelic doctors of scholastic memory.

The question we have with unbelievers is concerning a matter of fact, and the evidence upon which it is supported, and not concerning the result of a precarious hypothesis; concerning the sense of scripture, and the power of God; and not concerning the sense of Plato, Cicero, Descartes or Dr. Clarke; or the natural powers and capabilities of matter and spirit. If it appears to be the will of God, that there should be a total intermission of consciousness in man for a certain interval, our foundation standeth sure, *we know whom we have trusted, and we are persuaded he is able to keep*

that which we have committed to him against the appointed day; while all those fine spun notions of the immateriality of the soul, and all the artificial deductions from that principle, teach nothing but the art of blowing scholastic bubbles, which, when they have had their run of fashion, will as certainly go peaceably to their rest, as the old substantial forms have done, without the least detriment either to sound learning, or true religion. And that this may not pass for a visionary expectation, without any tokens of its accomplishment, I shall here subjoin a remarkable paragraph which appeared in all our news-papers.

*“ Copenhagen, Jan. 9, 1762. A person of
 “ high distinction, who does not chuse to be
 “ named, but who is thoroughly persuaded of
 “ the value, and of the immortality of the
 “ soul, invites the learned to compose a short
 “ dissertation to prove by reason, and the au-
 “ thority of the holy scriptures, that the soul,
 “ distinct from the body, enjoys the faculties
 “ of thinking and acting. They have the
 “ choice of writing it, in Latin, French, Ger-
 “ man, or Danish; and he who treats the
 “ matter most clearly and solidly, will re-
 “ ceive a gold medal of the value of ten Da-
 “ nish ducats. The pieces are to be sent frank-
 “ ed, to the office of address established in
 “ this city, before the 2d of February, 1763.
 “ It is presumed, that though the reward is
 “ but trifling, the importance of the subject
 “ will produce a number of competitors.”*

However this respectable person may be persuaded of the immortality of the soul, it seems he is not quite satisfied, that it enjoys the facul-

ties of thinking and acting distinct from the body, even after all the demonstrations of that point that have been offered to the world, by writers of the first reputation in such researches. It is not to be doubted, but the reward, trifling as it is, hath produced a number of competitors. The honour of having a medal to shew, charged with legends and ensigns of victory, will be a sufficient incentive to many an aspiring mind, which would despise the remuneration of four pounds, twelve shillings and sixpence Danish currency. In the mean time, the curiosity of the public will be interested to know what the competitors themselves have produced, and in what respects the clearness and solidity of their lucubrations have given satisfaction to this querist of high distinction, and supplied the defects of so many able writers who have gone before them in this intricate disquisition.

APPENDIX.

Containing an Inquiry into the sentiments of MARTIN LUTHER concerning the state of the Soul between Death and the Resurrection.

Cardinal Du Perron asserts, that Luther held that the soul died with the body. Mr. Bayle treats this as a calumny. Writes to a Lutheran minister to know what pretext there was for this. The minister's answer. Shewn to be futile and evasive. A passage from Dr. Jortin's Life of Erasmus. Examined. Several passages from Luther's works, with remarks.

“**LUTHER,**” says Cardinal *Du Perron*,
 “held, that the soul died with the body, and
 “that God would hereafter raise both the one
 “and the other.”*

Mr. Bayle is in high wrath with the Cardinal on this occasion, and thinks it below his eminence's dignity and reputation to advance such a calumny. But Bayle, supposing there might be something in Luther's works that gave a colour for Du Perron's accusation, applied himself

* Perroniana au Motte (LUTHER.)

to a divine of the confession of Augsburgh, desiring to know of him, “if there were any pretext, that could occasion Du Perron’s speaking as above.”*

The answer of this Lutheran minister, as it is exhibited in Bayle’s Dictionary, will give me occasion to examine into Luther’s real opinion on this subject.

He begins with saying, “Luther never taught that the soul died with the body, and was to rise again with the body; it can never be proved by his works, that he was of this opinion.”

Perhaps these propositions, as the Cardinal has expressed them, are not to be found in Luther’s works, in so many words. We have seen however above, that Luther mentioned the *Immortality of the soul*, as a *portentous opinion*, supported by nothing but the Pope’s decrees. And, indeed, if Luther did not hold an opinion equivalent to this ascribed to him by Du Perron, I would desire to be informed, what may be the meaning of the following annotation upon Eccles. ix. 10.

“*Quia in inferno nullum est opus, &c.]*
 “*Alius locus quod mortui nihil sentiant. Sensit ergo Salomon, mortuos omnino dormire, et nihil prorsus sentire. Jacent ibi mortui non numerantes dies vel annos, sed excitati, videbuntur sibi vix momentum dormivisse.*
 “*—Infernus autem significat foveam, sepulchrum; proprie vero, me iudice, significat illud abditum recessum in quo dormiunt mor-*

† AN. LUTHER. Rem. (D.D.)

“tui extra hanc vitam, unde anima abit in
 “suum locum, (qualiscunque est, non enim
 “corporalis esse potest) ut intelligas infernum
 “dici, ubi continentur animæ extra hunc cor-
 “poralem mundum, sicut terra est sepulchrum
 “corporis.”*

Here we find the soul as well as the body, in a sound, insensible sleep, and contained in an incorporeal sepulchre, in like manner as the body is contained in the ground; the present and future condition of both denoted by the words *mortui* and *excitati*; and all this delivered by Luther as his own opinion.

Our divine proceeds, “And he (Luther) has very clearly shewn, that he believed quite contrary. Consult what he has written upon the 8th verse of the 4th chapter of Genesis, where he speaks of the death of Abel.

Here then follows the passage referred to, in Luther’s own latin.

“Gen. iv. 9. *Et dicit Dominus ad Cain, ubi est Habel, frater tuus?*] Hic clare ostenditur, resurrectio mortuorum, siquidem Deus se mortui Habel Deum esse testatur, et mortuum Habel requirit. Ex hoc enim loco conteximus firmissimam rationem, quod si nullus esset qui curam nostri haberet post hanc vitam, Habel occisus non esset requisitus. Sed Deus requirit Habel sublatum ex hac vita, non vult ejus oblivisci, retinet memoriam ejus, quærit ubi sit? Ergo Deus est mortuorum Deus; hoc est, ergo etiam mortui vivunt, et habent Deum curantem et salvantem eos in alia vita quam hæc corporalis est, in qua sancti affliguntur.”†

* Opera. Wittemb. Tom. iv. fol. 36. 1574.

† Opera. Wittemb. Tom. vi. fol. 64.

The question is what Luther thought of the departed soul? And we are sent to consult a passage where the soul is not once mentioned. The whole note is concerning the dead person, and respects the state of the dead body, just as much as the state of the departed soul; and the proposition to be proved is the resurrection of the dead. I do not undertake to support Luther's logic; but it is manifest upon what scripture his argument is grounded. The same indeed, which has been brought to prove the separate existence of the soul, though the soul is not once mentioned in our Saviour's argument with the Sadducees, to which Luther here refers. But what wonder, when men take these liberties with the scriptures to serve an hypothesis, that they should do the like by the writings of private doctors? For the rest, had Du Perron undertaken to find the doctrine he ascribes to Luther, in this passage just cited, it would have been an easier task, than to confute the doctrine itself when he had found it.

I return to Luther's apologist. "The origin of the calumny," says he, "is in a letter he [Luther] wrote to Amsdorf in the year 1522, in which he appears much inclined to believe that the souls of the just sleep to the day of judgment, without knowing where they are, &c. He does not pretend to say that they are dead in this interval, but only lay in a profound rest and sleep, in which opinion he followed many fathers of the ancient church."

This letter to Amsdorf I have never been able to meet with, or to hear of, after much inquiry; nor is it very material, as Luther's sentiments are sufficiently evident from this short account

of it. But the calumny, so far as it is one, did not take its rise, solely at least, from this letter. I have now by me a popish book in English, containing the lives of some of the reformers, printed many years before Du Perron's time, in which the disbelief of the immortality of the soul is objected to Luther, and the authorities appealed to are Luther's defence of his articles against Pope Leo's Bull, cited above p. 10, and his comment upon Eccles. ix. 10. just mentioned, without any reference to, or mention of this letter to Amsdorf. If our apologist knew of these passages in Luther's works, he imposed upon Mr. Bayle in representing this doctrine of his master, as only to be found in a private letter. But to take him in his own way.

1. That Luther did not pretend to say, the souls of the just are dead in this interval, is to little purpose, as *the profound rest and sleep, without knowing where they are*, answers the Cardinal's purpose just as well: not to mention a suspicious *et cætera* in the Lutheran divine's report, which may probably conceal more than he thought proper to express.

2. The authority of the fathers would have been much to the apologist's purpose, had he brought it in support of Luther's opinion against the cavils of the papists. But it is of no sort of avail to defend an opinion of Luther, which, in the judgment of our apologist, ought to be rectified. As to the fathers who were of this opinion, it is probable they saw this profound rest and sleep, as necessary for themselves, and for the apostles before them, in opposing the dæmon-worship of the Pagans, as Luther found

it afterwards to confound the saint-worship of Popery.

Well, “but Luther, says the apologist, rectified this opinion in process of time.”

Did Luther then so far alter his mind as to recant, and espouse the contrary doctrine? No, our apologist does not say that, though he would not be unwilling Bayle should so understand him. He only means that he qualified his opinions with certain saving limitations, the import of which, we shall have occasion presently to consider. In the mean time, it is next to certain, that he held the sleep of the soul, for ten long years without these savings, namely, from the year 1522, the date of his letter to Amsdorf, to the year 1532, when he published his commentary on Ecclesiastes. And his reflection on the death of John, Elector of Saxony, who died of an apoplexy immediately upon his returning from the chace, that same year, shews that he was then in no disposition to retract it. Deus, says Luther, *illi evenire fecit, quod pueris, qui absque cura nascuntur, vivunt et exspirant; cum resurrecturus est [Elector] in die novissimo, putabit se ex saltu Lochaviensi, ubi venabatur, venire.**

The apology is thus concluded. “And though Luther seems in his later writings, to attribute rest to the souls of the predestinate, he does not mean thereby a rest which is a profound sleep, and deprives them of the vision and conversation of God and the angels. See his commentary on the 24th [it should be the 25th] chapter of Genesis, where

* Seckendorf. Hist. Luth. lib. iii. p. 30.

“ he speaks very largely of the state of souls
“ departed.”

So then Luther still persisted that the souls of the predestinate were *at rest*. But before we proceed to examine these particular passages in the commentary on Genesis, it will be necessary to premise the following considerations.

1. That Luther himself acknowledges he was sometimes obliged to take methods of expounding scripture which he himself did not approve, *in gratiam auditorum*.*

2. That this commentary on Genesis, was delivered at Wittemberg in the way of public lectures, to a promiscuous company of scholars and others, from the year 1536 to the year 1545. They were not intended for publication, till Luther understood that Cruciger, Rorarius, and others, had taken them down in writing. The account he himself gives of them is remarkable enough to be transcribed. *Extemporaliter et populariter omnia dicta sunt, prout in buccam venerunt verba, crebro et mixtim etiam Germanica, verbosius certe quam vellum.*†

3. That some disputes had happened among his followers upon the question, *what becomes of the soul after death?* which Luther assigns as the reason why he meddled with the question at all:† which disputes, by the way, he had endeavoured all along to silence, by saying, “ that nothing is revealed to us on that

* Seckendorf. u. s. lib. ii. p. 24.

† Seckendorf. u. s. lib. iii. p. 669.

‡ Ego quidem propterea eam disputationem attingo, ut præcidam et amoveam curiosas aliorum quæstiones et disputationes. *In Genesim.* xxv. 8.

“ head, and that it is rash to affirm any thing
 “ about it without the word of God.”*

4. It is certain that the general prejudice was against Luther's opinion. The article of the intercession of saints which led directly to the practice of invocation, stuck long with many protestants, even whole churches, and Luther himself was obliged to compromise matters with them as well as he could, even so late as the year 1539.† And what wonder that in these circumstances, and in a public lecture to which all sorts of people had access, Luther should endeavour to put the determination of

* See his annotation on Isaiah lxiv. 15, and compare it with what he says on Matth. xvi. 25.

† Seckendorf. Index tertius. Supplend. ad ann. 1522. And in the year 1539, it was among the instructions of those who were appointed to visit the Marche of Brandenburg, “ that they
 “ should injoin the pastors, to bring men by degrees, from the saints
 “ unto God ; that this would best be done by teaching them, that
 “ there was neither precept, example, nor form in the scriptures for
 “ the invocation of saints.—But that these things should be incul-
 “ cated with caution and modesty, lest the saints should be contume-
 “ liously treated, and deprived of their true honour.” Seckendorf, l. iii. p. 238. Maimbourg, in his history of Lutheranism, says, that at the conference held at Augsburgh, 1530, on the design of reconciling the Protestants and the Papists, “ the former owned that saints
 “ and angels intercede for us, and were therefore to be honoured, but
 “ not invoked.” Seckendorf does not contradict this, where it falls in his way, Lib. ii. p. 178. He only observes that both sides agreed, that invocation was not commanded in scripture. Afterwards indeed, viz. lib. iii. p. 548, in answer to the bishop of Hildersheim, who insisted on the same fact, Seckendorf, says, “ he does not find any
 “ such concession was ever made, either at the conference at Augs-
 “ burgh, or elsewhere.” The fact seems to have been, that Melancthon, a man of peace and meekness, had been too soft and tender upon this head of intercession, and might be understood to give it up. Melancthon's timidity drew upon him the reproaches of Luther at certain times ; on other occasions, when it proceeded to dejection and despondency, Luther was as ready to comfort and encourage him.

this question upon such a footing, that they among the protestants who were disposed to honour and revere the saints, should neither be scandalized at his treating them as non-existents, nor take occasion from his concessions to call for their intercession by prayer and adoration?

Let us now see how far this commentary on Genesis may be supposed to have been adapted to these circumstances. I shall give the citations in Luther's own words, that they may not be suspected to be misrepresented by an unfaithful translation.

“ GEN. xxv. 8. Abraham *collectus est ad*
 “ *populos suos.* Hæc verba spiritus sancti neu-
 “ tiquam otiosa sunt nec dicuntur bestiis, quæ
 “ non eunt ad patres et populos suos; sed ho-
 “ minibus, et testantur restare post hanc vitam
 “ aliam et meliorem; quin etiam ante Christi
 “ adventum, fuisse populum viventium, qui
 “ habitant in terra viventium, et ad quos emi-
 “ grarunt pii. Inde ergo patres intellexerunt
 “ resurrectionem et vitam æternam.—De im-
 “ piis hoc non dicitur, sed est sermo de sanctis
 “ et justis.”

Thus far Luther attempts only to draw from these words a general proof of a resurrection and eternal life; and this, he supposes, they suggested to the patriarchs. What he meant by a *living people, inhabiting the land of the living*, we shall see presently. In the mean time, be it observed, that according to Luther, the wicked and impious are not comprehended among the inhabitants of the land of the living. He proceeds next to the question concerning the state of souls after this life.

“ Porro hoc loco quæstio agitari potest de
 B b 2

“statu animarum post hanc vitam. — Simplex
 “autem responsio est quam Christus præscri-
 “bit, cum inquit, Matth. xxii. *Deus non est*
 “*mortuorum Deus, sed viventium.* Inde certi
 “sumus vivere animas, et dormire in pace, nec
 “torqueri ullis cruciatibus. Idque multi loci
 “scripturæ sanctæ comprobant, quod post
 “mortem non morimur, sed vivimus simplici-
 “ter : sicut sententiæ admodum claræ Esaïæ
 “testantur. *Viri misericordiæ colliguntur, et*
 “*nemo attendit nec curat. Justus sublatus*
 “*est ante calamitatum, et antequam veniant*
 “*ærumnæ, intrat in pacem suam, et requiescit*
 “*in cubiculo suo.* Quiescunt sancti molliter
 “et tranquille, sicut in Apocalypsi testatur
 “vox de cœlo ; *A modo jam dicit spiritus, ut*
 “*requiescant a laboribus suis.*”

This is our reformer's idea of *the land of the living* mentioned above, the soul *lives simply, sleeps in peace, without being tormented.* But it is remarkable that though these expressions may seem to include all souls whatever, and that souls in this state were so asleep as to be void of all sensation, yet his proofs from Isaiah and the Apocalypse, only come home to the saints, and the righteous. Does he mean then that the souls of the saints and of the righteous live simply, sleep in peace, insensible of joy, as well as of pain and torment? This he seems to have apprehended, might give offence, and therefore qualifies it as follows.

“Differunt tamen somnus sive quies hujus
 “vitæ et futuræ. Homo enim in hac vita defa-
 “tigatus diurno labore, sub noctem intrat cu-
 “biculum suum tanquam in pace, ut ibi dor-
 “miat, et ea nocte fruitur quiete, neque quic-

“quam scit de ullo malo, sive incendii, sive
 “cædis. Anima autem non sic dormit, sed
 “vigilat, et patitur visiones, loquelas ange-
 “lorum et Dei. Iedo somnus in futura vita
 “profundior est quam in hac vita, et tamen
 “coram Deo vivit.”

This, I suppose, is the *rectification* of Luther's former opinion mentioned by the Lutheran divine. And to what does it amount? Even to this. “The soul is in a watchful, drowsy, active, passive state, acted upon by visions and conversations of God and angels, even while it is in a more profound sleep than that of a man in this life who is conscious of nothing.” Does not this look liker a chambermaids's riddle, than the sober system of a learned divine? And did ever any man of common sense express himself in so strange a manner *who had a mind to be understood?* And what shall we make of what follows.

“Hac similitudine quam habeo a somno viv-
 “ventis hominis, contentus sum. In illo enim
 “est pax et quies. Putat se dormivisse vix
 “unam aut alteram horam, et tamen videt ani-
 “mam ita dormire, ut etiam vigilet.”

But in the paragraph immediately foregoing, Luther's sleeping man was *conscious of nothing*, and in this very circumstance he places the difference between the sleep of a living man, and the sleep of a departed soul. Here he makes the sleep of the living man, and the sleep of a departed soul to correspond throughout. For thus he concludes.

“Sic anima post mortem intrat suum cubi-
 “culum, et pacem, et dormiens, non sentit
 “suum somnum, et tamen servat Deus vigi-

“*lantem animam. Ita Deus potest excitare*
 “*Heliam, Mosen, &c. et sic regere ut vivant.*
 “*Sed quomodo? Nescimus. Sufficit simili-*
 “*tudo somni corporalis, et quod Deus affirmat*
 “*esse somnum quietam et pacem.*”

Can any thing paint in more lively colours the distress of a man who, fearing to give offence, is labouring to conceal his real sentiments, under a cloud of words without any consistency, or indeed any sense in them?

Mr. Bayle however seems to have acquiesced in this account of his correspondent, without giving himself the trouble to consider, whether even the sort of sleep, mentioned in these passages of Luther's commentary, would not admit of all the consequences that might be drawn from the mortality of the soul. The learned Dr. Jortin too, upon the credit, as it should seem, of this same letter of the Lutheran divine to Mr. Bayle, has thought fit to say, “Luther's last and settled opinion seems to have been, that the souls of the good are in a state of felicity.”* A certain sign that neither he, nor Bayle, had consulted the passages to which the Lutheran divine refers. Since nothing can be farther from all idea of settlement than the obscure and fluctuating notions we have just exhibited.

Dr. Jortin indeed afterwards refers us to two passages in Luther's *Colloquia mensalia* † published by Bell, that may seem to favour his sentiments concerning Luther's settled opinion, which it will be necessary to consider.

* Life of Erasmus, vol. i. p. 221.

† Life of Erasmus, p. 336.

“ I am persuaded, says Luther, of all those
 “ of whom the scripture saith, *and he slept*
 “ *with his fathers*, that they are all in heaven,
 “ for this word [sleep] sheweth something that
 “ is good in the scriptures.” * Here the cita-
 tion ends in the Dr’s book; but in Bell’s, Luther
 goes on thus, “ but of whom is it written, *they*
 “ *were made away, and slain by the enemies, or*
 “ *were devoured and torn in pieces by wild*
 “ *beasts, &c.* I am persuaded that they are
 “ lost and damned.”

I imagine it will hardly be thought that all Luther’s sentiments retailed in this apocryphal collection, are accurately reported. Be that as it may, it is plain that Luther here is inferring from certain expressions in scripture, the happy or miserable condition of certain persons after this life, whose end is described in those expressions. It is likewise plain, from Luther’s saying that they who die by violence, *are lost and damned*, that he is speaking of the *final* (and not of the intermediate state) both of the one and the other. To be *saved*, and to be *in heaven*, are, in popular language, the same thing as to be happy; and are often used to express the condition of good men departed, when the separate state of their souls is never thought of. This particularly is Luther’s common language. Had the question been put to him whether he thought John the Elector of Saxony above-mentioned, was in heaven? He would most certainly have answered in the affirmative; and yet we have seen that he would have meant this, not of present, but of future felicity.

* Colloq. Menf. p. 301.

But what follows will put the matter out of all doubt.

The other passage is this, “your son, says
 “Luther to a disconsolate father, is well pro-
 “vided for; he liveth now with Christ. O!
 “would to God that I had finished my course,
 “I would not wish me here again.”*

The stress here, I suppose, is laid upon the deceased son’s living with Christ. It is pity the worthy doctor did not cast his eye towards the bottom of the page whence this citation is taken. He would there have found Luther’s own comment upon these and the like expressions. For having there represented a perplexed person in tribulation, objecting, that the saying of St. Paul, Rom. v. 1. *They who are justified by faith, have peace with God, &c.* is not verified in those good men who are not at peace in the present life, he answers: “True
 “it is they have peace in faith, but the same
 “peace is invisible, and surpasseth all human
 “conceit. Insomuch, that being even in
 “death, feeling no life at all, we must never-
 “theless believe we live.” I will only add, that if these are the only testimonies which can be produced out of this folio book of above 500 pages for Luther’s *settled* opinion, they must be very thin sown. But be they more or fewer, I will engage to confront them with an equal number on the other side out of this very collection.

I shall however now close the present disquisition with an indisputable proof that Luther’s latest, and on that account, real opinion concerning the state of the dead, was conform-

* Coll. Mens. p. 402.

able to his commentary on Eccles. ix. 10. his reflection on the death of John Elector of Saxony, and his letter to Amsdorf: and that upon better authority than that of the colloquies.

Sleidan, speaking of Luther's behaviour on the day of his death, tells us, "Inter cœnandum, variis de rebus locutus, hoc etiam inter alia rogabat, num in illâ sempiternâ vita, simus alter alterum recognituri? cumque illi averent ex ipso scire, quid, inquit, accidit Adamo? nunquam ille viderat Evam; sed, cum illam formaret Deus, altissima quiete sopitus, dormiebat; expergefactus autem cum illam videret, non rogat, quæ sit? aut unde veniat? sed carnem esse de suâ carne dicit, et os de suis ossibus. Qui vero sciebat istud? Nimirum spiritu sancto plenus, et vera Dei cognitione præditus, ita pronuntiabat. *Ad eundem modum*, nos itiam in altera vita renovabimur per Christum, et parentes, uxores, liberos, et quicquid est, multo perfectius agnoscemus, quam tunc Evam Adamus cognovit.*

Luther here considers those who will know their friends in that eternal life, as in the same state that Adam was when Eve was first presented to him, namely, just awaked out of a deep sleep.

The renewal by Christ cannot possibly mean any thing but the resurrection of the dead; and these two circumstances, considered together, leave not the least room for a conscious intermediate state. A plain proof that Luther never departed from the sentiments he disclosed

* Sleidan, lib. xvi. 488.

to Amsdorf in 1522, but retained to his dying moment, the same uniform idea of a total suspension of thought and consciousness during the interval between death and the resurrection.

The misfortune was that his more immediate disciples were in another persuasion, and therefore, instead of defending their master's doctrine, set themselves to prove he never held it;* and thus leaving the main root of popery, in the ground, it is no wonder they should have been unsuccessful in pruning away the corrupt fruits which always have, and always will spring from it.

* Seckendorf, I suspect, wanted to conceal Luther's sentiments on the intermediate state, through an apprehension of their being heretical. There are few traces of what Luther thought on the subject in all this voluminous work. And though Seckendorf gives an account of most of his commentaries on the scriptures, under the several years in which they were published, he never mentions Luther's opinion on the state of the dead, except in one or two places, where Luther says, *there is nothing revealed about it in scripture*. Luther's reflexion on the death of the elector of Saxony, was too striking to be omitted, and had been recorded elsewhere. So likewise was his last conversation concerning the knowledge of our friends in another life. But Seckendorf took care to soften the offensive expressions, as may be seen by comparing his account of it, p. 636, with Sleidan's and Melchior Adam's. These little partialities will stick to writers of the most consummate integrity, of whom Seckendorf is in the foremost rank. That Luther's works have not been faithfully dealt with by some of his disciples, we have the following testimony from one of his biographers. *Quo imprimis etiam pertinet, quod de Scriptorum suorum factis apud posteritatem agens [Lutherus] vereri se dixit, ne id quod boni esset in scriptis suis oblivionis tenebris obrueretur: quod augurium adeo eum non fefellit, ut post obitum ipsius, ne quidem ejusmodi homines defuerint qui ex scriptis illius varia, et ea imprimis delere sunt ausi, quæ ipsis minus placebant, et quibus multa redargui animadvertabant, quæ tamen emendare ipsis non satis commodum erat.* *Præfatio Georgii Knoppii in vitam Lutheri a Jo. Dan. Henschenio Conscripam, p. 29.*

THE END.



Blackburne, Francis

The works, theological and miscellaneous, including some pieces, not before printed with some account of the life and writings of the author

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